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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

GIFT  OF 

Kate  Gordon  Moore 


PRAGMATISM  AND  THE 
PROBLEM  OF  THE  IDEA 


Imptimi  I^otest 

REMIGIUS  LAFORT,  S.T.D. 

Librorum  Censor 


Peekskill,  N.Y. 

April  21,  19 1 5 


PRAGMATISM 

AND  THE 

PROBLEM    OF    THE    IDEA 


BY   THE 

Rev.  JOHN  T.  DRISCOLL,  S.T.L. 

AUTHOR   OF 

Christian  Philosophy :  The  Soul,  and 
Christian  Philosophy :  God,  etc. 


LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

FOURTH  AVENUE  6*  30TH  STREET,  NEW  YORK 
LONDON,   BOMBAY,    CALCUTTA,   AND   MADRAS 

I915 


COPYRIGHT,     1915 
BY    LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 


3 

PREFACE 

The  present  volume  is  the  result  of  studies 
carried  on  for  some  years  in  an  endeavor  to  show 
that  the  most  recent  Theory  of  Philosophy  known 
as  Pragmatism  rests  upon  an  erroneous  philosoph- 
ical basis. 

That  the  ground-work  of  Pragmatism  is  a  false 
conception  of  the  idea  was  fully  illustrated  by  the 
author  in  a  course  of  lectures  delivered  at  the  Cath- 
ohc  Summer  School  of  America  during  the  Session 
of  1902.  This  course  is  summed  up  in  the  chapter 
of  the  present  work  entitled  Absolute  Pragma- 
tism. A  critical  analysis  of  the  works  published 
by  the  leading  exponents  of  Pragmatism  has  fully 
confirmed  the  judgment  of  the  writer. 

The  plausibility  of  the  arguments  advanced,  and 
the  fact  that  m  the  last  analysis  God  in  the  Chris- 
tian sense  of  the  term  is  excluded  from  human  thought 
and  life  make  their  theory  especially  dangerous. 

The  proof  that  Pragmatism  is  fundamentally 
false  is  based  on  data  taken  from  the  writings  of 
Professor  Royce  and  the  late  Professor  James  of 
Harvard,  Professor  Dewey  of  Columbia,  Professor 
Schiller  of  Oxford  and  Professor  Bergson  of  the 
College  of  France,  who  are  recognized  as  the 
leaders  of  the  new  philosophy. 


VI 


PREFACE 


The  author  gratefully  acknowledges  the  privilege 
granted  by  the  editors  of  the  American  Catholic 
Quarterly  Review  and  of  the  North  American 
Review,  to  reprint  articles  which  appear  in 
Chapters  II  and  TV. 

In  presenting  the  volume  to  the  pubHc  the  hope 
is  entertained  that  a  discussion  of  this  kind  will 
prove  of  some  value  towards  the  reconstruction  of 
Philosophy  on  a  sane  and  sound  basis. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface v 

CHAPTER  I 

Introductory 

(i)  Present  period  of  Philosophy  compared  to: 

(a)  Greek  Philosophy  at  the  time  of  Socrates i 

(b)  Scholastic  Philosophy  of  the  Xlllth  century i 

(2)  Place  of  Psychology  in  Modern  Philosophy: 

(a)  the  result  of  the  XlXth  century  thought 2 

(b)  theories  of  evolution  made  nature  of  man  a  \'ital 
issue 3 

(3)  Pragmatism: 

(a)  a  Philosophy  of  Tendency  based  on  the  purposiveness 

of  thought    3 

(b)  this  tendency  twofold:  Idealistic  and  Empirical 4 

(c)  not  a  definite  system  but  a  condition  of  philosophic 
thought S 

(4)  Origin: 

(a)  in  the  evolution  philosophy  of  the  XlXth  century 5 

(b)  crucial  problem  was  the  Theistic  controversy  and  re- 
solved into  a  discussion  of  Purpose 7 

(c)  in  establishing  purpose  the  problem  changed  from  God 

to  man,  and  became  one  not  of  origins  but  of  ends 8 

(d)  change  of  base  shown : 

in  Absolute  Pragmatism  which  reverses  process  of 
Hegel ••         8 

in  Empirical  Pragmatism  which  regards  mental  life 
not  as  structural  but  as  functioning 9 

(e)  hence  Empirical  Pragmatism  is  the  static  psychology 

of  Mill,  Bain  and  Spencer  viewed  as  dynamic 9 

(5)  Doctrine: 

(a)  basis  is  the  Phenomenal  Idealism  of  Sensism 10 

(b)  constructive  element  is  evolution  which  defines  the 
idea  as  a  plan  of  action ic 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

(6)  Criticism:  page 

(a)  the  fundamental  error  of  Hegel  is  that  of  Pragmatism .  lo 

(b)  Pragmatism  evades  the  difl&culty  by  teaching  that 
latent  truths  are  not  ideas 12 

(c)  issue  therefore  is  on  the  meaning  of  the  idea 12 

(7)  Influence: 

(a)  influence  of  these  writers  unequal 13 

(b)  Empirical  Pragmatism  harmful: 

presents  a  philosophic  basis  for  the  modem  Gospel  of 

Success 14 

subversive  of  morality 14 

leads  to  disastrous  consequences IS 

CHAPTER  II 

Empirical  Pragmatism 
I.  Its  Postulates: 

(i)  Basic  postulate  is  Phenomenal  Idealism  of  Sensism: 

(a)  we  know  not  things  but  the  subjective  expe- 
riences of  things 18 

(b)  this  teaching  involves:   Relativity  of  Knowl- 
edge, Agnosticism,  Nominalism 19 

(2)  Integrating  postulate  is  Evolution: 

(a)  an  evolutive  process  of  subjective  experience. .       20 

(b)  hence  the  teaching  that  Reality  is  plastic 20 

(c)  this  evolutive  experience  is  purposive 21 

(3)  Instrumental  postulate  a  so-called  Scientific  Method      22 

II.  Theory  of  Truth: 

(i)  Basis  of  Truth  is  subjective  experience: 

(a)  hence  Truth  is  relative  and  changeable 24 

(b)  conceived  as  working  within  experience 24 

(c)  no  objective  truth 25 

(2)  Criterion  of  Truth: 

(a)  Instrumental  Theory,  i.e.  an  idea  is  true  if  and 

in  so  far  as  it  works 25 

(b)  truth  relative  to  needs  and  desires 25 

(c)  hence  not  the  idea  but  the  act  of  the  idea  is  con- 
sidered and  Truth  is  the  expedient 26 

(d)  hence  plasticity  of  Truth 26 

(e)  Truth  a  working  hj^iothesis 27 


CONTENTS  IX 

III.  The  Problem  of  Thought:  page 

(i)  Thought  is  subjective  experiencing 30 

(a)  fact  and  idea  are  distinctions  within  experience  30 

(b)  subjective  and  objective 30 

(2)  Thought  a  purposive  evolutive  process: 

(a)  conflict-mediatorial  theory    32 

(b)  mind  a  transition-phase  of  the  experiencing 
process 2>Z 

(c)  thinking  a  mode  of  adaptative  function 2)2> 

(d)  mind  and  will  identified 34 

(e)  meaning  of  free-will 34 

(3)  The  Thought -process  explained  by  the  working  hy- 
pothesis: 

(a)  thought  confined  to  the  judgment  of  doubt ...  36 

(b)  the    functioning    of    the    predicate    and    the 
subject 37 

(c)  thought  begins  with  doubt  and  develops  by 
experiment 37 

IV.  Criticism 38 


CHAPTER  III 

Absolute  Pragmatism 

I.  Conceptions  of  Being: 

(i)  Realistic 41 

(2)  Mystical 42 

(3)  Theory  of  Validity 44 

(4)  Synthetic 45 

II.  Principles: 

(i)  Reality  viewed  from  the  side  of  ideas 45 

(2)  Hence  fundamental  problem  is  the  nature  of  the 
idea: 

(a)  idea  a  volitional  process 45 

(b)  its  essentially  teleological  inner  structure 46 

(c)  Internal  and  External  meanings  of  the  idea .  .  46 

(d)  theory  of  judgment 47 

(e)  object  of  the  idea  is  the  purpose  of  the  idea  .  .  47 

(f)  theory  of  the  universal 4Q 


:  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(3)  Nature  of  Being  and  Reality: 

(a)  based  on  the  Internal  and  External  meanings 

of  ideas 49 

(b)  to  be  is  to  fulfil  a  purpose 49 

(c)  hence  the  purpose  of  the  idea  is  the  constituent 

of  Being  and  Reality 5° 

(4)  An  Idealistic  Pantheism: 

(a)  no  immediate  perception  of  the  external  world      50 

(b)  fimdamental  principle  of  knowledge  is  that  of 

a  vast  cosmic  process 5° 

(c)  the  Real  is  the  Ideal  of  our  striving 51 

(d)  and  the  Real  and  Ideal  are  identified 51 

(5)  Nature  of  Truth: 

(a)  the  adequate  expression  of  the  Internal  mean- 
ing of  ideas 52 

(b)  by  virtue  of  their  purposive  selective  function       52 

(c)  hence  not  agreement  but  intended  agreement 
constitutes  truth 52 

III.  Application: 

(i)  Basic  concepts  of  Absolute  Pragmatism:  idea  and  its 
object 53 

(2)  These  concepts  applied  to  God,  the  World  and  the 
Individual: 

(a)  the  individual  a  unique  conscious  plan 53 

(b)  the  Absolute  the  sole  integrating  Self 54 

(c)  individual  selves  and  the  Absolute  Self 54 

(d)  The  World  of  Description  and  of  Appreciation  55 

(e)  structure  of  the  World  teleological  and  con- 
scious    56 

(3)  Unity  of  Being: 

(a)  World  one  with  God  56 

(b)  no  true  separation  among  finite  beings 56 

(c)  relation  of  self  to  other  selves  and  to  God 57 

IV.  Criticism: 

(i)  Classification  of  Being  erroneous 61 

(2)  Conception  of  Being  as  Validity 62 

(3)  The  Idea  not  Will 64 

(4)  The  Idea  and  the  Object  of  the  idea 67 

(5)  Summary 7° 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  IV 

Absolute  Pragmatism  and  the  Problem  of  Christianity 
I.  The  Problem  of  Christianity: 

(i)  Statement:  page 

(a)  the  problem  is   the   relation  of  Christianity 

to  the  mind  of  to-day 73 

(b)  how  and  in  what  way  can  the  modern  man 

be  a  Christian 74 

(c)  solution  sought  in  Christian  social  experience 

and  in  fundamental  metaphysical  ideas 74 

(2)  The  modern  man 74 

(3)  The  fundamental  metaphysical  ideas: 

(a)  idea  a  plan  of  action 75 

(b)  no  immediate  perception  of  external  things.  .  .       76 

(c)  cognitive  process  based  on  interpretation 76 

(d)  the  World  a  process  of  interpretation 77 

(e)  the  nature  of  Self 77 

(f)  the  doctrines  of  the  Individual,  the  Community 

and  the  Two  Levels 77 

(4)  Christianity: 

(a)  its  origin  and  doctrine  to  be  sought  in  the 
social  experience  of  the  Pauline  Churches   78 

(b)  this  experience  reveals  the  three  characteristic 
doctrines  of  Christianity,  viz.  Community,  Lost 
State,  Atonement  and  Grace 79 

II.  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Life: 

(i)  The  Problem  of  Christianity  is  the  Christian  Doc- 
trine of  Life  79 

(2)  Problem  viewed  as: 

(a)  the  problem  of  human  evolution  and  as  such 

the  problem  of  humanity 79 

(b)  and  as  the  product  of  the  social  experience 
of  the  Pauline  Churches:  as  such  it  is  distinc- 
tively Christian 79 

(c)  hence  doctrine  should  be  analyzed  as  a  human 
problem  to  know  what  Christianity  is 79 

(3)  Problem  viewed  as  human : 

(a)  natural  condition  of  man  one  of  sin  and  social 
chaos 80 

(b)  sin  increases  with  advance  of  culture 8i 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(c)  the  doctrine  of  the  individual  and  the  Com- 
munity         8i 

(d)  the  human  philosophy  of  loyalty 82 

(e)  this  includes  the  three  ideas 83 

(4)  Problem  viewed  as  Christian : 

(a)  whole  of  Christianity  summed  up  in  these  three 
ideas 84 

(b)  St.  Paul's  presentation  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Community 84 

(c)  hence  Christianity  a  religion  of  loyalty 85 

(d)  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Life 86 

III.  The  Essence  of  Christianity: 

(i)  The  illustration  of  the  Greek  philosopher 87 

(2)  The  solution  at  variance  with  Professor  Royce's 
teaching 87 

(3)  And  is  a  re-presentation  of  Strauss'  Mythical  Theory  89 

IV.  Criticism: 

(i)  Professor  Royce's  treatise  is  based  upon  his  philo- 
sophical system 9^ 

(2)  But  this  system  is  erroneous: 

(a)  doctrine  of  the  Community  rests  upon  an  er- 
roneous definition  of  the  Self 91 

(b)  his  philosophy  of  history  an  assumption 92 

(c)  as  is  also  his  doctrine  of  the  Two  Levels 92 

(d)  fundamental  error  is  the  false  presentation  of 

the  idea    93 

CHAPTER  V 
Pragmatism  and  Humanism 
I.  Notion  of  Humanism: 

(i)  Term  directly  expresses  not  a  system,  but  an  atti- 
tude of  mind  and  a  resultant  method 95 

(2)  Doctrine: 

(a)  basis  is  subjective  experience 96 

(b)  central  principle  is  purposiveness  of  human 
thought  (i.e.  experiencing)  and  the  teleological 
character  of  its  methods 96 

(c)  hence  not  concerned  with  origins  but  with  pur- 
poses and  ends 96 


CONTENTS  xm 

PAGE 

(d)  difference    between    Humanism    and    Prag- 
matism         96 

(e)  a  teleological  Psychology  which  implies  ulti- 
mately a  voluntaristic  metaphysic 98 

(f)  as  such  a  philosophy  of  life  with  foundation  in 
Ethics 99 

(g)  hence  a  Personal  Idealism  conceived  as  a  Meta- 
physical Voluntarism 100 

II.  A  Personal  Idealism: 

(i)  Based  on  subjective  experience: 

(a)  the  real  is  what  is  known-as loi 

(b)  Ontology  conditioned  by  Epistomology loi 

(c)  fad,  truth,  reality,  objective  are  distinctions  of 
function  within  experience 102 

(d)  leads  to  Solipsism 102 

(2)  Fundamental  principle:   man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things: 

(a)  accepted  in  the  individual  and  in  the  generic 
sense 103 

(b)  reality  relative  to  our  faculties 103 

(c)  an  Idealistic  Experientalism 104 

(d)  the  common  world  a  social  convention  assumed 

for  convenience'  sake 105 

(3)  Hence  a  psychological  side  to  everything: 

(a)  all  physical  objects  become  psychological.  ...     106 

(b)  a  Hylozoism  or  Panpsychism 107 

III.  Criticism: 

(i)  Humanism    based    on    Phenomenal    Idealism    of 
Sensism 107 

(2)  Deals  with  reflective  thought 107 

(3)  Professor  Schiller's  douhle-voice 108 

(4)  Aim  is  to  establish  a  harmony  not  among  things 

but  among  conceptions,  beliefs,  imaginings iii 

CHAPTER  VI 

Pragmatism  and  Humanism  (continued) 

I.  Humanism  an  Ethical  Voluntarism: 

(i)  This  is  the  integrating  principle  of  Humanism: 

(a)  experience  conceived  as  active,  i.e.  purposive 
and  teleological  for  ends  of  practical  life 112 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(b)  thought,  i.e.  experiencing,  expressed  in  terms 

of  will 112 

(2)  Its  basis: 

(a)  the  assumption  that  the  world  of  our  expe- 
rience is  a  cosmos 112 

(b)  this  harmony  the  result  of  purposive  thought .  .      113 

(c)  hence  perceptions  of  Purpose  and  End  domi- 
nant      113 

(3)  The  Process: 

(a)  the  Real  is  experience  manipulated,  the  True 

is  the  instrument  of  the  manipulation   113 

(b)  ambiguous  truths  and  valid  truths 113 

(c)  the  true  and  the  false  are  intellectual  forms  of 

the  good  and  the  bad 114 

(d)  truth  relative  to  the  present  purpose,  and  is 
falsified  and  verified  in  one  and  same  process 114 

(e)  necessary  truths  and  necessary  errors 115 

(f)  hence  truth  flexible  and  adjustable 115 

(g)  objective  truth  and  social  usefulness 115 

(4)  This  Voluntarism  essentially  ethical: 

(a)  the  real  and  the  true  subordinated  to  the  good     116 

(b)  and  so  depend  on  end  and  purpose,  i.e.  the  will 

to  know 116 

(c)  Ethics  deals  with  ends,  hence  Voluntarism  is 
ethical "6 

n.  The  Making  of  Truth  and  of  Reality: 

(i)  Experience  a  purposive  evolutive  integration: 

(a)  involves  the  doctrine  that  the  world  is  in 
process n? 

(b)  its  fundamental  principle:  the  assumption 
that  experiencing  makes  a  difference  alike  to  the 
systems  of  truth  and  to  the  world  of  reality 117 

(2)  Hence  the  central  teaching:   the  Making  of  Truth 
and  of  Reality: 

(a)  primary  reality  or  appearance 117 

(b)  primary  and  real  reality 118 

(c)  higher  realities  are  inferences  assumed  as 
instruments  for  the  conceptual  manipulation  of 
experience 118 

(d)  and  are  judged  to  be  true  by  their  usefulness     119 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

(e)  hence  real  fact  evolved  out  of  primary  fact  by 
a  process  of  selection 119 

(3)  Hence  the  Making  of  Truth  and  the  Making  of 
Reality  fundamentally  one: 

(a)  reality  something  which  grows  up  in  the  mak- 
ing of  truth 120 

(b)  and  truth  a  valuation  as  a  successful  operation 

on  reality 120 

(c)  hence  truth  and  error,  real  and  unreal  are  dis- 
tinctions of  value  within  experience  made  by 
experience  functioning,  i.e.  predicating 120 

(d)  subject  and  object  mutually  involved  and 
evolved    121 

(e)  the  process  human,  painful,  arbitrary  and  con- 
tinuous        121 

(f)  beginnings  of  knowledge  wrapped  in  mystery 

and  the  Ultimate  Reality  a  goal 122 

(g)  thus  reality  is  plastic,  growing,  incomplete; 
becomes  determinate  by  and  in  the  process  of 
knowing 123 

(h)  and  human  truth  is  not  absolute  but  fluid  and 
fallible 124 

(i)  hence  conception  of  freedom  as  capacity  for 
change 125 

(4)  Criticism: 

Limitations  to  the  making  of  truth  and  of  reality: 

(a)  beginning  of  the  process  not  made 126 

(b)  Professor  Schiller  forced  to  admit  that  the 
making  of  reahty  is  merely  subjective 127 

(c)  and  is  forced  to  admit  the  distinction  between 
discovering  and  making  reality 128 

(d)  likewise  confesses  that  the  world  of  common 
sense  and  of  rigid  facts  was  not  made  in  any 
human  sense 129 

III.  Experience  and  Experiment: 
(i)  Experience  means: 

(a)  the  fact  of  purposive  experiencing 130 

(b)  the  manner  of  the  experiencing,  i.e.  experiment     130 
(2)  Experiment: 

(a)  evolutionary  process  carried  on  by  experi- 
mentation       131 


XVI  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(b)  means  employed  are  assertions  with  a  view  to 
attain  the  proposed  end 131 

(3)  Nature  of  the  process,  a  working  hypothesis: 

(a)  assertions  tested  by  the  use-criterion 131 

(b)  no  absolute  truth;  only  approximations 131 

(c)  truth  and  reality  is  plastic,  variable  and  grows  132 

(d)  a  difficulty:  when  consequences  are  in  doubt .  .  133 

(e)  assertions  assumed  as  means  or  instnunents 
because  desired 134 

(f)  first  principles  are  starting-points  and  necessary 
truths  mean  ?ieedful 134 

(4)  Criticism: 

(a)  teaching  is  Scepticism 135 

(b)  truth  not  a  working  hypothesis 136 

(c)  method  of  Humanism  erroneous 136 

CHAPTER  VII 
Pragmatism  and  Hxjmanism  (concluded) 
I.  What  We  Know: 

(i)  With  Humanism  immediate  experience  is: 

(a)  not  the  act  of  perceiving  external  things 138 

(b)  but  the  subject-matter  of  our  thinking 138 

(c)  hence  differs  from  Common  Sense  Realism.  ...      139 

(2)  Object  of  our  knowledge: 

(a)  Humanism  by  object  means  purpose 139 

(b)  the  subjective  and  the  objective 139 

(c)  things  are  as  they  are  known-as 140 

(d)  how  we  perceive  the  same 140 

(3)  Criticism 142 

II.  Thought  as  Purposive  Volition: 

(i)  Central  principle  is  the  purposiveness  of  thought: 

(a)  every  cognition  a  moral  act,  hence  a  mode  of 
conduct,  initiated  and  guided  by  interest  or 
volition 143 

(b)  which  employs  hypothetical  assumptions  as 
means 144 

(c)  hence  faith  is  at  the  basis  of  reason,  and  by 
faith  is  meant  the  unll-to-believe 144 

(d)  hence  thought  is  a  wish  and  originates  in  sub- 
jective demands 144 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

(2)  Conception  of  thought  as  purposive  volition  based 
on  the  assumption  that  mental  life  is  an  evolution  in 
the  time-process: 

(a)  hence  in  a  state  of  Becoming i44 

(b)  how  the  beginnings  of  thought  are  explained .  .  145 

(c)  the  process  of  Becoming  a  functioning  and 
adaptation ^45 

(d)  reason  a  means  for  achieving  adaptation 145 

(e)  reason  not  a  faculty,  but  an  acquired  group 

of  habits 146 

(3)  Mind,  Soul,  Self: 

(a)  a  potential  unity  and  a  result 146 

(b)  no  real  distinction  between  thinking,  willing, 
feeling i47 

(c)  these  only  labels  for  a  unitary  personality  or  a 
reacting  organism i47 

III.  Criticism: 

(i)  All  thought  not  purposive: 

(a)  admitted  by  Humanists I47 

(b)  taught  by  Scholastic  Philosophy 148 

(2)  The  working  hypothesis  does  not  explain  the  process 
of  thought: 

(a)  the  working  hypothesis  as  used  by  science.  ...      149 

(b)  applied  to  mental  life  considers  judgment  as  a 

tool  or  instrument i49 

(c)  the  idea  also  a  tool  slowly  fashioned 150 

(d)  the  imiversal  is  actually  concrete 151 

(3)  Hence  in  last  analysis  Humanism  is  based  on  a 
wrong  conception  of  the  idea 15° 

(4)  Summary 15° 

CHAPTER  VIH 

Pragmatism  and  Creative  Evolution 

Purpose  of  Professor  Bergson's  Metaphysic 153 

I.  The  Fact  of  Change: 

(i)  Fundamental  problem  is  the  meaning  of  ea;wie«ce .  .     154 
(2)  Data  for  the  solution  found    in  our    twofold  ex- 
perience: 

(a)  this  the  basic  doctrine  of  Creative  Evolution . .     154 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(b)  external  experience  is  of  intellect  and  sense  and 

is  what  is  thought 155 

(c)  internal  experience  is  of  feeling  and  is  what  is 
lived 15s 

(3)  Internal  experience  reveals  great  fact  of  change: 

(a)  inner  life  a  constant  change 156 

(b)  hence  fundamental  reality  is  Duration,  i.e.  a 
continuity  which  unfolds 156 

(c)  states  only  apparent  and  artificial 156 

(d)  concept  of  Personality 157 

(e)  at  basis  an  undivided  flow 157 

(4)  Duration: 

(a)  the  stuff  out  of  which  psychic  existence  is  made  158 

(b)  a  vital  force  and  means  creation 158 

(c)  revealed  in  a  continuous  progress 158 

(d)  especially  in  our  personality 159 

(5)  Hence  Existence  is  Creative  Evolution: 

(a)  this   fact   of   inner   experience  predicated   of 
existence  in  general 160 

(b)  hence  Duration  is  the  foundation  of  our  being 

and  the  substance  of  the  world 160 

II.  Change  and  Permanence: 

(1)  Change  and  Permanence  are  both  facts  of  inner  life 

(a)  Prof.  Bergson  ignores  fact  of  permanence 160 

(b)  permanence  more  fundamental  than  change.  .      160 

(2)  Criticism  of  Prof.  Bergson's  doctrine  of  change: 

(a)  ambiguous  and  contradictory 161 

(b)  concrete  Duration  implies  permanence 162 

(c)  so  also  does  memory  and  Creative  Evolution  .  .     162 

III.  An  Ideal  Pantheism: 
(i)  An  IdeaUsm: 

(a)  Duration  is  Reahty,  the  Absolute 163 

(b)  is  a  flux,  a  tendency  not  a  being 163 

(c)  Criticism 163 

(2)  An  Idealistic  Evolution: 

(a)  the  Absolute  is  a  ceaseless  evolution  of  some- 
thing new 163 

(b)  its  nature  is  conscious  action 163 

(c)  this  action  twofold:    making  itself  and  un- 
making itself 164 


CONTENTS  XIX 

PAGE 

(d)  hence  spirit  and  matter  are  not  things,  and 
only  differ  as  counter  tendencies  of  the  Absolute  164 

(e)  matter  and  intellect  of  the  same  nature 165 

(f)  natural  and  artificial  systems 166 

(g)  physical  law  a  mental  relation  without  objec- 
tive reality 167 

(h)  intellect  static  and  gives  not  parts  but  partial 
views  of  the  whole 168 

(3)  Pantheistic: 

(a)  action  making  itself  reveals  a  Pantheism  of 
Manifestation 168 

(b)  action    unmaking    itself    shows   genesis   and 
nature  of  intellect 168 

(c)  which  presents  an  Idealism  of  Representation 

and  cannot  grasp  Reality,  i.e.  Duration 168 

rV.  Reality  and  Feeling: 

(i)  Knowledge  of  Reality  twofold,  i.e.  of  thought  and  of 
living  or  feeling 169 

(2)  Intellect  cannot  think  Duration: 

(a)  cannot  grasp  matter  as  a  perpetual  flux 169 

(b)  but  only  presents  what  is  singled  out  of  reality 

for  practical  interests 169 

(c)  hence  its  knowledge  is  static,  relative,  mechan- 
ical and  symbolical 170 

(3)  Feeling  gives  direct  vision  of  reality: 

(a)  hence  we  must  transcend  intelligence 170 

(b)  by  going  counter  to  the  natural  bent  of  the 
intellect 171 

(c)  which  is  the  function  of  philosophy 171 

(4)  Criticism 172 

CHAPTER  IX 

Pragmatism  and  Creative  Evolution  (continued) 
Theory  of  Life 

The  characteristic  doctrine  of  Creative  Evolution 173 

I.  Creative  Evolution: 

(i)  Its  sphere i7S 

(2)  Nature: 

(a)  an  ascending  movement,  called  the  Absolute, 
yet  dependent  and  contingent 176 


XX  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(b)  a  vital  impetus  and  a  continuous  creative 
progress 176 

(c)  the  aim  is  not  to  annihilate  but  to  magnetize 

and  use  matter 177 

(3)  Creative: 

(a)  impetus  of  Life  consists  in  a  need  of  creation . .     177 

(b)  creation  had  a  beginning 177 

(c)  need  of  creation  manifest  only  when  creation 

is  possible i77 

(d)  then  the  impetus  awakens  from  sleep  and  the 
awakening  is  due  to  Camot's  law 177 

(e)  creation  does  not  mean  creation  of  matter  nor  of 
energy,  but  oiform  only  and  of  indetcrtnination.  .  .      178 

(f)  creation  symbolized:  not  a  thing,  but  a  con- 
tinuity of  shooting-out 179 

(4)  Creative  action  dependent: 

(a)  on  the  resistance  from  matter  and  on  its  own 
explosive  force 180 

(b)  how  the  Absolute  overcomes  the  resistance 
from   matter 180 

(c)  as  a  result  matter  becomes  like  India-rubber. .     180 

(5)  Organization: 

(a)  described  as  matter  marked  by  the  teeth  of  the 
Absolute  or  as  a  modus  vivetidi  between  two 
currents 181 

(b)  and  organisms  are  accidental  excrescences,  i.e. 
marks  left  on  the  material  tendency  by  the  vital 
tendency 181 

(c)  are  means  for  the  progression  of  Life 181 

(d)  progression  explained  by  Weismann's  germ- 
plasm  or  by  a  continuity  of  genetic  energy  con- 
tained in  sexual  elements 181 

(e)  the  progression  or  current  is  Life  or  Duration .  .      181 

(f)  adaptation  a  necessary  condition  of  the  evolu- 
tion        182 

II.  Transformism: 

(i)  Postulated  by  the  plasticity  of  matter 183 

(2)  Professor  Bergson  and  Transformism: 

(a)  admits  that  it  is  not  proved  and  may  be  wrong     183 

(b)  holds  we  must  accept  it,  even  if  we  know 
nothing  about  it 184 


CONTENTS  XXI 

PAGE 

(c)  rejects  the  various  scientific  theories  and  holds 
the  philosophical  explanation  because  philosophy 
is  not  constrained  to  scientific  precision 184 

(3)  Nature: 

(a)  effected  not  by  passive  but  by  active  adapta- 
tion    184 

(b)  illustrated  in  the  evolution  of  character 185 

(c)  yet  Professor  Bergson  admits  the  illustration 
cannot  be  applied  to  the  organized  world 186 

(d)  but  says  this  is  not  necessary  for  his  purpose . .  187 

(4)  Process: 

(a)  r61e  of  Life  is  to  engraft  onto  the  necessity  of 
matter  the  largest  possible  amount  of  indetermi- 
nation 187 

(b)  does  this  by  making  the  best  of  pre-existing 
energy,  which  it  fabricates  into  explosives,  repre- 
senting a  storing-house  of  solar  energy 187 

(c)  as  a  result  the  course  of  material  changes  down- 
wards is  not  stopped  but  retarded 188 

(d)  thus  vegetable  and  animal  life  is  an  effort  to 
accumulate  solar  energy  and  let  it  flow  through 
changeable  channels,  i.e.  organisms 188 

(e)  this  effort  clogged  by  the  organic  forms  and 
opposed  by  contrary  forces 188 

(f)  so  the  process  is  a  marking  time,  often  a  turn- 
ing back  and  reveals  a  conflict 188 

(5)  Organic  Life: 

(a)  in  simplest  forms,  difficult  to  determine 
whether  they  are  vital  or  physical  and  chemical .  .      189 

(b)  vegetable  and  animal  descended  from  a 
conamon  ancestor 189 

(c)  in  process  of  development  the  vegetable  tended 
principally  to  storing  energy,  the  animal  to  ex- 
ploding energy IQO 

(d)  hence  vegetable  distinguished  by  comparative 
immobility  or  consciousness  asleep,  i.e.  torpor,  the 
animal  by  mobility  or  consciousness  awake 191 

(e)  mobility  develops  a  nervous  system,  the  reser- 
voir of  locomotor  activity  and  the  regulator  of  the 
organic  life 192 


xxii  CONTENTS 

(6)  The  Animal  Kingdom:  _  page 

(a)  hence  fundamental  direction  of  life  is  to  the 
animal • ^93 

(b)  in  the  animal  kingdom  the  impetus  of  Life  has 
won  in  the  arthropods,  e.g.  insect,  and  in  the 
vertebrates,  e.g.  man i93 

(c)  the  insect  is  characterized  by  instinct,  man  by 
intellect i93 

(d)  hence  evolution  of  the  animal  kingdom  has 
taken  place  on  two  divergent  paths,  i.e.  instinct 

and  intelligence ^93 

(e)  these  are  tendencies  not  things,  opposed  but 
complementary i93 

(f)  in  evolution  of  Life  intellect  superior  to 
instinct ^94 

(7)  Simimary ^95 

III.  A  Voluntarism: 

(i)  Creative  Evolution  an  evolution  of  a  conscious  will     195 

(2)  Consciousness: 

(a)  in  general  and  in  particular 19S 

(b)  means  mobility,  action,  choice,  willing 196 

(c)  the  motive  power  of  evolution;  as  such  a 
conscious  willing 190 

(3)  Purpose  of  Creative  Evolution: 

(a)  to  introduce  consciousness  into  matter 197 

(b)  and  so  to  create  with  matter  an  instrimaent  of 
freedom ^97 

(c)  a  failure  except  in  case  of  man I97 

(4)  Creative  Evolution  a  conscious  striving: 

(a)  it  is  the  Will-to-act 198 

(b)  implies  the  power  of  choice,  for  the  Absolute 

or  vital  force  or  conscious  will  is  limited 198 

(c)  almost  arrested  by  the  hard  shell  crabs  but 
finds  an  avenue  of  escape  with  arthropods  and 
vertebrates ^99 

(d)  even  then  not  a  success •  •  •     i99 

(e)  the  conscious  striving  is  the  essence  of  Life, 
hence  no  real  individuality,  but  Panpsychism 200 

(f)  Mitigated  Finalism 201 

(g)  the  process  of  Creative  Evolution  leads  to 
scissions,  divergent  tendencies,  retrogressions, 
struggles,  accidents  and  a  discord  striking  and 
terrible 203 


CONTENTS  »cm 

IV.  Criticism:  page 

(i)  The  exposition  the  best  criticism 204 

(2)  Transformism  a  pure  assumption 204 

(3)  Basic  assumption  of  Transformism  erroneous 205 

(4)  Locomotion  is  not  mutation 205 

(5)  Creative  Evolution  had  a  beginning  and  will  have  an 

end 207 

(6)  Exposition  of  law  of  Conservation  of  energy 
erroneous 207 

(7)  Order  of  Life  which  develops  through  instinct  closes 
automatically,  and  is  only  kept  open  through  intellect, 
which,  on  hypothesis,  belongs  to  the  Order  of  Matter. .     208 

CHAPTER  X 

Pragmatism  and  Creative  Evolution  (continued) 

Theory  of  Knowledge 

Place  and  meaning  of  Theory  of  Knowledge 209 

I.  The  Genesis  of  Intellect: 

(i)  Whole  evolution  of  Life  proceeds  from  a  current  of 
existence  and  the  opposing  current 211 

(2)  Current  of  existence  original  and  fundamental:    it 

is  the  Order  of  Life 211 

(3)  The  contrary  current  is  materiality  and  contains 
immanent  in  itself  an  order  approximately  mathematical     211 

(4)  Current  of  Life  ascends  across  the  current  of  matter: 

(a)  and  fixes  its  attention  on  its  own  movement,  i.e. 

in  the  direction  of  instinct  and  intuition 212 

(b)  or  on  the  matter  it  is  passing  through,  i.e.  in 

the  direction  of  intellect 212 

(c)  so  the  mind,  i.e.  the  Absolute,  goes  in  two 
opposite  ways 213 

(s)  Hence  intellect  and  matter  are  of  same  nature  and 
are  produced  in  the  same  way : 

(a)  for  Consciousness  or  Life  adapting  itself  to 
matter  is  intellectuality 213 

(b)  and  this  adaptation  is  consolidation 213 

(c)  hence  intellect  is  cut  out  of  Consciousness  and 

is  a  by-product  or  local  effect  of  evolution 213 

(d)  hence  genesis  of  intellect  and  of  material  bodies 
is  correlative  and  there  is  an  agreement  between 
them 214 


xxiv  CONTENTS 

(6)  Nature  of  Intellect:  _     _       page 

(a)  its  knowledge  is  abstract,  mechanical,  artificial, 
external  and  symbolical 214 

(b)  the  concept  is  a  symbol 218 

(c)  the    moving-picture    an    illustration    of    the 
mechanism  of  thought 219 

II.  Illusions  of  the  Intellect: 
(i)  Illusion  of  Disorder: 

(a)  Disorder  a  pseudo-idea 221 

(b)  for  Disorder  is  only  the  order  we  were  not 
expecting 22i; 

(2)  Idea  of  Nothing: 

(a)  a  pseudo-idea 222 

(b)  involves  a  preference  and  a  substitution 223 

(c)  and  means  the  absence  not  of  a  thing  but  of  a 
utility 223 

(3)  That  the  mind  imitates  the  movement  of  the  real: 

(a)  this  supposes  that  we  can  reduce  Becoming  to 
ideas 224 

(b)  and  is  due  to  the  moving-picture  mechanism  of 

the  intellect 224 

(4)  The  attempt  to  impose  on  vital  phenomena  the  cate- 
gories of  the  intellect    224 

(5)  The  idea  of  a  general  order  in  nature 225 

CHAPTER  XI 

Pragmatism  and  Creative  Evolution  (concluded) 
I.  Intellect  atid  Instinct: 

(i)  Nature: 

(a)  two  psychic  tendencies,  opposite  and  comple- 
mentary, originally  fused  in  one 227 

(b)  became  separated  by  the  action  of  the  Absolute 

on  matter 227 

(c)  instinct  is  the  result  of  the  impetus  acting  on 
matter  directly,  completes  the  work  of  organiza- 
tion and  is  in  the  Order  of  Life 228 

(d)  intellect  is  the  result  of  the  impetus  acting  on 
matter  indirectly,  and  so  is  in  the  Material  Order     228 

(e)  difference  between  instinct  and  intelligence  ...     228 

(f)  Criticism 230 


CONTENTS  XXV 

(2)  Background  is  Consciousness:  page 

(a)  consciousness  described 232 

(b)  canalized  in  the  nervous  system 233 

(c)  consciousness  and  brain 234 

(d)  inhibition  a  mechanical  function 235 

(e)  consciousness  and  self 235 

II.  Nature  of  Intuition: 

(i)  Based  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Two  Orders 235 

(2)  The   characteristic   teaching   of   Bergson's   Episte- 
mology 236 

(3)  Opposed  to,  yet  supplementary  of,  intellect: 

(a)  intellect  and  intuition  represent  two  opposite 
directions  of  the  action  of  Consciousness 236 

(b)  intuition  goes  in  the  direction  of  Life,  intellect 

in  the  direction  of  matter 236 

(c)  a  perfect  humanity  would  contain  both,  but 
with  us  intuition  is  almost  completely  sacrificed  to 
intellect 236 

(4)  Nature  and  function : 

(a)  grasped  by  its  relations  to  instinct  and  to 
intelligence    236 

(b)  instinct  is  sympathy,  i.e.  feeling  specialized, 
and  intuition  is  instinct  purified,  i.e.  feeling  not 
specialized 236 

(c)  intellect  is  the  condensation  of  Consciousness 
with  matter,  i.e.  the  nucleus;  intuition  or  feeling 
is  the  uncondensed  fringe  surrounding  the 
nucleus 237 

(d)  difference  between  action  of  intellect  and  in- 
tuition       237 

(s)  Theory  of  Knowledge: 

(a)  must  be  based  on  intellect  and  intuition 238 

(b)  hence  not  based  on  intellect  alone 238 

(c)  for  intellect  gives  only  the  negative  half  of  the 

real  and  cannot  reach  the  fundamental  reality ....     238 

(d)  hence  to  intellect  must  be  added  intuition.  .  .  .     239 
(6)  The  Process  by  which  complete  knowledge  of  the  real 

is  acquired : 

(a)  is  to  develop  intuition,  and  to  expand  or  tran- 
scend intellect;  this  is  done  in  general 239 

(b)  in  particular  by  the  cultivation  of  the  aesthetic 
sense 241 


xxvi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

(c)  by  the  cultivation  of  sympathy  i.e.  instinct . . .     241 

(d)  by  squeezing  intellect  and  instinct  together .  .  .     242 

(e)  by  awakening  the  consciousness  that  slumbers 

in  instinct 243 

(f)  by  placing  ourselves  within  the  vital  impetus  .  .  243 

(g)  by  making  thought  coincide  with  will  i.e. 
feeling 244 

(h)  by  the  amalgamation  or  mixture  of  other  forms 
of  consciousness 245 

(i)  by  the  manipulation  of  the  formal  knowledge 

of  intellect 246 

(7)  Result  of  the  process  twofold: 

(a)  the  reconciliation  of  science  and  philosophy . . .     247 

(b)  philosophy  enables  us  to  grasp  the  nature  of 
intellectual  knowledge  and  also  by  expanding 
intellect  is  an  effort  to  dissolve  again  into  the 
whole 247 

III.  Criticism: 

(i)  Theory  of  Knowledge  presents  a  confused  mixture 
of  assumptions 247 

(2)  Rests  on  Theory  of  Life  but  this  was  shown  to  be 
erroneous 248 

(3)  The  working  hypothesis 248 

(4)  Confounds  intellect  with  imagination,  e.g.  a  moving- 
picture  show  without  an  audience 249 

(5)  And  does  so  because  the  image  is  confounded  with 

the  idea 250 


CHAPTER  XII 
Pragmatism  and  Scholastic  Philosophy 
The  issue  presented  by  the  constituent  elements  of  Pragmatism     252 
I.  The  Perception  of  External  Things: 

(i)  Pragmatism  based  on  the  Phenomenal  Idealism  of 
Sensism : 

(a)  teaches  the  immediate  perception  not  of  things 

but  of  the  conceptions  or  feelings  of  things 253 

(b)  things  mediately  or  indirectly  known 253 

(c)  the  fundamental  teaching  of  Agnosticism 253 


CONTENTS  xxvii 

PAGE 

(2)  Scholastic  Philosophy  holds  doctrine  of  Immediate 
Perception: 

(a)  we  directly  and  immediately  know  things. . . .     253 

(b)  in  sense-perception  three  conditions  necessary : 
subject  perceiving,  object  perceived,  union  or  con- 
tact of  subject  and  object 254 

(c)  the  union  or  contact  illustrated 255 

(d)  the  species  impressa  and  the  species  expressa .  .     255 

(e)  the  knowledge  of  the  not-me  primary  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  me 257 

(f)  error  of  Pragmatism 258 

II.  Evolution: 

(i)  The  integrating  element  of  Pragmatism 259 

(2)  Teaching  of  Scholastic  Philosophy: 

(a)  Evolution  confounded  with  fact  of  growth ....  260 

(b)  Evolution  as  a  scientific  hypothesis 261 

(c)  Evolution  as  a  philosophical  theory 264 

III.  Theory  of  Mental  Life: 

(i)  The  soul  a  simple  spiritual  principle: 

(a)  Pragmatism  teaches  a  Psychology  without  a 
soul 267 

(b)  Scholastic  doctrine  of  the  soul 267 

(2)  Contents  of  mental  life,  i.e.  knowledge: 

(a)  Pragmatism  confounds  thought  with  sense- 
experience  268 

(b)  Scholastic  Philosophy  teaches  the  Essential 
difference  between  sense  and  intellect 269 

(c)  for  the  act  of  sense  is  totally  different  from  the 

act  of  intellect 269 

(d)  the  act  of  intellect  illustrated 270 

(e)  contact  of  object  with  sense  different  from 
contact  of  object  with  intellect 272 

(f)  idea  and  image  accompany  each  other  but  are 
different  in  nature    2  73 


PRAGMATISM  AND  THE 
PROBLEM  OF  THE  IDEA 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

The  present  period  of  philosophic  thought  can  be 
justly  compared  to  the  period  of  Greek  Philosophy 
at  the  birth  of  Socrates  and  to  the  philosophy  of 
the  Middle  Ages  at  the  time  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas. 
The  life-work  of  Socrates  was  to  show  the  distinction 
between  true  and  false  knowledge.  His  method  was 
a  process  of  intellectual  analysis.  He  aimed  at 
pointing  out  the  necessity  of  forming  clear  concepts. 

The  Middle  Ages  witnessed  the  formation  of 
Scholastic  Philosophy,  rightly  described  as  the 
greatest  monument  of  carefully  reasoned  thought 
which  the  human  mind  has  ever  produced.  In  the 
formation  of  this  system,  the  fundamental  problem 
was  the  theory  of  the  concept  or  universal  idea.  The 
History  of  Philosophy  records  the  theories  of  Con- 
ceptualism  and  of  Nominalism  as  opposed  to  the 
theory  of  Mitigated  Realism  defended  by  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas  with  keen  analysis  and  profound 
learning.  The  Conceptualists  taught  that  the  idea 
was  merely  the  product  of  the  mind.  They  were  the 


2  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

precursors  of  modern  extreme  Idealism.  The  Nom- 
inalists held  that  the  idea  was  a  name  only,  some- 
thing like  a  tag.  They  were  the  precursors  of  modern 
Sense-Empiricism.  On  the  contrary,  the  theory  of 
Mitigated  Realism  made  a  distinction  between  the 
form  of  the  universal  idea  and  the  concrete  element 
in  its  content.  It  held  that  the  form  of  the  idea  was 
mental,  i.e.  that  the  mind  fashioned  or  elaborated 
the  form,  but  that  the  concrete  element  in  the  con- 
tent came  through  the  senses  from  the  world  with- 
out. This  theory  was  summed  up  in  the  classic 
Scholastic  phrase  that  the  idea  was  a  mental  product 
with  a  basis  in  external  reality.  Thus  on  the  one 
hand  free  play  with  proper  place  and  proportion 
were  allowed  all  the  processes  of  mind  which  in  their 
last  analysis  centre  around  the  idea,  and  on  the 
other  hand  Idealism  was  guarded  against  by  show- 
ing that  the  mind  was  in  direct  contact  with  external 
reality.  This  teaching  obtained  in  the  Scholastic 
schools  and  is  viewed  as  the  Scholastic  teaching  on 
the  nature  of  the  idea. 

In  our  own  time  Psychology  holds  the  vital 
position  in  philosophic  discussion.  This  came  about 
naturally  in  the  trend  of  modern  thought.  Towards 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  Science- 
Philosophy  arose  enunciating  the  philosophic  theory 
of  evolution  based  on  data  of  the  Physical  Sciences. 
This  theory  was  confidently  claimed  to  be  the 
solution  and  explanation  of  all  things.  To  realize 
these  roseate  hopes  its  advocates  contended  that 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

man  also  was  included  in  the  great  evolutive  process. 
Hence  discussion  about  man's  place  in  nature  be- 
came the  crucial  problem.  Had  man  a  spiritual 
nature  with  an  immortal  destiny,  or  was  he  the 
mere  product  of  physical  forces  evolving  more  and 
more  perfectly  through  interminable  ages  from  the 
lowest  forms  of  life.  Thus  the  nature  of  man  be- 
came the  vital  issue  in  philosophy.  Various  theories 
were  thereupon  proposed  to  explain  the  nature  of 
man.  They  are  all  psychological  because  they  are 
based  on  the  data  of  human  thoughts  and  emotions. 
The  latest  to  assume  proportions  and  exert  influence 
is  called  Pragmatism.  It,  too,  is  psychological.  The 
purpose  of  the  present  volume  is  to  show  that 
Pragmatism,  as  set  forth  by  its  main  exponents,  is 
based  upon  an  erroneous  analysis  of  the  idea,  and 
that  consequently  the  problem  of  the  idea  has 
assumed  an  important  place  in  contemporary 
philosophic  thought. 

The  term.  Pragmatism,  is  extremely  vague.  Thus 
it  is  that  difiiculty  is  experienced  in  giving  a  clear 
and  succinct  definition.  For  the  same  reason  the 
casual  reader  is  inclined  to  regard  Pragmatism  as  a 
new  creation  without  any  very  definite  philosophical 
antecedents.  Applied  to  designate  a  prevailing 
type  of  philosophic  thought.  Pragmatism  is  a  mis- 
nomer. In  reality  it  marks  only  one  phase  of  this 
thought.  A  clearer  and  more  comprehensive  term 
would  be  the  Philosophy  of  Tendency.  All  the 
writers  classed  as  belonging  to  the  school  of  Prag- 


4  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

matism,  are  characterized  alike  by  the  element  of 
tendency.  They  are  not  dominated  by  first  begin- 
nings but  by  aims  and  purposes.  They  are  not  so 
much  concerned  with  the  past  as  with  the  future 
and  results.  It  is  the  Becoming,  i.e.  the  To  fieri 
of  Hegel  in  a  new  form.  Hegel  viewed  the  Becoming 
in  the  Absolute  Idea.  Pragmatism  considers  the 
Becoming  of  the  idea  in  the  human  mind.  As  human 
action  is  colored  by  aims  or  purposes,  it  follows  that 
the  Philosophy  of  Tendency  considers  the  Becoming 
as  purposive  or  as  aiming  at  definite  ends.  Now  the 
human  tendency  of  Pragmatism  is  twofold:  it 
aims  at  the  concrete  and  practical,  or  at  the  ideal 
and  abstract.  The  former  tendency  is  expressed 
in  Professor  James  and  Professor  Dewey  and  is 
more  correctly  termed  Pragmatism,  i.e.  practical 
philosophy.  The  latter  tendency  is  best  expressed 
in  Professor  Royce,  who  calls  himself  an  Absolute 
Pragmatist.  With  Professor  Schiller  and  Professor 
Bergson  we  have  a  mixture  of  both  tendencies;  in 
the  former  the  mixture  is  more  temperate,  in  the 
latter  we  find  a  mixture  of  extremes:  the  extreme  of 
the  abstract  and  the  extreme  of  the  sensual;  in  both 
the  result  is  unsatisfactory  and  will  not  stand  the 
test  of  rigid  scrutiny,  especially  so  in  regard  to 
Professor  Bergson  who  tries  to  combine  the  extremes 
into  a  system  by  the  aid  of  the  most  crude  imagin- 
ings, contradictory  statements  and  discarded  phil- 
osophical theories. 

Pragmatism  therefore  does  not  express  a  definite 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

system  but  is  a  term  used  to  indicate  a  condition 
of  contemporary  philosophic  thought.  As  such 
it  is  shown  by  deeper  study  to  be  the  direct  develop- 
ment of  the  philosophy  which  prevailed  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Apart  from 
the  Scholastic  system  the  philosophy  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  developed  along  two  main  lines: 
Empiricism  and  Idealism.  The  Empiricism  is  a  re- 
awakening of  eighteenth  century  materialism  and 
owed  its  great  influence  to  a  reaction  against  the 
extravagant  theory  of  Hegel  and  to  the  rise  of  the 
Physical  Sciences.  It  was  an  attempt  to  construct 
a  system  of  philosophy  on  the  data  of  the  Physical 
Sciences  alone,  whence  its  more  specific  designation 
as  the  Science-Philosophy. 

The  Idealism  arose  with  Kant  and  reached  its 
culmination  with  Hegel,  thereupon  dividing  into 
two  main  streams:  the  Neo-Kantian  and  the  Neo- 
HegeHan.  About  the  middle  of  the  century  the 
notion  of  Evolution  appeared  and  dominated  all 
departments  of  knowledge.  From  the  beginning 
Idealism  completely  absorbed  it.  The  element  of 
Evolution  in  Hegel  differentiates  his  system  from 
that  of  Kant.  With  Hegel  evolution  is  the  construc- 
tive element.  His  fundamental  principle  is  the  evo- 
lution of  the  Idea.  The  idea  is  viewed  by  him  not 
in  the  human  mind  but  in  the  mind  of  the  Absolute. 
His  system  is  based  on  the  Psychology  of  the  Abso- 
lute and  from  this  Psychology  he  endeavors  to 
construct    a   world-system.       Existing    things    are 


6  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

manifestations  which  the  idea  presents  in  the  con- 
tinuous process  of  its  evolving.  The  Empiricism 
of  the  Science-Philosophy  likewise  made  Evolution 
the  constituent  element  of  its  system.  Yet  with 
its  advocates  the  use  and  sphere  of  Evolution  was 
restricted.  The  reason  was  that  this  Empiricism 
aimed  at  fixing  man's  place  in  the  universe.  It 
was  concerned  with  the  origin  and  place  of  man 
and  strove  to  show  that  man  is  a  product 
through  a  long  process  of  evolution  reaching  back 
to  matter  and  to  the  lowest  forms  of  life.  The 
great  effort  was  made  to  show  that  there  was  a 
continuity  in  the  process  of  evolution  ending  with 
man. 

In  proclaiming  "the  survival  of  the  fittest"  as 
the  great  principle,  Empirical  evolutionists  aimed 
at  showing  that  all  existing  things,  man  included, 
were  results.  Thus  purpose  and  design  were  ruled 
out  of  Philosophy  and  of  Science.  Their  explanation 
was  known  as  the  mechanical  interpretation  of 
nature.  Yet  by  some  strange  inconsistency  they  did 
not  employ  the  element  of  evolution  in  the  explana- 
tion of  mental  life.  John  Stuart  Mill  is  the  logician, 
Bain  the  psychologist,  Spencer  the  sociologist  of 
this  school.  In  none  of  these  writers,  however,  do 
we  find  the  element  of  evolution  applied  to  the  expo- 
sition of  mental  life  considered  individually  or  col- 
lectively. They  simply  took  man  as  an  evolutionary 
product  and  regarded  the  process  of  evolution  as 
ending  with  this  product.    Hence  their  expositions 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

of  mental  life  are  static  not  dynamic,  are  structural 
not  functional. 

Toward  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  influence  of  these  writers  was  very  great.  For 
over  twenty  years  Mill's  Logic  dominated  the  Eng- 
lish mind.  Then  William  George  Ward  pointed  out 
clearly  the  weakness  of  his  system.  Bain's  Sense 
Empiricism  and  Determinism  were  shown  to  be 
arbitrary  and  unsatisfactory.  Spencer  Hved  long 
enough  to  see  his  own  system  shattered.  The  crucial 
point  at  issue  was  the  Theistic  controversy.  Theistic 
writers  maintained  that  no  system  of  philosophy  can 
do  away  with  the  element  of  purpose  or  teleology, 
that  teleology  as  a  fact  of  mental  life  has  to  be  taken 
into  account,  that  the  mechanical  view  of  nature 
far  from  being  opposed  to  teleology  does  in  fact 
imply  teleology.  Appeal  was  made  to  the  works 
of  nature  but  especially  to  man.  Purpose  and  aim 
were  shown  to  be  characteristic  of  mental  life,  were 
revealed  in  the  structure  of  the  human  body,  and 
were  the  moving  causes  of  the  mechanical  instru- 
ments contrived  by  man  for  use.  The  issue  was 
bitterly  fought,  but  the  result  was  a  victory  for 
Theistic  writers.  Purpose  and  aim  were  shown  to 
exist  in  human  life.  Mill  and  Bain  and  Spencer  are 
no  longer  names  to  conjure  with;  they  merely  recall 
to  the  reader  shattered  systems  of  false  philosophic 
teaching. 

With  the  admission  of  purpose  in  mental  life 
philosophic  thought  took  a  new  trend  —  it  became 


8  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

saturated  with  purpose.  Hence  the  Philosophy  of 
Tendency.  Like  a  child  with  a  new  toy,  these 
writers  seemed  oblivious  to  everything  but  their 
new  discovery. 

Fifty  years  ago  the  philosophic  problem  was  con- 
cerned with  origins,  now  it  is  occupied  with  the 
striving  after  aims  or  purposes.  Then  the  great 
question  at  issue  was  the  existence  and  nature  of 
God.  To-day  man  is  the  centre  of  the  universe; 
in  fact  there  is  nothing  but  the  human. 

In  estabHshing  the  existence  of  purpose  the  con- 
troversy shifted  from  God  to  man.  Psychology 
became  the  battleground.  The  result  of  this  change 
had  a  marked  influence  on  the  development  of 
both  the  Idealistic  and  the  Empiristic  streams  of 
nineteenth  century  thought.  The  IdeaHst  kept  the 
idea  of  God,  but  erroneously  conceived  His  nature. 
To  them  God  was  the  Absolute  and  their  systems 
were  Pantheistic  throughout.  Yet  the  change  in 
the  field  of  controversy  had  this  result  that  whereas 
Hegel  began  with  the  Absolute  and  tried  to  show 
that  all  existing  things,  especially  man,  were  the 
manifestations  of  the  evolutive  Absolute  Idea, 
Royce  reverses  the  process  and,  beginning  with  man, 
endeavors  to  prove  that  the  purposive  evolution 
of  the  human  idea  develops  into  the  Absolute. 
With  Hegel  therefore,  the  problem  was  one  of  origin, 
and  human  consciousness  was  explained  as  the  high- 
est point  reached  by  the  Absolute  Idea  in  the  pro- 
cess of  its  evolution.     With  Royce,  however,  the 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

problem  is  one  of  purpose  and  end,  i.e.  the  conscious 
evolution  of  the  human  idea,  so  that  God  is  con- 
sidered the  aim  and  end  of  the  process  and  is  nothing 
more  than  human  consciousness  augmented  and 
magnified.  Hence  the  world-theory  of  Royce  is 
psychological  as  the  reader  will  readily  perceive  in 
the  following  pages  where  the  basic  principle  of  his 
system  is  shown  to  be  contained  in  the  phrase 
"  The  object  of  the  idea  "  and  by  the  word  "  object " 
in  his  teaching  is  understood  "purpose." 

The  recognition  of  purpose  in  human  life  had  a 
profound  effect  upon  the  empiric  stream  of  nine- 
teenth century  philosophic  thought.  Mental  life 
began  to  be  considered  not  as  static  but  as  active; 
not  as  structural  but  as  functioning.  With  this 
viewpoint  the  element  of  evolution  entered  into 
the  Psychology  of  Empiricism.  Mental  life  was  thus 
considered  as  a  process  of  acting,  functioning,  evolv- 
ing. With  this  discovery  a  new  name  was  coined 
for  the  supposedly  new  system  and  the  name  is 
Pragmatism.  In  reality  there  is  very  little  that  is 
new  in  Pragmatism.  It  is  nothing  more  than  the 
Empiric  Psychology  of  Mill,  Bain,  and  Spencer,  con- 
sidered as  functioning  or  evolving.  Thus  Professor 
Dewey  complains  that  Mill's  defect  was  that  he 
did  not  go  far  enough,  i.e.  that  he  stopped  at  struc- 
ture without  considering  function.  Likewise  Pro- 
fessors Small  and  Vincent  in  their  Manual  of 
Sociology  teach  that  Modern  Sociology  begins 
where  Spencer  ends,  i.e.   that  Spencer  presented 


lo  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

the    structure,   whereas    Modern    Sociology    takes 
structure  as  a  starting-point  and  is  occupied  prin- 
cipally in  studying  the  functions  of  the  social  body. 
Pragmatism   is   an   IdeaHsm.      With    Professor 
Royce  we  have  Absolute  Idealism  inherited  from 
Absolute  IdeaHsm  of  the  nineteenth  century.    The 
Empiric    element   in    Pragmatism    represented    by 
Professor  James  and  Professor  Dewey  teaches  the 
Phenomenal   Idealism   of   the   nineteenth   century 
Empiricism.     Hence    Pragmatism    rests    upon    an 
IdeaHstic  basis.  It  deals  not  with  external  things  but 
with  our  subjective  ideas  or  feeHngs  of  things.  Thus 
it  holds  that  mental  life  has  no  conscious  direct 
contact  with  external  reaHty.    Its  basis  therefore  is 
subjective  experience.    Shut  off  from  contact  with 
external  reahty  it  views  the  idea  in  the  conscious 
process  of  purposive  evolution.     Hence  it  is  that 
Pragmatism  conceives  mental  life  as  a  conscious 
purposive  evolutive    process,  i.e.   it  conceives  the 
idea  in  the  very  process  of  evolution.     Thus  the 
idea  is  true,  if  it  is  vaHd;   it  is  valid,  if  it  works; 
it    works,    if    it    has    practical    success.      Hence 
Pragmatism    is   concerned    not   with    thought    but 
with  thinking,  not  with  feeling  the  noun,  but  with 
feeling    the  verb,  and    this  thinking  or    feeling    is 
a  purposive  process  entire  and  throughout.    Since 
the  purposive  process  is  to  them  the  process  of  the 
idea,  it  follows  that  the  idea  is  regarded  as  "a  plan 
of  action,"  and  as  action  in  human  life  is  often  sy- 
nonymous with  conduct,  "conduct"  to  them  is  a 


INTRODUCTORY  ii 

fundamental  conception,  with  this  distinction  that 
whereas  in  ordinary  conversation  we  use  the  word 
conduct  as  having  a  moral  meaning  with  reference 
to  a  principle  of  right  and  wrong,  Pragmatists  by 
the  term  conduct  mean  action  without  any  moral 
meaning  but  only  its  utiHty  for  producing  results. 

The  same  criticism  which  dealt  a  vital  blow  to 
Hegel's  Metaphysics  can  be  brought  against  the 
Pragmatist  conception  of  mental  life  as  a  conscious 
purposive  evolutive  process.  The  fundamental 
principle  of  Hegel  was  the  evolution  of  the  Absolute 
Idea.  This  evolution  was  constant  and  continuous. 
Hence  this  system  postulated  motion  only,  and  had 
no  place  for  rest.  Now  Physical  Science  admits  not 
only  kinetic  energy  but  also  potential  energy.  If 
Hegel's  principle  were  true,  nature  would  reveal 
kinetic  energies  only.  In  like  manner,  if  conscious 
purposive  evolution  held  sway  throughout  mental 
life,  all  knowledge  would  form  part  of  the  process 
and  there  would  be  no  latent  knowledge,  i.e.  knowl- 
edge outside  of  the  process.  This  teaching,  however, 
is  not  true,  as  our  experience  clearly  proves.  Mem- 
ory can  be  compared  to  a  storehouse  of  latent 
knowledge.  Both  Professor  Dewey  and  Professor 
James  admit  the  truth  of  this  criticism,  and  the 
admission  reveals  the  weakness  of  their  fundamental 
principle.  Professor  James  calls  these  latent  ele- 
ments of  knowledge  not  ideas  but  "latent  truths," 
a  delightful  illustration  of  "a  contradiction  in 
terms,"  for  according  to  his  teaching  a  truth  is  a 


12  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

truth  because  it  works,  and  if  a  truth  is  not  working, 
how  can  it  be  a  truth? 

Pragmatists  evade  the  criticism  by  maintaining 
that  their  basic  principle  is  the  purposive  evolution 
of  the  idea,  that  the  idea  is  "a  plan  of  action"  and 
therefore  that  these  latent  truths  or  elements  of 
knowledge  are  not  ideas  inasmuch  as  they  are  not 
plans  of  action  entering  into  the  conscious  process. 
Hence  the  issue  is  centred  on  the  meaning  of  the 
"idea." 

Pragmatism  proposes  the  idea  as  "a  plan  of 
action."  This  teaching  is  not  startHng  nor  is  it 
new.  For  centuries  Scholastic  Philosophy  has  con- 
stantly taught  that  there  is  an  idea  exemplaris,  i.e. 
an  exemplar  idea;  or  in  other  words  an  idea  conceived 
as  a  plan  of  action.  What  is  startling  and  new  in 
the  statement  of  Pragmatists  is  that  the  idea  is  "a 
plan  of  action"  only.  In  this  teaching  Pragmatism 
comes  into  direct  conflict  not  only  with  Scholastic 
Philosophy  but  with  common  sense.  Scholastic 
Philosophy  teaches  that  the  idea  is  the  grasping  by 
the  mind  of  the  meaning  of  a  thing,  i.e.  it  is  the 
intellectual  meaning  of  an  object  either  existing  in 
nature  or  pictured  as  an  image  in  the  imagination. 
This  meaning  may  or  may  not  initiate  a  course  of 
action;  it  may  or  may  not  become  a  plan  of  action. 
If  it  does.  Scholastic  Philosophy  terms  it  an  exem- 
plar idea,  i.e.  an  idea  conceived  as  or  connoting  a 
plan  of  action.  The  intellectual  meaning  of  a 
thing  may  instantly  become  a  plan  of  action  or  it 


INTRODUCTORY  13 

may  not;  yet  it  always  has  a  potency  to  initiate 
action.  Hence  the  distinction  is  made  between 
active  and  latent  ideas  or  knowledge  of  things  —  a 
distinction  recognized  by  common  sense.  Modern 
Pedagogy  admits  the  same  distinction  when  it  insists 
upon  the  importance  of  "fruitful  ideas,"  thus  main- 
taining that  some  ideas  are  fruitful,  i.e.  lead  to 
action,  and  others  are  not  fruitful.  Pragmatism  re- 
stricts the  meaning  of  "idea"  to  a  special  class  of 
ideas  because  its  main  principle  is  that  mental  life 
is  an  active  purposive  evolutive  process.  Hence 
by  the  term  "idea"  it  is  compelled,  in  virtue  of  its 
basic  principle,  to  accept  only  ideas  that  are  active 
and  fruitful  of  effects.  But  in  narrowing  the  defini- 
tion of  the  idea  to  an  idea  which  initiates  action, 
they  not  only  fail  to  make  active  purposive  evolution 
reign  supreme  throughout  the  totality  of  mental 
life,  but  really  admit  its  limitations.  Thus  a  sub- 
terfuge is  employed  not  easily  discernible  to  the 
ordinary  reader  but  once  pointed  out  is  readily 
understood. 

The  influence  exerted  by  the  writers  criticised  in 
the  following  pages  is  not  of  the  same  degree.  Pro- 
fessor Royce  was  more  widely  read  while  his  system 
was  in  process  of  formation.  At  present  his  hold  on 
the  American  mind  is  waning  fast.  Professor  Dewey 
and  the  Chicago  School  appeal  directly  to  teachers, 
and  his  influence  therefore  has  been  primarily 
academic.  Professor  Schiller,  through  his  doctrine 
of  Humanism,  has  struck  a  more  popular  vein.  The 


14  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

teachings  of  Professor  James  and  of  Professor 
Bergson,  on  the  contrary,  are  not  confined  to  the 
classroom.  They  are  read  and  discussed  in  business, 
professional  and  social  circles.  The  nature  of  this 
influence  is  materialistic  and  sensual.  Their  writings 
are  in  harmony  with  a  certain  trend  of  modern  life, 
and  consequently  seem  to  furnish  a  philosophical 
basis  for  and  a  justification  of  this  trend. 

In  the  business  and  professional  world  to-day  the 
ruling  principle  is  success.  To  obtain  results  is  the 
great  purpose  and  aim.  By  results  is  understood 
material  gain.  Professor  James  and  Professor  Berg- 
son present  a  Psychology  and  a  World-Theory  con- 
formable to  this  frame  of  mind.  This  Psychology 
and  World-Theory  are  really  based  on  the  principle 
that  "  the  end  justifies  the  means."  The  means  em- 
ployed are  not  judged  with  reference  to  a  principle 
of  right  and  wrong.  They  are  considered  to  be  true 
and  good,  if  useful  or  expedient  to  the  purpose  in 
view.  Hence  the  truth  or  goodness  of  an  action  or 
of  conduct  is  gauged  by  success  alone,  and  this 
success  is  personal  and  always  of  a  practical  kind. 

In  making  the  morality  of  action  or  conduct 
depend  on  material  or  practical  success,  the  very 
notion  of  morahty  is  destroyed.  Now  there  is 
one  fact  absolutely  certain  in  human  life,  viz.  that 
there  is  a  moral  law  of  right  and  wrong  based  on 
the  very  nature  of  things.  The  conscience  of  the 
individual,  the  history  of  the  human  race,  bear 
witness  to  the  existence  and  sway  of  the  moral  law 


INTRODUCTORY  15 

as  a  fundamental  principle  and  primary  conviction 
in  human  life.  In  denying  a  fundamental  principle 
and  primary  conviction  of  human  life,  Pragmatism 
is  shown  to  be  radically  false. 

Moreover,  in  teaching  that  practical  success  is 
the  only  test  of  what  is  true  and  good,  Pragmatism 
advocates  a  principle  which  leads  to  most  disastrous 
consequences  in  individual  social  and  political  life. 
It  professedly  proclaims  that  might  is  superior  to 
right,  that  trickery  and  dishonesty  are  superior  to 
uprightness  and  truth.  The  thoughtful  reader  is 
appalled  at  the  results  which  would  follow  from  the 
rigid  application  of  such  doctrines.  Law  and  order 
would  no  longer  exist.  Personal  and  public  con- 
science would  become  words  with  no  meaning  and 
the  practical  man  would  rule  them  out  of  his  vocabu- 
lary. Civilization  would  be  shaken  to  its  very 
foundations,  for  our  civilization  is  based  on  the 
Christian  moral  law. 

There  is  more  in  human  life  than  the  material 
and  sensual.  There  is  more  in  the  universe  than  the 
human.  God  rules  in  His  world  and  the  moral 
law  holds  sway.  Any  school  of  Philosophy  which 
ignores  these  truths  fails  to  understand  the  meaning 
of  nature  and  to  recognize  what  is  deepest  in  human 
life.  It  is  with  this  conviction  that  the  present 
volume  is  published.  The  aim  is  not  only  to  point 
out  the  consequences  of  the  Pragmatic  teaching, 
but  primarily  to  show  from  a  close  study  of  its 
leading  advocates  that  its  doctrine  is  narrow,  one- 


1 6  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

sided  and  false,  that  its  characteristic  teaching  is 
the  importance  attached  to  purpose  and  the  exclu- 
sion of  first  principles,  that  its  basis  rests  upon  an 
erroneous  interpretation  of  mental  life,  which  a 
special  meaning  attached  to  the  word  idea  in  vain 
attempts  to  justify. 


CHAPTER   II 

EMPIRICAL   PRAGMATISM 

Pragmatism  is  best  described  as  a  point  of  view 
which  is  based  on  definite  postulates  and  is  ex- 
pressed in  a  distinctive  way  of  regarding  mental 
life  and  conduct.  As  a  point  of  view  it  is  looking 
away  from  first  principles  and  looking  to  results, 
which  it  terms  facts.  Hence  it  claims  to  be  an 
Empirical  tendency.  The  point  of  view  is  shown 
in  its  theory  of  truth,  its  explanation  of  mental  life 
and  in  its  teaching  on  the  relation  of  thought  to 
reality.  Thus  its  doctrines  have  been  summed  up 
and  set  forth  in  three  phases:  in  psychology  by 
Professor  James,  who  calls  his  system  Radical 
Empiricism;  in  logic  by  Professor  Dewey,  who 
proclaims  Instrumentalism,  and  in  metaphysics 
by  Professor  Royce,  who  claims  to  be  an  Absolute 
Pragmatist;  Schiller,  who  teaches  Humanism,  and 
Bergson,  who  is  known  as  the  Apostle  of  Creative 
Evolution.  The  present  chapter  is  confined  to  the 
psychological  and  logical  phases  which  deal  prin- 
cipally with  the  theory  of  truth  and  the  explanation 
of  mental  life. 


1 8  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

I.  Postulates  of  Pragmatism 

Pragmatism  can  be  understood  only  by  viewing 
it  against  a  background  which  it  accepts  without 
question.  In  origin  it  is  a  reaction  against  the 
extravagant  Idealism  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
With  the  reaction  went  a  leaning  to  and  an  accept- 
ance of  the  Empirical  stream  of  nineteenth  century 
thought.  To  this  it  added  its  sole  characteristic 
doctrine:  insistence  on  mental  activity,  which  is 
viewed  as  a  unifying  principle  for  the  Empiric 
background.  In  the  background  are  found  the 
postulates  or  assumptions  of  Pragmatism.  The 
more  important  of  these  are:  Sensism,  Evolution 
and  a  so-called  Scientific  Method. 

Phenomenal  Idealism  of  Sensism  is  the  basic 
postulate  of  Pragmatism.  Sense-experience  is  held 
to  be  the  source  and  material  of  all  knowledge. 
Therefore  the  objects  of  knowledge  are  not  things, 
nor  the  real  appearance  of  things,  but  their  appear- 
ances as  they  are  viewed  within  the  mind.  Thus 
Professor  James  holds  that  our  whole  conception 
of  an  object  consists  of  "sensations  and  their  reac- 
tions," and  that  "ideas  themselves  are  but  parts 
of  our  experience."  To  confound  ideas  with  sensa- 
tions by  denying  a  distinction  between  the  two  is 
Sensism,  just  as  to  say  that  the  mental  appearances 
are  the  object  of  knowledge  is  Phenomenal  Idealism. 
Again  he  writes  that  things  are  not  what  they  are, 
but  only  what  and  as  "  they  are  known  as,"  and 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  19 

"for  us  they  are  not  different  if  they  make  no  differ- 
ence." But  this  is  the  false  principle  of  the  Relativity 
of  knowledge  added  to  the  Idealism.  Moreover,  he 
tells  us  that  we  cannot  know  substances,  either 
material  or  spiritual,  as  such.  But  this  is  Agnosti- 
cism. Besides,  to  say  that  "  substance  is  a  spurious 
idea,"  that  it  is  only  "  the  name  for  a  group  of  sensa- 
tions," because  phenomena  come  to  us  "as  groups 
of  sensations,"  is  to  propose  the  false  teaching  of 
Nominalism;  i.e.  our  conceptions  of  things  are  names 
only.  With  Professor  Dewey  "experience"  is  the 
sum  and  substance  of  knowledge  and  of  mental 
life.  He  denies  an  ontological  distinction  between 
thought  and  its  material,  and  says  this  distinction 
is  "  within  experience  "  and  then  only  "  an  economic 
distinction"  to  show  "a  division  of  labor."  Hence 
the  material  or  subject-matter  of  thought  is  not 
outside  of  and  distinct  from  the  mind.  Again  he 
writes  that "  the  distinctions  between  mind  and  body 
and  their  alleged  disparateness  and  supposed  paral- 
lelism are  a  pseudo-problem  created  by  a  prejudiced 
metaphysics."  Thus  the  facts  with  which  Pragma- 
tism deals  are  mental  facts;  not  things,  but  the  per- 
ceptions of  things;  not  God,  but  belief  in  God;  not 
an  external  world,  but  belief  in  an  external  world. 
God  and  the  external  world  exist  for  the  Pragmatist 
only  because  and  in  so  far  as  these  beliefs  have 
the  marks  of  a  true  belief.  Hence  God  and  the 
external  world  are  known  only  as  inferred  from 
the  beliefs. 


20  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Evolution  is  the  constructive  or  integrating  pos- 
tulate of  Pragmatism.  The  world,  i.e.  experience, 
is  an  evolutive  process.  Professor  James  rejects 
Absolute  Monism  and  Absolute  Pluralism.  To  him 
the  world  is  one  in  so  far  as  its  parts  hang  together 
by  any  definite  connection;  it  is  many  just  so  far  as 
any  definite  connection  fails  to  obtain;  and  he  adds 
that  "it  is  growing  more  and  more  united  by  those 
systems  of  connection  which  human  energy  keeps 
forming  as  time  goes  on."  Professor  Dewey  holds 
that  the  evolution  process  is  of  experience  and  in 
experience,  and  writes,  "  Reality  must  be  defined  in 
terms  of  experience,  and  judgment  appears  as  the 
medium  through  which  the  consciously  effected  evo- 
lution of  Reality  goes  on."  Hence  thought  is  not  a 
mere  product,  but  an  organic  factor  in  the  process. 
Thus  the  difference  between  mind  and  matter,  sub- 
ject and  object,  does  not  mean  the  existence  of  two 
separate  and  naturally  exclusive  worlds,  but  the 
rich  potentiality,  the  creative  activity  of  one.  But 
this  is  Ideal  Monism.  Reality,  therefore,  does  not 
exist  outside  the  mind.  It  consists  in  the  mental 
process  of  making  or  remaking  the  world,  i.e.  experi- 
ence. Hence  evolution  is  an  essential  character  of 
Reality  and  Reality  is  change.  This  fact  that  "ex- 
perience "  is  undergoing  change  in  the  evolution 
process  is  the  Pragmatic  doctrine  that  Reality,  i.e. 
Being,  is  plastic.  Experience  is  conceived  as  self- 
supporting  and  self-propelling.  Thus  the  principle 
of  continuity  is  assumed.     Reality,  i.e.  experience, 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  21 

is  not  conceived  as  individual  experience,  but  as 
social.  Hence  the  evolution  is  described  as  a 
social  process,  of  which  the  individual  experience 
or  reality  is  a  part.  Moreover,  Pragmatism  holds 
that  Darwin  showed  the  existence  of  purpose, 
and  hence  teaches  that  the  evolution-process  is 
purposive  or  teleological. 

In  criticism  it  can  be  said  that  the  evolution 
postulate  is  a  pure  assumption.  Reahty  is  not 
what  is  known  as,  nor  is  it  merely  the  product  of 
our  thought.  Realities  exist  without  reference  to  our 
minds.  The  mind  finds  realities  and  must  conform 
to  them.  It  is  true  I  can  combine  realities,  e.g. 
build  a  house,  or  dissociate  them,  e.g.  in  chemical 
analysis,  but  I  must  conform  to  certain  laws  having 
reference  to  their  properties  and  action.  To  make 
the  knowledge  of  realities  constitute  realities  is 
idealism.  The  familiar  story  of  the  nine  blind  men 
and  the  elephant  comes  in  illustration.  Many 
realities  exist  without  being  known  as  such  and 
exert  an  influence  upon  our  lives,  e.g.  the  composi- 
tion of  the  atmosphere.  Again  we  are  told  that 
private  and  social  consciousness  make  up  experience, 
but  Professor  James  assures  us  that  experience  only 
becomes  experience  when  known  as,  and  what  is 
not  known  as  does  not  exist. 

Moreover,  to  set  forth  evolution  as  a  world- 
process,  whether  real  or  ideal,  is  the  extreme  of 
Metaphysics,  although  Professor  Dewey  is  fond 
of   ridiculing    Metaphysics.     Darwinian  evolution 


22  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

is  discredited  by  scientists  of  to-day.     The  only 
element  of   truth  in  Darwin's  system  is   the  fact 
of  growth.     He  showed   that  growth  is  a  law  of 
life.     But  the  processes  of   growth   depend  upon 
the  nature  of  the  life.     The  mind  grows,  but  not 
like    the    body;     Psychology  is    not   Physiology. 
The  body  grows,  but  not  like  the  tree;  Physiology 
is  not  Botany.    The  only  real  advance  in  Biology 
within  fifty  years  is  Mendel's  Law  verified  of  vege- 
table life  only.    And  Professor  Bateson,  of  Oxford, 
asserts  that  had  Darwin  known  of  this  law,  the 
Origin  of  Species  would  not  have  been  written.    To 
conceive  the  abstract  fact  of  Growth  as  an  integrat- 
ing principle  in  a  world-process  is  a  pure  assumption 
in  contradiction  to  established  truths.    Even  Pro- 
fessor James  holds  that  the  perception  of  sameness 
in  kind  is  a  category  of  common  sense,  and  according 
to  him  the  one  first  discovered  and  used  by  our 
lowest  ancestors.    But  how  can  we  recognize  same- 
ness in  kind  in  an  ever-changing  process  of  develop- 
ment where  the  "experience"  is  ever  plastic  and 
thinking  of  a  thing  means  its  "real  modification" 
with  Professor  Dewey,  or  its"  transformation "  with 
Professor  James,  so  that  the  "  future  .may  not  iden- 
tically repeat  and  imitate  the  past"  ? 

A  so-called  Scientific  Method  is  the  instrumental 
postulate  of  Pragmatism.  This  method  is  the 
appHcation  of  the  working-hypothesis  of  Modern 
Science  to  mental  life.  Evolution  explains  the 
"going,"    the    working-hypothesis    gives    us    the 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  23 

instrument    of    the    "going"    and     unfolds     the 
technique  of  the  process. 

The  working-hypothesis  of  science  is  a  "device" 
or  "working-formula"  for  dealing  with  scientific 
problems  and  accepted  provisionally  if  it  does  the 
work.  In  Hke  manner  all  our  theories  are  viewed 
as  "leadings,"  "instruments  for  use,"  "modes  of 
adaptation"  to  the  ReaHty  which  is  conceived 
to  be  in  the  solution  of  the  mental  problem.  The 
sole  question  in  the  mind  of  the  Pragmatist  is 
not  that  the  theory  or  the  "idea"  with  Professor 
James  or  the  "judgment  process"  with  Professor 
Dewey  be  true  or  false,  but  will  it  "work"? 
The  theory  is  adopted  simply  for  that  reason  and 
for  that  alone.  Its  value  consists  in  its  working 
quality,  and  this  consists  in  its  adaptability  for 
undergoing  real  variation  in  the  evolutive  recon- 
struction of  experience.  Thus,  in  the  sense  that  it 
is  a  useful  instrument,  the  idea  becomes  a  mediating 
factor  or  function  in  the  process. 

In  criticism  we  say  that  men  of  science  explic- 
itly contrast  working-hypotheses  with  established 
truths  and  give  provisional  assent  only  to  the 
former.  It  is  Scepticism  to  hold  that  all  scientific 
theories  are  purely  working-hypotheses,  and  it  is 
false  to  apply  the  working-hypothesis  to  mental 
life  and  call  it  a  scientific  method.  Finally, 
science  deals  with  actual  existing  things,  not  with 
group-sensations. 


24  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

II.    The  Theory  of  Truth 

Pragmatism  tests  the  truth  of  a  notion  by  its 
respective  practical  consequences.  Truth  with 
Professor  James  is  what  is  "useful"  or  "expedient"; 
with  Professor'  Dewey  what  is  "instrumental"  for 
"satisfaction."  Hence  truth  is  relative  to  the 
person:  what  is  useful  to  me  may  not  be  useful  to 
you,  and  what  is  useful  to  me  to-day  may  not  be 
useful  to-morrow.  Thus  truth  changes  with  per- 
sons, times  and  places.  But  this  is  Scepticism  and 
destroys  the  bases  of  Physical  Science. 

Again,  Professor  James  asks  what  difference  it 
would  practically  make  to  any  one  if  this  notion 
rather  than  that  were  true,  and  answers,  "If  no  dif- 
ference, the  alternative  means  practically  the  same." 
But  this  is  Subjectivism  and  is  contradicted  by  the 
history  of  development  in  every  branch  of  science. 
We  distinguish  pure  science  from  applied  science. 
The  truths  of  pure  science  are  discovered  and  veri- 
fied before  they  are  applied  to  the  practical  uses  of 
life.  Again,  practical  significance  riiay  be  real  or 
apparent,  actual  or  possible.  Yet  I  do  not  know 
the  possible  practical  significance  of  all  things.  To 
make  my  present  knowledge  or  needs  the  test  of 
truth  is  the  ego-centric  doctrine  in  an  extreme  form. 
But  Pragmatism  cannot  avoid  the  difficulty,  for 
its  basic  postulate  is  "experience."  Truth  is  con- 
ceived as  working  within  "experience."  Hence 
experience  must  find  within  itself  the  source  and 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  25 

support  of  its  values  of  truth  and  error.  Thus 
Professor  James  holds  that  objective  truth,  i.e. 
apart  from  its  function  in  our  experience,  is  not  to 
be  found. 

As  experience  is  the  basis  upon  which  the  theory 
of  truth  rests,  so  the  evolution-process  furnishes 
the  test  of  its  value.  An  idea  is  true  if  it  works, 
and  it  works  if,  in  the  constant  evolutive  recon- 
struction of  experience,  it  is  successful  in  bringing 
one  part  of  experience  in  touch  with  another  part, 
especially  in  mediating  between  old  opinions  and 
new  experience,  so  as  to  cause  the  least  possible 
jolt  in  the  blending.  Hence  truth  is  not  a  property 
inherent  in  the  idea:  it  marks  the  success  and  effi- 
ciency of  the  idea  as  a  useful  instrument. 

This  is  the  theory  of  Instrumentalism  proposed 
by  Professor  Dewey.  The  working  is  prompted  by 
needs,  hence  it  is  true  for  a  special  purpose.  But 
to  assume  that  the  satisfaction  of  needs  is  desirable 
and  necessary  is  Perfectionism  in  its  most  flagrant 
form,  although  Pragmatists  are  fond  of  ridicuHng 
Perfectionism.  Not  all  our  needs  or  desires  should 
be  satisfied,  and,  with  many,  restraint  should  be 
used.  Temperance  in  thought  and  action  is  a 
cardinal  virtue.  Discipline  of  thought  and  char- 
acter is  the  basic  principle  in  education.  Hence 
there  is  a  difference  of  value  in  needs  and  desires. 
If  the  value  of  truth  consists  merely  in  the  efficiency 
of  work,  where  is  the  standard  for  the  difference  of 
value  in  needs  and  desires?     The  act  of  the  idea  to 


26  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Pragmatists,  not  the  idea  itself,  is  true,  and  it  is 
true  in  so  far  as  it  functions  or  is  an  adaptation 
in  the  evolutive  process  of  experience.  Its  truth 
is  its  utility  as  a  means  to  an  end.  An  idea  is 
true  because  it  makes  itself  true  by  an  efficient 
discharge  of  its  mediating  function  as  an  organic 
part  of  the  process  of  real  change  in  a  developing 
world. 

Thus  with  Professor  James  the  true  is  only  *'the 
expedient"  in  the  way  of  our  thinking,  just  as  the 
right  is  only  the  expedient  "in  the  way  of  our  be- 
having." As  ends  constantly  change  in  the  experi- 
encing-process,  so  do  the  purposes  change,  and  with 
the  change  of  purposes  comes  the  corresponding 
constant  changing  of  the  means  when  judged  by 
the  test  of  expediency.  With  the  change  in  means 
goes  a  corresponding  change  in  truth.  What  may 
be  true,  i.e.  expedient  and  useful  to-day,  may  to- 
morrow be  false,  i.e.  inexpedient  and  useless.  The 
ends  and  means  change,  because  the  means,  in 
working,  effect  a  change  in  the  contents  of  expe- 
rience. 

This  is  the  Pragmatic  Doctrine  of  the  Plasticity 
of  truth.  Thus  as  the  postulate  of  evolution 
teaches  a  plasticity  of  being,  so,  when  viewed 
as  the  background  of  truth,  does  it  teach  a  plas- 
ticity of  truth.  Professor  James  calls  Absolute 
Truth,  i.e.  what  no  further  experience  will  ever 
alter,  "that  ideal  vanishing-point  towards  which  we 
imagine  all  our  temporary  truths  will  some  day 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  27 

converge."  Nothing  is  stable  in  this  teaching. 
Yet  there  are  stable  elements  in  the  physical, 
mental  and  moral  worlds.  These  do  not  impede, 
but  guide  and  serve  action.  Orderly  activity  sup- 
poses them.  Otherwise  science  could  not  exist. 
The  very  basis  and  structural  elements  of  a  science 
are  made  up  of  definite  fixed  principles  or  laws. 

Thus  truth  as  a  mental  activity  appears  in  the 
form  of  a  working-hypothesis,  with  no  guide  or  test 
except  the  measure  of  success  which  it  achieves 
for  the  time  being.  The  measure  of  success  justi- 
fies its  use  and  it  is  useful  "in  so  far  forth"  as  it 
succeeds.  Applied  to  business  life,  this  principle 
implies,  if  not  dishonesty,  at  least  sharp  practice. 
Applied  to  politics,  it  does  not  set  forth  a  high, 
true  ideal  of  citizenship,  but  is  very  welcome  to  the 
"grafter."  Applied  to  moral  life,  it  teaches  that 
the  end  justifies  the  means.  As  a  working-hypothe- 
sis, the  idea  appears  as  a  process,  a  plan  of  action, 
and  a  process  which  is  only  approximately  true. 
Hence  there  are  grades  in  truth.  Some  truths  are 
truer  than  others,  i.e.  if  they  are  more  useful  in- 
struments for  the  work.  If  better  instruments  are 
found  or  invented,  the  old  truths,  like  old  clothes, 
are  outworn  and  discarded,  unless  a  practical  mother 
makes  them  over  for  the  rising  heir.  Professor 
Dewey  teaches  that  truth  is  what  is  "instrumental" 
for  "satisfaction,"  and  Professor  James  says  that 
"individuals  will  emphasize  their  points  of  satis- 
faction differently." 


28  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

In  criticism  we  say  that  science  holds  data 
true  prior  to  the  process,  hence  they  are  true  in 
some  other  sense  than  by  being  satisfactory. 
Besides,  some  truths  are  not  satisfactory  just 
because  they  are  true.  Again,  men  of  science 
distinguish  between  established  truths  and  work- 
ing-hypotheses. In  taking  the  latter  to  illustrate 
mental  activity,  Pragmatism  assumes  as  its 
method  that  which  in  science  is  regarded  as 
giving  the  least  assurance  that  truth  is  present  at 
all.  Again,  a  he  may  be  useful  at  times;  if  useful, 
it  is  true.  Moreover,  to  tell  the  truth  may  not  be 
useful  or  expedient,  hence  the  truth  may  not  be 
true.  The  Pragmatist  is  ever  asking  the  question, 
What  is  there  in  this  for  me?  Thus  Professor 
James  says  that  "we  cannot  reject  any  hypothesis 
if  consequences  useful  to  life  flow  from  it."  Yet  in 
fact  error,  delusion  and  deception  appeaHng  to 
human  needs  and  purposes  are  at  times  effective 
in  directing  human  life  and  conduct. 

Thus,  while  the  postulates  of  Pragmatism  fur- 
nish the  setting  for  the  theory  of  truth  and  enable 
us  to  see  how  it  works,  yet  the  theory  itself  is  clearly 
grasped  only  when  viewed  as  the  positive  expres- 
sion of  the  sole  characteristic  doctrine  of  Pragma- 
tism, viz.  its  explanation  of  mental  life  which  sets 
forth  the  "idea"  or  the  "judgment  process"  as  a 
purposive  action,  thereby  combining  mind  and  will 
in  one  act.  Hence  truth  with  them  is  not  the  cor- 
respondence of  an  idea  within  the  mind  to  an  object 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  29 

outside  the  mind,  but  consists  in  the  efficacy  of  the 
"idea"  or  "judgment"  as  a  means  or  instrument 
to  an  end.  The  end,  constantly  changing  with  the 
constant  changing  subject-matter  or  experience,  is 
the  ever-present  purposive  reconstruction  of  the 
experience  within  the  mind.  The  successful  work- 
ing, at  best  approximate  only,  and  different  with 
different  persons,  or  with  the  same  person  at  each 
succeeding  moment,  is  the  reconstruction  of  expe- 
rience, and  this  is  viewed  as  reality  because  it  is  the 
effect  or  result  of  mental  action. 

Thus  to  Pragmatists  truth  is  the  relation  or  the 
correspondence  of  the  idea  or  judgment  to  reality, 
i.e.  the  mental  effect  which  it  produces.  There- 
fore the  postulates,  in  furnishing  the  setting  for 
the  Pragmatic  theory  of  truth,  are  not  accepted 
because  they  are  true  in  themselves.  In  fact, 
they  are  pure  assumptions  and  considered  as 
true  by  Pragmatists  "inasmuch"  and  "in  so  far 
forth"  as  they  are  "useful"  or  "expedient"  for 
the  working  presentation  of  the  theory. 

III.    The  Problem  of  Thought 

With  Professor  Dewey  the  heart  of  the  knowing 
problem  is  the  relation  of  thought  to  its  empirical 
antecedents  and  to  its  consequent,  i.e.  truth,  and 
the  relation  of  both  to  Reality.  To  him  Reality 
is  not  viewed  as  self-existent  outside  the  mind;  it 
is    experience    undergoing    reconstruction    in    and 


30  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

through  the  judgment  process.  Therefore  mental 
life  contains  no  entity  as  ''soul"  or  "mind,"  but  is 
"a  stream  of  consciousness"  compounded  of  "in- 
stincts," "interests"  or  "impulses."  Hence  he 
defines  Psychology  as  the  natural  history  of  the 
various  attitudes  and  structures  through  which 
experiencing  passes  as  mental  states  in  the  stream 
of  consciousness.  Thus  experience  is  the  general 
term  for  mental  activity;  "habit,"  "attention," 
"consciousness"  are  particular  works  or  functions 
of  that  activity. 

Experience  first  comes  to  the  mind  unorganized; 
as  such,  with  Professor  Dewey,  it  is  not  knowledge, 
for  knowledge  he  conceives  to  be  organized  or 
reconstructed  experience,  and  as  this  recon- 
struction takes  place  in  the  judgment-process, 
there  is  no  knowledge  outside  of  the  judgment. 
"Fact"  and  "idea"  are  distinctions  within  expe- 
rience, and  as  such  are  parts  of  experience  viewed 
as  different  simply  because  they  act  or  function  in 
a  different  manner;  the  "fact"  is  the  object  within 
the  mind,  the  "idea"  is  its  meaning.  The  ante- 
cedents of  thought  are  not  knowledge :  only  stimuli 
to  knowledge.  Hence  Professor  Dewey  says  that 
"the  simple  idea  of  sensation  is  without  objective 
reference";  that  "what  is  perceived  immediately  is 
that  part  of  the  datum  in  the  mind  which  is  the 
object  of  attention";  that  "objectivity  consists  in 
actually  being  the  object  of  thought,"  for  "what 
I  do  not  think  about  is  not  objective,"  and  to  be  the 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  31 

object  of  thought  is  what  is  "isolated  in  the  stream 
of  conscious  experience  by  attention  with  a  view  to 
the  attainment  of  a  purpose."  Thus  ''things  are 
apprehended  as  objective  in  virtue  of  the  agent's 
attitude  to  them;  they  are  not  objective  antecedent 
to  his  attitude."  In  Hke  manner  Professor  James 
tells  us  that  things  are  "as  they  are  known  as." 
Therefore  the  basis  of  mental  life  is  Phenomenal 
Idealism. 

In  criticism  it  can  be  said  that  objectivity  is 
defined  in  a  partial  and  erroneous  sense.  It  is 
true  a  mental  state  may  be  the  object  of  thought 
as  in  meditation.  Yet  a  thing  existing  outside  the 
mind  can  be  the  object  of  thought,  e.g.  a  child 
playing  with  blocks,  my  friend  at  solitaire,  or  a 
scientist  in  the  laboratory  is  dealing  with  real 
objective  things.  Again,  the  objects  within  the 
mind  come  wholly  or  in  part  from  the  outside 
world.  Therefore  the  term  objective  primarily  and 
essentially  refers  to  things  existing  outside  the 
mind.  Pragmatism  confines  the  use  of  the  term 
objective  to  mental  states  and  makes  the  distinction 
between  objective  and  subjective  a  distinction 
within  the  mind  because  its  teaching  is  based  on 
mental  experience,  and  holds  that  mental  expe- 
rience is  the  sole  subject-matter  of  thought.  But 
this  contention  is  contradicted  by  the  happenings 
of  ordinary  daily  life. 

Moreover,  Pragmatism  assumes  mental  experi- 
ence as  the  subject-matter  of  thought  because  it 


32  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

denies  immediate  knowledge  of  things  external 
to  the  mind.  Yet  Professor  Stuart  admits  that 
mental  "actions  are  suggested  by  consciously  rec- 
ognized stimuli"  and  that  the  external  "object, 
e.g.  a  stone,  must  have  a  certain  meaning  as  a 
stimulus  first  of  all."^  These  admissions  overturn 
the  foundation  of  his  system.  The  "conscious  rec- 
ognition of  stimuli"  and  the  apprehension  of  their 
** meaning"  is  knowledge.  This  knowledge  may  not 
be  classified  or  as  complete  as  that  found  in  the 
judgment  process,  but  there  can  be  grades  or  de- 
grees of  knowledge,  and  even  Professor  Dewey  says 
that  the  knowledge  of  the  judgment  process  is  not 
final,  but  provisional  only.  Hence  it  is  a  contra- 
diction to  confine  knowledge  to  the  judgment 
process  and  admit  that  we  grasp  the  "meaning" 
of  what  stimulates  the  process. 

Thought  for  Pragmatism  is  the  name  for  the 
process  in  which  instincts  and  their  appreciations 
interact  and  reconstruct  themselves  under  the  guid- 
ance of  purpose  with  a  view  to  conscious  control. 
As  ideal  experience  is  the  basic  postulate  of  mental 
life,  so  evolution  is  the  integrating  postulate.  The 
first  stage  of  the  process  arises  in  inner  "distrac- 
tions" or  "tensions"  produced  by  needs  of  the 
mental  situation.  The  process  is  active  throughout 
and  is  described  as  a  constant  movement  toward 
a  defined  equilibrium  or  reorganization  which  is 
viewed    as    the    fulfilment    of    the    purpose.      The 

'  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  pp.  251,  256.      ib.,  pp.  31,  35,  37-40  48. 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  33 

**idea"  is  derived  from  the  situation  and  mediates 
as  "a  plan  of  action"  in  readjusting  the  conflicting 
elements.  This  is  known  as  "the  conflict-medi- 
atorial" theory  of  thought.  Mind  or  consciousness 
is  what  it  seems  to  be,  viz.  a  transition-phase  of 
the  contents  of  experience  undergoing  reconstruc- 
tion into  something  else.  In  this  view  experience 
is  conceived  as  dynamic  and  self-evolving  in  specific 
conditions  determined  and  controlled  by  the  specific 
purposes. 

Knowledge  therefore  is  not  a  state,  i.e.  stable, 
but  an  action:  it  is  knowing  for  the  present  plan 
or  purpose,  and  the  act  of  knowing  is  set  forth 
in  biological  terms.  Thus  Professor  Dewey  says 
that  logical  theory  is  an  account  of  thinking  as  a 
mode  of  adaptation  and  judges  its  validity  by  the 
consequences,  i.e.  its  efficiency  in  meeting  the  prob- 
lem. This  view  of  thought  as  a  dynamic  teleo- 
logical  evolution  effecting  ever-constant  change  in 
reality  brings  out  the  fundamental  doctrine  in  the 
Pragmatic  theory  of  thought,  viz.  the  definition  of 
thought  as  purposive  action,  and  purposive  action  is 
conduct,  a  definition  which  identifies  thought  and 
will  and  denies  any  distinction  between  them.  The 
source  of  this  doctrine  is  found  in  the  development 
of  modern  Psychology.  Just  as  modern  Sociology 
differs  from  the  Sociology  of  Spencer  in  this  that  it 
takes  the  Sociology  of  Spencer,  which  is  structural 
merely  and  views  it  as  functional,  so  that  writers 
hold  that  Modern  Sociology  begins  where  Spencer's 


34  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Sociology  ends,  in  like  manner  a  change  in  the  point 
of  view  has  taken  place  in  Psychology.  The  Psy- 
chology of  Spencer,  Bain  and  Mill  is  structural 
only.  This  structural  Psychology  is  now  viewed 
as  functioning. 

The  evolutive  functioning  of  experience  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  dynamic  action  of  thought,  which 
can  be  so  conceived  only  by  identifying  thought 
and  will.  The  identification  becomes  necessary 
from  the  fact  that  purpose  is  now  admitted  to 
rule  in  the  world.  Thus  we  can  understand  why 
Professor  Dewey  aims  to  set  forth  the  natural 
history  of  thought,  i.e.  after  Spencer;  why  he 
seeks  its  beginnings  in  conflict,  i.e.  after  Spencer; 
why  he  describes  the  process  as  a  teleological  inte- 
grating movement  toward  conscious  control,  i.e. 
adding  purpose  to  Spencer's  equilibrium;  why  he 
considers  first  principles  as  results  of  previous 
inductions  transmitted  to  us,  i.e.  after  Spencer,  and 
why  he  explains  the  thought-process  as  an  adapta- 
tion not  of  structure  to  function  as  with  Spencer, 
but  of  function  to  Reality,  which  is  conceived  as 
the  product  and  result  of  the  thought  functioning. 
Reality  therefore  is  considered  as  ever  in  the  mak- 
ing, and  here  Pragmatism  places  its  doctrine  of 
free-will,  which,  with  Professor  James,  means  the 
introduction  of  ''changes"  into  the  world. 

In  criticism  we  say  that,  although  Pragmatists 
teach  the  identification  of  thought  and  will  by  ex- 
plaining thought  as  purposive  action,  yet  in  fact  they 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  35 

admit  the  distinction  by  regarding  some  thought  as 
not  here  and  now  entering  into  the  purposive  action. 
Thus  Professor  James  writes:  "The  practical  value 
of  true  ideas  is  primarily  derived  from  the  practical 
importance  of  their  objects  to  us.  These  objects 
are,  indeed,  not  important  at  all  times,  and  these 
ideas,  however  verifiable,  will  be  practically  irrele- 
vant and  had  better  remain  latent.  Yet  since 
almost  any  object  may  some  day  become  tem- 
porarily important,  the  advantage  of  having  a 
general  stock  of  extra  truths,  of  ideas  that  shall  be 
true  of  merely  possible  situations,  is  obvious."  ^ 
Professor  Dewey  writes  that  "the  conflict  in  thought 
makes  certain  elements  in  experience  assume  con- 
scious objectification " ;  that  "the  most  char- 
acteristic trait  of  consciousness  is  its  selective 
function  with  reference  to  stimuli";  that  "the 
subjective  is  the  holding  of  contents  from  defi- 
nitely asserted  position";  that  "the  objective  is 
that  which  is  carried  forward  in  the  process,  the 
subjective  is  what  is  left  behind"  or  "excluded  from 
the  problem";  that  "  this  subjective  may  become 
the  initial  in  other  problems  and  remains  a  fact, 
even  a  worthful  fact,  as  a  part  of  one's  inner 
experience."  He  admits  "abstractions  which  are 
without  possible  reference  or  bearing"  on  the  spe- 
cific problem,  says  "thought  starts  from  a  specific, 
i.e.  particular  occasion  and  ends  at  a  specific  issue," 
and  holds  that  "in  the  history  of  scientific  inquiry 
^  Pragmatism,  p.  203. 


36  PRAGMATISM  AND    THE  IDEA 

there  is  a   relegation   of   accepted   meanings   into 
the  limbo   of   mere   ideas."  ^ 

These  words  show  clearly  that  there  are  conscious 
elements  in  experience  which  here  and  now  do  not 
enter  into  the  present  purposive  thought-process. 
This  means  that  while  all  purpose  includes  the  ele- 
ment of  thought,  yet  all  thought-elements  are  not 
purposive  here  and  now,  although  they  may  become 
so.  But  this  is  the  fundamental  teaching  of  Scho- 
lastic Philosophy,  and  Professor  Dewey's  admission 
of  this  truth  destroys  the  basic  element  of  his 
system.  In  fact,  the  introduction  of  purpose  as  the 
guiding  element  in  the  thought-process  apparently 
makes  thought  purposive,  and  in  truth  much 
thought  is  purposive,  but  closer  analysis  shows 
that  purpose  is  selective  both  in  the  beginning  and 
throughout  the  thought-process,  and  selection  means 
that  certain  conscious  elements  of  experience  are  ex- 
cluded from  the  present  process.  They  are  latent 
or  quiescent  and  exist  in  the  mind,  for  Professor 
Dewey  describes  them.  Therefore  all  conscious 
experience  is  not  at  the  same  time  purposive 
action. 

In  explaining  the  technique  of  thought,  Prag- 
matists  appeal  to  the  "working-hypothesis"  of 
Physical  Science.  To  them  knowledge  is  confined 
to  judgment  and  not  to  judgment  pure  and  simple, 
but  to  a  special  kind  of  judgment,  viz.  the  judg- 
ment whose  meaning  is  uncertain.     Hence  knowledge 

^  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  ch.  I-IV. 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  37 

begins  with  doubt  and  is  in  essence  an  inquiry.  The 
subject  of  the  judgment  is  the  mental  fact,  the  predi- 
cate is  the  idea.  The  process  is  the  determination 
of  the  fact,  and  the  idea  accompHshes  this  after  the 
manner  of  a  working-hypothesis. 

In  criticism  we  may  say  that  knowledge,  accord- 
ing to  the  expressed  statements  of  Pragmatists,  is 
not  confined  to  the  judgment,  for  they  admit  con- 
scious elements  in  experience  which  are  not  included 
in  the  judgment  process  going  on  here  and  now. 
Therefore  the  technique  of  the  working-hypothesis 
cannot  be  applied  to  all  our  conscious  states,  but 
is  confined  to  the  actual  judgment  process  of  the 
moment. 

Furthermore,  the  working-hypothesis  cannot  be 
applied  in  explanation  of  all  judgment,  for  there 
are  judgments  whose  truth  is  grasped  without 
any  process  of  inquiry,  e.g.  first  principles  and 
axioms.  These  are  the  basis  of  knowledge.  To 
deliberately  exclude  self-evident  truths  from  being 
considered  knowledge  and  to  confine  knowledge 
to  the  elucidation  of  mental  situations  which  are 
doubtful  is  to  make  Scepticism  the  beginning 
and  basis  of  knowledge. 

Finally,  even  in  the  process  of  the  doubt-judg- 
ment, the  idea  is  not  a  working-hypothesis.  If  it 
were,  then  the  only  difference  in  ideas  would  be  their 
efficiency  in  solving  the  situation.  But  the  presence 
of  purpose  in  the  process  shows  clearly  that  some 
ideas  are  selected  in  preference  to  others  as  more 


38  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

fitted  to  meet  the  situation,  and  that  they  are 
selected  because  their  difference  in  character  is 
perceived  antecedent  to  their  work. 


IV.   Criticism 

The  postulates  in  the  background  of  Pragmatism 
are  fragments  coming  from  the  broken  Science- 
Philosophy  of  the  last  century.  They  are  not  true 
in  themselves,  and  no  mere  combination  can  ever 
make  them  true.  The  sole  characteristic  doctrine 
of  Pragmatism,  which  forms  them  into  the  new 
combination,  is  not  true;  for  Pragmatists  admit 
that  all  conscious  elements  of  experience  are  not 
purposive.  This  means  that  all  thought  is  not 
purposive. 

To  take  the  Association-Psychology  of  Spencer, 
Mill  and  Bain,  discarded  for  some  years  in  the 
schools,  and  to  turn  it,  by  the  twist  of  a  word,  into 
a  new  system,  does  not  make  a  new  system  in  reahty, 
but  in  appearance  only.  The  fundamental  difficul- 
ties unanswerable  to  the  old  Psychology  are  thus 
carried  over  into  the  new  and  persistently  cry  out 
for  a  solution.  To  get  the  old  structural  mechanism 
to  work  by  the  use  of  a  word  will  not  solve  the  diffi- 
culties. The  mechanism  itself  needs  attention. 

Thus  how  can  Pragmatism  explain  unity  of  con- 
sciousness, memory,  anticipation,  personal  identity  or 
even  reflection?  In  fact,  Pragmatists  give  minute 
description  of  the  mental  process  in  all  its  stages 


EMPIRICAL  PRAGMATISM  39 

and  mention  the  other  elements  of  conscious  experi- 
ence which  are  outside  the  process,  but  forget  to 
explain  the  most  important  problem  of  mental  Hfe, 
viz.  who  sees  all  this.  Pragmatists  expHcitly  reject 
a  soul  or  mind,  but  in  their  descriptions  of  mental 
life  actually  postulate  its  existence. 

There  is  direct  knowledge,  e.g.  when  I  deal  with 
external  things,  as  well  as  reflex  knowledge,  e.g. 
meditation.  To  confound  both  or  to  neglect  the 
former  and  make  the  logic  of  reflective  thought  con- 
stitute the  logical  theory  is  on  a  par  with  confining 
the  use  of  the  term  knowledge  to  the  judgment  of 
doubt  and  assume  that  this  kind  of  knowledge  is 
all  we  have. 

Mental  distinction  does  not  mean  actual  separa- 
tion. I  can  distinguish  many  elements  in  combina- 
tion without  thereby  separating  them. 

In  calHng  attention  to  the  activity  of  mental 
life,  Pragmatism  insists  upon  a  truth.  Mental  life 
is  active.  Its  explanation  of  this  activity,  however, 
is  false.  This  is  the  purpose  of  the  present  analysis, 
viz.  to  point  out  that  the  distinctive  doctrine  of  the 
latest  philosophical  system  is  based  upon  the  false 
definition  of  the  idea:  the  most  fundamental  and 
apparently  the  simplest  element  in  mental  life. 


CHAPTER   III 

ABSOLUTE   PRAGMATISM 

The  most  important  contribution  to  Meta- 
physics in  recent  years  from  the  pen  of  an  American 
writer  is  the  publication  of  the  Gifford  Lectures 
delivered  by  Professor  Royce  at  the  University  of 
Aberdeen,  entitled  The  World  and  the  Individual. 
In  these  lectures  is  set  forth  for  the  first  time  the 
system  of  Constructive  Idealism  which  has  been 
taking  shape  in  the  mind  of  Professor  Royce  since 
the  publishing  of  his  early  philosophical  essays 
some  twenty  years  ago.  The  reader  faces  a  theory 
of  the  universe  set  forth  with  a  wealth  and  vivid- 
ness of  language.  This  theory  is  characterized  by 
the  dominant  element  of  tendency  and  is  an  ex- 
haustive presentation  of  what  Professor  Royce  calls 
Absolute  Pragmatism. 


I.  Conceptions  of  Being 

Professor  Royce  tells  us  that  his  Gifford  Lectures 
are  "a  philosophical  inquiry  into  first  principles," 
and  "an  apphcation  of  these  first  principles  to 
problems  that  directly  concern  reHgion,"   Vol.   I, 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  41 

p.  vii.  By  "first  principles"  he  means  the  prin- 
ciples of  Ontology,  and  he,  therefore,  calls  his  work 
a  treatise  on  the  Metaphysics  of  Religion,  ib., 
Introduction.  To  him  religion  must  be  studied 
"primarily  as  a  body  of  ontological  problems  and 
opinions,  in  other  words  as,  in  its  theory,  a  branch 
of  the  Theory  of  Being,"  ib.,  p.  11.  Yet  in  the 
Introductory  Lecture  of  the  second  volume,  he 
takes  the  reader  into  his  confidence  by  the  assur- 
ance that  science  is  "  the  field  of  empirically  ac- 
credited facts,"  religion  "  the  field  of  facts  beyond 
the  range  of  human  experience."  Therefore,  "an 
Idealistic  Theory  of  Being  Hes  beyond  all  human 
experience,"  Vol.  II,  p.  13;  thus  his  Metaphysics 
becomes   an  IdeaHsm,  his  Ontology   an  Idealogy. 

Closer  and  more  detailed  study  places  beyond 
doubt  that  this  is  the  real  value  of  Professor  Royce's 
contribution  to  the  philosophy  of  religion.  With 
the  avowed  purpose  of  discussing  the  Metaphysics 
of  ReHgion  he  first  of  all  proposes  a  Theory  of 
Being.  The  Theories  of  Realism,  of  Mysticism, 
of  Validity  are  criticised  and  set  aside  as  defective. 

The  ReaHstic  conception  of  Being  is  "the  typical 
notion  of  socially  respectable  conservatism,  when- 
ever such  conservatism  begins  to  use  the  speech  of 
technical  philosophy,"  Vol.  I,  p.  91.  ReaHsm  as- 
serts "that  to  be  real  means  to  be  independent  of 
ideas,  which,  while  other  than  a  given  real  being, 
still  relate  to  that  being,"  ib.,  pp.  92,  62.  Hence 
the  world  according  to  ReaHsm  is  "a  world  of  in- 


42  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

dependent  Beings,"  ih.,  p.  103.  The  Realistic 
conception  of  Being  Professor  Royce  rejects.  His 
reasons  are  that  it  "especially  tends  to  sunder  the 
what  from  the  that,  the  essence  from  its  existence," 
ib.,  p.  106.  In  other  words  it  "sunders  external 
and  internal  meaning:  is  exclusively  external," 
ih.,  p.  75.  Hence  "its  central  technical  difficulty 
is  the  nature  of  individuality  and  the  naming  of 
universals,"  ih.,  p.  76. 

With  Realism  "independence  destroys  Hnkages 
among  beings,  hence  "  the  problem  of  the  One  and 
the  Many  proves  to  be  the  great  test  problem  of 
realistic  metaphysics,"  ih.,  p.  112.  If  the  beings 
are  "mutually  independent,"  "the  many  entities 
of  this  reaHstic  world  have  no  features  in  com- 
mon," and  possess  no  "common  characters,"  ih., 
pp.  127,  131.  Therefore,  "the  realm  of  a  con- 
sistent Realism  is  not  the  realm  of  One  nor  yet 
the  realm  of  Many,  it  is  the  realm  of  absolutely 
nothing,"  ih.,  p.  137.  Finally  it  is  contradictory 
for  "it  asserts  the  mutual  dependence  of  Know- 
ing and  of  Being  in  the  act  of  declaring  Being 
independent,"  ih.,  p.  76. 

The  Mystical  conception  of  Being  is,  to  Pro- 
fessor Royce's  view,  the  opposite  of  the  ReaHstic 
and  must  also  be  rejected.  "The  mystic  asserts 
that  the  real  cannot  be  wholly  independent  of 
knowledge  .  .  .  that  the  reality  of  which  you  think 
and  speak  is  first  of  all  a  reahty  meant  by  you 
.  .  .  that  within  you  Hes  the  sole  motive  to  distin- 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  43 

guish  truth  from  error,  reality  from  unreality,  the 
world  from  the  instant's  passing  contents,"  ib., 
p.  189.  Hence  with  Mysticism  "To  be  real  means 
to  be  in  such  wise  Immediate  that,  in  presence  of 
this  immediacy,  all  thought  and  all  ideas,  absolutely 
satisfied,  are  quenched,  so  that  the  finite  search 
ceases  and  the  Other  is  no  longer  another,  but  is 
absolutely  found,"  ib.,  p.  144.  In  this  sense  it 
differs  from  "common-sense  Realism,"  which 
"makes  the  truth  an  independent  Being,  that  is 
beyond  our  striving,  in  the  sense  of  Being  wholly 
apart  from  every  knowledge  which  refers  to  it," 
ib.,  p.  173.  Professor  Royce  notes  the  unrest  and 
aspirations  of  the  human  soul  and  holds  that  "Pri- 
marily in  seeking  Being  we  seek  what  is  to  end  our 
disquietude,"  ib.,  p.  154.  Thus  "Being  is  once 
for  all,  to  a  finite  thinker,  at  least  in  part,  the  Other 
that  he  seeks,"  ib.,  p.  148.  The  purpose  of  the 
mystic  is  the  dehberate  and  conscious  rejection, 
as  something  to  be  overcome,  of  "the  common- 
sense  antithesis  between  the  immediate  and  the  ideal 
and  between  the  real  and  the  desirable,"  ib., 
p.  155.  Hence  Mysticism  teaches  that  "to  be 
means  to  quench  thought  in  the  presence  of  a  final 
immediacy  which  completely  satisfies  all  ideas," 
ib.,  p.  186.  "Absolute  immediacy"  is  attained 
"  on  the  borders  of  unconsciousness  when  we  are 
closest  to  dreamland  slumber,"  ib.,  p.  168,  and 
"to  be  possessed  of  absolute  knowledge  is  to  be 
unconscious,"  ib.,p.  191. 


44  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Professor  Royce  rejects  the  mystical  conception 
of  Being  for  the  reason  that  it  is  partial  and  incom- 
plete; its  great  fault  is  that  like  Realism  it  goes  to 
an  extreme  but  in  an  opposite  direction.  "The 
Mystic  in  general  knows  only  Internal  Meanings, 
as  the  Realist  considers  only  External  mean- 
ings," ih.,  p.  176. 

The  third  conception  of  Being  which  Professor 
Royce  rejects  is  termed  the  Theory  of  Validity.  It 
differs  from  the  two  preceding  theories  in  its  desig- 
nation as  a  Transformed  ReaHsm.  Thus  "Being  is 
that  which  is  known,  is  found  giving  to  ideas  their 
validity,  as  that  to  which  ideas  ought  to  corres- 
pond," ih.,  p.  201.  "To  be  real  now  means 
primarily,  to  be  vahd,  to  be  true,  to  be  in  essence 
the  standard  for  ideas,"  ih.,  p.  202.  In  this 
third  conception,  ReaHty  is  identified  with  VaHd- 
ity,  for  "what  is  Being  then  but  the  VaHdity  of 
ideas,"  ih.,  p.  204.  Professor  Royce  calls  this 
the  theory  of  Critical  Rationalism.  "God  is  no 
longer  a  person.  .  .  .  The  impersonal  conceptions 
of  a  Righteous  order  of  the  universe  remains," 
ih.,  p.  206.  This  theory  according  to  Professor  Royce 
is  found  in  the  teaching  of  Aristotle,  St.  Augus- 
tine, St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  of  Kant,  ih.,  pp. 
227-239. 

Professor  Royce  teaches  that  the  defect  of  the 
third  conception  of  Being  is  that  it  "consciously 
attempts  to  define  the  Real  as  expHcitly  and  only 
the    Universal,"  ih.,    p.   240,    i.e.   "bare   abstract 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  45 

universal  and  does  not  assert  the  individuality  of 
Being,"  ib.,  p.  290.  To  be  or  to  be  valid  means 
that  an  idea  "has  truth,  defines  an  experience,  that 
at  least,  as  a  mathematical  ideal,  and  perhaps,  as 
an  empirical  event,  is  determinately  possible," 
ib.,  p.  227. 

Thus  in  this  sense  real  Being  is  possible  Being, 
i.e.  Being  "whose  ReaHty  lies  in  its  VaHdity,"  ib., 
p.  233.  A  negative  answer  is  given  to  the  ques- 
tion, "Can  there  be  two  sorts  of  Being  both  known 
to  us  as  valid  but  the  one  individual,  the  other 
universal,  the  one  empirical,  the  other  merely 
ideal,  the  one  present,  the  other  barely  possible, 
the  one  a  concrete  life,  the  other  a  pure  form," 
ib.,  p.  261.  For  these  reasons  Professor  Royce  sets 
it  aside  for  his  own  explanation  which  he  calls  the 
Fourth  or  the  Synthetic  Conception  of  Being. 

11.  Principles 

The  method  adopted  by  Professor  Royce  in 
dealing  with  the  problem  of  Reality  is  to  view  it 
"from  the  side  of  the  means  through  which  we  are 
supposed  to  attain  reality,  i.e.  Ideas,"  ib.,  p.  19. 
The  fundamental  question,  therefore,  is  the  nature 
of  the  idea. 

To  Professor  Royce  "the  idea  is  as  much  a  voli- 
tional process  as  it  is  an  intellectual  process,"  ib., 
p.  311.  In  fact  "all  our  thinking  is  itself  a  process 
of  willing,"  ib.,  p.  153.     "A   color  seen,   a  brute 


46  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

noise  heard  is  not  an  idea,"  ih.^  p.  24.  Hence 
"  the  idea  is  a  will  seeking  its  own  determination. 
It  is  nothing  else,"  ih.,  p.  332.  It  appears  in 
consciousness  as  having  the  significance  of  an  act 
of  will,"  ih.,  p.  23.  By  way  of  illustration  I  am 
informed  that  "when  I  have  an  idea  of  the  world, 
my  idea  is  a  will,  and  the  world  of  my  idea  is  simply 
my  own  will  itself  determinately  embodied,"  ih., 
p.  327.  In  this  sense  he  speaks  of  "the  essentially 
teleological  inner  structure  of  conscious  ideas," 
ih.,  p.  310. 

To  make  clearer  and  more  explicit  what  he  under- 
stands by  the  idea  Professor  Royce  distinguishes  the 
"Internal  and  External  meanings"  of  ideas,  Vol. 
II,  Lect.  III.  By  the  Internal  meaning  he  under- 
stands the  "conscious  inner  purpose  embodied  in 
a  given  idea,"  by  the  External  meaning  "the  em- 
bodiment" itself  which  as  such  is  a  part  of  sensitive 
experience,  Vol.  I,  p.  308  sq.  To  a  superficial  thinker 
there  is  a  conflict  between  the  external  and  the  in- 
ternal meaning.  This  is  only  apparent.  Deeper 
down  there  is  a  harmony  inasmuch  as  the  external 
meaning  is  subordinated  to  the  internal  meaning. 
For  the  "  external  meaning  must  be  interpreted  not 
primarily  in  the  sense  of  mere  dependence  upon 
the  brute  facts,  but  in  terms  of  the  inner  purpose 
of  the  idea  itself,"  ih.,  p.  33. 

Hence  the  external  meaning  is  only  apparently 
external,  and  in  very  truth  is  but  an  aspect  of  the 
completely  developed  internal  meaning,  ih.^  p.  36. 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  47 

The  contrast  between  the  internal  and  external 
meanings  is  solved  by  "conscious  selection,"  ib., 
p.  31,  i.e.  by  the  "conscious  inner  purpose  of  the 
idea,"  selecting  its  own  partial  embodiment  or  ful- 
filment. Thus  in  the  idea,  conscious  selection  plays 
a  part  analogous  to  that  played  by  natural  and 
sexual  selection  in  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  as  to 
the  development  of  the  organic  world. 

On  the  distinction  between  internal  and  external 
meaning  is  based  the  theory  of  judgment.  For 
"  to  judge  is  to  bring  the  what  into  relation  with 
the  that,"  ib.,  p.  273.  It  "is  to  consider  internal 
meanings  with  reference  to  external  meanings," 
ib.  By  the  what  Professor  Royce  understands 
"the  abstractly  universal,"  by  the  that  "the  indi- 
vidual," ib.,  p.  294. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  understand  what  is 
meant  by  "the  essential  relation  of  idea  and  ob- 
ject." This  is  "the  world-knot,"  ib.,  p.  431.  By 
the  "object"  of  the  idea  Professor  Royce  does 
not  mean  the  objective  content  of  the  idea,  i.e.  the 
thing  of  which  the  idea  is  the  representation,  but 
"the  purpose  of  the  idea."  For  the  word  object  in 
the  Enghsh  language  is  susceptible  of  two  mean- 
ings, e.g.  the  subject-matter  and  the  aim  or  pur- 
pose. As  can  be  readily  inferred  from  what  has  been 
said  Professor  Royce  so  defines  the  idea  "as  not 
formally  to  presuppose  the  power  of  ideas  to  have 
cognitive  relations  to  outer  objects,"  ib.,  p.  20. 
For  he  tells  his  readers  that  "your  intelligent  ideas 


48  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

of  things  never  consist  of  mere  images  of  the  things, 
but  always  involve  a  consciousness  of  how  you 
propose  to  act  toward  the  things  of  which  you  have 
ideas,"  and  therefore,  "intelligent  ideas  belong,  so 
to  speak,  to  the  motor  side  of  your  life  rather  than 
to  the  merely  sensory,"  ib.,  p.  22.  He  admits  that 
**the  idea  is  a  representation  of  a  fact  existent  be- 
yond itself,"  ib.,  p.  23.  Yet  he  maintains  that 
"representative  character  is  not  the  primary  char- 
acter," for  "this  is  its  inner  character  as  relatively 
fulfilling  a  purpose,"  ib.,  p.  24.  Phrases  as  "fact 
beyond  itself"  and  "object"  are  to  be  interpreted 
in  terms  of  "purpose."  For  "the  idea  in  seeking  for 
its  object  is  seeking  for  the  determination  of  its 
own  just  now  indeterminate  will,"  ib.,  p.  333. 
"This  further  determination  is  given  only  in  terms 
of  experience,"  ib.,  p.  334.  For  "my  conscious 
will  as  expressed  in  my  ideas  does  logically  deter- 
mine what  objects  are  my  objects,"  ib.  Hence  "  the 
object  sought  is  simply  the  precise  determination 
of  this  very  will  itself  to  unique  and  unambiguous 
expression.  .  .  .  For  the  object  is  a  true  other, 
and  yet  it  is  object  only  as  the  meaning  of  this 
idea,"  ib.,  p.  331.  Thus,  "whatever  the  object, 
it  is  still  the  object  for  a  given  idea  solely  because 
that  idea  wills  it  to  be  such,"  ib.  The  determina- 
tion of  the  object  by  the  will  he  calls  a  "selection." 
"That  an  idea  has  an  object  depends,  at  least  in 
part,  upon  this  that  the  idea  selects  its  object  .  .  . 
and  this  selection  is  manifested  in  consciousness 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  49 

by  what  is  usually  called  attention,"  ib,  p.  317. 
The  relation  of  idea  to  object  is  ''essentially  the 
relation  of  a  partial  meaning  to  a  totally  express 
rational  meaning,"  and  "the  relation  of  partial  and 
total  meaning  is,  at  the  same  time,  the  relation  of 
any  finite  will  to  the  expression  of  the  complete 
content  of  that  same  will,"  ib.,  p.  431, 

If  we  bear  in  mind  that  the  idea  is  to  be  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  "purpose"  and  that  "all  our 
thinking  is  itself  a  process  of  willing"  we  may  be 
able  to  grasp  the  peculiar  meaning  Professor  Royce 
attaches  to  the  universal.  "Ideas  as  they  come  to 
us  in  their  finite  imperfections  are  at  first  inde- 
terminate, and  for  that  very  reason,  vague,  gen- 
eral, or  as  technical  language  often  expresses  it, 
abstractly  universal,"  ib.,  p.  336.  Hence  "an 
universal,  in  the  abstract  sense  of  the  term,  is 
known  to  us  merely  as  that  of  which  there  might 
be  another  instance,"  ib.  For,  as  shall  be  shown 
later  on,  the  idea  in  seeking  its  own  determination 
assumes  more  and  more  unique  character. 

The  transitions  from  the  idea  to  Being  and  Real- 
ity, and  the  application  of  the  one  to  the  solution 
of  the  other  is  made  very  easy  in  the  philosophy  of 
Professor  Royce.  For  "  the  whole  problem  of  the 
nature  of  Being  is  in  the  end  a  study  of  internal 
and  external  meanings,"  ib.,  p.  32.  Hence,  "to 
be  is  to  fulfil  a  purpose,"  ib.,  p.  335.  The  Being 
to  which  any  idea  refers  is  "simply  the  will  of  the 
idea  more  determinately  and  also  more  completely 


50  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

expressed,"  ib.,  p.  353.  The  ''purpose"  of  the 
idea,  the  "object"  or  "other"  which  it  consciously 
seeks,  is,  therefore,  the  constituent  of  Being  and 
Reality.  Thus,  "our  concept  of  Being  implies  that 
whatever  is,  is  consciously  known  as  the  fulfilment 
of  some  idea,"  ih.,  p.  396.  This  knowledge  is  pos- 
sessed either  "by  ourselves  at  this  moment,  or  by  a 
consciousness  inclusive  of  our  own,"  ih.  That  Pro- 
fessor Royce  proposes  a  theory  of  IdeaHstic  Panthe- 
ism is  evident  from  a  careful  study  of  the  context, 
ih.,  pp.  397-400,  and  will  be  brought  out  clearly 
in  the  application  of  the  theory  to  God  and  to  the 
world.  We  have  no  immediate  perception  of  the 
external  world,  Vol.  II,  p.  159,  nor  have  we  "fun- 
damental assurances,"  i6.,  pp.  70,  160.  For  the 
"idea"  is  "a  conscious  striving"  and  the  "object" 
of  the  idea  is  the  "purpose"  which  it  consciously 
seeks.  Matter  is  "mere  appearance,"  ih.,  p. 
213,  and  the  fundamental  principle  of  knowledge 
is  that  of  "a  vast  conscious  process,"  ih.,  pp. 
226-240. 

In  seeking  its  object  "any  idea  whatever  seeks 
absolutely  nothing  but  its  own  explicit,  and  in  the 
end  complete  determination  as  this  conscious  pur- 
pose, embodied  in  this  one  way.  The  complete 
content  of  the  idea's  own  purpose  is  the  only  object 
of  which  the  idea  can  ever  take  note.  This  alone 
is  the  other  that  is  sought,"  Vol.  I,  p.  339. 

In  consulting  experience  "we  are  simply  seeking 
aid  in  the  undertaking  to  give  our  ideas  a  certain 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  51 

positive  determination  to  this  content  and  no  other, ^^ 
ib.,  p.  297,  but  he  adds  that  "we  never  reach 
that,"  ib.  Hence  ''this  individual  determination 
itself  remains,  so  far,  the  principal  character  of  the 
Real,  and  is  as  an  Ideal,  the  Limit  toward  which 
we  endlessly  aim,"  ib.,  pp.  297,  446.  The  dis- 
tinction of  the  Ideal  and  the  Real  involves  no 
separation;  at  the  basis  they  are  identified.  For 
"the  Real  is  that  which  is  immediately  beyond  the 
whole  of  our  series  of  possible  efforts  to  bring,  by 
any  process  of  finite  experience  and  of  merely 
general  conceptions,  our  own  internal  meaning  to 
a    complete  determination,"  ib.,  pp.    280-299. 

Reality  thus  becomes  "the  goal  of  life's  journey," 
ib.,  p.  188,  and  "what  determines  us  to  acknowl- 
edge as  real  a  system  of  particular  facts  is  the 
Ought,"  Vol.  II,  p.  41- 

If  we  bear  in  mind  that  the  idea  "selects"  its 
own  object,  i.e.  purpose,  and  if  "purpose"  con- 
stitutes the  Real,  we  can  understand  after  some 
fashion  what  Professor  Royce  means  when  he  writes 
that  Being  is  "a  selection  from  abstractly  possible 
contents,"  ib.,  p.  449,  that  "what  is,  is  a  selec- 
tion from  possibilities,"  ib.,  that  "so  long  as  you 
define  mere  universals  (i.e  vague,  indeterminate 
strivings  as  they  first  come  to  us  in  their  finite 
imperfections,  ib.,  p.  336),  mere  general  notions 
of  things,  you  define  neither  the  Being  of  objects 
nor  the  truth  of  ideas,"  ib.,  p.  452.  The  reason 
is  that  "the  essence  of  Being  is  to  be  individual," 


52  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

ib.,  p.  348,  and  the  individual  is  due  to  "the 
selective  character  of  every  rational  conscious 
process,"  ib.,  p.  449. 

The  notion  of  Truth  in  the  system  of  Professor 
Royce,  like  the  notions  of  Being  and  of  Reality, 
follows  naturally  from  the  notion  of  the  idea.  To 
Him  "truth  is  the  adequate  expression  and  develop- 
ment of  the  internal  meaning  of  the  idea  itself," 
ib.,  p.  33.  Ideas,  therefore,  "really  possess  truth 
or  falsity  only  by  virtue  of  their  own  selection  of 
their  task  as  ideas,"  ib.,  p.  32.  And  as  ideas 
by  "selection"  constitute  Reality  and  Being,  so 
also  "Being  has  to  be  that  object  which  makes 
ideas  true  or  false,"  ib.,  p.  349.  An  idea  is  false 
"unless  that  kind  of  identity  in  inner  structure  be- 
tween ideas  and  object  can  be  found  which  the 
specific  purpose  embodied  in  a  given  idea  demands," 
ib.,  p.  306.  Hence  "it  is  not  mere  agreement, 
but  intended  agreement  that  constitutes  truth," 
ib.,  p.  307.  There  is  "no  purely  external  cri- 
terion of  truth,"  ib.,  p.  306,  for  the  "sole  motive 
to  distinguish  truth  from  error  is  within,"  ib., 
pp.  189,  308.  "The  embodied  purpose,  the  internal 
meaning,  of  the  instant's  act  is  thus  a  conditio  sine 
qua  non  for  all  external  meaning  and  for  all  truth," 
ib.,  p.  311.  In  fact  purpose  is  "the  test  of  truth- 
ful correspondence  of  an  idea  to  its  object,"  ib., 
p.  306.  We  say  that  "this  instant's  idea  is  true, 
if  in  its  own  measure  and  on  its  own  plan,  it  cor- 
responds, even  in  its  vagueness,  to  its  own  final  and 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  53 

completely  individual  expression,"  ih.,  p.  339. 
In  like  manner  the  error  of  an  idea  "is  always 
a  failure  to  win  the  intended  aim  of  the  idea 
precisely  in  so  far  as  the  idea  sought  truth," 
ib.,  p.  324. 

III.  Application 

Thus  in  a  brief  outHne,  employing  as  far  as  pos- 
sible his  own  words,  I  have  endeavored  to  set  forth 
the  basal  concepts  of  a  philosophical  system  which 
has  placed  Professor  Royce  the  peer  of  metaphysical 
writers  in  America.  These  concepts  are  the  idea 
and  its  object.  On  these  his  whole  system  is  con- 
structed and  from  their  peculiar  contents  it  takes 
form  and  existence.  To  make  the  exposition  com- 
plete it  is  necessary  to  show  the  application  of 
these  concepts  to  God,  to  the  world,  and  to  the 
individual. 

To  Professor  Royce,  the  absolute  is  "a  system" 
yet  "an  unique  and  individual  system,"  ib.,  p. 
563.  It  is  an  individual  because  the  act  of  an  indi- 
vidual is  an  "insight  and  a  choice,"  ib.,  p.  446; 
Vol.  II,  Lect.  VII,  and  individuality  of  self  is  "the 
unique  conscious  plan,"  ib.,  pp.  293,  326.  The 
Absolute  is  not  distinct  from  the  world,  for  he 
speaks  of  the  "whole  individual  Being  called  the 
World,"  Vol.  I,  p.  40,  and  tells  us  that  "the  true 
World  as  rightly  viewed  by  an  absolute  insight 
would  be  a  world  of  selves,  forming  in  the  unity 
of  their  systems,  one  Self,"  Vol.  II,  p.  106.    Thus, 


54  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

"the  Absolute  Individual  is  the  sole  completely 
integrating  Self,"  ih.,  p.  447.  He  teaches  the 
"infinity  of  the  real  system  of  the  Self,"  ih., 
p.  451,  and  holds  that  "the  various  individual 
selves  are  the  various  self-expressions  of  the  same 
system,"  ih.,  p.  448.  It  is  wrong  to  suppose 
that  "a  new  individual"  is  a  "new  thing";  it  is 
only  "a  new  kind  of  Hfe-purpose, "  ih.,  p.  308. 
What  in  ordinary  language  we  term  individuals 
"are  all  the  various  expressions  of  the  Absolute  in 
so  far  as  they  are  many,"  ih.,  p.  336,  and  "are 
made  distinct  through  their  various  meanings," 
ih.,  p.  239.  The  soul  is  "no  monad,  but  a  Hfe 
individuated  solely  by  its  purpose,"  ih.,  p. 
238.  Hence  "it  is  will  in  God  and  in  man  that 
logically  determines  the  consciousness  of  individual- 
ity," Vol.  I,  p.  460.  Selective  attention  and  the 
nature  of  individuahty  are  "studied  as  aspects 
of  will,"  (Vol.  I,  Supplementary  Essay).  The 
world  is  nothing  more  than  an  endless  Kette,  i.e.  a 
series,  ih.,  p.  588,  and  "in  its  entirety  an  embodi- 
ment of  our  own  will,"  Vol.  II,  p.  61,  or  "an  ex- 
pression of  my  will,"  ih.,  p.  295.  For  "the  Theory 
of  Being  requires  us  to  view  every  fact  of  Nature 
and  of  man's  life  as  a  fragmentary  gHmpse  of  the 
Absolute  life,  as  a  revelation,  however  mysterious 
and  to  us  men  now  in  detail  illegible,  of  the  unity 
of  the  perfect  whole,"  ih.,  p.  8. 

That  this  is  the  logical  inference  from  the  notion 
of  Being  is  evident  from  the  doctrine  that  "to  be 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  55 

means  simply  to  express,  to  embody  the  complete 
internal  meaning  of  a  certain  absolute  system  of 
ideas;  a  system  moreover  which  is  genuinely  implied 
in  the  true  internal  meaning  or  purpose  of  every 
finite  idea,  however  fragmentary,"  Vol.  I,  p.  36. 
He  confesses  that  "our  ideas  imperfectly  embody 
our  will,  and  the  real  world  is  just  our  whole  will 
embodied,"  ib.,  p.  37.  Hence  it  is  that  "my 
own  purpose  of  comprehension  is  itself  a  part  of 
the  world-purpose"  and  "within  its  limits  repre- 
sents one  aspect  of  truth,"  Vol.  II,  p.  107.  Thus, 
"amidst  all  the  complexities  of  nature  and  of  man's 
Ufe,  we  are  deahng  with  fragmentary  gHmpses  of 
an  Absolute  Unity,"  ib.,  p.  9.  If  we  ask  what 
is  the  nature  of  these  "complexities"  and  "frag- 
mentary glimpses"  we  are  told  that  "In  case  of 
Nature  in  general  as  in  particular  of  man,  we  are 
deahng  with  phenomenal  signs  of  a  vast  conscious 
process,  whose  relation  to  Time  varies  vastly,  but 
whose  general  characteristics  are  throughout  the 
same,"  ib.,  p.  226.  Hence,  "for  our  own  ideal- 
istic view,  all  nature  is  an  expression  of  mind," 
ib.,  p.  158. 

The  phenomenal  world  Professor  Royce  calls 
the  "World  of  Description"  and  from  it  distin- 
guishes the  world  of  Appreciation,  i.e.  the  world 
of  socially  interrelated  selves,"  ib.,  pp.  107,  155, 
309,  or  "the  world  of  Life,"  ib.,  p.  26.  The 
unity  of  the  world  is  "a  unity  of  consciousness," 
Vol.  I,  p.  466.     The  universe  "is  a  well-ordered 


56  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Infinite  Series,  which  as  embodying  a  single  plan 
may  be  rightly  viewed  as  forming  a  totality," 
Vol.  II,  p.  146.  Hence  "the  fundamental  structure 
of  the  universe  is  essentially  both  teleological  and 
conscious,"  Vol.  I,  p.  432,  and  "the  world  is  one 
with  God,"  Vol.  II,  pp.  271,  292,  Lect.  III.  We 
ascribe  to  the  true  world  "a  certain  eternal  type  of 
Being,"  ib.,  p.  in,  and  the  reason  is  that  "a 
temporal  world  must  needs  be,  when  viewed  in 
its  wholeness,  an  eternal  world,"  ib.,  pp.  133, 
138.  As  a  fact  "in  defining  time,  we  have  already 
and  inevitably  defined  eternity,"  for  "time  viewed 
in  its  wholeness  is  eternity,"  ib.,  p.  337,  and 
"the  temporal  order  is  identical  with  the  eternal 
order,"  ib.,  p.  386.  Thus  "the  whole  real  content 
of  this  temporal  order  is  at  once  known,  i.e.  is  con- 
sciously experienced  as  a  whole  by  the  Absolute," 
ib.,  p.  138.  In  illustration  we  are  told  that  if  you 
"listen  to  any  musical  phase  and  grasp  it  as  a 
whole,  you  thereupon  have  present  in  you  the 
image,  so  to  speak,  of  the  divine  knowledge  of 
the  temporal  order,"  ib.,  p.  145,  the  difference  is 
only  "one  of  span,"  ib. 

The  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  Being  impHes 
"that  all  selves  are  known,  without  any  true 
separation,  in  the  organism  of  a  single  world-life," 
ib.,  p.  393.  Hence  "the  whole  of  time  will  con- 
tain a  single  expression  of  the  divine  will  and 
therefore,  despite  its  endlessness,  the  time-world 
will    be    present    as    such    a  single  whole  to   the 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  57 

Absolute,  whose  will  this  is,  and  whose  life  all 
this  sequence  embodies,"  ib.,  p.  147.  Thus  "the 
Absolute  is  identical  with  our  whole  will  ex- 
pressed" and  "we  are  the  divine  as  it  expresses 
itself  here  and  now,"  ib.,  p,  408. 

Man's  personality  is  "constituted  by  contrast," 
ib.,  p.  425.  The  contrast  between  the  self 
and  the  not-self  "comes  to  us  primarily  as  the 
contrast  between  the  internal  and  the  external 
meaning  of  the  present  moment's  purpose,"  ib., 
p.  272.  The  true  self  of  an  individual  "is  not  a 
datum,  but  an  ideal,"  ib.,  p,  287;  and  "any 
finite  idea  is  so  far  a  self,"  ib.,  p.  272.  For  "self 
is  created  by  a  life-plan,  by  possession  of  an  ideal, 
by  an  intent  to  remain  other  than  my  fellows, 
despite  my  divinely  planned  unity  with  them," 
ib.,  pp.  268,  276.  Hence  the  self  of  the  indi- 
vidual "is  constituted  by  contrast  with  other 
selves,"  ib.,  p.  296.  Thus,  "when  I  seek  my  own 
goal,  I  am  looking  for  the  whole  of  myself.  In 
so  far  as  my  aim  is  the  absolute  completion  of  my 
selfhood,  my  goal  is  identical  with  the  whole  life  of 
God.  But,  in  so  far  as,  by  my  whole  individual  self, 
I  mean  my  whole  Self  in  contrast  with  the  Selves 
of  my  fellows,  then  the  completion  of  my  individual 
expression  in  so  far  as  I  am  this  individual  and  no 
other,  i.e.  my  goal,  as  this  Self,  is  still  not  any  one 
point  or  experience  in  my  life,  nor  any  one  stage  of 
my  life,  but  the  totality  of  my  individual  life  viewed 
as  in  contrast  with  the  lives  of  other  individuals," 


58  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

ib.,-p.  135.    In  its  entirety  the  "Self  is  the  whole 
of   a   self-representative   or   recurrent  process   and 
not  the  mere  last  moment  or  stage  of  that  process," 
ib.    For  "every  finite  Internal  Meaning  wins  final 
expression,  not  merely  through  the  last  stage  of 
its  life,  but  through  its  whole  embodiment,"  p.  270. 
The  absolute  is  the  "one  absolutely  final  and  in- 
tegrated Self,"  ib.,  p.  289,  and  as  Self,  "is  inclu- 
sive of  a  variety  of  various  but  interwoven  Selves," 
ib.,  p.  288,   nay  more,  it  is  "our   own  very  self- 
hood in  fulfilment,"  ib.,  p.  302.     Thus  "man  is  one 
with  God,"  ib.,  pp.  148,  275,  327;  Lect.  Ill,  VII. 
In  describing  the  Absolute  as  a  self-representative 
system  Professor  Royce  wishes  to  insist  that  "every 
fact  in  this  system  fulfils  a  purpose,"  ib.,  p.  397. 
He  tells  us  that  "longing  exists  in  the  Absolute 
Life    and    as    a    significant    part    thereof,"    ib., 
p.  299,  that  "the  Absolute  to  be  complete  must 
include  finitude,"  ib.,  p.   302,   that    the   Absolute 
is  "thought  inclusive  of  will  and  expression,"  Vol. 
I,  p.  ix,  and  aims  "to  bring  into  a  synthesis  the 
relations  of  knowledge  and  of  will  in  our  concep- 
tion of   God,"  ib.      Human   experience   is   limited 
and  to  him  its  characteristic  limitation  is  "that  it 
grasps  within   the   narrow  Umits    of    this    or    that 
instant,  fragments  of   a  meaning  which  can  only 
be  conceived  with  consistency  by  regarding  it  as 
embodied  in  an  experience  of  a  wider  scope,  of  de- 
terminate constitution,  and  of  united  significance," 
Vol.  II,  p.  24. 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  59 

Professor  Royce  denies  the  existence  of  a  sub- 
stantial soul,  ib.,  pp.  vii,  60,  267,  and  holds 
that  God  is  the  only  substance,  Vol.  I,  p.  11.  "Man 
is  (only)  the  fragment  of  a  whole,  whose  inner  unity 
is  far  beyond  the  reach  of  our  present  form  of 
consciousness,"  Vol.  II,  p.  8,  and  "a  new  individual 
life  is  a  new  way  of  behavior  appearing  amongst 
natural  phenomena,"  ib.,  p.  315.  To  him  the 
principle  of  morality  is  *'to  harmonize  thine  own 
will  with  the  World's  will,"  ib.,  p.  348,  and 
moral  freedom  "  is  to  hold  by  attention  or  to  forget 
by  inattention,  an  Ought  already  present  to  one's 
finite  consciousness,"  p.  360. 

When  Professor  Royce  speaks  of  the  "back- 
ground of  reality"  he  means  "the  world,"  ib.,  p.  55. 
An  act  of  concrete  knowledge  is  "an  abstraction 
from  the  background."  Abstraction  is  "a  selective 
process"  and  is  very  much  akin  to  Kant's  apper- 
ception. In  this  sense  Professor  Royce  speaks  of 
the  "underlying  unity  of  the  object  of  knowledge," 
ib.,  p.  56.  Hence  in  the  act  of  knowledge  there 
is  no  active  mind  but  only  idea-forces  which  in 
some  way,  by  virtue  of  the  purpose  and  energy 
which  constitute  the  internal  meaning  of  the  idea, 
rise  over  the  threshold  of  consciousness.  "This 
passing  moment  of  consciousness"  is  "the  fragment 
of  our  will,"  whereas  "the  world  in  its  entirety  is 
the  embodiment  of  our  whole  will,"  ib.,  p.  61. 
The  so-called  unity  of  apperception  is  to  him  "as 
aspect,"   ib.,   p.    148,    a    "fragment,"    Vol.    I,    p. 


6o  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

401 ;  Vol.  II,  p.  270,  of  a  larger  unity,  which  is  "the 
unity  of  the  world,"  the  "unity  of  ordered  series," 
ib.,  pp.  70,  292.  The  rising  of  present  consciousness 
out  of  the  background  of  reaHty  is  explained  by 
the  "recurrent  process,"  ib.,  p.  297.  The  charac- 
teristics of  self-recurrency  show  how  it  is  that  a 
process  which  in  its  entirety  is  considered  as  the 
only  reaHty,  as  the  Absolute,  appears  in  "frag- 
ments," or  "aspects,"  or  "sensible  phenomena," 
which  we  call  "the  empirical  self,"  ib.,  p.  266, 
and  the  "visible  world,"  ib.,  p.  288.  "The 
ordered  series,"  i.e.  the  world,  is  "a  unity,"  because 
it  is  "the  expression  of  a  single  voHtional  process," 
ib.,  p.  86.  Hence  "the  reaHty  is  not  the  world 
apart  from  the  activity  of  knowing  beings,  it  is  the 
world  of  fact  and  the  knowledge  in  one  organic 
whole,"  ib.,  p.  102.  For  "the  world  acknowledged 
as  beyond  is  presented  to  us  at  every  moment 
as  a  single  whole  within  which  the  facts  are  present," 
ib.,  p.  86.  Time  and  eternity  are  thus  two  as- 
pects of  a  single  process  and  represent  "the  twofold 
view  of  your  nature  as  a  temporal  process  and  as  an 
eternal  system  of  fact,"  ib.,  p.  147. 

IV.    Criticism 

The  attempt  to  grasp  and  set  forth  the  system 
of  Professor  Royce  is  by  no  means  an  easy  task. 
The  pecuHar  meaning  he  attaches  to  words,  many  of 
which  have  a  place  in  the  ordinary  vocabulary  of 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  6i 

dally  intercourse,  the  singular  beauty  of  the  style, 
the  lavish  wealth  of  illustration  make  the  work  of 
a  critic  one  of  the  greatest  difficulty.  The  exposi- 
tion presented  in  the  preceding  pages  may  not  be 
exhaustive;  at  least  it  is  complete  in  the  sense  that 
the  reader  can  gather  therefrom  the  salient  features 
of  his  philosophical  theory.  The  method  adopted 
is  to  select  the  fundamental  problem,  viz.  the  nature 
and  meaning  of  the  idea.  The  reader  thus  has  an 
insight  into  the  mind  of  Professor  Royce,  a  clear 
view  of  his  system  and  an  opportunity  to  estimate 
its  philosophical  as  well  as  its  practical  value. 

The  classification  of  the  Four  Conceptions  of 
Being,  with  which  Professor  Royce  prefaces  his 
treatise,  is  vague  and  unsatisfactory  when  viewed 
as  a  classification  and  erroneous  when  studied  in 
detail.  He  admits  that  he  refers  to  an  extreme 
form  of  Realism,  but  this  admission  shows  that  his 
criticism  is  not  broad,  nor  scholarly,  nor  exact. 
In  rejecting  Realism  as  a  theory  which  proclaims 
Being  and  Reality  to  be  independent  of  mind,  he 
fails  to  distinguish  between  the  human  and  the 
divine  mind.  That  the  world  has  Being  and  Reality 
independent  of  our  minds  is  a  fact  which  no  elabo- 
rate system  of  Philosophy  can  destroy.  But  no 
one,  unless  he  be  a  Materialist  and  an  Atheist, 
admits  that  the  world  is  independent  of  the  divine 
mind. 

A  like  criticism  holds  good  for  his  presentation 
of  Mysticism.     To  the  mystic,  in  his  view.  Being 


62  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

and  Reality  is  what  is  immediate.  But  this  defi- 
nition is  vague  and  inaccurate.  Mysticism  is  not  a 
relation  of  immediacy  to  any  being  whatsoever, 
but  to  a  particular  being,  viz.  God.  If  Professor 
Royce's  definition  were  true,  the  little  child  at 
school,  who  sees  for  the  first  time  on  the  black- 
board the  mathematical  equation  2  +  2  =  4,  and 
grasps  its  immediate  truth,  would  be  a  mystic.  If 
a  friend  should  call  on  me  and  we  have  a  heart-to- 
heart  talk,  we  could  not  of  necessity  be  called  mys- 
tics. Or  take  another  illustration.  A  crisis  comes 
in  a  man's  life.  He  faces  the  issue  and  plans  his 
course  and  conduct.  Is  he  a  mystic?  Moreover 
an  exact  and  thoughtful  writer  would  not  fall  into 
the  error  of  citing  without  discrimination  St.  Ber- 
nard and  the  philosophers  of  the  Upanishads  as 
examples  of  mystics. 

A  Hke  criticism  applies  to  Professor  Royce's  de- 
scription of  the  Third  Conception  of  Being.  The 
truth  of  ideas  consists  in  their  correspondence  with 
things.  The  things  exist  as  concrete  particular  facts. 
Hence  it  is  not  true  to  say  that  Being  as  objective 
truth  is  universal.  Plato  taught  archetypical  forms 
or  ideas,  and  the  Conceptualists  of  the  Middle  Ages 
held  that  universals  as  such  were  real  and  existing. 
Professor  Royce  evidently  is  not  famiUar  with  the  fa- 
mous controversy  as  to  the  nature  of  universal  ideas 
which  played  so  prominent  a  part  with  the  School- 
men. A  universal  as  such  is  the  creation  of  the 
mind,  its  form  is  logical,  yet  it  has  a  basis  in  reality, 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  63 

because  the  mind  grasps  the  common  nature  of  in- 
dividual things.  The  common  nature  is  denoted 
by  the  phrase  "ens  essentiae,"  i.e.  essence,  the 
existence  of  the  particular  fact  is  called  "ens  exis- 
tentiae,"  i.e.  existence.  Professor  Royce  denies  the 
concept  of  common  nature,  yet  keeps  the  distinc- 
tion in  the  terms  the  what  and  the  that  —  the  in- 
ternal meaning  and  the  external  meaning,  although 
these  terms  have  a  peculiar  meaning,  because  of  the 
peculiar  meaning  he  attaches  to  the  idea.  Peter 
Lombard,  Albert  the  Great,  Alexander  of  Hales, 
St.  Bonaventure,  St.  Thomas  of  Aquin,  Duns  Scotus 
reflect  the  development  and  acme  of  Scholastic 
Philosophy,  which  is  justly  termed  the  greatest 
monument  of  carefully  reasoned  thought  the  world 
has  ever  seen.  They  all  taught  that  a  universal 
idea  viewed  as  a  universal  was  the  creation  of  the 
mind,  but  that  it  had  a  foundation  or  basis  in  exist- 
ing things  inasmuch  as  the  content  of  the  universal 
idea  represented  the  essence  of  a  particular  thing 
conceived  as  the  same  in  many  individuals.  Hence 
it  is  that,  in  Christian  Philosophy,  God,  ch.  iv,  I 
infer  the  existence  of  objective  truth  from  the  con- 
tent of  the  idea.  It  is  thus  that  the  reality  of  the 
external  world  enters  into  the  realm  of  thought, 
and  a  discussion  conducted  on  these  lines  avoids 
the  extreme  of  Idealism.  This  concept  of  the  uni- 
versal also  furnishes  a  sound  basis  for  the  distinc- 
tion between  existing  and  possible  things,  and  in 
what  sense  the  predicate  of  reality  applies  to  them. 


64  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Thus  the  Conception  of  Being  as  VaHdity  is  capable 
of  a  true  interpretation,  and  as  such  can  be  classed 
as  a  Mitigated  Realism. 

The  Synthetic  Conception  of  Being  developed  by 
Professor  Royce  is  the  basis  of  his  philosophical 
system.  A  critical  examination  of  this  solution  is 
of  primary  importance  to  the  student  who  wishes 
to  grasp  the  meaning  of  his  contribution  to  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion  or  to  give  a  true  estimate  of 
its  value.  What  gives  to  the  Synthetic  Conception 
its  special  characteristics  is  the  phrase  ''the  object 
of  the  idea."  This  phrase  not  only  constitutes 
the  Synthetic  Conception  but  gives  form  and 
substance  to  Professor  Royce's  whole  theory.  To 
understand  the  importance  of  the  phrase  it  is  neces- 
sary to  analyze  the  meaning  of  the  words. 

Professor  Royce  defines  idea  in  terms  of  will: 
"It  is  as  much  a  volitional  process  as  an  intellec- 
tual process."  But  this  doctrine  is  contrary  to  the 
testimony  of  consciousness.  That  intellect  and 
will  are  different  is  an  elemental  fact  of  conscious 
experience.  The  intellect  is  the  cognitive  form  or 
mode  of  our  conscious  life;  whereas  the  will  is  the 
source  and  spring  of  motive  power.  The  intellect 
is  primarily  and  essentially  receptive;  the  will  on 
the  contrary  is  effective.  A  psychologist  would  be 
no  more  justified  in  combining  intellect  and  will 
than  would  be  a  physiologist  in  teaching  that  the 
afferent  and  efiferent  nerves  have  one  and  the  same 
function.     Moreover  these  faculties  are  unequal  in 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  65 

the  individual.  Thus,  e.g.,  we  find  a  man  who  has 
a  weak  intellect  and  a  strong  will,  or  another  who 
has  a  strong  intellect  and  a  weak  will.  Intellect 
and  will  are  called  faculties  or  modes  by  which  our 
soul-Hfe  is  manifested.  Hence,  although  distinct 
from  each  other,  they  are  not  separated  in  the  sense 
that  they  are  two  entities,  but  coalesce  into  a  unity 
by  virtue  of  the  spiritual  principle,  viz.  the  soul, 
whose  modes  of  activity  they  are.  Only  thus  can 
we  reconcile  the  unity  of  consciousness  with  the 
diverse  experiential  elements  of  our  conscious  life. 

Professor  Royce  denies  the  existence  of  a  sub- 
stantial soul,  and  in  its  place  accepts  the  unity  of 
apperception.  Now  the  unity  of  apperception  is 
a  theory  of  modern  Psychology  from  the  time  of 
Kant  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  intellectual  life 
without  having  recourse  to  a  soul.  But  what  about 
the  phenomena  of  wiUing?  Professor  Royce  sees  the 
difficulty,  and  to  meet  it  blends  together  intellect 
and  will  by  asserting  the  primacy  of  will,  i.e.  by 
making  intellect  a  process  of  willing.  Thus  he 
broadens  the  unity  of  apperception  by  making  it 
include  the  phenomena  of  wilHng  and  adds  to  it  as 
a  distinctive  characteristic  the  power  of  ''selection" 
or  of  "choice."  This  solution  may  be  simple  and 
ingenious,  but  it  is  not  true.  An  examination  of  our 
conscious  fife  does  not  justify  the  primacy  and  dom- 
ination of  the  will  as  explained  by  Professor  Royce. 
While  every  act  of  the  will  is  of  necessity  accom- 
panied by  an  act  of  the  intellect  in  the  form  of  a 


66  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

motive  yet  it  is  not  true  to  say  that  every  act  of  the 
intellect  necessarily  entails  an  act  of  the  will.  Here 
we  have  the  crucial  point  in  the  problem  of  free-will. 
Freedom  of  will  demands  the  distinction  of  intellect 
and  will.  When  we  say  that  the  will  is  free,  we 
mean  that  it  has  the  power  of  choice,  e.g.  that 
when  the  mind  proposes  a  course  of  action,  the 
will  can  choose  either  to  act  or  not  to  act,  or  to  act 
in  one  way  or  the  other  by  a  selection  among  the 
various  motives  presented.  By  the  power  of  "se- 
lection" Professor  Royce  understands  not  the  power 
which  the  will  has  to  choose  among  the  motives 
presented  by  the  intellect,  for  to  him  intellect  and 
will  are  one,  but  the  power  inherent  in  the  idea  to 
select  from  "the  background  of  consciousness." 
By  way  of  illustration  I  would  say:  make  the 
unity  of  apperception  a  volitional  process  and 
endow  it  with  the  power  of  selection  from  the 
background  of  consciousness,  and  you  have  some 
conception  of  Professor  Royce's  "  idea." 

The  doctrine  of  the  idea,  as  proposed  by  Professor 
Royce,  is  therefore  a  pure  fiction  of  the  mind  and 
at  variance  with  the  elemental  facts  of  conscious 
experience.  Moreover  is  Professor  Royce  aware 
that,  in  setting  forth  the  doctrine  of  the  idea,  he  has 
taken  an  unprotected  position  and  Ues  exposed 
to  a  merciless  crossfire?  Let  me  explain.  Pro- 
fessor Royce  is  a  Phenomenal  Psychologist,  i.e. 
he  teaches  a  Psychology  without  a  soul.  In  the 
present  course  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  he 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  67 

proposes  to  treat  exclusively  the  Metaphysics  of 
Religion.  The  fundamental  problem  of  the  Meta- 
physics of  Religion  is  to  him  the  theory  of  Being. 
He  attempts  a  restatement  of  the  theory  of  Being 
based  on  the  study  of  the  nature  of  the  Idea.  Here 
we  have  a  professed  Phenomenal  Psychologist 
writing  a  treatise  on  Metaphysical  Psychology. 
The  Metaphysics  he  proposes  is  a  personified  idea 
of  a  very  peculiar  structure.  The  result  is  that 
whereas  the  hypothesis  of  a  soul  is  simple,  nat- 
ural, justified  by  and  in  harmony  with  the  phe- 
nomena of  conscious  experience,  the  hypothesis 
of  the  idea,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  pure  creation 
of  a  subtle  fertile  mind  and  contradictory  to  the  ob- 
vious facts  of  mental  life.  Probably  Professor  Royce 
might  reply  that  he  denies  the  soul  by  virtue  of 
''the  mere  theoretical  consciousness,"  and  admits 
in  its  place  the  idea  by  reason  of  "the  more 
explicitly  volitional  consciousness,"  p.  27.  This 
distinction  is  the  reason  given  for  designating  the 
World  of  Description  as  other  than  the  World  of 
Appreciation.  The  distinction  may  be  useful  but 
we  do  not  understand  it.  The  difficulty  is  to  admit 
a  theoretical  consciousness  distinct  from  a  voli- 
tional consciousness  when  the  mind  and  the  will 
are  unified. 

If  we  bear  in  mind  that  according  to  Professor 
Royce  the  idea  is  "a  will  seeking  its  own  determi- 
nation," Vol.  I,  p.  332,  we  can  understand  that  the 
"object  of  the  idea"  is  "the  complete  content  of  the 


68  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

idea's  own  purpose,"  ib.,  p.  329,  and  as  such  is  the 
''other"  the  ''beyond,"  the  "goal  of  life's  journey." 
The  object,  therefore,  is  not  something  in  the  world 
around  us  which  is  grasped  by  the  mind  in  a  cog- 
nitive act,  but  the  object  of  our  will  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  the  purpose  and  goal  of  our  striving.  This 
meaning  naturally  follows  from  his  definition  of  the 
idea.  In  criticism  I  would  say  that  it  is  true  to 
call  the  object  of  the  will's  striving  a  purpose  or 
goal.  But  it  is  a  mistake  to  restrict  the  object 
of  the  intellect  to  the  purpose  of  our  conscious 
tendencies.  The  object  of  the  intellect  is  a  pur- 
pose or  goal  only  in  case  of  purposive  action. 
But  our  intellectual  Hfe  is  cognizant  of  many 
objects  without  thereby  viewing  them  as  goals. 
Speculative  or  contemplative  knowledge  as  such 
includes  no  positive  volitional  process  such  as  Pro- 
fessor Royce  holds  to  be  constitutive  of  the  idea. 

Again,  if  the  definition  of  the  idea  given  by 
Professor  Royce  is  false,  so  also  is  the  definition 
of  the  object  false.  Now  we  have  seen  by  an 
examination  of  our  conscious  experience  that  the 
idea  is  a  product  of  the  mind,  that  the  mind 
and  the  will  are  distinct  and  should  not  be  con- 
founded. Hence,  we  cannot  define  idea  as  "a 
will  seeking  to  its  own  determination,"  ib.,  p. 
332.  Nor  can  we  define  the  object  of  the  idea  as 
the  purpose  or  goal  of  this  tendency. 

Finally  the  error  of  defining  object  in  terms  of 
purpose  is  the  result  of  another  error,  viz.  the  denial 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  69 

of  immediate  perception  of  the  external  world, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  159-161.  Hence  in  his  system  external 
things  cannot  be  the  objects  of  ideas.  This  is 
Idealism  pure  and  simple.  Now  it  is  certain  that 
we  have  direct  and  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
world  around  us.  Through  the  senses  we  are 
brought  into  direct  cognitive  contact  with  external 
things.  The  senses  of  sight  and  of  touch  make  us 
aware  of  extended  and  resisting  bodies.  Hearing, 
smell  and  taste  furnish  sounds,  odors  and  tastes. 
It  is  true  that  sounds,  odors  and  tastes  do  not  exist 
as  such  independently  of  us,  that  they  are  the 
product  of  the  stimuh  acting  upon  the  sense-organs. 
Nevertheless,  the  stimuli  are  material  and  external, 
and  therefore  in  these  sensations  the  external  and 
material  elements  are  present.  Aristotle  long  ago 
mentioned  this  distinction  in  sense-cognitions. 
Thus  we  have  immediate  perception  of  the  external 
world.  The  teaching  that  sensations  are  the  direct 
object  of  the  mind  was  introduced  into  English 
Psychology  by  Locke,  and  has  been  ever  since  the 
fruitful  germ  of  philosophical  error.  A  logical  form 
which  has  wrought  much  confusion  in  contemporary 
thought  is  the  Phenomenal  Idealism  of  Sensism,  But 
this  very  error  is  the  postulate  of  Professor  Royce's 
theory  of  Being,  for  he  writes,  "Leave  out  the  realm 
of  the  past  from  our  conception  of  the  real  world, 
and  our  empirical  universe  at  this  instant  would 
shrivel  for  us,  into  a  mere  collection  of  almost 
uninterrupted  sensations,"  Vol.  I,  p.  403. 


70  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

The  reader  is  now  prepared  to  form  some  estimate 
of  the  philosophical  system  set  forth  by  Professor 
Royce.  It  may  justly  be  called  a  synthesis  formed 
from  the  best  elements  of  modern  Idealistic  Pan- 
theism merged  into  one  whole.  He  takes  from 
Kant  the  unity  of  apperception  and  by  endowing 
it  with  the  power  of  selection  makes  it  not  a  pure 
intellectual  but  an  active  vohtional  process.  The 
moral  order  of  Fichte  is  static,  the  purpose-ten- 
dency of  Royce  is  dynamic.  The  word  idea  he 
takes  from  Hegel,  yet  interprets  it  in  terms  of 
Schopenhauer's  Will  and  of  Hartmann's  Striving, 
and  makes  it  conscious  throughout.  By  the  unity 
of  the  "process"  he  identifies  man  and  the  world 
and  God.  With  Taine  and  Vacherot  he  holds  that 
God  is  the  goal,  i.e.  Dieu  Progres,  "that  far  off 
divine  event  toward  which  the  whole  creation 
moves,"  yet  differs  from  them  in  teaching  that  the 
Absolute  is  not  the  goal  alone,  but  the  goal  together 
with  all  the  machinery  of  the  striving;  hence  he 
calls  the  Absolute  a  system.  With  Spinoza  he 
holds  that  God  is  the  one  substance,  but  differs 
from  him  in  teaching  that  consciousness  is  the  sole 
attribute  of  that  substance,  and  that  material  things 
are  only  phenomenal  "fragments"  or  "aspects" 
of  the  purpose  seeking  its  complete  embodiment. 
By  the  "dynamo"  of  ideas,  Vol.  II,  pp.  174-178, 
he  approximates  to  Leibnitz's  " monads"  and  Fouil- 
lee's  "idea-forces."  He  starts  from  what  he  con- 
siders an  experimental  basis,  i.e.  from  the  facts  of 


ABSOLUTE  PRAGMATISM  71 

Experimental  Psychology,  yet  views  these  facts  in 
the  light  of  the  Phenomenal  Idealism  of  Sensism, 
and  thus  his  system  is  vitiated  in  the  beginning  by 
a  preconceived  doctrine  of  Idealism.  In  the  in- 
tense introspection  and  the  theory  of  the  Self  he 
shows  the  influence  of  the  Hindu  Pantheism.  By 
teaching  that  the  Absolute  is  a  unity,  that  in  this 
unity  Man,  the  World  and  God  are  unified,  that 
external  things  are  phenomenal  fragments  or  aspects 
of  one  great  conscious  striving  process,  he  seems  to 
hold  a  Pantheism  of  Manifestation. 

Upon  the  whole  the  Gilford  Lectures  of  Professor 
Royce  are  a  disappointment  to  many  who  have 
read  with  dehght  his  previous  pubhcations,  and 
watched  with  interest  the  gradual  development  of 
his  mind.  His  beautiful  and  sympathetic  tribute 
to  Scholastic  Philosophy,  which  appeared  in  the 
Boston  Transcript  at  the  death  of  Pope  Leo  XIII 
has  endeared  him  to  the  great  mass  of  thinkers  and 
writers  in  this  country  who  look  to  the  Schoolmen 
for  a  philosophical  solution  of  the  great  problems 
affecting  human  life  and  destiny.  It  seems  a  pity 
that  Professor  Royce  has  not  devoted  more  time 
to  a  careful  study  of  Scholastic  Philosophy  before 
he  issued  these  Lectures  in  their  present  form. 
The  most  interesting  feature  of  his  intellectual  life  is 
that  he  has  been  struggling  against  a  philosophical 
environment  initially  created  by  Locke  and  Kant 
and  developed  in  one  form  or  the  other  by  the  phil- 
osophical writers  of  the  nineteenth  century.     The 


72  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

hope  was  engendered  that  at  the  publication  of 
his  system,  which  was  in  process  of  formation,  he 
would  break  from  the  influence  of  thinkers  whose 
fundamental  principles  have  been  shown  to  be  false. 
In  this  sense  the  lectures  are  a  disappointment. 
From  a  literary  point  of  view  The  World  and  the 
Individual  are  inferior  to  the  Spiritual  Aspects  of 
Philosophy.  Viewed  as  a  system  they  are  too 
vague  and  abstract  and  transcendental  ever  to 
exert  an  abiding  influence  on  the  development 
of  philosophical  thought.  Subjected  to  a  rigid 
analysis  the  principles  therein  set  forth  are  at 
variance  with  the  elementary  facts  of  conscious 
life  and  are  contradicted  by  the  ordinary  language 
and  experience  of  daily  existence. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ABSOLUTE   PRAGMATISM   AND   THE   PROBLEM 
OF   CHRISTIANITY 

In  a  recent  work,  The  Problem  of  Christianity, 
the  Hibbert  Lectures  191 2-13,  Professor  Royce 
makes  an  attempt  to  set  forth  a  philosophy  of 
Christianity  which  is  based  upon  human  experience 
and  is  in  essential  harmony  with  the  teaching  of 
philosophical  Idealism  developed  in  his  Gifford 
Lectures,  The  World  and  the  Individual.  In  the 
Preface  he  states  that  these  views  have  been  grad- 
ually maturing  since  1908,  when  he  published  The 
Philosophy  of  Loyalty,  and  find  expression  in  the 
Bross  Lectures  of  191 2  on  TJie  Sources  of  Religious 
Thought.  As  a  logical  sequence  to  the  preceding 
chapter  it  is  necessary  to  criticise  his  attempt  to 
apply  this  Idealism  to  the  Problem  of  Christianity 
wherein  he  discusses  the  Christian  Doctrine  of 
Life  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  setting  forth  the 
Essence  of  the  Christian  Religion. 

I.  The  Problem  of  Christianity 

To  Professor  Royce  the  Problem  of  Christianity 
arises  from  the  relation  of  Christianity  to  the  mind 


74  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

of  to-day.  The  question  he  proposes  to  discuss  is 
"in  what  way,  if  in  any,  can  the  modern  man 
consistently  be,  in  creed,  a  Christian?"  The  two 
terms  of  the  comparison  are  clearly  stated  —  viz. 
Christianity  and  the  modern  man.  The  means  of 
the  comparison  are  twofold:  to  state  in  empirical 
terms  certain  aspects  of  Christian  social  experience 
and  to  defend  these  aspects  in  the  light  of  a  re- 
examination of  certain  fundamental  metaphysical 
ideas.  Thus  three  terms  enter  into  the  discus- 
sion: the  modern  man,  a  metaphysical  theory, 
Christianity. 

To  Professor  Royce  the  modern  man  is  a  postu- 
late and  is  "one  who  is  supposed  to  teach  what  the 
education  of  the  human  race  has  taught  him." 
"This  postulate,"  he  continues,  "includes  a  doc- 
trine that  the  human  race,  taken  as  a  whole,  has 
some  genuine  and  significant  spiritual  unity,  so 
that  its  life  includes  a  growth  in  genuine  insight," 
and  adds  that  this  doctrine  contains  "the  implica- 
tion that  in  light  of  common  insight  gradually 
attained  by  the  whole  race,  our  creed  should  be 
tested  and,  if  needs  be,  revised."  The  inference 
drawn  from  these  words  is  that  the  teaching  of  the 
modern  man  is  true.  Yet  in  fact  we  inherit  the 
follies  as  well  as  the  wisdom  of  the  ages.  What 
criterion  is  here  presented  to  guide  me  between  the 
truth  and  error  of  the  past?  Or  to  guide  Professor 
Royce  in  disagreeing  with  traditional  Christianity? 
Why  should  it  be  taken  for  granted  that  a  discus- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  75 

sion  of  the  Problem  of  Christianity  means  the 
revision  of  Christianity  up  to  the  mental  state  of 
the  modern  man?  Does  not  a  suspicion  enter  the 
mind  that  the  modern  man  might  be  revised  up 
to  the  teaching  of  Christianity?  The  term,  modern 
man,  therefore  is  a  fiction.  Or  it  may  be  a  modest 
way  by  which  Professor  Royce  designates  himself. 
Yet  we  are  told  that  the  test  of  a  scientific  dis- 
covery is  the  consensus  of  opinion,  and  that  phi- 
losophers of  to-day  *'do  not  agree  regarding  any 
one  philosophical  opinion."  Even  Professor  Royce 
explains  that  these  volumes  are  the  exclusive  result 
of  his  own  study,  that  they  contain  a  new  interpre- 
tation of  Christianity,  and  is  at  pains  to  point  out 
how  he  differs  from  Hegel,  James,  Bergson,  Pro- 
fessors Macintosh  and  Sanday.  May  not  the  claim 
be  made  that  they  have  inherited  the  wisdom  of 
the  ages?  In  truth,  Professor  Royce's  doctrine 
is  based  on  a  postulate  or  assumption  which  can 
be  maintained  only  by  one  who  accepts  his  system 
of  philosophical  Idealism. 

Professor  Royce  admits  that  he  faces  the  study 
of  Christianity  from  the  viewpoint  of  Metaphysical 
Idealism  and  that  he  applies  the  spirit  of  this  Ideal- 
ism to  the  problems  arising  from  the  study.  In 
this  Idealism  are  found  no  terms  as  "soul"  or 
"mind."  He  admits  "the  self  "  or  person  and  holds 
that  it  is  constituted  by  conscious  memory.  The 
active  element  in  the  self  is  the  "idea,"  which  is 
a  "volitional  process"  and  is  defined  as  "a  plan 


76  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

of  action."  The  ordinary  Pragmatist — i.e.  Pro- 
fessor James  —  is  concerned  with  the  direct  and 
immediate  effect  of  the  "idea-striving."  Professor 
Royce  regards  the  ultimate  purpose  or  "goal"  of  the 
idea  and  terms  himself  an  "Absolute  Pragmatist." 

Professor  Royce  denies  immediate  perception  of 
the  self  or  other  selves.  He  deprecates  the  con- 
troversy about  "percept"  and  "concept,"  calls 
these  "sterile,"  and  bases  his  whole  system  on  a 
new  and  integrating  cognitive  process  which  he 
calls  interpretation  —  that  is,  the  mediating  be- 
tween two  ideas  or  processes  by  means  of  a  third. 
Only  by  interpretation  do  we  know  the  self,  for  self 
is  not  "a  datum,"  but  a  hfe  or  process  containing 
three  elements:  past,  present  and  future.  Inter- 
pretation sums  up  past  experience  into  present 
experience,  sets  for  us  our  future  task  and  thus 
brings  us  into  touch  with  the  real  world.  The  Real 
World  is  therefore  the  interpretation  of  our  pres- 
ent experience,  namely.  Appearance,  and  the  idea 
of  the  goal  of  experience,  namely,  Reality.  By  inter- 
pretation only  do  we  know  other  selves  and  things. 
For  they  are  only  "appearances"  of  reahty,  "em- 
bodiments" of  the  idea,  "signs"  with  a  meaning. 
The  reahty,  the  idea,  the  meaning  are  attained  by 
interpretation,  and  our  interpretations  are  "signs" 
to  be  further  interpreted.  Thus  experience  shows 
that  our  hfe  is  a  realm  of  signs  and  is  made  up  of 
interpretations  of  signs.  Metaphysics  generalizes 
this  doctrine  and  appHes  it  to  the  world  at  large. 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  77 

Hence  the  world  is  a  process  of  interpretation  not 
in  its  wholeness  at  any  one  moment,  but  through  an 
infinite  series  of  acts  whereby  the  present  progress- 
ively interprets  the  past  to  the  future,  thus  con- 
stituting the  temporal  order.  Thus  the  universe 
is  one  vast  cosmic  process  of  humanity  moving  on 
to  its  goal  where  is  attained  an  all-embracing  unity 
of  consciousness.  ''The  absolute,  the  sole  and 
supreme  Reahty,"  is  the  entire  process  which  is 
essentially  social  as  made  up  of  many  individual 
selves.  The  aim  and  result  of  the  process  is  the 
Absolute  Self,  which  Professor  Royce  calls  "the 
ideal  community  (common  self)  of  all  mankind." 

Between  the  individual  self  on  its  way  to  the 
goal  are  various  "spiritual  communities,"  that  is, 
common  or  social  selves,  through  which  man  has 
closest  relations  to  the  immeasurably  vast  cosmic 
process,  which  is  conceived  as  a  process  of  coherent 
social  evolution.  Unity  of  consciousness  con- 
stitutes the  individual  self.  In  like  manner  a 
unity  of  consciousness  —  a  common  consciousness 
among  many  individuals  —  constitutes  a  commu- 
nity, namely,  a  common  self.  This  unity  of  con- 
sciousness is  based  upon  a  common  memory  and  a 
common  ideal  or  hope  among  many  individuals. 
As  a  social  being,  man  lives  in  communities.  The 
community  has  a  sort  of  organic  unity,  a  mind  of 
its  own,  and  behaves  like  a  conscious  unit  or  a 
"suprasensible  being."  The  notion  of  the  com- 
munity suggests  to  Professor  Royce  a  solution  of 


78  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

the  philosophical  problem  of  the  Many  and  the  One, 
and  also  gives  occasion  to  unfold  his  fundamental 
religious  doctrine  of  the  Two  Levels,  that  is,  man 
the  individual  and  man  the  community. 

Assuming  the  principle  that  religion  is  the  product 
of  certain  human  needs,  Professor  Royce  seeks  the 
origin  and  teaching  of  Christianity  in  Christian 
experience,  not  in  the  individual  religious  experience 
of  Professor  James,  but  in  "that  form  of  social 
religious  experience  which,  in  ideal,  the  Apostle 
Paul  viewed  as  the  experience  of  the  Church." 
For  religion  is  essentially  social,  in  Professor  Royce's 
view,  because  of  man's  essential  relation  to  the 
social  evolutive  process  of  the  cosmos.  He  holds 
that  the  human  individual  Jesus  is  not  the  founder 
of  Christianity  and  denies  that  the  Problem  of 
Christianity  can  be  solved  by  views  respecting  the 
person  of  Jesus.  For  Christianity  preaches  sal- 
vation and  salvation  cannot  come  from  an  indi- 
vidual, but  only  from  loyalty  to  a  community  of 
ideal  purpose.  Besides,  historical  evidence  as  to 
Christ's  teaching  is  insufficient.  "Humanly  speak- 
ing," Jesus  gave  "the  impetus"  to  the  movement 
in  preaching  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven,  and  humanly 
speaking  this  can  be  explained  by  "genius."  Hence 
the  modern  man  can  be  a  Christian  without  hold- 
ing any  definite  views  about  the  person  of  Christ. 
Nor  can  the  Apostle  Paul  be  considered  the  founder, 
for  what  he  taught  he  learned  from  the  religious 
experience    of    the    Christian    Church.     Professor 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  79 

Royce  holds  that  the  Christian  community  was  the 
human  founder  of  Christianity,  but  has  no  hypoth- 
esis about  the  origin  of  the  community  through  lack 
of  historical  evidence.  Yet  he  maintains  that  we 
have  "priceless  information  about  the  essence  of 
Christianity  of  the  Pauline  Churches  and  their 
actual  life."  The  interpretation  of  the  social  re- 
ligious experience  of  these  churches  reveals  three 
ideas  most  characteristic  of  primitive  Christianity 
—  viz.  the  Community,  the  Lost  State  of  the  nat- 
ural man.  Atonement  and  Grace.  The  discussion 
of  these  ideas  is  Professor  Royce's  contribution 
to  the  Problem  of  Christianity  on  the  basis  of  a 
social  study  of  Christian  origins. 

II.    The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Life 

Professor  Royce  holds  that  the  Problem  of  Chris- 
tianity is  the  Christian  Doctrine  of  Life.  He  says 
that  this  can  be  considered  in  a  twofold  light;  as 
the  product  of  human  evolution  and  the  outcome  of 
a  long  history,  and  as  the  product  of  the  social 
experience  of  the  Pauline  Churches.  In  the  former 
view  it  is  "the  problem  of  humanity";  in  the  latter 
"it  has  features  distinctively  Christian."  There- 
fore, he  maintains  that  the  doctrine  should  be 
analyzed  in  its  relation  to  the  whole  lesson  of  human 
history  and  in  the  light  of  a  philosophical  study  of 
this  history,  in  order  to  know  what  Christianity  is 
and  means  in  the  religious  history  of  the  race. 


8o  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE   IDEA 

The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Life  is  constituted  by 
the  Three  Ideas.  Professor  Royce  teaches  that 
these  ideas  have  "a  basis  in  human  nature,"  are 
"the  expressions  of  universal  human  needs,  inde- 
pendent of  Christianity,"  are  "the  verifiable  re- 
sults of  the  higher  social  religious  experience  of 
mankind,"  "can  be  estimated  and  put  into  practice 
without  presupposing  any  one  view  of  God  or  of 
revelation,"  and  are  "religious,  for  they  relate  to 
the  salvation  of  mankind."  This  aspect  is  their 
"human  and  empirical  aspect,"  for  they  furnish  "a 
purely  human  philosophy  of  loyalty"  and  yet  "are 
based  upon  metaphysical  truths  whose  significance 
is  more  than  human"  (Lect.  VIII). 

To  Professor  Royce  the  natural  condition  of  man 
is  a  state  of  social  chaos.  Man  is  an  animal  liv- 
ing in  communities.  These  communities  exist  in 
human  history  in  countless  different  forms  and 
grades  "of  which  the  visible  and  historical  Church 
is  one  instance."  From  the  communities  man  de- 
rives religion,  language,  civilization  and  all  his 
natural  powers.  Constant  tension  and  conflicts 
exist  between  self,  his  fellows  and  the  social  will, 
which  produce  consciousness  of  self:  that  is,  con- 
science. The  standard  of  the  social  will,  namely, 
the  law  of  St.  Paul,  is  an  attempt  to  bring  about 
social  harmony,  but  in  reality  creates  new  and  more 
complex  tensions  by  the  application  of  social  dis- 
cipline. Through  this  social  training  our  self-will 
is  developed  and  ideals  arise.     The  more  cultivated 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  8i 

the  training,  the  stronger  grows  the  self-will.  The 
evil  increases  and  the  burden  grows  heavier.  The 
individual  may  obey  (conduct),  but  he  inwardly 
revolts  (consciousness  of  conduct).  As  culture 
advances,  the  revolt  (distraction  of  will)  increases; 
for  high  social  cultivation  trains  Individualism. 
Thus  the  individual  is  by  nature  subject  to  an 
overwhelming  moral  burden  which  springs  from  the 
original  sin  of  social  contentiousness,  and  is  in- 
creased by  social  training  and  by  personal  guilt. 
His  natural  condition  is  one  of  sin,  for  the  sinfulness 
belongs  to  the  race  in  its  corporate  capacity  and 
the  social  order  breeds  conscious  sinners.  No 
act  of  his  can  save  him.  Escape  is  not  from  this 
type  of  cultivation  —  that  is,  the  law.  Help 
(salvation,  which  is  winning  the  true  goal  of  life) 
must  come  from  a  source  above  his  level  —  that  is, 
the  spirit,  which  rescues  him  and  lifts  him  from  his 
fallen  state. 

The  higher  source,  whence  salvation  comes,  is, 
according  to  Professor  Royce,  the  Community. 
For  communities  tend  to  be  organized  into  more 
composite  communities  of  still  higher  grade,  of 
vaster  conscious  unity.  Through  the  community 
the  individual  is  most  closely  related  to  the  world 
process,  shares  its  spirit  and  lives  its  life,  a  life  of 
ever-increasing  conscious  unity.  Apart  from  the 
spirit  and  life  of  the  community,  the  individual  is 
viewed  as  "morally  detached"  and  in  *'a  lost  state." 
Hence  we  read  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Community 


82  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

is  "a  doctrine  about  the  being,  nature  and  mani- 
festation of  God." 

Here  is  unfolded  Professor  Royce's  doctrine  about 
the  two  levels  of  human  existence:  man,  the  in- 
dividual, on  the  level  of  the  flesh  and  the  law,  and 
man,  the  community,  on  the  level  of  the  spirit.  He 
holds  that  they  are  levels  of  mental  human  beings 
and  differ  as  two  grades  of  human  life.  The  in- 
dividual regards  the  community  as  higher,  nobler, 
more  powerful,  more  enduring  than  himself,  and 
shows  this  practical  faith  by  devoted  loyalty  to 
its  interests.  He  no  longer  loves  according  to  the 
flesh  —  that  is,  as  a  mere  individual  loves  a  mere 
individual  —  but  according  to  the  spirit,  and  this 
love  is  loyalty.  To  him  loyalty  becomes  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  personal  life.  The  loyal 
*'are,  in  ideal,  essentially  kin,"  in  them  all  is  "a 
spirit  essentially  one,"  and  as  loyalty  begets  loyalty, 
the  logical  development  of  the  loyal  spirit  is  "the 
rise  of  the  consciousness  of  the  ideal  of  a  universal 
community  of  the  loyal."  Hence  the  higher  of  the 
two  levels  is  essentially,  endlessly  and  divinely 
above  the  individual  level,  and  to  act  as  a  member 
of  such  a  community  is  to  win  what  religion  calls 
salvation.  This  loyalty,  namely,  thorough-going 
devotion  to  a  cause  which  unites  many  selves  in 
one,  appeals  to  the  individual  by  fixing  attention 
on  a  life  incomparably  vaster  than  his  own,  and 
belongs  to  no  one  time,  country  or  people.  Hence 
experience  shows  that  salvation  for  man  lies  in  the 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  83 

purely  human  philosophy  of  loyalty  and  loyalty  is 
a  religion,  for  it  creates  a  new  type  of  consciousness 
—  love  for  the  community  —  and  thus  effects  a 
spiritual  transformation  in  the  individual. 

The  "Lost  State"  includes  not  only  the  "morally 
detached"  individual  —  that  is,  one  who  has  not 
found  his  ideal  community,  but  also  the  individual 
who,  having  found  it,  has  lost  it  by  proving  false 
to  the  ideal  —  a  traitor.  Is  there  any  reconcilia- 
tion between  him  and  his  community,  his  moral 
world?  Not  on  the  part  of  the  traitor;  his  deed 
cannot  be  undone  and  by  it  he  belongs  to  the 
"Hell  of  the  Irrevocable."  But  atonement  can  be 
given  the  community  through  heroic  deeds  per- 
formed on  his  behalf  by  some  faithful  servant  in 
whom  the  very  spirit  of  the  community  is  incar- 
nated. Treason's  lost  causes  have  proved  to  be 
opportunities  for  humanity's  most  triumphant 
loyalty.  It  is  a  human  triumph  of  the  creative 
spirit  of  humanity  that  could  not  undo  the  trea- 
son, but,  through  skill  and  ingenuity,  effected  the 
heroic  act  which  transformed  the  meaning  of  the 
treason  and  made  the  world  better  by  a  trans- 
figuration of  loss  into  gain.  In  illustration, 
Professor  Royce  cites  the  story  of  Joseph  and  his 
brethren,  where  Joseph  is  the  symbol  for  the  spirit 
of  the  family  and  the  result  of  the  atoning  act  is  a 
more  perfect  family  unity.  Through  atonement 
the  traitor  enters  into  a  saving  union  with  the 
community,   for    his    act    of    treason,   now    trans- 


84  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

figured,  is  part  of  the  community  life.  Hence 
atonement  is  the  function  in  which  the  life  of 
the  community  culminates.  It  teaches  that  in 
due  time  loyal  love  will  oppose  its  atoning  deeds  to 
treason's  sin.  Professor  Royce  holds  that  Chris- 
tianity expressed  this  teaching  in  the  symbolic 
form  of  a  report  concerning  the  supernatural  work 
of  Christ,  and  humanity  must  express  it  through  the 
devotion,  genius,  skill,  labor  of  its  loyal  servants 
in  whom  its  spirit  is  incarnated.  The  teaching  and 
the  symbol,  he  adds,  "are  two  sides  of  the  same 
life  —  at  once  human  and  divine." 

The  doctrine  of  the  two  levels  arising  from  the 
study  of  human  experience  is,  according  to  Pro- 
fessor Royce,  the  doctrine  out  of  which  the  whole  of 
Christianity  grows.  For  Christianity,  he  tells  us, 
was  founded  on  the  idea  of  a  community,  whose 
spirit  or  life  was  the  spirit  or  life  of  its  risen  Lord, 
held  as  a  present  possession  by  an  ideal  common 
memory  of  a  past  event,  "the  rising  of  Jesus  to  the 
realm  of  the  spirit,"  and  by  an  ideal  common  hope 
of  a  future  event,  when,  according  to  the  Apostle, 
"we  should  rise  with  him"  to  the  spirit,  with  love 
enlivening  and  completing  both  memory  and  hope. 
This  belief,  he  says,  grew  out  of  the  Master's  teach- 
ing about  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven.  Professor 
Royce  holds  that,  historically  speaking,  Christian- 
ity never  appeared  as  the  religion  taught  by  the 
Master,  but  as  an  interpretation  of  his  teaching, 
going  beyond  it,  and  this  was  due  to  the  presence 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  85 

of  the  founder's  spirit.  The  enlargement  of  doc- 
trine is  shown  especially,  he  says,  in  the  fact  that 
the  Master,  like  other  religious  leaders  in  the 
world's  history,  emphasized  God  and  our  neighbor 
only.  Whereas  the  Apostle  Paul  introduced  a 
third  being,  a  corporate  Entity,  "the  Body  of 
Christ,"  which  he  claims  to  be  ''a  new  revelation" 
discovered  in  his  experience  of  an  apostle  as  the 
product  of  the  Ufe  of  the  Christian  community 
itself  and  due  to  ''the  spirit  of  his  Lord."  To 
Paul  the  Church  was  "the  very  presence  of  his 
Lord,"  at  once  "a  fact  of  present  experience  and 
a  divine  creation,"  hence  "a  mystery,"  "whose 
origin  was  wholly  miraculous."  Professor  Royce 
holds  that  this  belief  "constitutes  a  new  beginning 
in  the  evolution  of  Christianity."  The  Master  had 
laid  stress  on  the  value  of  individual  life,  but  St. 
Paul,  as  also  Professor  Royce,  holds  individuality 
to  be  the  source  of  all  our  sin  and  woe.  Only  by 
ceasing  to  be  a  mere  individual,  through  love  for 
the  Body  of  Christ,  can  one  be  saved.  Thus  the 
neighbor  is  transfigured  as  a  member  of  the  Beloved 
Community.  We  love  him  not  as  an  individual  — 
this  the  Master  taught,  but  as  a  member  of  this 
divine  community  which,  in  ideal,  is  one  conscious 
unity  of  all  mankind.  The  spirit  of  the  "risen 
Lord,"  which  is  the  life  of  the  Body,  through  love 
becomes  our  own.  Hence  love  is  loyalty  and 
loyalty  is  Christian  faith  and  Christian  faith  is 
grace  and  grace  is  the  mystery  of  the  incarnation  in 


86  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

another  form.  Thus  salvation  comes  through  loy- 
alty, for  loyalty  involves  "an  essentially  new  type 
of  consciousness"  —  that  is,  "the  consciousness  of 
one  who  loves  the  community  as  a  person." 

Professor  Royce  holds  that  the  Master's  teach- 
ing concerning  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven,  which  the 
Apostle  presented  in  a  new  revelation  as  the  Body 
of  Christ,  "developed  into  the  conception  which  the 
historic  Church  formed  of  its  own  mission,"  but 
says  that  the  true  Church  is  "one  endlessly  and 
conscious  human  spirit,  whose  Hfe  is  to  be  hved  on 
its  own  level";  hence  invisible  and  still  to  be 
created  by  a  process  of  evolution. 

Therefore,  according  to  Professor  Royce,  an 
examination  into  the  Christian  Doctrine  of  Life 
shows  (i)  how  the  spirit,  the  community,  the  process 
of  salvation,  are  genuine  realities  transcending  any 
of  their  human  embodiments;  (2)  that  Christianity 
is  the  most  effective  expression  of  religious  loyalty 
which  the  human  race  has,  in  its  corporate  capacity, 
expressed;  (3)  that  the  rock  upon  which  the  true 
and  ideal  church  is  built  is  the  doctrine  that  the 
community,  wherein  dwells  the  divine  redeeming 
spirit,  is,  through  loyalty,  the  source  of  salvation. 

Ill,    The  Essence  of  Christianity 

The  aim  and  result  of  the  work  under  discussion 
is  to  point  out  what  is  vital  in  Christianity,  so  that 
the  modern  man  may  know  what  to  hold  and  be  a 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  87 

Christian.  Professor  Royce  gives  the  solution  of 
the  problem  by  way  of  an  illustration.  Let  us 
suppose  the  case  of  a  young,  highly  educated  Greek 
philosopher  who  became  a  convert  of  the  Pauline 
Church  and,  after  living  the  life  of  an  earnest  Chris- 
tian, at  length  dies.  He  comes  to  life  in  our  time, 
is  carefully  instructed  in  our  art,  history,  philos- 
ophy, and  then  is  brought  face  to  face  with  Chris- 
tianity as  it  now  exists.  How,  asks  the  Professor, 
can  he,  astonished  and  saddened  at  the  essential 
changes  which  have  taken  place,  retain  his  Chris- 
tian faith?     And  answers: 

"The  one  thing  he  must  hold  fast  is  the  Pauline 
Doctrine  of  the  presence  of  the  redeeming  divine 
spirit  in  the  living  church.  This  is  the  essence  of 
Christianity  in  the  Pauline  Churches  and  in  all  the 
subsequent  ages  of  Christian  development.  Thus 
he  will  keep  in  touch  with  historical  Christianity. 
His  church  will  neither  be  the  official  church  nor 
the  sect.  His  test  of  the  church  will  be  simply 
this,  that  it  actually  unifies  all  mankind  and 
makes  them  one  in  the  divine  spirit.  All  else  in 
Paul's  teaching  he  may  come  to  regard  as  symbol 
or  as  legend.  This  is  in  essence  the  faith  of  the 
Apostles"  (Lect.  XV). 

This  solution  sounds  strange  coming  from  such 
a  source.  Professor  Royce's  volumes  are  a  treatise 
in  religious  Social  Psychology.  A  fundamental 
principle  of  this  Psychology  is  "that  religion  springs 
from  our  conscious  needs"  and  he  expressly  states 


88  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

that  "the  religious  needs  of  the  modern  man  are 
different  from  any  ever  before  experienced  and  still 
greater  changes  will  come  in  the  near  future" 
(Vol.  I,  p.  387).  Why  not  then  give  the  redivivus 
young  Greek  a  course  in  religious  Social  Psychology 
and  prepare  him  not  only  to  accept  a  changed 
Christianity,  but  to  look  with  suspicion  upon  a 
Christianity  that  has  not  changed?  Again  Pro- 
fessor Royce  teaches  that  the  "person"  or  "self" 
is  not  "a  datum,"  but  "a  life"  or  "a  process" 
and  applies  the  description  to  the  individual  self, 
the  social  self  and  the  absolute  self,  of  which  the 
world-process  is  the  expression.  The  social  or 
common  self  —  that  is,  the  Community  —  is  the 
basic  idea  in  his  treatise  and  has  a  marvelous  rich- 
ness of  possible  expansion  without  any  limitation 
or  interruption  so  far  as  the  nature  of  the  common 
self  is  concerned.  Now  both  experience  and  science 
tell  that  growth  or  development  is  a  law  of  life. 
On  this  doctrine  of  the  self,  I  ask  why  does  Pro- 
fessor Royce  think  that  his  young  friend  should  be 
surprised  or  that  he  should  regard  the  PauHne 
community  as  "a  datum"  or  a  fixture  and  not  as 
"a  life"  or  "a  process"?  In  the  emergency  the 
simple  and  consistent  course  for  the  author  is, 
not  to  forget  his  own  philosophy,  but  to  give  a 
clear  exposition  of  his  theory  of  knowledge  and 
of  metaphysical  idealism  to  his  perplexed  friend. 
Moreover,  Professor  Royce  holds  that  interpreta- 
tion is  the  ruling  category  of  mental  life  and  of  the 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  89 

world-process,  and  that  it  is  of  the  nature  of  inter- 
pretation to  create  something  new.  Hence  our 
mental  life,  our  code  of  morality,  everything  about 
us,  change  at  each  succeeding  moment,  as  also 
does  the  conscious  time-stream  change.  He  ap- 
plies this  principle  to  the  PauHne  community  and 
says  that  this  being,  the  Body  of  Christ,  first  dis- 
covered the  three  ideas  constituting  the  Christian 
Doctrine  of  Life  in  the  effort  to  interpret  the 
Master's  teaching,  that  these  ideas  were  a  "new 
revelation"  and  *'a  new  beginning  in  the  evolution 
of  Chris'tianity,"  and  that,  furthermore,  the  dog- 
mas of  the  Trinity  and  of  the  Incarnation  were 
only  symbols  whereby  the  Pauline  consciousness 
attempted  to  set  forth  the  relations  between  the 
Absolute,  the  Spirit  of  the  Pauline  community, 
and  the  human  founder  Jesus.  Now  the  young 
man  should  be  aware  of  this.  The  reader  will  be 
forced  to  conclude  that  the  Greek  was  totally 
ignorant  both  of  Professor  Royce's  philosophy  and 
of  the  evolutive  life  of  the  PauHne  Churches  as  he 
has  described  this  life. 

In  presenting  a  symbolic  interpretation  of  Chris- 
tianity, Professor  Royce  is  influenced  by  his  theory 
of  knowledge,  which  exhibits  the  "idea"  as  a 
conscious  idea  striving  and  by  his  metaphysical 
IdeaHsm  which  considers  the  universe  as  an  ideal 
evolution  of  an  endlessly  creative  and  conscious 
human  spirit.  This  evolutive  spirit  he  calls  the 
Universal    or    the    Beloved    Community,    namely, 


go  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

the  whole  common  consciousness  of  mankind. 
This  is  the  one  reality;  all  else  are  figures  or  symbols 
—  partial  embodiments  of  the  reality.  Hence 
God  is  a  symbol  for  the  community  as  a  whole. 
The  historical  Church  is  a  partial  embodiment 
and  the  ideal  Church  is  another  name  for  the  com- 
munity. The  ideas  making  up  the  Christian  doc- 
trine of  Life,  the  parables  of  Jesus,  the  dogmas 
of  the  Church  are  symbols  of  the  evolution  process 
in  whole  or  in  part.  The  human  individual  Jesus 
is  the  incarnation  of  the  Spirit  or  life  of  humanity, 
just  as  the  Christian  Church  is  the  incarnation  of 
the  Spirit  of  Jesus,  and  as  we  ourselves  are  the 
incarnations  of  humanity's  spirit  or  life,  when, 
through  loyalty,  we  become  one  with  this  life  or, 
through  heroic  deeds,  we  atone  for  humanity's 
wrongs.  Hence  Professor  Royce  questions  the 
historical  truth  of  the  Gospels  and  holds  that  the 
life  of  Jesus  was  "the  object  of  many  legendary 
reports  so  framed  that  they  include  a  symboHsm 
whereby  a  portion  of  the  true  faith  is  expressed." 

This  explanation  is  not  new.  He  proposes  for 
our  acceptance  the  mythical  theory  of  Strauss 
written  not  as  a  historian  nor  as  a  theologian,  but 
as  a  disciple  of  Hegel's  Idealism.  Strauss  viewed  the 
Hegelian  process  in  its  subjective  aspect,  sought 
the  basic  truths  of  Christianity  in  the  early  Chris- 
tian consciousness,  regarded  Christ  of  the  New 
Testament  as  the  outcome  of  this  consciousness 
and    held   that  legendary   reports   and   embellish- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  91 

merits  were  merely  symbols  for  spiritual  ideas.  But 
the  theory  was  too  fanciful,  could  not  withstand 
the  comparison  of  the  truthful  matter-of-fact  char- 
acter of  the  New  Testament  writings  with  the 
Apocrypha  and  was  rejected  by  scholars.  In  Old 
and  New  Faith,  1870,  Strauss  confessed  to  disap- 
pointment at  the  outcome  of  his  labors, 

IV,  Criticism 

Professor  Royce  writes  that  he  has  "approached 
this  study  not  as  a  historian,  nor  as  a  theologian, 
but  as  a  philosopher."  Therefore  the  criticism 
regards  him  as  a  philosopher  only. 

To  him  the  community  is  the  fundamental  no- 
tion in  the  religious  history  of  the  race  and  in 
Christianity.  The  community  is  the  common  self 
and,  he  says,  is  constituted  by  a  common  conscious- 
ness. Thus  the  definition  of  the  community  is  based 
upon  the  definition  of  the  self.  He  holds  that  the 
self  is  constituted  by  conscious  memory.  Hence 
the  individual  is  a  self  because  he  possesses  a  pres- 
ent unity  of  conscious  memory  ideally  extended  to 
the  future.  But  the  teaching  that  consciousness 
constitutes  the  self  is  an  error  in  philosophy  coming 
down  from  Locke  and  Kant,  Conscious  memory 
makes  me  aware  of  my  personal  identity  and  pre- 
supposes it.  Memory  or  loss  of  memory  does  not 
change  me  or  what  /  did.  Forgetfulness,  aphasia, 
dementia^  delirium,  sleep,  do  not  change  the  per- 


92  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

son  or  self,  but  produce  different  states  of  the  same 
self.  Hence  a  distinction  should  be  made  be- 
tween self  and  the  states  of  the  self.  Hence  the 
notion  of  Professor  Royce's  community  is  radically 
erroneous. 

Again,  in  describing  the  natural  state  of  man,  he 
adopts  the  teaching  of  Hobbes  and  Spencer.  But 
in  fact  this  teaching  is  only  a  philosophical  theory 
and  not  proved.  Rousseau  and  his  followers  hold 
the  peaceful  state  of  the  natural  man.  This  opinion 
is  a  philosophical  theory  also,  and  not  proved.  There- 
fore upon  a  philosophical  theory  not  proved  and 
not  universally  accepted  by  anthropologists  he 
bases  his  doctrine  of  the  origin  of  the  community. 
What  becomes  of  his  criterion  that  the  consensus 
of  opinion  is  necessary  for  a  scientific  hypothesis? 

From  the  notion  of  the  community  springs  Pro- 
fessor Royce's  doctrine  of  the  Two  Levels,  which 
he  claims  to  be  the  fundamental  principle  in  re- 
ligious history  and  in  Christianity.  Now  in  fact 
the  careful  reader  distinguishes  three  levels  —  viz. 
the  individual,  the  community  actually  existing,  and 
the  ideal  community,  namely,  of  ideal  purpose. 
He  draws  on  some  current  sociological  psychology 
to  show  that  actual  communities  have  a  mental 
and  ethical  unity  of  their  own  which  makes 
them  appear  to  the  individual  as  "Suprapersonal 
beings."  He  leaves  the  reader  to  imply  that  all 
this  applies  to  ideal  communities.  But  this  implica- 
tion is  not  at  all  clear.    True,  actual  communities 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CHRISTIANITY  93 

may  not  be  made  up  of  soul-mates  or  affinities, 
but  they  have  a  moral  unity,  or,  to  use  the  author's 
thought,  a  unity  constituted  by  the  spirit.  Why 
then  could  not  the  individual  find  "his  fulfil- 
ment and  moral  destiny"  in  devoted  loyalty  to 
actual  communities?  Furthermore,  this  current 
sociological  psychology  is  based  on  the  definition 
of  the  self,  which  was  shown  to  be  erroneous,  and 
regards  man  as  an  animal  progressively  evolving 
a  human  nature  —  another  philosophical  theory 
not  by  any  means  proved. 

The  fundamental  error  of  Professor  Royce  is 
his  teaching  concerning  the  nature  of  man  and  of 
mental  life.  In  denying  immediate  perception  he 
falls  into  Phenomenal  IdeaKsm  which  develops  into 
a  Metaphysical  Idealism  where  idea,  spirit,  human- 
ity are  regarded  as  the  only  realities.  But  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  these  are  only  personifications.  He  does 
not  seem  to  be  aware  that  notion,  judgment  and 
reasoning  are  fundamental  elements  in  our  mental 
life.  Finally  he  defines  the  "idea"  in  terms  of  will. 
But  this  is  contrary  to  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness. That  intellect  and  will  are  different  is  an 
elemental  fact  of  conscious  experience.  The  intel- 
lect is  the  cognitive  mode  or  form  of  our  conscious 
life;  whereas  the  will  is  the  source  of  motive  power. 
A  psychologist  would  be  no  more  justified  in  com- 
bining intellect  and  will  than  would  be  a  physiologist 
in  blending  the  afferent  and  efferent  nerves  in  one 
act.    Moreover,  these  faculties  are  unequal  in  the 


94  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

individual.  Intellect  and  will  are  called  modes  in 
which  our  soul-life  is  manifested.  Hence,  though 
distinct  from  each  other,  they  are  not  separated  in 
the  sense  that  they  are  two  entities,  but  unite  in  a 
unity  by  virtue  of  the  spiritual  principle  —  viz. 
the  soul,  whose  modes  of  activity  they  are. 

Thus  the  most  noteworthy  publication  of  the 
year  on  the  philosophy  of  religion,  carefully  con- 
structed and  written  in  beautiful  language  with  a 
wealth  of  illustration,  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  based 
upon  an  erroneous  definition  of  the  "idea"  —  the 
most  fundamental  and  apparently  the  simplest 
element  in  mental  Ufe. 


CHAPTER   V 

PRAGMATISM   AND   HUMANISM 

The  term  Humanism  is  used  by  Professor  Schil- 
ler to  designate  a  movement  which  he  proclaims 
to  be  a  reform  and  an  advance  in  Philosophy.  This 
reform,  he  assures  us,  is  made  necessary  by  the 
collapse  of  current  metaphysical  systems  and  by 
the  great  progress  in  Physical  Science.  That  the 
call  for  reform  and  reconstruction  in  Philosophy 
is  urgent,  no  candid  student  of  modern  thought 
can  deny.  The  truth  of  the  reasons  alleged  is  like- 
wise patent  to  the  ordinary  mind.  But  the  reform 
proposed  demands  attention.  This  is  the  purpose 
of  the  present  study,  viz.  to  show  that  the  philos- 
ophy outlined  by  Professor  Schiller  is  vitiated 
throughout  by  a  method  which,  far  from  proving 
to  be  the  harbinger  of  peace  and  reconciliation, 
tends  directly  to  increase  the  warring  confusion 
of  contemporary  philosophic  thought. 


I.  Notion  of  Humanism 

The  term.  Humanism,  as  employed  by  Professor 
Schiller,  does  not  directly  designate  a  philosophical 


96  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

system;  it  rather  is  restricted  to  express  an  atti- 
tude of  mind  and  a  resultant  method  which  tends 
by  ever-increasing  application  to  construct  a  sys- 
tem. Professor  Schiller  says  that  it  is  "in  itself 
the  simplest  of  philosophic  standpoints,  viz.  the 
perception  that  the  philosophic  problem  conceives 
human  beings  striving  to  comprehend  a  world 
of  human  experience  by  the  resources  of  human 
minds"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  12),  that  "man's 
complete  satisfaction  shall  be  the  conclusion  Phi- 
losophy must  aim  at"  {ih.,  p.  13).  Thus  its  starting 
point,  its  subject-matter,  its  aim  is  man  or  what  is 
human,  and  by  human  is  understood  "human  ex- 
perience." The  world  is  known  only  and  in  so  far 
as  it  enters  into  and  is  colored  by  this  "human 
experience."  On  these  grounds  Humanism  is  and 
has  been  rightly  called  Personal  Idealism. 

In  manipulating  this  world  of  experience  Human- 
ism accepts  and  applies  the  Pragmatic  method.  Its 
central  principle  therefore  is  "the  purposiveness 
of  human  thought  and  the  teleological  character 
of  its  methods"  {Humanism,  Pref.,  p.  xiii).  Hence 
it  turns  from  beginnings  with  their  first  principles 
and  self-evident  truths  and  looks  to  the  end  singly 
and  alone.  The  purpose  of  the  act  alone  is  and  can 
be  the  test  and  gauge  of  its  worth.  Pragmatism 
restricts  this  method  to  the  theory  of  knowledge; 
whereas  Humanism  extends  it  to  every  phase  and 
feature  of  human  life.  Thus  "Pragmatism  will 
seem  a  special  application  of  Humanism  to  the 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  97 

theory  of  knowledge,"  and  Humanism  involves 
"the  expansion  of  Pragmatism."  Hence  Human- 
ism is  "more  universal"  as  possessing  "a  method 
applicable  universally,  to  ethics,  to  aesthetics,  to 
metaphysics,  to  theology,  to  every  concern  of  man, 
as  well  as  to  the  theory  of  knowledge"  {Studies 
in  Humanism,  p.  16).  In  this  hght  Pragmatism  is 
"the  forerunner  and  vice-regent"  of  Humanism 
{Humanism,  Pref.,  p.  xix),  or  "an  aspect  of  our 
Humanism"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  437). 

Pragmatism,  therefore,  is  concerned  directly  with 
human  thought.  Humanism  with  human  life  in  every 
form  and  under  every  aspect.  But  if  we  bear  in 
mind  that  with  Pragmatism  and  Humanism  alike 
thought  is  experiencing,  and  experiencing  is  con- 
duct or  life,  any  real  difference  fades  away.  Hence 
Pragmatism  and  Humanism  are  terms  designating 
the  same  thing,  e.g.  human  experience,  considered 
under  different  viewpoints.  Pragmatism  sets  forth 
a  method  of  thought;  Humanism  accepts  this 
method,  but  lays  special  stress  on  its  contents. 
From  these  contents  our  thought  takes  human 
form  and  color.  Humanism,  writes  Professor  Schil- 
ler, "insists  on  leaving  in  the  whole  rich  luxuriance 
of  individual  minds,  instead  of  compressing  them 
all  into  a  single  type  of  'mind'  feigned  to  be  one 
and  immutable"  {ih.,  p.  13). 

The  constituent  element  in  Humanism,  therefore, 
is  a  psychological  method.  This  it  has  in  common 
with  Pragmatism.     In  essence  this  method  is:  all 


98  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

mental  life  is  purposive  {ib.,  p.  lo).  Hence 
mental  life  is  described  in  voluntarist  terms, 
i.e.  in  terms  of  will  {ib.,  p.  128).  As  a  method 
Humanism  is  defined  "as  a  conscious  applica- 
tion of  a  teleological  psychology,  which  implies, 
ultimately,  a  voluntaristic  metaphysic"  {ib.,  p.  12). 
Professor  Schiller,  however,  is  reluctant  to  con- 
sider Humanism  a  metaphysic.  Neither  Pragmatism 
nor  Humanism,  he  says,  "necessitates  a  metaphysic; 
both  are  methods"  {ib.,  p.  16).  Yet  he  admits  that 
"if  we  have  the  courage  and  persistence  in  thinking 
to  the  end,  we  should  arrive  at  Voluntarism"  and 
that  "Pragmatism  may,  somewhat  definitely,  point 
to  a  metaphysic"  {ib.,  p.  11).  The  reasons  for  his 
reluctance  are  that  "we  may  stop"  without  think- 
ing to  the  end,  but  this  would  be  at  the  cost  of 
courage  or  consistency;  and  that  "metaphysics  is 
the  science  of  the  final  synthesis  of  all  the  data  of 
our  experience.  But  de  facto  these  data  are  insufl&- 
cient  and  individual"  {ib.,  p.  17).  This  only  shows 
that  Humanism  is  not  a  metaphysical  system  per- 
fected in  every  detail.  Hence  in  its  basic  principle, 
in  its  working  and  in  its  structure.  Humanism  is 
essentially  a  metaphysic.  Professor  Schiller  is 
aware  of  this  truth,  for  he  writes  that  "though 
Pragmatism  and  Humanism  are  only  methods  in 
themselves,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  methods 
may  be  turned  into  metaphysics  by  accepting 
them  as  ultimate"  {ib.,  p.  19);  that  "methods  may 
have    metaphysical    affinities,"    thus,    e.g.    Prag- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   HUMANISM  99 

matism  is  conceived  as  derivative  from  "a  vol- 
untarist  metaphysic,"  and  "Humanism  may  be 
affiliated  to  metaphysical  personalism"  {ib.,  p.  19); 
that  "methods  may  point  to  metaphysical  con- 
clusions," e.g.  "Pragmatism  may  point  to  the  ulti- 
mate reality  of  human  activity  and  freedom,  to 
the  plasticity  and  incompleteness  of  reality,  to  the 
reahty  of  the  world-process  in  time,"  and  "Human- 
ism, in  addition,  may  point  to  the  personality  of 
whatever  cosmic  principle  we  can  postulate  as 
ultimate  and  to  its  kinship  and  sympathy  with 
man"  {ib.,  p.  19). 

The  character  of  this  Voluntarist  Metaphysic  is 
revealed  through  an  analysis  of  its  basic  principle, 
viz.  all  mental  life  is  purposive.  This  principle  must 
be  regarded  not  in  the  abstract  but  in  the  concrete. 
Thinking  therefore  is  willing,  and  willing  on  and 
in  the  contents  of  experience  is  conduct  or  conduct 
in  the  making.  In  this  light  Humanism  is  essen- 
tially a  philosophy  of  human  life.  It  aims  at  man's 
complete  satisfaction,  and  by  satisfaction  is  under- 
stood harmony.  Hence  it  "takes  as  the  sole 
essential  problem  of  philosophy  the  harmonizing 
of  a  life"  (ib.,  p.  227)  through  "the  all-pervading 
purposiveness  of  human  conduct"  {ib.,  p.  128)  and 
reinstates  "conduct  as  the  all-controlling  influence 
in  every  department  of  life"  {Humanism,  p.  4). 

In  the  light  of  such  a  teleological  psychology, 
decisive  weight  is  given  "to  the  conceptions  of 
Purpose    and    End,"   i.e.    "the    purposiveness    of 


lOO  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

all  our  actual  thinking  and  the  relation  of  all  our 
actual  realities  to  the  ends  of  our  practical  life." 
Now  such  a  metaphysic  is  essentially  ethical.  It 
means  "the  sway  of  human  valuations  on  every 
region  of  our  experience."  Hence  Logic  and 
Metaphysics  are  subordinated  to  Ethics  and 
''thus  rejuvenated."  "The  ethical  conception  of 
Good  assumes  supreme  authority  over  the  logical 
conception  of  True  and  the  metaphysical  concep- 
tion of  Real.'''  "Our  apprehension  of  the  Real,  our 
comprehension  of  the  True,  is  always  effected  by 
beings  who  are  aiming  at  the  attainment  of  some 
Good,  and  choose  between  rival  claimants  to  reality 
and  truth  according  to  the  services  they  render" 
{il.,  p.  8).  "Neither  the  question  of  Fact,  therefore, 
nor  the  question  of  knowledge  can  be  raised  without 
raising  also  the  question  of  Value.  Our  "'Facts' 
when  analyzed  turn  out  to  be  'Values,'  and  the 
conception  of  'Value'  therefore  becomes  more 
ultimate  than  that  of  'Fact.'  Our  valuations  thus 
pervade  our  whole  experience,  and  affect  whatever 
'fact,'  whatever  'knowledge'  we  consent  to  recog- 
nize." Hence  as  "there  is  no  hiowing  without 
valuing^'  and  as  "knowledge  is  a  form  of  value,  or, 
in  other  words,  a  factor  in  a  Good,"  "the  founda- 
tions of  metaphysics  have  actually  been  found  to 
lie  in  ethics"  {ih.,  p.  lo). 

Humanism,  therefore,  may  be  described  as  a 
Personal  Idealism  conceived  as  a  Metaphysical 
Voluntarist  Ethics.     To  Professor  Schiller  such  a 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  loi 

metaphysic  is  "an  ideal,  the  theory  of  a  perfect 
life"  (Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  21). 


II.  A  Personal  Idealism 

The  starting  point  and  subject-matter  of  Human- 
ism is  "Experience."  For  this  reason  it  claims  to  be 
an  Empiricism  {Humanism,  p.  229).  But  its  use  of 
the  term  "Experience"  does  not  imply  that  things 
exist  in  themselves  apart  from  our  knowing.  This 
Professor  Schiller  expressly  denies.  He  holds  that 
"before  there  can  be  a  real  for  us  at  all,  the  Real 
must  be  knowable,"  that  "the  true  formulation 
therefore  of  the  ultimate  question  of  metaphysics 
must  become  what  can  I  know  as  real,"  and  that 
"hence  Ontology,  the  theory  of  Reality,  comes  to 
be  conditioned  by  Epistemology,  the  theory  of 
Knowledge"  {ib.,  p.  9).  Hence  reality  is  what  is 
"known  as"  and  "in  so  far  as  known  as."  For 
"the  fact  we  start  from,  and  must  continue  to 
start  from,  is  not  a  'reality'  which  is  'independent' 
but  one  which  is  experienced";  and  hence  reality 
"is  never  extra-mental"  (Studies  in  Humanism, 
p.  482). 

Humanism  is,  therefore,  not  a  Real  but  an  Ideal 
Phenomenalism.  Fact  is  not  independent,  but 
dependent  and  relative  to  our  knowing  {ib.,  p. 
181).  Professor  Schiller  distinguishes  two  mean- 
ings of  "fact."  "In  the  wider  sense  everything 
is   'fact'    qua    experienced,    including    imaginings, 


I02  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

illusions,  errors,  hallucinations."  "In  the  stricter 
sense  facts  are  products  of  this  experience  ob- 
tained by  processes  of  selection  and  valuation " 
initiated  and  controlled  "by  interests,  desires  and 
emotions"  and  therefore  "immensely  arbitrary" 
{ib.,  pp.  i86,  187,  188).  Hence  he  speaks  of  "the 
individual  variations  as  to  the  acceptance  of 
fact,"  says  that  "our  neglect  of  facts  really  tends 
to  make  them  unreal"  and  that  "without  a  process 
of  selection  by  us,  there  are  no  real  facts  for  us" 
(ib.) .  In  this  sense  he  writes  "  facts  are  far  from  being 
rigid,  irresistible,  triumphant  forces  of  nature; 
rather  they  are  artificial  products  of  our  selection, 
of  our  interests,  of  our  hopes,  of  our  fears.  The 
shape  they  assume  depends  on  our  point  of  view, 
their  meaning  on  our  purpose,  their  value  on  the 
use  we  put  them  to;  nay,  perhaps,  their  very  reahty 
on  our  willingness  to  accept  them"  {ib.,  p.  371).  The 
distinctions  of  "  fact,"  "truth,""  reahty"  are  distinc- 
tions made  within  experience.  The  "objective"  is 
"that  which  he  aims  at  and  from"  {ib.,  p.  189), 
likewise  within  experience.  Hence  the  starting 
point,  the  data,  the  aim,  the  results  of  the  process 
are  all  based  on  and  within  experience. 

Thus  "in  the  end  our  world  is  human  experi- 
ence" {Humanism,  p.  346).  A  world  which  we 
neither  did  nor  could  experience  would  not  be 
one  which  we  need  argue  or  trouble  about.  This 
is  the  doctrine  of  Personal  Idealism  and  leads 
directly  to  Solipsism.      Indeed  Professor   Schiller 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  103 

says  that  ''Solipsism  is  intellectually  quite  an  en- 
tertaining doctrine,  and  not  logically  untenable; 
it  is  only  practically  uncomfortable"  {Studies  in 
Humanism,  p.  472).  Therefore  whereas  "the  fun- 
damental dictum  of  Idealism  must  be  formulated 
as  being  that  Reality  is  'my'  experience''  {ib.,  p. 
469),  still  it  "is  not  pragmatically  workable  and 
must  be  expanded  and  subjected  to  a  modification 
which  amounts  to  a  correction"  {ib.,  p.  470).  Thus 
he  speaks  of  "reality  largely  'ejected'  or  extruded 
from  my  very  consciousness  and  endowed  with  an 
'independent'  existence  or  'transcendent'  reality" 
and  of  "the  fact  that  we  refused  to  accept  as  ours 
the  whole  of  our  experience"  {ib.,  p.  470). 

Again  the  basic  principle  of  Humanism  is  the 
famous  saying  of  Pythagoras  that  "man  is  the 
measure  of  all  things."  Professor  Schiller  accepts 
it  in  the  individual  and  in  the  generic  sense,  in- 
cluding man  and  men.  He  holds  that  the  principle 
is  "most  important"  because  ''it  emphasizes  the 
subjective  factor,"  that  "whatever  appear  to  each, 
that  really  is  to  him  and  also  to  others  in  so  far  as 
they  have  to  deal  with  him  and  his  ideas,"  that 
"reality  is  for  us  relative  to  our  faculties,"  that 
"truth  is  a  valuation"  hence  "subjective  judg- 
ments vary  in  value  and  a  selection  of  the  more 
valuable  and  serviceable  is  made."  These  judg- 
ments of  the  individual,  or  "subjective  truth," 
are  ratified  by  other  men,  i.e.  by  society,  and  this 
ratification    or    social    selection    constitutes    "ob- 


I04  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

jective  truth."  Hence  arise  ''growing  bodies  of 
objective  truth  shared  and  agreed  upon  by  prac- 
tically all"  (ib.,pp.  33-35). 

This  teaching  Professor  Schiller  expresses  more 
clearly  in  what  he  terms  Idealistic  Experiential- 
ism,  "a  clumsy  phrase,"  he  says,  used  "to  desig- 
nate the  view  that  'the  world'  is  primarily  'my 
experience,'  plus  (secondarily)  the  supplementings 
of  that  experience  which  its  nature  renders  it  neces- 
sary to  assume,  such  as  e.g.  other  persons  and  a 
'real'  material  world"  {Humanism,  p.  366).  Thus 
"the  world,  in  which  we  suppose  ourselves  to  be, 
is,  and  always  remains,  relative  to  the  experience 
which  we  seek  to  interpret  by  it,  and  if  that  ex- 
perience were  to  change,  so  necessarily  would  our 
'real'  world.  Its  reality  was  guaranteed  to  it,  so 
long  as  it  did  its  work  and  explained  our  experience; 
it  is  abrogated  so  soon  as  it  ceases  to  do  so"  (ib.). 
Thus  "in  dreams  we  pass  into  a  new  world;  we 
wake  in  a  more  'real'  world,  in  the  ex  post  facto 
judgment  of  which  the  dream-world  is  fleeting 
chaotic  and  unmanageable"  {ib.).  But  "the  phil- 
osophic critic  cannot  presume  the  theoretical  cor- 
rectness of  our  ordinary  judgment.  To  him  all 
modes  of  experience  are,  in  the  first  instance,  real. 
He  can  find  no  standing-ground  outside  experience 
whence  to  judge  it"  {ib.,  p.  367).  Hence  "all  our 
distinctions  between  the  'real'  and  the  'unreal' 
are  intrinsic:  it  is  the  dream-world's  character 
itself  that  leads  us  to  condemn  it"  {ib.,  p.  367)  as 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  105 

not  being  "a  real  explanation^^  of  our  world  {ib., 
p.  195).  Yet  "if  in  our  dreams  we  found  ourselves 
transported  into  worlds  more  coherent,  more  in- 
telligible, more  delightful  than  that  of  daily  life, 
should  we  not  gladly  attribute  to  them  a  superior 
reality?"  {ib.,  p.  367).  Hence  "if  the  whole  world 
be  experience,  new  worlds  may  be  found  by  psychical 
transformation,  as  probably  and  as  validly  as  by 
physical  transportation"  {ib.,  p.  368). 

But  Professor  Schiller  is  somewhat  sane,  even 
though  inconsistent,  and  he  comes  down  from  the 
airy  flight  to  earth,  if  such  a  thing  really  exists 
for  the  Pragmatist  or  is  merely  a  supposition  for 
convenience'  sake,  by  "appealing  to  the  great  so- 
cial convention  whereby  we  postulate  (for  practical 
purposes)  a  common  world  which  is  experienced 
by  us  all.  Even  during  life  that  convention  is  main- 
tained only  at  the  cost  of  excluding  from  reality  all 
such  experiences  as  are  personal,  or  divergent,  or 
incapable  of  forming  a  basis  for  common  action. 
At  death  it  breaks  down  altogether,  and  the  long- 
suppressed  divergence  between  the  world  of  'my' 
experience  and  the  'objective'  world,  which  is 
nobody's  experience  but  is  supposed  to  account 
for  everybody's,  dominates  the  situation"  {ib., 
p.  371).  Does  not  this  mean  that  Humanism  leads 
directly  to  a  Solipsism  of  the  most  fanciful  kind, 
that  the  Humanist  avoids  the  consequences  during 
life  by  the  "supposition"  of  a  "social  convention," 
and  that  at  death  he  becomes  a  solipsist  pure  and 


io6  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

simple?  If  Humanism  be  a  "philosophy  of  life" 
for  ''practical  purposes,"  why  can  it  not  work 
its  way  along  on  its  own  principles  without  making 
"artificial"  and  "contradictory"  suppositions  to 
avoid  a  breakdown?  The  assumption  of  "a  com- 
mon world"  is  "a  convention"  maintained  only 
at  the  cost  of  "excluding  from  'reality'  all  that 
is  personal,"  yet  the  essential  contention  with 
Humanism  is  ^'leaving  in  the  whole  rich  lux- 
uriance of  individual  minds  .  .  .  the  psycho- 
logical wealth  of  every  human  mind  and  the 
complexities  of  its  interests,  emotions,  volitions, 
aspirations"  (Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  13).  Here 
also  it  may  be  asked  how  the  Humanist  can 
postulate  on  "external  world"  of  "other  men"  or 
"society"  or  a  "social  convention"  without  having 
a  previous  knowledge  of  them  and  how  does  he 
obtain  this  knowledge? 

Finally  Professor  Schiller  tells  us  that  "Psychol- 
ogy is  a  descriptive  science,  whose  aim  is  the 
description  of  mental  processes  as  such,"  that  it 
embraces  "the  whole  realm  of  direct  experience," 
that  "it  recognizes  a  psychological  side  to  every- 
thing that  can  he  known,  inasmuch  as  everything 
known  to  exist  must  be  connected  with  our  experi- 
ence, and  known  by  a  psychical  process.  In  so  far 
as  any  real  is  known,  a  process  of  experiencing  is 
involved  in  it,  and  this  process  appertains  to  the 
science  of  Psychology.  Thus  all  physical  objects 
and  questions  become  psychological,  so  soon  as  we 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  107 

ask  how  they  can  be  experienced"  {ib.,  p.  75). 
This  teaching  he  pushes  to  logical  conclusion  and 
proposes  "Hylozoism  or  (better)  Panpsychism " 
as  "at  bottom  merely  forms  of  Humanism,  — • 
attempts  to  make  the  human  and  the  cosmic 
more  akin,  and  to  bring  them  closer  to  us,  that 
we  may  act  upon  them  more  successfully"  {ib.,  p. 
443).  This  teaching  is  amazing  when  we  reflect 
that  it  rests  upon  confounding  the  ideal  repre- 
sentation of  a  thing  in  the  mind  with  the  thing 
itself. 

HI.  Criticism 

The  radical  defect  in  Professor  Schiller's  Human- 
ism is  that  he  exposes  a  Metaphysics  of  reflective 
thought.  In  like  manner  Professor  Dewey  gives  a 
Logic  of  reflective  thought.  Reflective  thought 
is  necessary,  but  it  must  always  be  tested  by  con- 
tact with  and  application  to  existing  things  dis- 
tinct and  separate  from  ourselves.  This  test  neither 
Professor  Schiller  nor  Professor  Dewey  can  adopt 
because  their  doctrines  are  based  on  the  Phenomenal 
Idealism  of  Sensism.  We  see  Professor  Schiller  at 
his  desk  buried  in  profound  reflective  thought.  For 
the  time,  he  forgets  the  chair  in  which  he  sits,  the 
desk  before  him,  the  pen  and  paper.  He  is  not 
concerned  with  things  as  they  exist,  he  is  reflecting 
on  their  intra-mental  representations.  His  medita- 
tion is  interrupted  at  times  by  facts  which  "are 
thrust  upon  him,"  "unpleasant  novelties,"  as  e.g. 


io8  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

an  unwelcome  interruption,  but  though  "facts 
may  at  times  coerce,  it  is  yet  more  essential  to  them 
to  be  accepted"  and  hence  what  was  '^ de  facto" 
thrust  upon  him"  "becomes  de  jure  willed"  {ib.,  pp. 
189-220). 

Back  again  therefore  he  is  in  reflective  thought. 
Now  "ejections"  or  "extrusions  of  reality"  from 
his  own  "consciousness"  take  place,  which  are 
"endowed  with  an  independent  existence  or  trans- 
cendent reality"  {ib.,  p.  470).  They  pass  and  he 
settles  down  to  reflective  thought  and  views 
them  as  representations  in  his  experience.  He 
may  remember  the  fact  that  at  a  time  he  "re- 
fused to  accept  as  his  own,  the  whole  of  his 
experience"  (ib.)  and  "so  postulated  an  extra 
mental  reality"  {ib.,  p.  471).  Now,  however,  all 
that  is  a  part  of  his  experience.  He  is  aware  that 
there  is  a  difference  between  discovering  a  reality 
and  making  a  reality,  for  he  writes  on  the  paper  "a 
reality  is  said  to  be  discovered  and  not  made,  when 
its  behavior  is  such  that  it  is  practically  incon- 
venient or  impossible  to  ascribe  its  reality  for  us 
entirely  to  our  subjective  activity.  .  .  .  To  wish 
a  chair  (or  note-paper)  and  find  one,  and  to  wish  for 
for  a  chair  and  make  one,  are  experiences  which 
it  is  not  easy  to  confuse  and  which  involve  very 
different  operations  and  attitudes  on  our  part.  In 
the  one  case  we  have  merely  to  look  around  and 
our  trusty  senses  present  to  us  the  object  of  our 
desire   in   effortless   completion.      In   the   other   a 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  109 

prolonged    process    of    construction    is    required" 
{ib.,  p.  430). 

Evidently  Professor  Schiller  has  opened  his  eyes. 
He  now  admits  that  **  primary  reality  may,  cer- 
tainly, in  a  sense,  be  called  independent  of  us" 
{ib.,  p.  187);  that  *'he  may  prefer  to  sacrifice  a 
cherished  prejudice  rather  than  to  deny  e.g.  the 
evidence  of  his  senses"  {ib.,  p.  189);  that  "the 
'correspondence-with-reahty'  view  of  truth"  is 
''most  plausible  and  least  inadequate  in  its  sen- 
sationalistic  form,  as  referring  thoughts  to  the  test 
of  perceptions"  and  "indeed,  it  is  plainly  descrip- 
tive of  processes  which  actually  occur  in  our  know- 
ing" {ib.,  p.  177);  that  "in  ordinary  life  we  deal 
directly  with  an  '  external  world '  perceived  through 
the  senses;  in  science,  with  the  same  a  little  less 
directly;  in  either  case,  our  hypotheses  appeal  to 
some  overt  visible  and  palpable  fact,  by  the  obser- 
vation of  which  they  are  adequately  verified" 
{ib.,  p.  362);  that  "the  actual  limitation  of  our 
power  to  produce  movements  to  bodies  directly 
touched  by  our  organism  is  wholly  empirical" 
{ib.,  p.  380);  that  "among  the  major  difficulties 
of  Absolutism"  is  "what  may  be  called  the  imper- 
viousness  and  mutual  exclusiveness  of  minds,  which 
seem  capable  of  communicating  with  each  other 
only  by  elaborate  codes  of  signalling  and  the  em- 
ployment of  material  machinery"  {ib.,  p.  266);  that 
"the  laws  of  nature,  however  they  may  be  thought 
to  originate,  are  de  facto  the  established  habits  of 


no  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

things,  and  their  constancy  is  an  empirical  fact 
of  observation"  {ib.,  p.  409)- 

Now  Professor  Schiller  closes  his  eyes  and  in 
reflective  thought  beholds  "the  flux  of  human 
reahty ' '  through  experience.  He  distinguishes  facts 
forming  "coherent  systems  of  interpretation," 
which  he  calls  "facts  of  science"  {ib.,  p.  370)  from 
other  facts  which  he  calls  "crude  facts"  {ib.)  or 
"sheer,  brute  uncomprehended"  facts  {ih.,  p.  414). 
He  does  not  ask  why  they  cannot  be  interpreted 
or  how  they  came  into  experience,  for  "Pragmatism 
is  not  laying  stress  on  their  origin"  {ib.,  p.  245). 
In  fact  he  ascribes  "novelties  in  experience"  as 
due  to  " a  providential  interposition"  or  as  an  "acci- 
dental variation."  "Metaphysically  these  expla- 
nations are  equivalents"  {ib.,  p.  244).  But  why 
resort  to  Metaphysics  when  by  opening  his  eyes  he 
can  see  how  things  enter  into  experience  and  can 
understand  that  things  unexplained  in  nature  are 
also  unexplained  in  experience. 

Professor  Schiller  in  an  acute  criticism  of  Her- 
bert Spencer's  "strange  see-saw  in  regarding 
equilibration  now  as  universal  death,  now  as  perfect 
life"  accuses  Spencer  of  speaking  "with  a  double 
voice  throughout"  {Humanism,  p.  219).  But  this 
is  the  great  fault  with  Professor  Schiller  himself. 
Now  he  speaks  with  his  eyes  open  and  is  deaHng 
directly  with  things.  Now  he  speaks  with  his 
eyes  shut  and  is  deahn-g  with  the  presentations  of 
things  as  they  appear  in  reflective  thought.     He 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  iii 

insists  on  subordinating  the  former  to  the  latter; 
and  as  to  the  latter,  he  is  not  concerned  with  their 
origin  but  only  with  the  devices  which  will  cause 
them  to  coalesce  into  a  harmonious  unity  of  a 
perfect  life.  He  does  not  seem  to  be  aware  that 
the  harmony  he  tries  to  establish  is  not  a  harmony 
among  "things"  but  a  harmony  among  ''concep- 
tions" "beliefs"  and  "imaginings." 


CHAPTER  VI 

PRAGMATISM   AND    HUMANISM    {continued) 

While  the  basis  of  Humanism  is  a  Personal 
Idealism,  its  integrating  principle  is  an  ethical 
Voluntarism. 

I.    An  Ethical  Voluntarism 

Humanism  conceives  "experience"  as  active,  i.e. 
as  purposive  {Studies  in  Humanism,  pp.  ii,  130). 
Thus  it  is  distinguished  from  the  Empiricism  of 
Bain  and  Mill.  Its  main  principle  is  the  "pur- 
posiveness  of  human  thought  and  experience" 
{ib.,  p.  230).  The  purposiveness  of  human 
thought  reveals  its  teleological  nature  {ib.,  p. 
271),  i.e.  the  relation  of  all  our  actual  experi- 
ence to  the  ends  of  our  practical  life  {Human- 
ism, p.  8).  Desire  and  will  give  the  initiative, 
direction  and  decisive  weight  to  mental  action. 
Hence  thought  is  expressed  in  terms  of  will  and  is 
the  purposive  tendency  to  an  end.  This  Volun- 
tarism implies  "the  intrinsic  coherence  and  po- 
tential harmony  of  the  whole  of  experience"  {ib., 
p.  346),  and  is  based  on  the  assumption  "that  the 
elements  of  our  experience  admit  of  being  harmo- 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  113 

nized,  that  the  world  (i.e.  of  our  experience)  is  truly 
a  cosmos^^  {ib.,  p.  349),  "not  because  we  have  any- 
formal  and  a  priori  assurance  of  the  fact,  but  be- 
cause we  desire  it  to  be  so  and  are  willing  to  try 
whether  it  cannot  become  so"  {ib.,  p.  189).  Its 
aim  is  the  harmonizing  of  our  experience  through 
our  own  efforts  until  we  attain  complete  satisfac- 
tion (ib.,  p.  200).  We  start  with  immediate  ex- 
perience {ib.,  p.  192)  which  is  plainly  not  as  yet 
harmonious  {ib.,  p.  193)  and  by  purposive  action 
for  subordinated  ends  realized  in  and  through  the 
time-process,  we  attain  ever-growing  and  ever- 
wider  control  of  experience  {ib.,  p.  105). 

The  conceptions  of  Purpose  and  of  End,  there- 
fore, are  dominant  factors  in  experience  and  "assert 
the  sway  of  human  valuations  over  every  region 
of  our  experience"  {ib.,  p.  8).  Thus  the  "Real" 
is  our  experience  manipulated  under  the  influence 
of  purpose;  and  the  "True"  is  what  is  of  value  for 
an  end  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  152)  conceived 
as  the  means  or  the  instrument  of  the  manipulation. 
Hence  the  distinction  rests  on  the  various  behavior 
of  things  in  experience. 

Professor  Schiller  discriminates  between  "prop- 
ositions which  claim  to  be  true"  and  "valid 
truths."  The  "claims"  he  conceives  as  "ambigu- 
ous truth"  and  "may  turn  out  to  be  true  or 
false"  {ib.,  p.  144).  They  only  become  "valid 
truths"  when  verified  and  they  are  verified  by  use. 
Thus  "claims"  are  tested  by  their  consequences; 


114  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

i.e.  what  follows  from  their  truth  for  any  human 
interest  and  especially  for  the  interest  with  which 
they  are  directly  concerned,  is  what  establishes  their 
real  truth  and  vahdity  {ih.,  pp.  5,  148,  154).  For 
truth  is  conceived  as  human,  and  "human  interest 
is  vital  to  the  existence  of  truth."  Truth  is  "truth 
for  man,'"  i.e.  "has  a  bearing  upon  some  human 
interest,"  "its  consequences  must  be  consequences 
to  some  one  for  some  purpose";  they  must  be 
''practical  and  ^' good''  {ih.,  p.  5).  Hence  "the 
objects  of  our  contemplation  when  valued  as  true 
become  facts''  and  "truth  is  value  in  the  apprehen- 
sion oi  fact"  {Humanism,  p.  57).  As  the  valuation 
depends  on  reference  to  an  end  "the  true  and  the 
false  are  intellectual  forms  of  the  good  and  the  had" 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  154).  Thus  e.g.  "a 
truth  is  what  is  useful  in  building  up  a  science; 
a  falsehood  what  is  useless  or  noxious  for  the  same 
purpose";  "a  science  is  good  if  it  can  be  used  to 
harmonize  our  life;  if  it  cannot,  it  is  a  pseudo- 
science  or  a  game"  {ih.).  Moreover  "the  same 
predication  may  be  true  for  me  and  false  for  you, 
if  our  purposes  are  different,"  "success  in  validating 
a  truth  is  relative  to  the  purpose  with  which  the 
truth  was  claimed,"  "a  truth  in  the  abstract,  rel- 
ative to  no  purpose  is  plainly  unmeaning"  {ih., 
p.  193),  and  "we  declare  an  old  truth  false  because 
we  are  able  to  find  a  new  one  which  more  than 
fills  its  place."  Hence  "our  truth  is  not 
merely  being  falsified,  but  also  being  verified  in  one 


PRAGMATISM  AND   HUMANISM  115 

and  the  same  process;  it  is  corrected  only  to  be 
improved.  And  so  the  Humanist  can  recognize 
necessary  errors  as  well  as  necessary  truths,  errors 
which  are  fruitful  of  the  truths  which  supersede 
them."  "Our  errors  were  truths  in  their  day.  For 
they  were  the  most  adequate  ways  we  then  had 
of  dealing  with  our  experience.  They  were  not, 
therefore,  valueless.  Nor  were  they  gratuitous 
errors.  More  commonly  they  were  natural  or 
even  indispensable  stages  in  the  attainment  of 
truth."  Truth,  therefore,  is  "flexible"  as  "adjust- 
ing itself  to  the  demands  of  life"  {ib.,  pp.  211, 
212,   213). 

But  man  is  a  social  being  and  truth  is  not  merely 
an  individual  but  "to  a  large  extent  a  social  prod- 
uct" therefore  "it  has  to  win  social  recognition." 
This  is  effected  by  "the  use-criterion"  which 
selects  the  individual  truth-valuations  and  con- 
stitutes thereby  the  objective  truth  which  obtains 
social  recognition.  Hence  "in  the  fullest  sense" 
"Truth  is  the  useful,  efficient,  workable,  to  which 
our  practical  experience  tends  to  restrict  our  truth- 
valuations"  and  "social  usefulness  is  an  ultimate 
determinant  of  truth"  {Humanism,  pp.  52-60; 
Studies  in  Humanism,  pp.  152-153).  In  this  light 
Professor  Schiller  conceives  Humanism  to  be  "a 
conscious  application  to  the  theory  of  life  of  the 
psychological  facts  of  cognition  as  they  appear  to 
a  teleological  Voluntarism"  (  Humanism,  p.  8). 

Now  inasmuch   as   "a   theory  of  life"   and  its 


Ii6  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

method  of  " teleological  valuation"  are  "the  special 
spheres  of  ethical  inquiry,"  this  Voluntarism  is 
essentially  ethical.  For  "our  apprehension  of  the 
Real,  our  comprehension  of  the  True,  is  always 
effected  by  beings  who  are  aiming  at  the  attain- 
ment of  some  Good  (i.e.  an  end)  and  choose 
between  rival  claimants  to  reality  and  truth 
according  to  the  services  they  render."  Hence 
"  the  ethical  conception  of  the  Good  has  supreme 
authority  over  the  logical  conception  of  the  Triie 
and  the  metaphysical  conception  of  the  Real.'' 
Therefore  just  as  the  question  what  is  truth,  is 
dependent  on  the  particular  purpose  and  end, 
in  like  manner  "the  ultimate  question  for  phi- 
losophy becomes  —  What  is  reaUty  for  one  aiming 
at  knowing  what  ?  '  Real '  means  real  for  what  pur- 
pose? to  what  end?  in  what  use?  in  what  con- 
text? in  preference  to  what  alternative  belief? 
The  answers  always  come  in  terms  of  the  will  to 
know  which  puts  the  question.  This  at  once 
yields  a  simple  and  beautiful  explanation  of  the 
different  accounts  of  reality  which  are  given  in  the 
various  sciences  and  philosophies.  The  purpose 
of  the  questions  being  different,  so  is  their  purport, 
and  so  must  be  the  answers"  (ib.,  pp.  8-10).  But  as 
Ethics  is  the  "science  which  gives  an  orderly 
account  of  the  ends  of  life  that  are  or  should  be 
aimed  at"  it  follows  "that  our  ultimate  metaphysic 
must  be  ethical"  {ib.,  p.  105)  or  ^' quasi  ethical" 
(ib.,  p.  13). 


PRAGMATISM  AND   HUMANISM  117 

II.    The  Making  of  Truth  and  of  Reality 

Voluntarist  Metaphysics,  therefore,  exhibits  ex- 
perience as  a  purposive  evolutive  integration.  Its 
essence  is  *'the  doctrine  that  the  world  is  "in 
process"  that  "changes"  and  "novelties  occur." 
The  evolutive  process  is  purposive  and  thus  differs 
from  Spencer's  which  is  "physical"  and  "static" 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  226).  Its  fundamental 
principle  is  the  assumption  that  "human  action 
is  endowed  with  real  agency  and  really  makes  a 
difference  alike  to  the  system  of  truth  and  to  the 
world  of  reaHty"  {ih.,  pp.  391,  392).  Here  are 
set  forth  the  central  teachings  of  its  metaphysic, 
known  as  "the  Making  of  Truth"  and  "the 
Making  of  ReaHty." 

The  evolutive  process  starts  with  the  uncritical 
acceptance  of  whatever  seems  to  be,  i.e.  with  the 
assumption  "whatever  is,  is  real."  This  is  "pri- 
mary reality"  or  "appearance,"  and  "at  its  level, 
conceived  as  purely  cognitive,  everything  would  be, 
and  remain,  in  an  unmeaning,  indiscriminated  flow." 
"If  we  were  purely  cognitive  beings,  we  should 
also  stop  with  this."  But  we  are  "interested  and 
purposive  and  desirous  of  operating  and  control- 
hng  the  primary  reality"  {ih.,  pp.  220,  221).  "The 
felt  unsatisfactiveness  of  the  immediate  experience" 
elicits  the  purposive  action  {Humanism,  pp.  192, 
199),  for  "all  actual  thinking  is  impelled  by  inter- 
est" {ih.,  p.  52)  and  "purpose  may  be  conceived 


Ii8  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

as  a  concentration  of  interest"  {Studies  in  Human- 
ism, p.  82).  Thus  "we  are  neither  disposed  nor 
able  to  accept  our  immediate  experience  as  it 
appears  to  be,"  but  "are  compelled  to  discount  it 
and  treat  it  as  an  appearance  of  something  ulterior 
which  will  supplement  its  deficiency"  {Humanism, 

P-  193)- 

So  we  "proceed  to  distinguish  between  appear- 
ance and  reality,  between  primary  and  real  reality" 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  221).  "The  immediate 
experience,"  therefore,  "is  the  symbol  of  a  higher 
reality  whereof  it  partly  manifests  the  nature" 
{Humanism,  p.  193).  The  nature  of  the  purposive 
action  is  selective,  for  "it  selects  part  of  the  imme- 
diate experience  as  of  special  interest  to  be  operated 
on  or  aimed  at"  and  "is,  in  fact,  a  biological  func- 
tion" {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  10),  Moreover  it 
selects  or  makes  inferences,  assumptions,  postu- 
lates, which  function  on  the  selected  part  of  primary 
reality  with  a  view  to  control  it  for  the  special 
purpose.  If  these  assumptions  do  the  work,  they 
are  called  "higher  realities."  Their  reality  must 
be  made  to  depend  throughout  on  their  efficiency 
{Humanism,  p.  199).  Professor  Schiller  tells  us 
that  "the  reahties  of  ordinary  life  and  science, 
such  as  'the  external  world'  and  the  existence  of 
other  persons  are  all  of  this  secondary  order.  They 
rest  upon  inferences  from  our  immediate  experience 
which  have  been  found  to  work."  "We  then 
declare  real  the  conception  which  served  our  purpose, 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  119 

nay  more  real,  because  more  potent,  than  the 
immediate  experience  for  the  satisfaction  of  our 
desire"  {ib.,  p.  193).  Yet  he  adds  "that  the  im- 
mediate experience  is  after  all  in  a  way  more  real, 
i.e.  more  directly  real,  than  the  'higher  realities' 
which  are  said  to  explain  it"  {ib.,  p.  195). 

These  "higher"  or  "secondary"  reahties  are 
said  to  control  the  "primary"  or  "immediate" 
reahty,  when  they  "interpret"  it  {ib.,  p.  51), 
"explain,"  "transfigure"  it  {ib.,  p.  195),  "trans- 
form," "elucidate,"  " transmutate "  it  {ib.,  p.  199), 
"alter"  it  {ib.,  p.  193,  note;  Studies  in  Humanism,  p. 
31),  by  preparing  it  for  "assimilation"  {ib.,  p.  371) 
through  the  "conceptual  manipulation"  {Human- 
ism, p.  199),  "cognitive  elaboration"  or  "cognitive 
functioning  of  experience"  {Studies  in  Humanism, 
p.  426).  Our  actual  minds  possessing  some  prior 
knowledge  are  conceived  as  the  "starting  points" 
of  the  process  or  the  "platform"  from  which  we 
operate  on  the  situation  that  confronts  us.  The 
actual  procedure  is  "inductive,  experimental, 
postulatory,  and  tentative"  which  issues  in  an 
act.  "If  the  consequences  are  satisfactory,  the 
reasoning  employed  is  deemed  to  have  been  pro 
tanto  good,  the  results  right,  the  operations  per- 
formed valid,  while  the  conceptions  used  and  the 
predications  made  are  judged  true'^   {ib.,  pp.   184, 

185). 

Thus  real  fact  is  evolved  out  of  primary  fact  by 
a  process  of  selection  {ib.,  p.  187).     What  we  judge 


I20  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

to  be  true,  we  take  to  be  real  and  accept  as  fact. 
Hence  there  is  no  antithesis  of  truth  and  Jad,  but 
reality  is  conceived  as  something  which  grows  up 
in  the  making  of  truth,  for  in  the  cognitive  elabora- 
tion of  experience  the  making  of  truth  and  the 
making  of  reality  seem  to  *  be  fundamentally  one 
{ih.,  p.  426).  Hence  it  is  that  we  regard  the  false 
as  a  "term  attached  to  an  earlier  phase  of  the 
process  which  has  evolved  the  truth"  and  "see 
the  new  truth  continuously  growing  out  of  the  old, 
as  a  more  satisfactory  way  of  handHng  the  old 
problems"  and  "maintain  that  our  errors  were 
truths  in  their  day"  {ih.,  p.  212),  for  truth  is  a 
valuation  as  "a  successful  operation  on  reality" 
{ih.,  p.  118). 

In  like  manner  "facts  which  can  be  excluded 
from  our  lives,  which  do  not  interest  us,  which 
mean  nothing  to  us,  which  we  cannot  use,  which  are 
ineffective,  which  have  little  bearing  on  practical 
life,  tend  to  drop  into  unreality"  {ih.,  p.  188),  for 
''real  and  unreal  are  really  distinctions  of  value 
within  experience,  the  unreal  is  what  may  safely  be 
ignored,  the  real  what  is  better  to  recognize"  {ih., 
p.  480). 

As  "the  predication  of  truth"  is  "dependent  on 
relevance  to  a  proximate  purpose"  and  as  "what 
is  true  and  serviceable  for  one  purpose  is  not  neces- 
sarily so  for  another"  {ih.,  p.  156),  and  as  successful 
predication  proves  or  "reveals"  what  is  real,  while 
unsuccessful  predication  or  "functioning"  reveals 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  I2i 

what  is  unreal,  it  follows  that  the  designations  of 
'Hrue"  and  "false,"  of  "real"  and  "unreal"  are 
commonly  interchangeable;  for  ^^ reality  is  reality 
for  us  and  known  by  us,  just  as  truth  is  truth  for  us" 
{ih.,  p.  426). 

In  the  process  of  "conceptual  manipulation  of 
experience"  not  only  is  the  immediate  experience 
''interpreted"  and  "changed,"  but  "the  platform" 
whence  the  action  starts  is  conceived  as  changing, 
for  "it  is  not  anchored  to  the  eternal  bottom  of 
the  flux  of  time;  it  floats,  and  so  can  move  with  the 
times,  and  be  adjusted  to  the  occasion"  {ih.,  p.  190). 
Thus  "the  actual  situation  is  a  case  of  interaction, 
a  process  of  cognition  in  which  the  '  subject'  and  the 
'object'  determine  each  the  other,  and  both  'we' 
and  'the  reality'  are  involved,  and,  we  might  add, 
evolved ' '  {Humanism,  p.  1 1 ,  note) .  Hence  ' '  knowl- 
edge arises  out  of  pre-existing  knowledge"  and 
"the  development  of  mind  is  a  thoroughly  personal 
affair"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  186). 

As  the  process  is  elicited  by  interests  and  carried 
on  by  purposive  selection.  Professor  Schiller  holds 
that  it  is  intensely  "human"  {ih.,  p.  182),  "painful 
and  laborious"  {ih.,  p.  222),  "immensely  arbitrary" 
{ih.,  p.  188)  and  as  a  result  "in  general,  the  world, 
as  it  now  appears  to  us,  may  be  regarded  as  the 
reflection  of  our  interests  in  life"  {ih.,  p.  200). 
Moreover  the  process  is  continuous;  it  "is  as  un- 
ending as  the  pursuit  of  happiness"  {ih.,  p.  222) 
and  is  conceived  as  "an  integral  part  of  the  great 


122  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

cosmic  striving  towards  satisfaction  and  harmony 
and  equilibrium"  {Humanism,  p.  i88).  ^'Looking 
forward  the  making  of  truth  is  clearly  a  continuous 
progressive  and  cumulative  process.  For  the  sat- 
isfaction of  one  cognitive  purpose  leads  on  to  the 
formulation  of  another."  "Looking  backwards  the 
situation  is  less  plain,"  but  we  are  bound  "to  con- 
ceive, if  possible,  the  whole  process  as  continuous," 
for  "we  can  never  get  back  to  truths  so  funda- 
mental that  they  cannot  possibly  be  conceived  as 
having  been  made.  There  are  no  a  priori  truths 
which  are  indisputable"  {Studies  in  Humanism, 
pp.   195-197). 

Pragmatism  therefore  expressly  teaches  that  "  the 
beginning  of  knowledge  is  wrapped  in  mystery"  and 
in  justification  holds  that  it  is  not  really  concerned 
with  the  "explanation  of  the  past"  but  "to  know 
how  to  act  with  a  view  to  the  future."  Yet 
"there  would  seem  to  be  no  actual  end  in  sight" 
{ib.,  p.  198)  to  the  time-process,  created  by  our 
conceptual  functioning,  in  and  through  which  our 
individual  ends  were  realized  {Humanism,  pp.  105, 
106,  109).  The  absolutely  real  does  not  "already 
exist";  it  is  an  ideal  and  "will  be  that  which  ful- 
fils our  every  purpose  and  which  therefore  we  do 
not  seek  to  alter  but  only  to  maintain"  {Studies 
in  Humanism,  p.  321);  for  it  is  conceived  "as 
capable  of  including  and  harmonizing  all  the  lower 
realities"  and  "the  struggle  to  attain  a  glimpse 
of  such  an  Ultimate  Reality  forms  the  perennial 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  123 

content  of  the  drama  of  philosophy"  {Humanism, 
p.  194). 

Thus  Humanism  takes  "the  great  thought  of 
Fichte  and  Hegel  that  thought  and  reality,  logic 
and  metaphysics  belonged  together  and  must  not 
be  separated,"  accepts  "the  cosmic  process  as  one 
with  the  thought  process,"  but  corrects  the  defect 
of  their  thought-process  by  humanizing  it  {Studies 
in  Humanism,  pp.  422-424).  The  postulate  of 
purposive  selection  reveals  the  correlative  basic 
postulate  of  the  evolutive  cosmic  or  time  process, 
viz.  the  conception  of  reahty  as  "plastic,  growing, 
incomplete"  {ih.,  p.  427).  True,  "we  find  a  world 
made  for  us"  because  "we  are  the  heirs  of  bygone 
ages,  profiting  by  their  work,  and  it  may  be  suffer- 
ing for  their  folly,"  but  "we  can,  in  part,  remake 
it,  and  reform  a  world  that  has  slowly  reformed 
itself"  {ih.,  p.  320).  Even  "we  ourselves  are  made 
by  a  long  series  of  ancestors  and  these  in  their  turn 
were  inevitably  generated  by  non-human  forces  — 
of  a  purely  physical  kind"  {ih.,  p.  393).  Hence 
"a  really  evolving  and  therefore  as  yet  incomplete 
reality  involves  the  conception  of  a  determinable 
indetermination  in  nature  at  large"  {ih.,  p.  392). 
"Previous  to  our  trial"  the  nature  of  things  "is 
indeterminate,  within  Hmits  which  it  is  our  busi- 
ness to  discover.  It  grows  determinate  by  our 
experiments"  {Humanism,  p.  11,  note). 

Hence  "the  determinate  nature  of  reality  does 
not  subsist  outside  or  heyond  the  process  of  knowing 


124  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

it"  (ib.).  This  "universal  flux  of  reality  sways 
the  world  of  ideas"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  205), 
hence  "human  truth  not  absolute,  fluid  not  rigid, 
chosen  not  inevitable,  born  of  passion  and  sprung 
from  desire,  incomplete  not  perfect,  fallible  not 
unerrant,  absorbed  in  the  attaining  of  what  is  not 
yet  achieved,  purposive  and  struggling  towards 
ends"  {ih.y  p.  208).  "To  what  extent,"  however, 
"and  in  what  direction  the  world  is  plastic  and  to 
be  moulded  by  our  action,  we  do  not  know  as  yet. 
We  can  find  out  only  by  the  trying"  {Humanism, 
p.  12). 

To  Professor  Schiller  the  assertion  that  "reality 
is  utterly  plastic  to  our  every  demand  is  a  travesty 
of  Pragmatism"  {ih.,  p.  n,  note),  yet  he  says  that 
as  "an  obvious  methodological  principle  we  must 
regard  the  plasticity  of  fact  as  adequate  for  every 
purpose"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  445).  To  the 
objection  that  "not  all  the  responses  are  indeter- 
minate," he  replies  "that  it  is  easy  to  regard  them 
as  having  been  determined  by  other  experiments" 
{Humanism,  p.  12,  note),  or  holds  that  the  principle 
is  methodological  not  ontological  {Studies  in  Hu- 
manism, p.  446),  or  while  admitting  that  "even 
on  the  epistemological  plane  the  making  of  truth 
seemed  to  recognize  certain  limitations,"  yet  "the 
exact  nature  of  these,  being  unable  to  pursue  the 
subject  into  the  depths  of  metaphysics,  we  were 
not  able  to  determine"  {ih.,  p.  426),  or  "it  seems 
clear  that  we  are  not  the  sole  agents  in  the  world, 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  125 

and  that  herein  lies  the  true  explanation  of  those 
aspects  of  the  world,  which  we,  the  present  agents, 
i.e.  our  empirical  selves,  cannot  claim  to  have  made. 
There  is  no  reason  to  conceive  these  features  as 
original  and  rigid.  Why  should  we  not  conceive 
them  as  having  been  made  by  processes  analogous 
to  those  whereby  we  ourselves  make  reality  and 
watch  its  making"  {ib.,  p.  446).  As  a  consistent 
IdeaHst  how  can  Professor  Schiller  recognize  ''other 
agents"  and  "analogous  processes"? 

Nevertheless,  Professor  Schiller's  principle  de- 
mands complete  plasticity  for  "a  partial  plasticity 
would  be  nugatory  and  unworkable"  {ib.,  p.  445). 
In  confirmation  he  appeals  to  human  freedom. 
Freedom  is  a  postulate  of  the  Humanist  making 
of  reality,  and  "if  human  freedom  is  real,  the  world 
is  really  indeterminate"  {ib.,  p.  411).  For  "the 
laws  of  nature  may  be  regarded  as  the  habits  of 
things,  and  these  habits  as  behaviors  which  have 
grown  determinate,  and  more  or  less  stable,  by 
persistent  action,  but  as  still  capable  of  further 
determinations  under  the  proper  manipulation," 
and  "there  are  no  stringent  reasons  for  confining 
freedom,  and  the  plastic  indetermination  of  habit, 
on  which  it  rests,  to  man  alone.  It  may  well  be 
a  feature  which  really  pervades  the  universe." 
Now  to  the  Humanist,  freedom  is  the  capacity  for 
change.  As  to  change  in  the  universe  Physical 
Science  gives  a  decided  answer.  Thus  Professor 
Schiller  teaches  actual  plasticity  and  is  compelled  to 


126  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

fall  back  on  a  hope  in  a  latent  plasticity  {ib.,  pp. 
446-448). 

Though  expounding  a  metaphysical  theory  Pro- 
fessor Schiller  enjoys  poking  fun  at  Metaphysics. 
He  shies  it,  ostensibly  on  Pragmatic  grounds, 
when  brought  face  to  face  with  a  difficulty  of  his 
own  making.  Yet  we  cordially  assent  to  the 
statement,  "Metaphysics,  though  adventurous  and 
so  hazardous,  are  not  unbecoming  or  unmanly  .  .  . 
what  alone  renders  metaphysics  offensive  and 
dangerous  are  the  preposterous  pretensions  some- 
times made  on  their  behalf.  .  .  .  You  must  not, 
therefore,  grow  fanatical  about  your  metaphysics, 
but  hold  them  with  a  candid  and  constant  willing- 
ness to  revise  them,  and  to  evacuate  your  positions 
when  they  become  untenable"  (ib.,  pp.  437,  438). 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Humanism  recognizes  limi- 
tations in  the  making  of  truth  and  of  reality.  Thus 
Professor  Schiller  tells  us  that  "we  do  not  make 
truth  out  of  nothing,  of  course"  and  that  "our 
truths  were  made  out  of  previous  truths,  and 
built  upon  pre-existing  knowledge;  also  that 
our  procedure  involved  an  initial  recognition  of 
fact"  (ib.,  p.  186).  Here  is  a  difficulty,  for  "although 
any  particular  fact  can  always  be  conceived  as 
having  been  made  by  a  previous  cognitive  op- 
eration, this  latter  in  its  turn  will  always  presup- 
pose a  prior  basis  of  fact.  Hence,  however  rightly 
we  may  emphasize  the  fact  that  what  we  call  real- 
ity is  bound  up  with  our  knowing  and  depends 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  127 

on  our  manipulations,  there  will  always  seem  to 
be  an  insuperable  paradox  in  the  notion  that  real- 
ity can,  as  such  and  wholly,  he  engendered  by  the 
consequences  of  our  dealing  with  it."  Professor 
Schiller  recognizes  the  difficulty  and  evades  it  by 
"fighting  shy  of  metaphysics,"  by  conceiving  on 
the  Pragmatic  method  ''the  making  as  merely 
subjective,  as  referring  only  to  our  knowledge  of 
reality,  without  affecting  its  actual  existence," 
by  an  appeal  to  chaos,  by  the  admission  that 
his  method  cannot  give  a  solution,  by  maintain- 
ing that  the  Pragmatic  method  "is  not  disposed 
to  regard  initial  facts  or  truths  as  specially  im- 
portant, even  if  they  could  be  ascertained,"  by 
holding  that  "even  though  the  Pragmatic  method 
impHes  a  truth  and  a  reality  which  it  does  not 
make,  yet  it  does  not  conceive  them  as  valuable" 
but  "only  as  indicating  limits  to  our  explana- 
tions, and  not  as  revealing  the  soHd  foundations 
whereon  they  rest"  {ib.,  pp.  428-435).  But  to 
explain  reality  is  to  change  or  make  it,  and  a 
limit  to  our  explanations  is  ipso  facto  a  limit  to 
our  making. 

Nor  can  Professor  Schiller  escape  the  difficulty 
by  distinguishing  between  the  knowledge  of  reality 
and  its  actual  existence,  without  giving  up  the  basic 
principle  of  his  system,  for  Humanism  is  essentially 
an  IdeaHst  philosophy,  and  how  can  knowledge 
and  reality  be  separated  in  a  system  whose  central 
principle  is  that  truth  and  reality  grow  up  in  the 


128  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

one  and  same  act?  It  is  strange  that  in  explain- 
ing the  vital  teaching  of  Humanism,  he  should  be 
compelled  to  give  up  what  is  distinctive  in  his 
Humanism. 

Again  Professor  Schiller  is  forced  to  make  a  dis- 
tinction between  ''discovering"  reality  and  "mak- 
ing" reality  and  writes  "to  wish  for  a  chair  and 
find  one,  and  to  wish  for  a  chair  and  make  one, 
are  experiences  which  it  is  not  easy  to  confuse" 
{ib.,  p.  430).  Moreover  he  assures  us  that  "if  the 
objective  making  of  reality  should  prove  illusory, 
you  can  take  refuge  in  the  subjective  making  of 
reality  which  the  Pragmatic  method  has  quite 
clearly  established"  {ib.,  p.  438)  "and  so  it  may  be 
denied  that  we  make  reality  metaphysically,  though 
not  that  we  make  it  epistemologically"  {ib.,  p.  429). 

Thus  all  that  Professor  Schiller  said  about  plastic- 
ity and  the  purposive  evolutive  process  was  not  to  be 
taken  seriously  after  all,  and  he  assures  us  "that 
it  is  quite  possible  to  be  a  good  Pragmatist,  without 
attempting  to  turn  one's  method  into  a  meta- 
physic"  {ib.,  p.  430).  But  the  "making  of  Reality" 
is  a  metaphysic  and  the  real  trouble  is:  the  meta- 
physic  will  not  work.  As  a  consistent  Pragmatist, 
on  methodological  grounds,  he  should  discard  his 
system.  Furthermore  primary  reality  is  not  made 
even  though  Professor  Schiller  holds  that  it  has  a 
"dubious  independence"  {ib.,  p.  201). 

Again  when  Professor  Schiller  is  asked  to  explain 
"the  real  world  of  common  sense,  in  which  we  find 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  129 

ourselves,  and  which  we  do  not  seem  to  have  made 
in  any  human  sense,"  he  realizes  that  his  "theory 
of  knowledge  is  confronted  with  something  that 
claims  ontological  validity,"  but  complains  that  "it 
is  requested  to  turn  itself  into  a  metaphysic  to 
answer  it.  This,  of  course,  it  may  well  refuse  to 
do"  {ib.,  p.  200).  On  pragmatical  grounds  he  ad- 
mits that  the  view  of  ordinary  Realism  and  of 
Humanism  are  "pragmatically  valuable  truths" 
{ib.,  p.  201),  yet  speaks  of  "a  pragmatically  real 
world"  which,  "even  though  it  was  not  made  by 
us"  yet  "was  developed  by  processes  closely  anal- 
ogous to  our  own  procedure"  (ib.,  p.  203).  Again 
we  are  told  that  "if  we  question  amiss,  nature  will 
not  respond  and  we  must  try  again"  {ib.,  p.  10). 
But  this  assumes  not  that  our  desires  can  make  a 
change  in  things,  but  that  our  knowledge  is  con- 
ditioned by  the  world  outside  us.  Furthermore  we 
read  that  there  is  "sheer  brute  uncomprehended 
fact"  {ib.,  p.  414),  but  "uncomprehended  fact" 
is  a  fact  "without  meaning  and  meaning  depends 
on  purpose,  hence  not  referred  to  a  purpose  and  so 
not  changed." 

When  forced  to  admit  "rigid  facts,"  Professor 
Schiller  seems  content  to  hold  that  "they  are  still 
such  that  we  wa?tt  to  alter  them"  {ib.,  p.  371),  or 
says  that  there  is  no  reason  in  this  for  abandoning 
our  principle,  for  as  "  the  principle  is  methodological, 
it  would  not  affect  or  undermine  the  stability  of 
fact   wherever   that   was   needed   for   our   action" 


I30  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

(ib.,  p.  446).  But  if  a  fact  "were  needed  for  action" 
it  would  be  because  it  came  under  the  influence 
of  a  purpose  and  as  purposive  selection  effects  the 
change  in  reality,  we  should  in  this  case  have  a 
fact  not  changed  and  nevertheless  changed,  which 
is  an  open  contradiction. 

Finally  Professor  Schiller  admits  that  the  making 
of  truth  and  reahty  is  "the  conceptual  manipula- 
tion of  experience"  hence  wholly  subjective,  and 
even  then  subject  to  limitations,  for  the  subjective 
manipulation  of  experience  is  actually  tested  by 
reference  to  the  ontologically  real,  though  we  are 
asked  to  close  our  eyes  to  this.  Professor  Schiller 
may  not  have  been  conscious  of  the  humor  in  the 
statement  when  he  wrote  that  there  was  "not 
much  harm  in  metaphysics,  provided  they  are  not 
made  compulsory,  that  no  one  is  compelled  to 
advance  into  them  farther  than  he  likes  and  that 
every  one  perceives  their  real  character,  and  does 
not  allow  them  to  delude  him"  {ib.,  p.  437)- 

III.  Experience  and  Experiment 

In  setting  forth  the  doctrine  that  experience  is 
active,  Humanism  not  only  views  experience  as 
purposive  experiencing,  it  also  includes  the  manner 
in  which  the  experiencing  takes  place.  From  this 
point  of  view  experience  means  experiment.  Thus 
the  evolutive  process  exists  in  and  is  carried  on  by 
experimentation  on  its  contents   {Studies  in  Hu- 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  131 

manism,  p.  191).  We  have  before  us  a  mental  situ- 
ation which  we  try  to  explain.  We  explain  it  by- 
experimenting  upon  it.  Hence  we  make  certain 
assertions  suggested  by  our  practical  experience  in 
the  hope  and  expectation  that  they  will  prove  of 
value  in  elucidating  the  situation  with  the  view  to 
fulfil  the  special  purpose.  The  experiment  is  ini- 
tiated by  the  purposive  selection  of  the  situation 
and  is  carried  on  by  the  purposive  selection  of  the 
assertions  so  as  to  attain  the  proposed  end.  The 
test  of  the  experiment  is  the  use-criterion.  If  the 
assertions  are  usefid  for  the  proposed  end,  they  are 
of  value  and  in  so  far  true.  If  they  are  useless,  they 
have  no  value  and  in  so  far  are  false.  To  find  out 
whether  an  assertion  is  true  or  false,  we  give  it  a 
trial.  As  we  make  the  selection,  make  the  asser- 
tions and  make  the  experimental  application,  we 
are  said  to  make  their  truth  if  the  assertions 
prove  useful,  or  to  make  their  falsity  if  they 
prove  useless  {Humanism,  pp.  35,  38,  58;  Studies 
in  Humanism,  p.  212). 

Hence  "truth  is  essentially  a  valuation,  a  lauda- 
tory labeV  given  to  the  experimentation  process 
when  successful  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  211). 
The  "success"  of  the  operation  is  a  term  "rela- 
tive to  the  purpose."  "The  same  predication  may  be 
true  for  me  and  false  for  you,  if  our  purposes  are 
different"  {ih.,  p.  193). 

Furthermore,  "experiments  are  rarely  quite  suc- 
cessful," for  "we  may  have  had  to  purchase  the 


132  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

success  we  attain  by  the  use  of  artificial  abstractions, 
or  even  downright  fictions,  and  the  uncertainty 
which  this  imports  into  the  truth  of  our  conclu- 
sions will  have  to  be  acknowledged"  {ih.).  Here 
it  might  be  asked,  How  are  these  artificial  abstrac- 
tions or  fictions  known  as  such,  if  they  be  useful? 
For  Professor  Schiller  does  not  admit  absolute 
truth,  i.e.  "immutable"  truth.  On  the  contrary,  he 
holds  "as  a  general  principle  that  (truths),  just 
because  they  are  human,  cannot  be  absolute," 
but  "need  correction"  {ih.,  p.  207).  Hence  "we 
shall  conceive  ourselves  to  have  attained,  not 
complete  truths,"  i.e.  experimentations  so  perfect 
that  they  are  held  to  be  immutable,  "but  only 
'approximations  to  truth'  and  'working  hypotheses,' 
which  are  at  most  '  good  enough  for  practical '  pur- 
poses" and  therefore  "we  shall  not  have  found  a 
truth  which  fully  satisfies  even  our  immediate 
purpose,  but  shall  continue  to  search  for  a  more 
complete,  precise,  and  satisfactory  result "  (i6.,  pp. 
193,  194).  And  in  the  search  "the  Humanist  cas 
recognize  necessary  errors  as  well  as  necessary 
truths,  errors,  that  is,  which  are  fruitful  of  the 
truths  which  supersede  them"  {ih.,  p.  202). 

Thus  truth  "grows"  with  the  increase  of  effi- 
ciency in  the  experiment  and  with  the  change  or 
enlargement  of  the  purposes  {ih.,  p.  211).  With 
this  growth  there  is  a  concomitant  growth  in 
knowledge  and  reality,  for  "facts  are  products 
of  our  modes  of  valuation"  {Humanism,  p.  163), 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  133 

i.e.  of  the  experimentations  considered  as  useful. 
If  "experiments  fail,  we  shall  try  again  with  varia- 
tions in  our  methods  and  assumptions"  {Studies 
in  Humanism,  p.  194).  Hence  truth  is  "variable" 
{ih.,  p.  278),  "progressive"  {ih.,  p.  276),  of  "in- 
definite variety"  {ib.,  p.  277)  and  "will  admit  of 
degrees"  {ib.,  p.  158),  because  the  experimentation 
is  of  such  a  character. 

The  use-criterion  is  not  so  clear  and  simple  as  it 
looks.  The  consequences  may  be  in  doubt.  Pro- 
fessor Schiller  recognizes  the  difl&culty  and  tries 
to  solve  it  by  saying  that  it  "is  not  necessary  to 
contemplate  absurdities,  e.g.  the  intrusion  of  eth- 
ical or  aesthetical  motives  into  the  estimation  of 
mathematics."  But  if  "Humanism  be  a  philos- 
ophy of  life"  and  there  is  "a  psychological  side" 
to  everything  known,  and  Psychology  is  essen- 
tially ethical,  so  that  the  "conception  of  the 
Good  reigns  supreme,"  why  should  not  mathe- 
matics be  ethical?  Again  he  writes  that  "these 
differences  already  exist  and  are  in  no  wise  created 
by  their  being  recognized  and  explained";  or,  they 
"may  be  settled  by  enlarging  our  notions  of  what 
constitutes  relevant  evidence";  or,  they  may  be 
"composed  by  an  appeal  to  the  supreme  purpose 
which  unifies  and  harmonizes  all  our  ends,"  i.e. 
to  an  "ineffable  ideal"  of  which  "in  practice  we 
are  hardly  aware,  nor  agreed  as  to  what  it  is." 
Finally  he  complains  that  "the  blame,  surely, 
attaches  to  the  distracted   state  of   our  thoughts 


134  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

and  not  to  the  pragmatic  analysis  of  truth,"  for 
*'it  would  surely  be  preposterous  to  expect  a 
mere  theory  of  knowledge  to  adjudicate  upon  and 
settle  offhand,  by  sheer  dint  of  logic,  all  the  dis- 
puted questions  in  all  the  sciences"  {ib.,  pp.  155- 
158).  The  reason  of  the  breakdown  is  apparent. 
The  use-criterion  of  an  ideal  experimentation,  in 
itself  alone,  is  not  sufl&cient  to  guarantee  truth. 
The  whole  process  must  be  supplemented  and 
tested  by  an  appeal  to  the  existence  and  opera- 
tions of  things  existing  outside  and  independent 
of  the  mind. 

The  assertions,  made  with  the  view  to  achieve 
the  purpose  proposed.  Professor  Schiller  calls 
"instruments"  although  he  prefers  to  consider 
them  as  ''the  functioning"  of  experience.  They 
are  ''postulates"  or  "assumptions"  "assumed 
before  they  can  be  proved"  and  because  "they 
were  desired"  {Humanism,  p.  231)  and  useful  as  a 
means  to  an  end!  Hence  "first  principles"  are 
"mere  starting-points,  variously,  arbitrarily,  casu- 
ally selected,  from  which  we  hope  and  try  to  ad- 
vance to  something  better"  (Studies  in  Humanism, 
p.  432).  And  "necessary  truths"  mean  "needful," 
for  "necessity  is  always  dependent  and  so  hypo- 
thetical" {Humanism,  p.  36).  These  postulates 
are  "the  product  of  our  volitional  activity"  and 
an  act  of  "faith"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  357). 
Thus  "we  start  from  the  postulates  of  faith  and 
transmute  them  slowly  into  the  axioms  of  reason" 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  135 

{ib.,  p.  362),  and  "all  the  ultimate  assumptions  of 
our  knowledge  are  acts  of  faith,"  "the  exercise  of 
our  will  to  believe"  {Humanism,  p.  153).  All  that  is 
required  is  "that  they  work"  {Studies  in  Human- 
ism, p.  432).  A  "really  a  priori  truth,  i.e.  a  claim 
which  really  preceded  all  experience,  would  be  as 
likely  to  be  false  as  true  when  it  was  applied" 
{ib).  It  would  be  abandoned  when  it  had  "ceased 
to  be  of  the  slightest  possible  use"  {ib.,  p.  398), 
though  truths  so  called  "may  continue  to  be  ser- 
viceable even  after  they  have  been  discovered  to 
be  false"  {ib.,  p.  397).  Hence  they  are  true  "be- 
cause and  in  so  long  as  they  work"  {ib.,  p.  2^4). 
Self-evidence  in  no  way  "is  a  complete  guarantee  of 
truth,"  but  only  "seems  an  accident  of  our  state 
of  mind,"  for  "to  none  do  so  many  things  seem  so 
strongly  self-evident  as  to  the  insane"  {Human- 
ism, p.  36).  But  Professor  Schiller  forgets  to  tell 
why  they  are  called  "insane."  "No  science," 
therefore,  "deals  with  plain  facts  or  rests  on  abso- 
lutely certain  principles.  Its  facts  are  always  rela- 
tive to  its  principles,  and  the  principles  always 
really  rest  on  their  ability  to  provide  a  coherent 
interpretation  of  the  facts."  Thus  "all  proof  is  a 
matter  of  degree  and  accumulation,  and  no  science 
is  more  than  a  coherent  system  of  interpretations, 
which,  when  applied,  will  work"  {ib.,  p.  386). 

Now  such  doctrines  lead  inevitably  to  Scepticism. 
The  breakdown  of  Humanism  is  due  to  its  basic 
principle   of  Idealism.      Shut   up  within   the  con- 


136  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

fines  of  mental  life,  the  Humanist  cannot  recog- 
nize a  reality  apart  from  him  by  which  he  can  test 
his  mental  operations.  If  at  times  he  appeals  to 
the  truths  of  Physical  Science  or  admits  the  partial 
truth  of  the  "correspondence-theory-of-truth,"  he 
does  so  only  by  acting  inconsistently  with  his 
idealistic  basis. 

Then  regarding  mental  life  as  essentially  a  pur- 
posive tendency  to  an  end  which  is  the  offspring 
of  desire,  the  Humanist  is  compelled  to  regard  the 
particular  tendency  as  "a  working  hypothesis" 
whose  truth  is  measured  by  its  capacity  to  achieve 
the  result.  In  this  he  confounds  truth  with  false- 
hood, and  does  violence  to  the  principles  and  meth- 
ods of  reason  shown  in  ordinary  hfe  as  well  as  in 
scientific  procedure.  The  truths  of  life  and  of 
science  are  not  simply  "working  hypotheses,"  as 
Professor  Schiller  would  recognize  if  he  should 
open  his  eyes  and  accept  the  testimony  of  his 
''trusty  senses."  We  can  and  do  use  "working 
hypotheses"  but  everyone  clearly  admits  their 
tentative  nature.  But  Professor  Schiller  has  a 
method  and  the  method  leads  him  to  hold  that 
the  "anthropomorphic  humanism  of  our  whole 
treatment  of  experience  is  unavoidable  and  obvi- 
ous" {ib.,  p.  13).  The  fault  is  with  the  method 
and  the  principles  which  it  postulates  or  assumes. 
He  is  a  caustic  critic  of  other  philosophers, 
but  forgets  that  some  of  his  criticisms  may  be 
applied  to  himself,   as  e.g.  "the  philosopher  is  a 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  137 

very  strange  being.  He  is  in  the  world,  but  not  of 
it,  residing  mainly  in  a  'cloud-cuckoodom'  of  his 
own  invention"  (i.e.  make),  ''which  seems  to  have 
no  relation  to  the  actual  facts  of  life,  and  makes 
no  difference  to  anything  or  anybody  but  the 
philosopher  himself"  {ib.,  pp.  351,  352). 


CHAPTER  VII 

PRAGMATISM    AND    HUMANISM    {concluded) 

With  the  knowledge  that  Personal  Idealism  is 
the  basic  principle  of  Humanism,  that  Ethical 
Voluntarism  is  its  integrating  principle,  the  reader 
is  prepared  for  an  evaluation  of  the  constituent 
principle  or  essence  of  Humanism,  viz.  its  peculiar 
doctrine  as  to  mental  life. 

I.  What  We  Know 

Humanism  teaches  that  it  "may  fairly  claim 
to  be  the  philosophic  working  out  of  common 
sense"  {Humanism,  Introd.,  p.  xxi),  for  it  "starts 
with  the  unanalyzed  conceptions  of  crude  com- 
mon sense"  {ib.,  p.  xxiii),  viz.  "immediate  experi- 
ence and  experienced  self"  {ih.,  p.  xxii).  But  in 
fact  the  starting  points  for  Humanism  and  for 
common  sense  are  not  the  same;  they  are  widely 
divergent  and  Humanism  can  by  no  means  claim 
to  be  the  philosophic  development  of  common 
sense,  although  it  wishes  to  be  regarded  as  such 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  439).  For  with  Human- 
ism the  "immediate  experience"  does  not  mean  the 


PRAGMATISM  AND   HUMANISM  139 

act  of  perceiving  external  things  but  the  subject- 
matter  of  our  thought.  The  former  is  the  basis  of 
Common-Sense  Realism  which  holds  that  things 
exist  apart  and  independent  of  us;  the  latter  is  the 
Phenomenal  Idealism  of  Sensism  which  teaches  that 
we  do  not  deal  with  things  but  with  the  subjective 
experiences  of  things.  Thus  the  Humanist  con- 
siders not  God  but  belief  in  God,  not  things  but 
the  conceptions  or  ideal  representations  of  things. 

Humanism  uses  the  terms  object  and  objective 
but  in  a  meaning  peculiar  to  its  own  theory.  The 
word  object  has  two  meanings:  the  subject-matter 
we  discuss  and  the  aim  or  purpose,  i.e  the  objective 
point  of  the  discussion.  The  Humanist  uses  the 
terms  in  the  latter  meaning.  Thus  "the  objec- 
tive is  that  which  he  aims  at  or  from,"  not  that 
which  he  considers  {ib.,  p.  189).  With  Humanism 
therefore  "the  external  world  is  the  pragmatically 
efficient  part  of  our  total  experience,  to  which 
the  inefficient  parts  such  as  dreams,  fancies,  illu- 
sions etc.  can,  for  most  purposes  be  referred"  (ib., 
p.  202).  "The  realities  of  ordinary  life  and  science, 
such  as  the  'external  world'  and  the  existence  of 
other  persons"  are  not  existing  things  grasped 
immediately  by  the  mind,  but  are  "inferences," 
"postulates,"  "assumptions"  of  our  experience  to 
be  used  "for  the  satisfaction  of  our  desire"  and 
in  their  nature  are  "conceptions"  {Humanism, 
p.  193).  Hence  to  the  Humanist  the  distinction 
between  "subjective"  and  "objective"  is  "inter- 


I40  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

subjective,"  for  "it  is  the  usefulness  of  some  ideas 
which  leads  to  their  (intersubjective)  recognition  as 
true  and  objectively  valid  and  effectively  discrim- 
inates them  from  the  vagrant  fancies  that  are 
regarded  as  worthless  and  therefore  remains  merely 
subjective"  (ib.,  p.  258),  Thus  ''the  objectivity  of 
perceptions  is  essentially  practical  and  useful  and 
teleologicaV  {ib.,  p.  31).  This  test  of  teleological 
usefulness  applies  not  only  to  individual  but  also  to 
social  objective  truth  {ib.,  p.  55).  The  ''independ- 
ence" ascribed  to  certain  realities  is  false  as  "a 
metaphysical  dogma,"  for  "it  does  not  transcend 
the  cognitive  process"  and  "only  means  that  in 
our  experience  there  are  certain  features  which  it 
is  convenient  to  describe  as  'independent'  facts, 
powers,  persons  etc.  by  reason  of  the  peculiarities 
in  their  behavior"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  461). 
Things  are  as  they  are  known-as.  Thus  the 
IdeaHsm  necessarily  implies  the  relativity  of  knowl- 
edge. "Reality  is  to  each  man  what  appears  to 
him"  and  furthermore  "each  man  perceives" 
things  in  a  fashion  peculiar  to  himself.  Hence 
"it  is  foolish  even  to  inquire  whether  we  perceive 
the  same."  Our  perceptions  are  individual  and 
cannot  be  compared.  For  "I  cannot  carry  my 
perception  into  your  soul  nor  you  yours  into  mine, 
and  so  we  cannot  compare  them,  nor  see  how  far 
they  are  alike  or  not."  And  even  if  I  could,  "wy 
comparing"  would  not  be  "the  same  as  your  com- 
paring them"  {ib.,  p.  317-319)-     Sameness  therefore 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  141 

does  not  refer  to  things  but  to  the  experience  of 
things,  and  the  question  as  to  sameness  in  experi- 
ences is  inscrutable  and  unmeaning"  {Humanism, 

P-  31)- 

By  the  same  Professor  Schiller  does  not  mean  the 

"indistinguishable,"  a  doctrine  which  he  ascribes  to 
Professor  Bradley.  To  him  "logical  identity  is  a 
postulate"  due  to  selection  and  assumed  for  its 
practical  use.  "It  is  a  conscious  act  of  purposive 
thinking,  performed  in  spite  of  observed  differ- 
ences" and  "ultimately  one  of  the  devices  we  have 
hit  upon  for  dealing  with  our  experience"  {Studies 
in  Humanism,  p.  85).  For,  Professor  Schiller 
writes,  "by  a  divine  chance"  some  human  beings 
were  "endowed  with  the  ability  to  agree  and  act 
together  in  some  partial  ways,"  and  this  common 
action  proved  of  "great  advantage,"  as  that  they 
were  "enabled  to  join  together  and  to  form  a  com- 
munity in  virtue  of  the  communion  they  had 
achieved,"  which  would  make  them  "stronger  by 
far  than  those  who  did  not  perceive  the  same"  with 
the  result  that  they  would  "profit  in  proportion 
as  they  could  perceive  the  same"  and  so  "a  world 
of  common  perception  and  thought"  would  "thus 
gradually  grow  up"  {ib.,  p.  318).  Initially,  there- 
fore, the  same  means  "a  claim  that,  for  our  pur- 
pose," perceptual  "differences  maybe  ignored  and 
the  terms  treated  alike"  {ib.,  p.  85).  As  a  claim  it 
may  be  true  or  false;  if  useful,  it  will  be  true,  and 
the  use  is  determined  by  the  consequences.    Hence 


142  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

"perceiving  the  same"  is  "perceiving  in  such  a 
way  that  we  can  act  together"  it  "is  not  the  cause 
of  the  common  action,  but  its  effect,"  "not  a  start- 
ing-point, but  a  goal,  which  in  some  matters  we 
have  almost,  and  for  some  purposes  we  have  quite 
reached,"  for  "we  agree  about  the  things  which 
are  needed  for  bare  life"  {ib.,  pp.  318,  319)  and 
"this  agreement  is  both  difficult,  partial  and  deriva- 
tive. It  is  the  fruit  of  much  effort  and  of  a  long 
struggle,  and  not  an  original  endowment"  {Human- 
ism, p.  31).  Thus  "the  objectivity  of  our  percep- 
tions is  essentially  practical  and  useful  and  teleo- 
logical,"  for  "sense-perceptions  have  come  to  exist 
as  the  same''  {ib.),  and  "logical  identity  is  always 
made"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  118). 

The  causes  of  this  lamentable  breakdown  are 
Idealism  and  the  purposive  character  of  thought. 
When  we  seek  from  Professor  Schiller  for  the 
grounds  of  his  IdeaHsm  we  are  told  that  IdeaKsm 
is  one  of  "our  fundamental  assumptions"  "as- 
sumed tentatively"  on  "the  pragmatic  test"  as 
"to  how  it  works."  Should  he  not,  therefore,  as  a 
good  Pragmatist  put  it  aside?  He  tells  us  that 
the  belief  in  the  world  theory  of  ordinary  Realism 
"has  indisputably  worked  and  philosophic  argu- 
ments are  impotent  against  it"  {ib.,  p.  474).  On 
Pragmatic  grounds  therefore  he  should  be  a  Realist. 
But  he  rejects  ReaHsm  not  as  a  Pragmatist  but  as 
a  psychologist  for  the  reason  that  "the  independent 
reality"  "is  not  after  all  independent  of  experience, 


PRAGMATISM  AND   HUMANISM  143 

but  relative  to  the  experience  which  it  serves  to 
harmonize"  {ib.,  p.  474)  and,  abruptly  changing 
position,  proposes  an  Idealistic  Realism  not  as  a 
starting  ground  but  as  a  goal,  i.e.  an  ideal  towards 
which  the  whole  conceptual  manipulation  of  ex- 
perience tends  and  where  complete  harmony  is 
found  {ib.,  p.  486). 

II,    Thought  as  Purposive  Volition 

The  central  principle  of  Pragmatism  is  "the 
purposiveness  of  our  thought  and  the  teleological 
character  of  its  methods"  {Humanism,  Pref.,  p. 
xiii).  Thought,  therefore,  is  purposive  thinking  for 
an  end  of  our  practical  life.  Now  as  Humanism  is 
*'a  philosophy  of  life,"  such  an  end  is  always  moral, 
and  "every  cognition"  in  "potentially  a  moral 
act"  as  having  "a  practical  purpose  and  value" 
{ib.,  p.  15).  Hence  thought  or  thinking  is  con- 
ceived "as  a  mode  of  conduct,  as  an  integral  part 
of  active  life"  {ib.,  p.  4).  Thus  to  the  Humanist 
the  theory  of  knowledge  is  in  reality  a  theory  of 
Ethics. 

Again  "purpose  may  be  conceived  as  a  concen- 
tration of  interest"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  82). 
Hence  "interest  starts,  propels,  sustains  and  guides 
the  movement  of  our  thought,"  "effects  the  neces- 
sary selection  among  the  objects  of  our  attention" 
and  is  "the  cause  of  logical  coherence"  {Human- 
ism, p.  54).     Thus  the  end  of  our  thinking  depends 


144  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

on  interest,  as  also  do  the  means  we  employ. 
These  means  are  "hypothetical  assumptions," 
"the  product  of  our  volitional  activity"  {Studies 
in  Humanism,  p.  357).  Hence  "at  the  very  roots 
of  reason,  we  must  recognize  an  element  of  faith." 
Faith,  therefore,  is  "pre-eminently  an  attitude 
of  will,"  i.e.  a  "willing  to  take  upon  trust  val- 
uable and  desirable  beliefs,  before  they  have  been 
proved  true,  but  in  the  hope  that  this  attitude 
may  promote  their  verification"  {ih.),  "a  personal 
affair,  an  adventure  which  originates  in  individual 
opinions,  in  choices"  {ih.,  p.  361).  Thus  "all  the 
ultimate  assumptions  of  our  knowledge  rest  upon 
an  act  of  faith,"  which  is  "the  exercise  of  our  will 
to  believe,"  as  e.g.  "the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion" {Humanism,  p.  153),  "the  existence  of  God" 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  362)  and  "the  princi- 
ple of  causaHty"  {ih.,  p.  467).  This  will-to-helieve, 
therefore,  is  "the  wilHngness  to  take  the  risks 
involved  and  to  abide  by  the  results  of  subsequent 
experience"  and  it  takes  the  risks  prompted  by 
"emotional  interest  and  practical  value"  {Human- 
ism, p.  5).  Our  principles  are  "postulates,"  our 
thoughts  are  "wishes,"  to  be  explained  by  "inter- 
est" and  "desire"  {ib.,  p.  245),  i.e.  they  " originate 
as  subjective  demands"  {ih.,  p.  468).  The  con- 
ception of  thought  as  purposive  volition  is  based 
upon  the  assumption  that  mental  life  is  an  evolu- 
tion in  the  time-process  {ib.,  ch.  vi),  i.e.  is  in  a 
state  of  Becoming  {Studies  in  Humanism,  ch.  ii). 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  145 

Although  Humanism  is  adverse  to  dealing  with 
beginnings  Professor  Schiller  writes  that  the  human 
mind  "initially  commences  its  career  in  a  jumble 
resembhng  a  chaotic  rag-bag"  {ib.,  p.  233).  Now 
the  perception  of  this  condition  is  an  act,  and  how 
reconcile  this  with  the  statement  that  "the  pur- 
posive character  of  mental  Ufe  generally  must 
influence  also  our  most  remotely  cognitive  activi- 
ties"? {Humanism,  p.  8).  In  fact  he  says  that 
only  two  views  can  be  held  as  to  the  origin  of  any- 
thing, "a  providential  interposition"  "or  we  may 
reluctantly  recognize  it  as  an  accidental  variation. 
Metaphysically  these  explanations  are  equivalents." 
Or  maintain  "nothing  has  occurred  that  was  not 
fully  contained  in  and  determined  by  its  ante- 
cedents." The  former  is  the  view  of  Humanism 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  244).  But  how  explain 
purpose  in  a  chance  origin  from  chaos? 

In  explaining  the  mental  process  of  Becoming 
Professor  Schiller  uses  the  terms  "functioning" 
and  "adaptation."  Reason  is  "like  the  rest  of 
our  equipment,  a  weapon  in  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence and  a  means  for  achieving  adaptation." 
Hence  "the  use  which  has  developed  it,  must  have 
stamped  itself  upon  its  inmost  structure,"  and 
"a  reason  which  has  not  practical  value  for  the 
purposes  of  life  is  a  monstrosity,  a  morbid  aberra- 
tion or  failure  of  development,  which  natural  selec- 
tion must  sooner  or  later  wipe  away"  {Humanism, 
pp.  7,  8).     Furthermore,  we  are  told  that  "reason 


146  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

is  not  a  faculty.  It  stands  for  a  group  of  habits 
which  men  (and  to  some  extent  some  animals) 
have  acquired,  and  which  we  find  extremely  use- 
ful, nay  necessary,  for  the  successful  carrying  on 
of  life,"  and  "thinking  or  judging  is  one  of  these 
habits"  {Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  356). 

Hence  thought,  thinking,  concepts,  first  principles, 
judging  are  results.  Thus  ''knowledge  grows  in 
extent  and  trustworthiness  by  successful  function- 
ing" {ih.,  p.  194).  Considered  in  the  process,  how- 
ever, mind  is  viewed  as  a  potential  unity,  i.e.  a 
unity  which  becomes  so  {ih.,  p.  185).  The  dis- 
tinction between  subject  and  object  is  "  teleological 
and  is  rooted  in  feeling"  {ib.,  p.  221).  Soul  also  is 
a  potential  unity  and  a  result  {ib.,  p.  75)  as  is  also 
the  self,  for  "our  true  self  is  not  what  underlies 
thought,  will  and  feehng,  but  what  embraces  them 
in  a  perfect  harmony"  {Humanism,  p.  225),  and 
"we  are  not  rounded-off  and  self-complete  souls" 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  379),  and  "conscious 
persons  of  a  definite  kind"  are  to  be  regarded 
"as  mere  efficient,  though  imperfect,  concentra- 
tions of  our  being  upon  the  practical  purposes 
of  normal  life"  {ib.,  p.  378).  Man  himself  is  an 
evolutive  product,  for  "we  are  made  by  a  long 
series  of  ancestors,  and  these  in  their  turn  were 
inevitably  generated  by  non-human  forces,  of  a 
purely  physical  kind"  {ih.,  p.  393),  and  "his- 
torically man  was  a  knowing  being  long  before 
he  was  an  ethical  being,  .  .  ,  both  in  time  and  in 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  147 

urgency,  perceptual  adaptation  to  the  physical 
order  took  precedence  over  ethical  adaptation  to 
the  social  order"  {Humanism,  p.  348). 

Professor  Schiller  says  that  "the  analysis  of 
psychic  process  into  thinking,  willing  and  feeling, 
in  order  to  justify  the  restriction  of  logic  to  the  first 
and  the  exclusion  of  the  two  latter  is  unwarranted" 
{Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  98)  and  holds  that  "all 
three  faculties  are  at  bottom  only  labels  for  describ- 
ing the  activities  of  what  may  be  called  indiffer- 
ently a  unitary  personality  or  a  reacting  organism  " 
{ih.,  p.  129).  He  rejects  soul-substance  as  useless 
{Humanism,  p.  223)  and  says  "the  activity  is  the 
substance"  {ih.,  p.  225).  Now  Scholastic  Philos- 
ophy maintains  the  soul  to  be  a  substantial  activity 
and  avoids  the  confusion  of  regarding  "indifferently 
a  unitary  personality  or  a  reacting  organism" 
as  the  source  of  this  activity. 

III.    Criticism 

In  criticism  we  hold  that  the  basic  principle  on 
which  rests  the  Humanist  description  of  mental 
life,  viz.  that  all  thought  is  purposive,  is  not  true. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  all  thought  is  not  here  and  now 
purposive.  The  principle  of  selection,  considered 
by  Humanism  as  so  necessary  to  the  purposive 
operation  of  thought,  is  clear  proof.  For  the 
selective  attention  picks  out  some  from  a  more 
extensive  psychical  material  {Studies  in  Humanism, 
p.    95).     The    material    selected    enters    into    the 


148  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

psychic  process,  the  material  not  selected  remains 
outside  the  process.  It  is  not  an  answer  to  hold 
that  only  the  elements  entering  into  the  process 
deserve  the  name  of  thought,  whereas  the  elements 
remaining  outside  are  not  to  be  called  thought. 
That  is  a  quibble  with  words.  The  fact  is  we 
know  the  elements  without  and  the  elements  within 
the  process,  with  this  difference  that  the  former 
are  not  here  and  now  purposive  but  may  become 
so,  and  the  latter  are  here  and  now  purposive  but 
may  cease  to  be  so,  if  they  cease  to  be  useless  or 
the  purposes  change.  Hence  both  are  the  subject- 
matter  of  thought. 

This  distinction  is  repeatedly  made  by  Professor 
Schiller,  as  e.g.  when  he  says  that  "differences 
may  be  ignored"  so  we  may  perceive  "the  same" 
{ih.,  p.  85),  that  "selection  is  arbitrary,  in  that  it 
ignores  all  the  rest  of  the  situation  given"  {ih.,  p. 
191),  that  "the  worthless  elements  are  neglected" 
whereas  "the  useful  are  kept"  {ih.,  p.  233),  that 
"every  logical  process  is  essentially  a  selection  from 
and  valuation  of  a  more  extensive  psychical  ma- 
terial" {ih.,  p.  95);  or  when  he  speaks  of  "the  sub- 
jective" as  not  in  the  process  and  "the  objective" 
as  in  the  process,  or  of  the  "real"  and  the  "unreal." 
How  does  he  describe  them  unless  he  know  them, 
and  the  knowing  is  an  act  of  thought.  He  there- 
fore distinctly  admits  that  not  all  the  subject- 
matter  of  thought  is  here  and  now  purposive. 
But  this  is  the  teaching  of  Scholastic  Philosophy, 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  149 

which  holds  that  all  elements  of  thought  are  not 
here  and  now  purposive,  and  that  what  is  not  here 
and  now  purposive  may  become  so. 

In  describing  the  manner  in  which  the  function- 
ing and  adaptation  of  human  thought  takes  place, 
Humanism  makes  use  of  the  "working  hypothesis." 
The  working  of  science,  it  claims,  has  slowly  brought 
to  light  the  working  of  thought  {ib.,  p.  64).  It  is 
true  that  the  "working  hypothesis"  is  a  favorite 
method  of  science  employed  in  the  effort  to  explain 
the  nature  of  physical  things.  Yet  it  is  essentially 
tentative,  problematic  and  hypothetical  —  a  pure 
assumption  used  only  in  those  cases  where  no  cer- 
tain or  probable  indications  are  given  of  the  fact 
we  wish  to  explain.  Humanism  takes  this  method 
and  employs  it  exclusively  to  explain  mental  life. 
The  purposiveness  of  mental  life  shows  thought 
to  be  a  means  to  an  end  (Humanism,  p.  52,  n.); 
the  functioning  of  mental  life  shows  the  elements 
of  the  thought-process  to  be  tools  or  instruments 
in  their  nature.  Thus  the  judgment  is  an  instru- 
ment and  functions  in  an  experimental  manner. 
It  "refers  sooner  or  later  to  a  concrete  situation 
which  it  analyzes,"  and  "to  be  tested,  must  be 
acted  upon"  {ib.,  pp.  191,  192).  Its  "actual  mean- 
ing" lies  in  use,  i.e.  "in  its  adjustment  to  a  particu- 
lar case"  {ib.,  p.  171),  and  "its  objective  validity 
depends  on  its  adaptation  to  our  world"  {ib.,  p.  90). 
"The  concept,"  likewise,  is  an  instrument  by  which 
a  "one"  controls  a  "many"  {Studies in  Humanism, 


I50  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

p.  52),  "is  not  unalterable  and  only  relatively  con- 
stant, being  essentially  a  tool  slowly  fashioned  by 
a  practical  intelligence  for  the  mastery  of  its 
experience"  {ib.,  p.  64).  Universals  are  formed 
by  "abstracting  from  the  particular  nature  of  the 
psychological  imagery"  because  "identity  of  mean- 
ing overpowers  diversity  of  imagery"  {ib.,  p.  94) 
and  "all  meaning  depends  on  purpose"  {ib.,  p.  9). 
In  actual  use  they  are  "all  concrete,  for  they  are 
apphed  to  a  concrete  situation,"  and  are  "always 
particulars,  i.e.  they  are  applied  to  a  this  in  a  here 
and  now''  {ib.,  pp.  172,  173).  These  fancies  can 
be  reduced  to  the  one  source:  the  purposiveness 
of  human  thought.  Thus  the  working  of  this 
principle  in  its  idealistic  setting  gives  in  the  last 
analysis  a  false  conception  of  the  idea,  the  most 
fundamental  and  apparently  the  simplest  element 
in  mental  life. 

Such  is  a  brief  summary  of  Humanism.  Start- 
ing out  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  reforming 
Philosophy,  it  leaves  upon  the  mind  only  a  deeper 
conviction  of  the  necessity  of  a  reform.  Based 
on  pure  assumptions,  its  fundamental  principle 
and  essentially  arbitrary  method  lead  to  partial, 
confusing,  often  contradicting,  and  erronous  ex- 
planations. A  generation  ago  writers  strove  in 
every  possible  way  to  eliminate  design  from  Philos- 
ophy, and  in  the  premature  transition  from  Psy- 
chology   to    Sociology,    Ethics    was    passed    over. 


PRAGMATISM  AND  HUMANISM  151 

Humanism  grasps  the  place  and  importance  of 
design  and  of  Ethics,  but  goes  to  the  opposite 
extreme.  The  reason  is  that  Humanism  is  an 
ideahstic  philosophy  of  life,  dealing  only  with 
ideal  experience  which  is  to  be  controlled  and 
adapted  by  human  purposes  for  human  ends. 
Its  logical  conclusion  therefore  is  that  human 
purpose  sways  the  world  (i.e.  of  ideal  experience) 
and  Ethics  reigns  supreme.  Its  characteristic 
teaching,  whence  it  derives  the  term  Humanism, 
is  that  human  knowledge  is  human. 

There  is  an  element  of  truth  in  this  teaching, 
but  it  is  distorted  and  exaggerated  beyond  all 
bounds  by  the  method  employed  and  the  arbitrary 
assumptions  made.  It  is  a  common  fact  of  ordi- 
nary daily  Hfe,  and  a  central  truth  of  Scholastic 
Psychology,  that  while  the  material  of  thought 
enters  the  mind  from  the  outside  world  through 
the  senses,  yet  the  mind  analyzes,  compares,  ar- 
ranges, classifies  this  material  and  reasons  upon 
it.  As  a  result  the  material  to  a  certain  extent 
assumes  a  mental  form,  but  this  form  is  depend- 
ent on  the  external  nature  of  the  material  for  its 
content  and  on  the  native  character  of  mental 
principles.  To  the  Humanist,  ideal  experience  is 
real,  and  the  real  world  of  ideal  experience  is  made 
by  mental  action.  But  we  are  told  that  to  make 
reahty  is  not  to  create  it,  that  primal  reality  is 
assumed  as  not  made,  that  the  making  of  reality 
in  fact  means  the  remaking  of  it  (i.e.  the  rearrange- 


152  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

ment).  Again  we  read  that  the  effort  is  not  to 
make  objective  reality,  but  only  subjective,  for  the 
''making  of  reality"  is  "the  conceptual  manipula- 
tion of  (ideal)  experience."  Even  then  this  con- 
ceptual manipulation  meets  with  obstructions  as 
''independent,"  "brute"  "crude"  facts,  and  all 
this  in  spite  of  the  most  gratuitous  assumptions 
and  arbitrary  means  employed.  Surely  as  good 
Pragmatists  we  should  discard  a  system  Hke 
Humanism  because  it  does  not  work,  and  assume 
on  Pragmatic  grounds  alone  the  Scholastic  Philos- 
ophy which  sets  forth  so  clearly  and  so  logically 
the  position  of  Common-Sense  Realism. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Pragmatism  and  Creative  Evolution 

The  Philosophy  of  Tendency  has  reached  its 
extreme  and  most  fanciful  form  in  the  system 
outlined  by  Professor  Bergson.  Unlike  Professor 
Schiller  and  in  line  with  Professor  Royce  he  aims 
directly  and  expressly  at  setting  forth  a  meta- 
physic.  His  purpose  is  to  show  that  Theory  of 
Knowledge  and  Theory  of  Life  are  inseparable,  that 
the  clear  grasp  of  this  principle  "replaces  intellect  in 
the  general  evolution  of  life,"  teaches  us  "how  the 
frames  of  knowledge  have  been  constructed"  and 
"how  we  can  enlarge  and  go  beyond  them/'  shows 
us  "the  formation  of  the  intellect,  and  thereby 
the  genesis  of  that  matter  of  which  our  intellect 
traces  the  general  configuration"  {Creative  Evolu- 
tion, Intro.,  p.  xiii).  As  a  result  "we  cannot  and 
must  not  accept  the  relation  established  by  pure 
intellectualism  between  the  theory  of  knowledge 
and  the  theory  of  the  known,  between  metaphysics 
and  science"  {ih.,  p.  194).  Thus  Metaphysics  is 
identified  with  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  like 
other  systems  of  Pragmatism,  though  in  a  form 
far  more  radical,  the  basis  and  nature  of  the 
doctrine  is  "psychological." 


154  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Professor  Bergson  like  Professor  Schiller  and  all 
true  Pragmatists  is  modest.  He  "simply  desires 
to  define  the  method,"  not  to  construct  a  complete 
system.  In  fact  he  tells  us  that  such  a  system  ''will 
only  be  built  up  by  the  collective  and  progressive 
effort  of  many  thinkers,  of  many  observers  also, 
completing,  correcting  and  improving  one  another" 
{ib.,  p.  xiv),  that  "the  metaphysic,  if  possible,  can 
only  be  a  laborious  and  even  painful  effort"  {An 
Introduction  to  Metaphysics,  p.  55),  for  in  building 
it  up  we  must  "invert  the  habitual  direction  of  the 
work  of  thought"  {ib.,  p.  70). 

Forewarned,  therefore,  we  may  expect  to  find 
imperfections,  nay  even  positive  errors.  In  truth, 
a  careful  reading  shows  that  his  exposition  is  radi- 
cally erroneous  and  needs  corrections  on  vital 
points,  especially  Idealism,  Evolution,  and  the 
theory  of  Mental  Life. 

I.    The  Fact  of  Change 

The  fundamental  problem  which  Professor  Berg- 
son attempts  to  solve  is  the  meaning  of  "exist- 
ence" {Creative  Evolution,  p.  i.).  For  data  he 
appeals  to  "experience."  Here  at  the  outset  he 
sets  forth  the  doctrine  of  the  twofold  experience, 
i.e.  external  and  internal,  which  is  the  basis  of  his 
method  and  system. 

By  external  experience  is  understood  "something 
thought"  {ib.,  p.  9),  and  it  is  supposed  to  include 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     155 

not  merely  the  data  which  come  from  the  senses 
but  more  especially  what  we  acquire  through  the 
intellect.  For  the  intellect  "is  a  special  function 
of  the  mind  essentially  turned  toward  inert  matter" 
(ib.,  p.  206)  and  is  "formed  to  act  on  matter  from 
without,"  thus  presenting  "external  views  only," 
i.e.  "parts  external  to  parts"  (ib.,  p.  250).  With 
intellect  must  be  included  "consciousness,"  not 
consciousness  in  the  wide  acceptance  of  the 
word,  but  its  product,  "the  narrowed"  or  "dis- 
tinct consciousness"  or  "retrospective  vision," 
which  "is  the  natural  function  of  the  intellect" 
and  therefore  concerned  with  "the  already  made" 
(ib.,  p.  237),  i.e.  with  the  "static"  or  "stable" 
{ib.,  p.  163).  Thus  external  experience  gives 
knowledge  which  is  "phenomenal"  (ib.,  p.  360), 
"relative"  {ib.,  p.  199)  or  "external  and  super- 
ficial" {ib.,  p.  i). 

By  internal  experience,  on  the  contrary,  is  under- 
stood "something  lived."  "Internal  and  pro- 
found," it  furnishes  real  knowledge.  For  real 
knowledge  is  internal.  It  means  the  abiHty  "to 
grasp  from  within"  {ib.,  p.  358),  and  supposes  the 
internahty  of  subject  in  object  {ib.,  p.  307).  Hence 
internal  experience  presents  a  ground  which  "in- 
tellect does  not  cover"  {ib.,  p.  359).  For  it  is 
"the  most  removed  from  externaHty  and  the  least 
penetrated  with  intellectuahty,"  and  "in  its  depths 
we  feel  ourselves  most  intimately  within  our  own 
life"  {ib.,  p.  199). 


156  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

On  the  basis  of  this  twofold  experience  Professor 
Bergson  explains  the  meaning  of  the  word  "exist." 
He  looks  into  his  inner  Hfe  and  sees  looming  up 
large  the  great  fact  of  "change."  The  more  deeply 
he  penetrates  into  the  depths  of  his  being,  the  more 
profound  and  radical  is  the  change.  The  change 
is  not  merely  from  state  to  state,  e.g.  warm  or  cold, 
merry  or  sad;  a  state  itself  is  a  change,  for  there 
is  no  feehng,  no  idea,  no  volition,  which  is  not 
undergoing  change  every  moment.  Even  the  per- 
ception of  a  motionless  external  object  changes, 
for  memory  conveys  something  of  the  past  into 
the  present,  and  so  the  state  I  have  now  is  not 
the  same  it  was  a  moment  before.  If  a  mental 
state  ceased  to  vary,  its  duration  would  cease  to 
flow.  Thus  the  mental  state,  as  it  advances  on 
the  road  of  time,  is  continually  swelHng  with  the 
duration  which  it  accumulates,  rolling  upon  itself 
as  "a  snowball  on  the  snow."  Hence  we  change 
without  ceasing,  and  the  state  itself  is  nothing  but 
a  change,  although  "it  is  expedient  to  disregard 
this  uninterrupted  change,  and  to  notice  it  only 
when  it  becomes  sufi&cient  to  impress  a  new  atti- 
tude on  the  body,  a  new  direction  on  the  attention. 
Then,  and  then  only,  we  find  that  our  state  has 
changed"  (ib.,  p.  2). 

Thus  inner  experience  shows  to  Professor  Berg- 
son not  only  change  but  also  facts  of  "discontinu- 
ity" in  the  change,  e.g.  states  of  consciousness. 
But  this  discontinuity,  he  says,  is  only  apparent 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     157 

and  artificial,  and  is  due  to  the  intellect  through 
interest  fixing  its  attention  upon  them  by  a  series 
of  separate  acts.  In  reality  there  is  "a  gentle 
slope,"  not  "a  broken  line,"  nor  "separate  steps." 
The  states  or  incidents  are  only  designs  made  by 
the  intellect  on  a  continuous  background.  Each 
of  them  is  borne  by  "the  fluid  mass  of  our  whole 
psychical  existence"  and  "is  only  the  best  illumi- 
nated point  of  a  moving  zone  which  comprises  all 
that  we  feel  or  think  or  will  —  all,  in  short,  that 
we  are  at  any  given  moment"  {ib.,  p.  3). 

With  this  notion  of  personality,  Professor  Berg- 
son  proceeds  to  reject  the  idea  of  personality  as  a 
link  connecting  states  of  consciousness.  The  con- 
scious states,  he  says,  appear  as  "distinct  and 
solid  colors";  in  truth  they  are  "a  flux  of  fleeting 
shades  merging  into  each  other."  They  are  set 
up  as  "independent  realities";  in  truth  they  are 
"artificial  cut-outs"  or  "snapshots"  made  by  the 
intellect  on  the  "flux."  There  is  no  real  separa- 
tion; only  an  undivided  flow.  As  the  intellect 
separates  the  states  artificially,  so  it  unites  them 
artificially  by  means  of  "a  formless  ego,  indiffer- 
ent and  unchangeable."  But  this  "colorless  sub- 
stratum," he  adds,  perpetually  colored  by  that 
which  covers  it,  is  for  us  as  if  it  did  not  exist,  for 
we  only  perceive  "what  is  colored,"  i.e.  psychic 
states.  It  has  "no  reality"  and  is  "merely  a 
symbol  intended  to  recall  unceasingly  to  our  con- 
sciousness the  artificial  character  of  the  process  by 


158  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

which  attention  places  clean-cut  states  side  by 
side  where  actually  there  is  a  continuity  which 
unfolds."  With  "an  impassive  ago"  and  "sepa- 
rate states,"  there  is  no  duration,  for  "an  ego 
which  does  not  change,  does  not  endure,"  and  a 
state  which  does  not  change  "does  not  endure 
either."  The  element  of  "real  time"  is  ehminated 
and  there  is  presented  "only  an  artificial  imitation 
of  the  internal  Hfe,  a  static  equivalent,  which  lends 
itself  to  the  requirements  of  logic  and  language." 
On  the  contrary,  "the  psychical  life  unfolding 
beneath  the  symbols  which  conceal  it,  we  readily 
perceive"  i.e.  feel  {ih.,  p.  314). 

Hence  Professor  Bergson  concludes  that  psychic 
existence  "progresses  and  endures  in  real  time," 
"time  is  the  stuff  out  of  which  it  is  made"  {ih., 
pp.  4,  240),  and  "the  flux  of  time  is  the  reality 
itself"  {ih.,  p.  344).  By  "time"  he  means  not 
abstract  or  mathematical  time.  This  is  static, 
has  no  real  efiicacy  and  therefore  "is  nothing" 
{ih.,  p.  39).  But  by  "time"  is  understood  "real 
time"  or  "concrete  duration"  {ih.,  p.  4),  which  is 
"a  kind  of  force"  possessing  "real  efl&cacy"  {ih., 
p.  339)  or  "vital  process"  {ih.,  p.  340),  "means 
creation"  {il.,  p.  343),  and  reveals  its  creative 
power  in  "a  continuous  progress  of  the  past  which 
gnaws  into  the  future  and  swells  as  it  advances" 
{ih.,  p.  4).  "The  past  is  preserved  by  itself,  auto- 
matically," and  "the  present  is  the  condensation 
of    the    history    that    we    have    lived    from    our 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      159 

birth,"  e.g.  ''our  character''  {ib.,  p.  5);  not  by 
"memory"  for  ''memory  is  not  even  properly 
speaking  a  faculty"  {ib.,  p.  4).  Yet  in  other  pas- 
sages we  read  "immediate  experience  shows  us 
that  the  very  basis  of  our  conscious  existence  is 
memory,"  i.e.  "the  prolongation  of  the  past  into 
the  present,  or,  in  a  word,  duration,  acting  and 
irreversible"  {ib.,  p.  17);  "wherever  anything 
lives  there  is  open  somewhere  a  register  in  which 
time  is  being  inscribed"  {ib.,  p.  16),  and  "the 
evolution  of  the  living  being,  like  that  of  the 
embryo,  implies  an  appearance,  at  least,  of  organic 
memory"  {ib.,  p.  19).  Hence  "the  past,  as  a 
whole  is  made  manifest  to  us  in  its  impulse,  it  is 
felt  in  the  form  of  tendency,  although  a  small  part 
of  it  only  is  known  in  the  form  of  idea"  for  "we 
think  with  only  a  small  part  of  our  past,  but  it  is 
with  our  entire  past,  including  the  original  bent 
of   our   soul,  that   we   desire,  will   and   act"   {ib., 

P-5). 

The  creative  efficacy  of  duration  is  shown  es- 
pecially in  our  personaHty.  PersonaHty  is  a 
growth,  "is  being  built  up  each  instant,"  so  that 
"each  moment  of  our  life  is  a  kind  of  creation,"  is 
"something  new,  something  unforeseeable,"  and 
"each  of  our  states  being  indeed  the  new  form  that 
we  are  just  assuming."  Hence  "this  creation  of 
self  by  self"  is  the  great  fact  of  our  psychic  exist- 
ence. Therefore  Professor  Bergson  concludes  that 
"for  a  conscious  being,  to  exist  is  to  change,  to 


i6o  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

change  is  to  mature,  to  mature  is  to  go  on  creating 
ourselves  endlessly"  {ib.,  pp.  6,  7). 

Professor  Bergson  applies  the  same  line  of  reason- 
ing and  the  same  conclusions  to  existence  in  gen- 
eral. He  tells  us  that  "succession  is  an  undeniable 
fact  even  in  the  material  world"  where  we  behold 
"an  unfolding  like  our  own"  {ib.,  p.  9).  The  liv- 
ing being  seems  "to  share  with  consciousness  the 
attributes  of  continuity  in  change,  preservation  of 
the  past  in  the  present,  real  duration"  {ib.,  p.  23). 
This  "duration  is  immanent  to  the  whole  of  the 
universe,"  for  "the  whole  has  a  duration,  and  so 
a  form  of  existence  Uke  our  own"  {ib.,  p.  11). 
Hence  "each  conscious  being  taken  separately," 
"the  organism  which  Hves,"  "the  universe  as  a 
whole"  is  "a  thing  that  endures"  {ib.,  p.  15). 
He  concludes  therefore  that  "Duration  is  the 
foundation  of  our  being,  the  very  substance  of  the 
world  in  which  we  live"  {ib.,  p.  39). 

II.   Change  and  Permanence 

In  the  above  analysis  of  our  inner  life  Professor 
Bergson  rightly  calls  attention  to  the  fact  of  change, 
but  he  errs  radically  by  claiming  that  change  is 
the  only  or  the  fundamental  fact.  In  truth,  we 
are  aware  of  change,  and  also  of  another  great 
fact,  viz.  permanence  or  personal  identity.  This 
fact  of  permanence  is  more  fundamental  than  that 
of  change,  for  without  permanence,  change  is  not 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      i6i 

possible.  We  change,  a  thing  changes;  in  the 
change  there  is  a  subject  as  well  as  a  predicate. 
Professor  Bergson  ignores  the  subject  and  per- 
sonifies the  predicate,  i.e.  duration,  yet  in  so  doing 
he  gives  a  partial  and  radically  erroneous  descrip- 
tion of  our  inner  life.  So  deep-seated  is  this  fact 
of  permanence  that  Professor  Bergson  is  compelled 
to  recognize  it  when  he  speaks  of  memory  or 
duration  ''as  a  prolongation  of  the  past  into  the 
present"  {ib.,  p.  4)  and  of  the  present  as  "a  new 
state"  or  "form"  which  our  (past)  personality 
assumes.  He  may  use  words  as  he  pleases,  yet  to 
him  the  present  is  the  past  personality  with  a  new 
form. 

There  is  an  evident  ambiguity  in  Professor  Berg- 
son's  doctrine  of  change.  At  times  he  uses  the 
terms  "Duration,"  "continuous  progress,"  "con- 
tinuity of  Life"  and  "Time"  iib.,p.  27),  as  abstract 
personifications.  Again  he  describes  change  in  the 
concrete,  as  e.g.  when  he  speaks  of  the  universe 
or  each  conscious  being  or  the  living  organism  as 
a  thing  that  endures  {ib.,  p.  15)  or  of  ''the  animal" 
in  its  most  rudimentary  form,  or  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  embryo,  as  a  perpetual  change  of 
form  {ib.,  p.  18)  or  of  the  "vegetable  cell"  {ib., 
p.  108)  or  when  he  makes  "continuity  in  change" 
an  attribute  of  duration  {ib.,  p.  23). 

But,  as  he  is  treating  of  concrete  duration  we 
must  adopt  the  concrete  form  of  expression  and  this 
shows  a  certain  permanence  in  the  change.     More- 


1 62  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

over  the  word  "Duration"  implies  both  permanence 
and  change.  Take  e.g.  his  fundamental  principle 
"to  exist  is  to  endure,  and  to  endure  is  to  change." 
Express  this  principle  in  the  concrete  and  we  have: 
"a  living  being  (for  here  he  is  deaHng  with  the  liv- 
ing being)  endures  in  its  existence  by  developing 
changes  through  its  process  of  growth."  There  is 
nothing  startKng  in  this  statement,  for  we  know 
that  growth  is  a  law  of  life,  and  as  soon  as  the 
living  being  ceases  to  grow,  i.e.  to  change,  it  ceases 
to  Hve.  Now  to  admit  permanence  even  to  the 
least  possible  degree  in  addition  to  change  is  to 
deny  the  fundamental  principle  of  his  system. 

Again  Professor  Bergson  tells  us  that  "memory 
is  the  very  basis  of  our  conscious  existence"  and 
that  it  "conveys  something  of  the  past  into  the 
present."  Now  applying  this  concrete  duration  to 
myself,  how  can  memory  convey  something  of  my 
past  into  my  present,  without  supposing  my  per- 
manence or  personal  identity?  If  "memory  is  the 
basis  of  my  conscious  existence,"  personal  identity 
makes  memory  possible. 

Furthermore  Professor  Bergson  speaks  of  past, 
present  and  future  as  essential  to  duration,  so  that 
duration  could  not  be  conceived  without  them. 
Yet  if  we  examine  "past,  present  and  future" 
in  the  concrete,  we  find  that  they  could  not  be 
conceived  without  an  element  of  permanence  in 
addition  to  the  element  of  change.  Remove  the 
element  of  permanence  and  we  have  only  "an  in- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      163 

stantaneous  present";  the  very  criticism  he  levels 
at  the  systems  of  science  {ib.,  p.  22). 


III.   An  Ideal  Pantheism 

With  Professor  Bergson,  therefore,  Duration  is 
Reality,  is  the  Absolute  {ib.,  p.  206).  Thus  "the 
Absolute  is  revealed  very  near  us,  and,  in  a  certain 
measure,  in  us"  {ib.,  p.  299).  It  is  "a  flow,"  "a 
tendency,"  not  a  being.  This  Becoming  or  Dura- 
tion "is  the  very  life  of  things,  the  fundamental 
ReaHty"  {ib.,  p.  317).  But  Duration  apart  from 
permanence  is  an  abstract  personification.  Hence 
the  basic  principle  of  his  system,  and  which  is 
Reality  itself,  is  an  abstraction,  i.e.  mental. 

Now  Professor  Bergson  holds  that  this  funda- 
mental reahty  is  not  given  all  at  once,  that  its 
evolution  presents  "a  ceaseless  upspringing  of 
something  new."  Under  this  aspect  it  is  conceived 
as  "action  making  itself"  {ib.,  p.  245)  or  "gen- 
erating form"  {ib.,  p.  239).  This  creative  action 
"which  for  want  of  a  better  word  we  have  called 
consciousness,"  i.e.  consciousness  in  the  wide  sense 
of  the  word  as  distinguished  from  "  the  retrospective 
vision"  of  the  intellect,  is  "arrested"  or  "momen- 
tarily interrupted"  or  "distends."  Now  "the 
interruption  of  a  cause  being  here  equivalent  to  the 
reversal  of  the  effect"  {ib.,  p.  237),  the  direction 
which  this  reahty  (i.e.  action)  takes,  suggests  the  idea 
of  ''action  unmaking  itself,"  and  as  such  is  the  prin- 


1 64  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

ciple  of  matter  and  of  extension.  Hence  the  action 
"making  itself"  tends  in  the  direction  of  life  and 
of  spirit;  the  action  "unmaking  itself"  in  the  direc- 
tion of  materiality  and  of  space  {ib.,  p.  212).  Thus 
matter  and  spirit  are  of  the  same  substance,  viz. 
consciousness,  and  differ  only  in  the  fact  that  they 
are  counter  tendencies,  i.e.  matter  is  a  counter  or 
"inverse"  tendency  to  spirit  or  life.  The  inter- 
ruption or  relaxing  of  the  life-current  causes  it 
to  congeal  and  the  congealed  parts  are  matter.  Pro- 
fessor Bergson  assures  us  that  "we  are  not  the  vital 
current  itself;  we  are  this  current  already  loaded 
with  matter,  that  is  with  congealed  parts  of  its 
own  substance  which  it  carries  along  its  course" 
{ib.,  p.  239). 

Hence  matter  in  its  last  analysis  is  conceived  as 
something  negative,  i.e.  the  lack  or  withdrawal  of 
positive  action  {ib.,  p.  209).  For  illustration  Pro- 
fessor Bergson  appeals  to  mental  life.  "Suppose 
we  let  ourselves  go  and,  instead  of  acting,  dream. 
At  once  the  self  is  scattered.  Our  personality  thus 
descends  in  the  direction  of  space  and  of  extension. 
.  .  .  Extension  admits  of  degrees.  .  .  .  Sensations 
are  the  first  steps  in  the  direction  of  the  extended. 
.  .  .  Matter  consists  in  this  very  movement 
pushed  further,"  Therefore  he  concludes  that 
"physics  is  simply  psychics  inverted"  {ib.,  pp.  201- 
202),  that  "the  regression  of  the  extra-spatial 
degrades  itself  into  spatiality"  {ib.,  p.  207),  that, 
"matter  or  mind,  reahty  has  appeared  to  us  as  a 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      165 

perpetual  becoming;  it  makes  itself  or  it  unmakes 
itself,  but  it  is  never  something  made"  {ib.,  p.  272), 
that  the  task  of  Metaphysics  is  "to  remount  the 
decline  that  Physics  descends,  to  bring  back  matter 
to  its  origin,  and  to  build  up  progressively  a  cos- 
mology which  would  be,  so  to  speak,  a  reversed 
psychology"  {ib.,  p.  208). 

Furthermore,  just  as  matter  and  mind  are  of  the 
same  nature,  so  are  matter  and  intellect  in  their  turn 
of  the  same  nature.  Matter  and  intellect  belong 
to  the  inverse  tendency  (p.  208),  for  "the  movement 
at  the  end  of  which  is  spatiahty  lays  down  along  its 
course  the  faculty  of  induction  as  well  as  that  of  de- 
duction, in  fact,  intellectuality  entire"  (^6.,  p.  216). 
Hence  "an  identical  process  must  have  cut  out 
matter  and  intellect,  at  the  same  time  from  a  stuff 
that  contained  both"  {ib.,  p.  199),  i.e.  mind,  or  con- 
sciousness or  life,  for  "mind  overflows  intellect" 
{ib.,  p.  206).  Thus  intellect  is  a  product,  a  "de- 
posit" or  "local  effect"  of  the  evolution  of  life, 
"a  flame  perhaps  accidental,"  "an  emanation" 
or  "an  aspect"  of  life;  for  it  is  "a  more  precise, 
complex  and  subtle  adaptation  of  the  consciousness 
of  living  beings  to  the  conditions  of  existence  that 
are  made  for  them"  {ib.,  Intro.,  pp.  ix,  xiii). 

Hence  "intellect  and  matter  have  progressively 
adapted  themselves  one  to  the  other  in  order  to 
attain  a  common  form"  and  "this  adaptation 
has  been  brought  about  quite  naturally,  because  it 
is  the  same  inversion  of  the  same  movement  which 


1 66  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

creates  at  once  the  intellectuality  of  mind  and  the 
materiality  of  matter"  {ib.,  p.  206).  The  purpose 
of  the  adaptation  is  "to  secure  the  perfect  fitting 
of  our  body  to  its  environment,"  ''to  represent 
the  relations  of  external  things  among  themselves," 
i.e.  to  "think  matter."  Hence  "intellect  traces 
the  general  configuration  of  matter,"  "is  at  home 
among  inanimate  objects,  more  especially  among 
solids,"  "consequently  triumphs  in  geometry, 
wherein  is  revealed  the  kinship  of  logical  thought 
with  the  unorganized  matter"  {ib.,  Introduction). 
The  function  of  the  intellect,  therefore,  is  prac- 
tical, i.e.  "relative  or  an  appendage  to  action," 
prompted  by  interest  for  practical  utility,  "a  light 
to  our  conduct"  {ib.,  p.  29).  Yet  we  are  told  that 
"its  eyes  are  ever  turned  to  the  rear"  {ib.,  p.  46), 
probably  because  it  is  in  the  inverse  movement. 
But  as  "action  is  on  the  surface  of  things"  {ib.,  p. 
46),  so  intellect  "grasps  the  surface  of  things  only" 
and  "is  formed  to  act  on  matter  from  without"  {ib., 
p.  250).  It  "is  made  to  present  to  us  things  and 
states,  rather  than  changes  and  acts."  Yet  in 
reality  "there  are  no  things,  only  actions." 
"Things  and  states  are  only  views  taken  by  the 
mind  of  becoming."  They  "result  from  a  solid- 
ification performed  by  our  understanding,"  which 
takes  place  "by  the  instantaneous  cut  which  the 
understanding  practises,  at  a  given  moment,  on 
the  flux  of  the  real,"  and  so  "it  is  absurd  to  say 
that  new  things  can  join  things  already  existing" 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      167 

{ib.,  pp.  248-249).  "The  distinct  outlines  and 
individuality  of  objects  are  the  plan  of  our  eventual 
action  reflected  as  in  a  mirror.  Suppress  this  action, 
and  the  outlines,  i.e.  main  directions,  disappear. 
Hence  bodies  we  perceive  are  traced  or  cut  out  on 
the  stuff  of  nature  by  perception"  {ib.,  pp.  11-12). 
Thus  "the  subdivision  of  matter  into  separate 
bodies  is  relative  to  our  perception,  while  the  build- 
ing up  of  closed-off  systems  of  material  points  is 
relative  to  science"  {ib.,  p.  12),  whereas  "matter 
looked  at  as  an  undivided  whole  is  a  flux  rather 
than  a  thing"  {ib.,  p.  186). 

Artificial  systems  are  to  be  distinguished  from 
"natural"  or  "real  systems,"  e.g.  the  living  body. 
Into  the  former  enters  the  notion  of  abstract  time, 
while  the  natural  system  "develops  along  concrete 
time"  {ib.,  p.  21).  To  the  natural  systems  Pro- 
fessor Bergson  refers  when  he  speaks  of  created 
things  as  "manifestations"  in  which  "life  is  scat- 
tered in  proportion  to  its  progress"  {ib.,  p.  103) 
and  says  that  "the  permanence  of  their  form  is 
only  the  outline  of  a  movement"  {ib.,  p.  128). 

Moreover  we  read  that  "law  is  a  relation"  {ib., 
p.  228)  or  "a  bond  between  two  or  more  terms, 
established  by  the  mind"  {ib.,  p.  356)  and  "no  law 
of  a  physical  world  taken  separately  has  objective 
reahty,"  for  "each  of  them  is  the  work  of  an  in- 
vestigator who  has  regarded  things  from  a  certain 
bias,  isolated  certain  variables,  applied  certain 
conventional  units  of  measurement."     Hence  there 


1 68  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

is  "something  artificial  in  the  mathematical  form 
of  a  physical  law  and  consequently  in  our  scientific 
knowledge  of  things"  (iJ.,  p.  218). 

As  the  intellect  is  by  nature  static,  so  when  applied 
to  living  things  it  gives  ''symbols,"  i  e.  it  trans- 
lates or  imitates,  not  transforms  {ib.,  p.  226).  Sci- 
ence merely  "works  into  a  new  scheme  of  the 
whole  the  instantaneous  and  motionless  views 
taken  at  intervals  along  the  continuity  of  a  move- 
ment" (ib.,  p.  32).  These  systems  which  it  cuts 
out  within  the  whole  "are  not  parts  but  partial 
views  of  the  whole"  {ib.,  p.  31). 

Finally  Professor  Bergson  maintains  that  "the 
evolutionist  theory,  as  far  as  it  has  any  importance 
for  philosophy,  consists  above  all  in  estabhshing 
relations  of  ideal  kinship,  and  in  maintaining  that 
wherever  there  is  this  relation  of,  so  to  speak, 
logical  affiHation  between  forms,  there  is  also  a 
relation  of  chronological  succession  between  the 
species  in  which  these  forms  are  materialized" 
(ib.,  p.  25),  and  that  "the  whole  of  the  universe 
is  constructed  or  reconstructed  by  thought"  {ib., 

P-  15)- 

We  therefore  conclude  that  an  examination  into 
the  definition  of  Reality  proposed  by  Professor 
Bergson  shows  that  his  system  of  Creative  Evolu- 
tion is  a  Pantheistic  Idealism  of  Manifestation 
based  upon  an  abstract  idea,  i.e.  duration,  as 
regards  existing  things,  combined  with  a  Logical 
Idealism  of  Representation  in  relation  to  our  in- 


PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     169 

tellectual   knowledge,   whether   the  knowledge   be 
viewed  as  that  of  common  sense  or  of  science. 


IV.   Reality  and  Feeling 

The  twofold  experience,  viz.  of  intellect  and  of 
life,  gives  a  twofold  knowledge  of  reaHty,  the  one 
coming  from  intellect  and  senses  and  expressed  in 
common-sense    and   in    science,  the  other  coming 
from  living  or  feeling.     Now  as  "  the  function  of 
the   intellect   is  to   preside   over   actions"  and  as 
''our  activity  leaps  from  act  to  act,  it  is  necessary 
that  matter  should  pass  from  state  to  state,  for  it  is 
only  in  a  state  of  the  material  world  that  action 
can  fit  a  result,  so  as  to  be  accomplished."     ''If 
matter  appeared  as  a  perpetual  flowing,  we  should 
assign  no  termination  to  any  of  our  actions,"  and 
in  assigning  an  end  to  our  actions,  we  do  so  in 
order  that  the  idea  may  become  an  act,  yet  the 
end   or   idea   explicitly   is   pictured    to   our    mind, 
whereas  "the  moments  constituting  the  action  it- 
self either  elude  our  consciousness  or  reach  it  only 
confusedly"   {ib.,  pp.   299-300).     Accustomed  "to 
think  the  moving  by  means  of  the  immovable,  the 
intellect  generally  refuses  to  think  true  duration" 
(ib.),  has  no    direct    vision    of    reaHty   {ib.,  Intro, 
p.  xiii) ;  its  object  is  what  is  singled  out  of  reaHty 
(ib.,  p.  46)  for  "practical  interest,  and  so  we  can- 
not see  the  real  evolution,  the  radical  becoming," 
and  "even   when  we  speak  of  duration   and  be- 


I70  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

coming,  it  is  of  another  thing  that  we  are  think- 
ing" {ib.,  p.  273).  Thus  what  the  intellect  grasps 
of  the  real  is  static,  relative  (ib.,  p.  198),  mechanical 
and  symbolical  {ib.,  p.  196).  For  with  its  eyes  turned 
backwards,  the  intellect  cannot  grasp  reality  in 
the  making,  but  only  as  made,  i.e.  in  the  past, 
and  if  it  grasps  real  moments  of  duration  and 
puts  these  partial  static  views  of  the  past  end  to 
end,  it  would  not  give  a  real  reconstruction  of  the 
whole,  but  only  an  approximation  or  rather  an 
imitation  of  the  indivisible  motor  principle  (i.e. 
duration)  whence  the  impetus  proceeds  {ib.,  pp. 
46,  98,  loi,  200).  But  this  is  "the  natural  meta- 
physic  of  the  human  mind,"  and  Professor  Bergson 
warns  us  that  we  should  be  "on  our  guard  against 
it"  {ib.,  pp.  20,  21),  for  it  is  the  cause  of  a  twofold 
illusion,  viz.  "to  suppose  we  can  think  of  the 
unstable  by  means  of  the  stable,  the  moving  by 
means  of  the  immobile"  and  "to  impart  into 
speculation  a  procedure  made  for  practice"  {ib., 
p.  277). 

To  get  direct  vision  of  reality,  we  must  go  from 
the  experience  of  intellect  to  the  experience  of  living, 
i.e.  from  thought  to  feeling  {ib.,  p.  46).  Our  intellect, 
being  only  a  divergent  product  of  life,  "a  part  of 
the  whole,"  is  with  its  categories  of  unity,  multi- 
pHcity,  mechanical  casuality  and  intelligent  final- 
ity, too  narrow  and  rigid  for  the  living"  {ib.,  Intro., 
p.  10).  Hence  we  must  "transcend  intelligence" 
{ib.,  p.    191).     In   the  effort   to   do  so   "we  must 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      171 

break  with  scientific  habits  which  are  adapted  to 
the  fundamental  requirements  of  thought,  we  must 
do  violence  to  the  mind,  go  counter  to  the  natural 
bent  of  the  intellect.  But  that  is  just  the  function 
of  philosophy"  {ib.,  p.  30).  For  "  the  special  object 
of  philosophy  is  to  speculate,  i.e.  to  see"  (ib.,  p.  196) 
"with  the  spirit,"  i.e.  "that  faculty  of  seeing  which 
is  immanent  in  the  faculty  of  acting"  {ib.,  p.  250) 
not  with  matter  as  intellect  and  science  {ib.,  p.  196). 
And  as  the  experience  of  intellect  moves  in  an  op- 
posite direction  to  that  of  living  {ib.,  p.  359)  the 
faculty  of  spirit  "springs  up  somehow  by  the  twist- 
ing of  the  will  on  itself,  when  action  is  turned  into 
knowledge"  {ib.,  p.  250). 

Hence  we  transcend  our  consciousness,  which  is 
partial  and  retrospective,  by  making  it  coincide 
with  something  of  its  principle,  i.e.  Hfe,  or  conscious- 
ness in  the  wide  sense  of  the  term.  It  does  this  by 
detaching  itself  from  the  already  made  and  attaching 
itself  to  the  being-made;  i.e.  "turning  back  on  itself 
and  twisting  on  itself,  the  faculty  of  seeing  should 
be  made  one  with  the  faculty  of  willing  —  a  pain- 
ful effort  which  we  can  make  suddenly,  doing 
violence  to  our  nature,  but  cannot  sustain  more 
than  a  few  minutes"  {ib.,  p.  237)  and  even  then 
"it  is  an  individual  and  fragmentary  will  that  we 
grasp."  But  if  "we  not  only  put  back  our  being 
into  our  will"  but  also  "our  will  itself  into  the  im- 
pulsion it  prolongs,  we  understand,  we  feel,  that 
reality  is  a  perpetual  growth,  a  creation  pursued 


172  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

without  end"  {ib.,  p.  239).  ''To  movement,  then, 
everything  will  be  restored  and  into  movement 
everything  will  be  resolved"  {ib.,  p.  250). 

Such  are  the  mental  gymnastics  which  phi- 
losophy, according  to  Professor  Bergson,  must 
perform  to  get  the  vision  of  reahty,  in  "an  effort 
to  dissolve  again  into  the  Whole"  {ib.,  p.  191),  to 
attain  "that  most  vast  something  out  of  which  our 
understanding  is  cut"  {ib.,  p.  199).  No  doubt  at 
all  if  we  attempted  bodily  gymnastics  of  the  kind 
we  could  see  "stars"  or  as  Professor  Bergson  pre- 
fers "the  fiery  path  torn  by  the  last  rocket  in  a 
fire-works  display"  {ib.,  p.  257).  And  he  says 
that  "these  fleeting  intuitions  which  Hght  up  their 
object  only  at  distant  intervals,  philosophy  ought 
to  seize,  first  to  sustain  them,  then  to  expand  them 
and  so  unite  them  together"  {ib.,  p.  268),  and  that 
"philosophy  ought  to  follow  science,  in  order  to 
superpose  on  scientific  truth  a  knowledge  of  another 
kind,  which  may  be  called  metaphysical.  Thus 
combined,  all  our  knowledge,  both  scientific  and 
metaphysical,  is  heightened,"  for  "it  is  reahty  itself, 
in  the  profoundest  meaning  of  the  word,  that  we 
reach  by  the  combined  and  progressive  develop- 
ment of  science  and  philosophy"  {ib.,  p.  199). 


CHAPTER  IX 

PRAGMATISM  AND    CREATIVE   EVOLUTION  (continued) 

The  Theory  of  Life 

In  the  Theory  of  Life  is  set  forth  Professor 
Bergson's  characteristic  doctrine  of  Creative  Evo- 
lution. Our  twofold  experience  reveals  two  oppo- 
site movements  in  the  universe,  "descent"  and 
"ascent"  {ib.,  p.  ii).  The  original  movement  was 
Duration,  which  by  relaxation  of  tension  detends 
in  order  to  extend.  This  detension  is  conceived  as 
an  inversion  of  the  original  movement,  and  is  at 
bottom  a  "suppression,"  or  "interruption,"  or 
"diminution  of  positive  reality"  {ib.,  p.  210).  In 
illustration  of  the  "detension"  movement,  he 
points  to  "the  indivisible  active  will"  relaxing 
so  that  we  get  "the  feeling  of  extension"  {ib.,  p. 
207);  or  he  "sympathizes  with  the  inspiration  of 
the  poet,  follows  it  with  a  continuous  movement 
which  is,  like  the  inspiration  itself,  an  undivided 
act;  then  he  relaxes  the  attention,  lets  go  the  ten- 
sion that  is  in  him,  and  the  sounds,  hitherto  swal- 
lowed up  in  the  sense,  appear  distinctly,  one  by 
one,  in  their  materiahty  "  {ib.,  p.  209) ;  or  "  the  vision 
we  have  of  the  material  world  is  that  of  a  weight 


174  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

which  falls"  {ib.,  p.  245),  or  he  appeals  to  a  vessel  full 
of  steam  at  a  high  pressure;  the  steam  thrown  into 
the  air  is  nearly  all  condensed  into  little  drops  which 
fall  back,  and  this  condensation  and  this  fall  rep- 
resent simply  the  loss  of  something,  an  interruption, 
a  deficit;  and  so  "  from  an  immense  reservoir  of  life, 
jets  must  be  gushing  out  unceasingly,  of  which  each, 
falling  back,  is  a  world"  {ib.,  p.  247);  or  he  "thinks 
of  an  action  Hke  that  of  raising  the  arm;  and  then 
supposes  that  the  arm  left  to  itself  falls  back" 
(ib.,  p.  247).  He  finds,  "in  this  image  of  a  creative 
action  which  unmakes  itself,  a  representation  of 
matter"  (ib.). 

But  these  illustrations  are  not  appropriate. 
They  are  valid  only  if  we  admit  that  the  forces 
of  attraction  or  of  the  living  organism  exist  previous 
to  the  movement.  The  weight  and  drops  of  steam 
fall  by  virtue  of  attraction,  the  will  relaxes  by 
distraction  or  bodily  fatigue,  the  idea  of  extension 
comes  from  our  senses.  Now  he  is  dealing  with 
Duration,  the  Absolute  Reality,  and  he  expressly 
bases  "physical  laws  (p.  218),  organization  and 
extension  on  the  inverse  movement,"  i.e.  the  move- 
ment of  detension.  Hence  while  these  are,  accord- 
ing to  his  doctrine,  the  result  of  "the  creative  act 
unmaking  itself,"  they  are  brought  in  deliberately 
to  illustrate  the  unmaking  action,  and  so  exist  before 
they  are  supposed  to  exist.  The  Scholastic  idea 
of  creation  is  simplicity  and  consistency  itself 
compared  to  this. 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      175 

I.    Creative  Evolution 

However,  it  is  not  the  original  movement  of  Du- 
ration, i.e.  prior  to  its  detension,  that  finds  an  exclu- 
sive place  in  Professor  Bergson's  Creative  Evolution. 
He  needed  the  material  world,  or  an  explanation  of 
its  existence,  and  so  he  tells  us  that  the  Absolute 
"let  himself  go"  with  the  result  that  the  "letting 
go"  is  the  tendency  to  materiality.  But  this 
"letting  go"  is  not  complete;  the  Absolute  comes 
to  himself,  and  tries  to  get  back.  So  he  completes 
the  illustration  given  by  saying  that  "a  small  part 
of  the  jet  of  steam  subsists,  uncondensed,  for  some 
seconds;  it  is  making  an  effort  to  raise  the  drops 
which  are  falling;  it  succeeds  at  most  in  retarding 
their  fall";  and  after  the  arm  has  fallen  back 
"there  yet  subsists  in  it,  striving  to  raise  it  up 
again,  something  of  the  will  that  animates  it"  {ib., 
p.  247).  So  he  tells  us  "in  vital  activity  we  see, 
then,  that  which  subsists  of  the  direct  movement 
in  the  inverted  movement,  a  reality  which  is  making 
itself  in  a  reality,  which  is  unmaking  itself^'  {ih., 
p.   248). 

Now  this  is  the  sphere  and  purpose  of  Creative 
Evolution:  a  reality  making  itself  in  or  across  a 
reality  unmaking  itself.  Hence  we  read  that  in  the 
universe  itself  two  opposite  movements  are  to  be 
distinguished,  "descent"  and  "ascent."  The  first 
only  unwinds  a  roll  ready  prepared.  In  principle, 
it  might  be  accomplished  almost  instantaneously, 


176  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

like  releasing  a  spring.  But  the  ascending  move- 
ment, which  corresponds  to  an  inner  work  of  ripen- 
ing or  creating,  endures  essentially,  and  imposes  its 
rhythm  on  the  first,  which  is  inseparable  from  it 
{ih.,  p.  11).  Thus  before  Creative  Evolution  can 
get  to  work  we  are  supposed  to  accept  without 
question  these  idle  and  puerile  assumptions.  In 
reahty  we  seem  to  read  some  old  mythical  cosmog- 
ony instead  of  the  last  word  on  philosophy  by  a 
writer  of  the  twentieth  century.  Why  should  the 
Absolute  distend,  or  be  distending;  how  could  He 
lose  strength  in  the  fall;  why  should  He  reascend  so 
slowly,  painfully  and  imperfectly?  Why  could  He 
not  reascend  and  absorb  all  of  the  downward  move- 
ment, as  I  could  in  an  instant  raise  my  arm  to  the 
height  it  was  before  I  let  it  fall? 

The  movement  of  "ascent"  is  called  Duration, 
Time,  Life;  it  endures  of  itself,  is  Absolute  and  tends 
in  the  direction  of  spirituaUty  and  freedom.  The 
movement  of  "descent,"  on  the  contrary,  goes  in 
.the  inverse  direction  of  materiality,  necessity  and 
space;  it  "endures  only  by  its  connection  with  that 
which  ascends'^  (pp.  212,  369).  Hence  the  Abso- 
lute is  limited  as  to  extent  and  power,  is  dependent 
and  contingent  (p.  235).  The  ascending  move- 
ment is  designated  "a  vital  impetus"  which  is 
"a  tremendous  push";  its  essence  is  "progress, 
i.e.  creation  or  succession,"  i.e.  "continuity  of 
interpenetration"  which  is  either  the  cause  or  the 
effect  of  the  impetus;    its  aim  is  not  to  annihilate 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      177 

matter  or  push  it  out  of  the  way,  but  only  to  "mag- 
netize" matter  {ib.,  p.  99)  and  use  it  for  its  own 
purposes.  Hence  Life  in  its  entirety  is  "a  Creative 
Evolution,"  "a  continuous  creative  progress" 
(ib.,  pp.  22,  223).  The  essential  thing  in  Life,  there- 
fore, is  "continuous  progress"  (ib.,  p.  27);  for  this, 
creation  is  necessary,  hence  "the  impetus  of  Life 
consists  in  a  need  of  creation  "  {ib.,  p.  251). 

But  creation  had  a  beginning,  for  "at  a  certain 
moment,  in  certain  points  of  space,  a  visible  cur- 
rent has  taken  rise;  this  current  of  life  traversing 
the  bodies  it  has  organized  one  after  another,  pass- 
ing from  generation  to  generation,  has  become 
divided  among  species  and  distributed  among 
individuals"  {ib.,  p.  26).  This  visible  current, 
nevertheless,  is  carried  along  by  "an  invisible 
progress"  {ib.,  p.  27).  Yet  the  need  of  creation  is 
made  manifest  to  Life,  "only  when  creation  is 
possible.  It  lies  dormant  when  life  is  condemned 
to  automatism;  it  wakens  as  soon  as  the  possi- 
bihty  of  a  choice  is  restored"  {ib.,  p.  261).  "The 
truth  is,"  Professor  Bergson  assures  us,  "that  life 
is  possible  whenever  energy  descends  the  incline 
indicated  by  Carnot's  Law  and  where  a  cause  of 
inverse  direction  can  retard  the  descent"    {ib.,  p. 

256). 

But  if  Life  is  condemned  to  automatism,  where 
is  its  "tremendous  push"  {ib.,  p.  99),  and  how 
can  its  current  be  described  as  "intensifying  in 
proportion  to  its  advance"  {ib.,  p.  206),  and  why 


1 78  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

should  Life  be  the  resultant  of  or  depending  on  the 
interaction  of  contrary  movements  of  physical 
energy  when  it  is  presented  as  "an  original  internal 
impetus"  and  "its  essence  evolution"  (p.  22)? 
We  might  conceive  in  Professor  Bergson's  theory 
that  organization  depended  on  Carnot's  Law, 
but  we  cannot  understand  how  this  law  can  explain 
the  beginning  of  Life.  For  Life  is  Duration,  Time, 
the  Absolute,  and  here  we  are  told  that  Life  had 
a  beginning  due  to  physical  laws.  The  suspicion 
arises  that  Professor  Bergson's  cosmogony  is  really 
physical  and  that  in  this  case  is  presented  a  particu- 
lar illustration  of  his  teaching  that  "physics  is 
simply  psychics  inverted"  {ib.,  p.  202). 

Now  Hfe  evolves  through  creation.  But  the 
creation  does  not  extend  to  matter,  for  matter  is 
due  to  the  inverse  movement,  whereas  "the  life 
that  evolves  on  the  surface  of  our  planet  is  at- 
tached to  matter,"  hence  we  see  "in  life  an  effort 
to  remount  the  incline  that  matter  descends" 
(ib.,  p.  245).  Nor  does  creation  mean  the  creation 
of  energy,  for  "at  the  root  of  life  there  is  an  effort 
to  engraft  on  to  the  necessity  of  physical  forces 
the  largest  possible  amount  of  indetermination. 
This  effort  cannot  result  in  the  creation  of  energy" 
hence  "all  that  the  efifort  can  do  is  to  make  the 
best  of  a  pre-existing  energy  which  it  finds  at  its 
disposal"  and  "this  effort  itself  possesses  only  the 
power  of  releasing"  {ib.,  pp.  114-115).  Further- 
more creation  does  not  apply  to  physical  laws,  for 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      179 

life  "is  riveted  to  an  organism  that  subjects  it  to 
the  general  laws  of  inert  matter.  But  everything 
happens  as  if  it  were  doing  its  utmost  to  set  itself 
free  from  these  laws.  It  has  not  the  power  to 
reverse  the  direction  of  physical  changes,  such  as 
the  principle  of  Carnot  determines  it.  It  does, 
however,  behave  absolutely  as  a  force  would  behave 
which,  left  to  itself,  would  work  in  the  inverse 
direction.  Incapable  of  stopping  the  course  of  ma- 
terial changes  downwards,  it  succeeds  in  retarding 
it"  {ib.,  pp.  245-246). 

Thus  Creative  Evolution  is  concerned  with  the 
"creations  of  forms"  only  {ih.,  p.  239).  These 
"forms,  which  life  cuts  out  on  the  action  unmak- 
ing itself,  are  capable  of  being  themselves  pro- 
longed into  unforeseen  movements,  and  represent 
the  action  making  itself"  {ih.,  p.  248).  The 
creative  action  is  symbolized  by  a  geyser  {ib., 
p.  247), a  current  (i6.,  p.  26),  a  shell  (^5., p.  98), a  sheaf 
{ib.,  p.  117),  a  great  blast  raising  eddies  of  dust, 
which  are  the  living  beings  {ib.,  p.  128),  an  in- 
visible breath  {ib.,  128),  a  full  breath  {ib.,  p.  100), 
a  stream  {ib.,  p.  29),  by  "a  centre  from  which  worlds 
shoot  out  like  rockets  in  a  fire-works  display,  — 
provided,  however,  that  I  do  not  present  this 
centre  as  a  thing,  but  as  a  continuity  of  shoot- 
ing out"  {ib.,  p.  248).  For  it  is  an  "illusion  to 
think  of  things  which  are  created  and  a  thing  which 
creates,"  "there  are  no  things,  there  only  are 
actions,"  and  "God  thus  defined,  has  nothing  of 


i8o  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

the  already  made;  He  is  unceasing  Life,  action, 
freedom"  (ib.,  p.  248). 

The  creative  action  does  not  progress  in  a  straight 
course  "like  that  of  a  solid  ball  shot  from  a  can- 
non." "It  suddenly  bursts  like  a  shell  into  frag- 
ments and  these  in  turn  burst  into  other  fragments," 
i.e.  "species  and  individuals,"  and  "the  way  it 
breaks  depends  on  the  resistance  it  meets  from 
inert  matter  and  the  explosive  force  due  to  an 
unstable  balance  of  tendencies,  which  it  bears 
within  itself"  {ib.,  p.  98).  Being  "confronted  with 
matter,"  i.e.  the  inverse  tendency,  "the  impetus 
of  life  cannot  create  absolutely  but  it  seizes  upon 
this  matter  which  is  necessity  itself  and  strives  to 
introduce  into  it  the  largest  possible  amount  of 
indetermination  and  liberty"  {ib.,  p.  257).  It  over- 
comes the  resistance  of  matter  "by  humility,  by 
making  itself  very  small  and  insinuating,  bending 
to  physical  and  chemical  laws,  consenting  even  to 
go  part  of  the  way  with  them  Hke  a  switch  of  a  rail" 
{ib.,  p.  98),  not  at  all  like  a  shell,  or  rocket.  "Life 
had  to  enter  thus  into  the  habits  of  inert  matter  in 
order  to  draw  it  little  by  little,  magnetized,  as  it 
were,  to  another  track"  {ib.,  p.  99).  As  a  result, 
matter,  i.e.  the  inverse  tendency,  "becomes  as  if 
it  were  made  of  India-rubber,"  i.e.  plastic  {ib., 
p.  252). 

Hereupon  creative  Duration  no  longer  acts  like 
Rousseau's  sagacious  primitive;  it  changes  into 
Hobbes'  wild  animal  or  hungry  savage  and  "gnaws 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      i8i 

on  things,  leaving  on  tliem  the  mark  of  its  tooth" 
(ib.,  p.  46)  and  thus  shows  "the  need  of  creation." 
Matter  so  marked  is  organized.  Or  Professor  Berg- 
son  cites  the  illustration  of  a  current,  and  says  that 
the  result  of  the  two  currents  running  opposite  to 
each  other  is  "a  modus  vivendi  between  them,  which 
is  organization"  {ib.,  p.  250).  Its  principle  is  "the 
Becoming"  {ib.,  p.  237).  Its  real  centre  is  the  action 
and  its  nature  is  explosive  {ib.,  p.  92).  But  organ- 
isms are  only  accidental,  "excrescences"  or  "buds 
caused  to  sprout  by  the  former  germ  endeavoring 
to  continue  itself  in  a  new  germ,"  "the  essential 
thing  is  the  continuous  progress"  (p.  27);  ''life  can 
progress  only  by  means  of  the  living,  which  are 
its  depositaries"  {ib.,  p.  231),  and  the  progression  is 
explained  either  by  Weismann's  theory  of  the  "  con- 
tinuity of  the  germ-plasm"  or  "at  least  by  the  con- 
tinuity of  genetic  energy"  contained  in  "sexual 
elements"  (pp.  26-27).  Thus  Life  is  like  "a  current 
passing  from  germ  to  germ  through  the  medium  of 
a  developed  organism"  (p.  27),  and  "the  sprout- 
ing and  flowering  of  these  forms,  i.e.  organisms, 
are  stretched  out  on  an  unshrinkable  duration, 
which  is  one  with  their  essence"  (p.  341). 

In  illustration  Professor  Bergson  appeals  to  the 
phenomena  of  growing  old,  "what  is  vital  is  the 
continual  change  of  form,  which  implies  a  continual 
recording  of  duration"  (p.  19)  and  says  that  "the 
evolution  of  life  as  a  whole  from  its  humblest 
origins   to   its   highest   forms   constitutes   through 


1 82  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

the  unity  and  continuity  of  the  animated  matter, 
which  supports  it,  a  single  indivisible  history"  {ib., 
p.  37).  So  essential  is  this  change,  so  essential  is 
the  continuity  that  form  is  altogether  relative  to 
action,  so  that  "everything  changes  inwardly  and 
the  same  concrete  reahty  never  occurs"  {ib.,  p.  46), 
even  "the  organism  reconstructs  itself  entirely  for 
every  new  act"  {ib.,  p.  22).  If  sameness  and  repeti- 
tion appear  among  living  beings,  this  sameness  and 
repetition  are  merely  "accidental,"  inasmuch  as 
"innumerable  Hving  beings  almost  ahke  have  to 
repeat  each  other  in  space  and  time  for  the  novelty 
they  are  working  out  to  grow  and  mature"  {ib.,  p. 
21).  Action,  therefore,  is  prior  to  organization 
(ib.,  p.  174),  and  "the  form  of  the  organ  only 
expresses  the  degree  in  which  the  exercise  of  the 
function  has  been  obtained"  {ib.,  p.  96). 

From  the  fact  that  organization  is  the  modus 
vivendi  between  the  two  currents  it  follows  that 
"adaptation  is  a  necessary  condition  of  evolution" 
{ib.,  p.  loi),  not  in  the  sense  that  "outer  circum- 
stances are  the  directing  causes  of  evolution,"  but 
that  they  are  "forces  which  evolution  must  reckon 
with"  {ib.,  pp.  101-102),  for  "the  novelty  of  forms 
arises  from  an  internal  impetus  which  is  progress 
or  succession"  {ib.,  p.  341),  and  "life  must  create 
a  form  for  itself,  suited"  however  "to  the  circum- 
stances that  are  made  for  it,  i.e.  make  the  best  of 
these  circumstances,  respond  to  outer  actions  by 
building  up  a  machine  which  has  no  resemblance 


PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      183 

to  them.  Such  adapting  is  not  repeating,  but 
replying^'  {ib.,  p.  58),  not  passive  but  active  {ib., 
p.  52).  In  this  sense  form  and  adaptation  are 
contingent;  and  an  explanation  is  given  for  "set- 
backs," "arrests"  and  "conflict"  {ib.,  pp.  254 
-255).  Hence  "adaptation  explains  the  sinuos- 
ities of  the  movement,  not  its  general  direc- 
tion, nor  the  movement  itself"  {ib.,  p.  102), 
for  in  the  great  river  of  life  flowing  through  the 
body  of  humanity,  "the  movement  of  the  stream 
is  distinct  from  the  river  bed,  although  it  must 
adopt  its  winding  course"  {ib.,  p.  270),  with  this  re- 
minder that  "evolution  does  not  mark  out  a  soli- 
tary route,  it  takes  directions  without  aiming  at 
ends,  it  remains  inventive,  i.e.  creative,  even  in  its 
adaptations"  {ib.,  p.  102). 


II.  Transformism 

Hence  the  plasticity  of  matter  and  the  general 
movement  of  life,  which  on  divergent  lines  is  creat- 
ing forms  ever  new,  reveal  the  basic  doctrine  on 
which  Creative  Evolution  rests,  viz.  Transformism. 
Professor  Bergson  proposes  this  teaching.  He  claims 
that  experience  shows  that  the  most  complex  has 
been  able  to  issue  from  the  most  simple  by  way  of 
evolution  and  this  has  been  strengthened  by  scien- 
tific discoveries  {ib.,  p.  24).  To  him  the  doctrine  is 
probable,  not  proved;  he  admits  that  it  may  even 
be  wrong,  yet  maintains  that  we  could  and  would 


1 84  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

continue  to  establish  between  forms  an  ideal 
kinship  and  no  longer  a  material  affiliation;  and 
that  this  would  be  sufficient,  for  evolution  some- 
where would  still  have  to  be  supposed,  and  so  "it 
would  simply  have  been  transposed,  made  to  pass 
from  the  visible  to  the  invisible"  (ib.,  pp.  24-26). 
So  he  decides  to  "stick  to  the  letter  of  Transform- 
ism,"  the  more  so  because  it  is  "not  opposed  to 
special  creation"  {ib.,  p.  26).  He  takes  exception  to 
the  present  forms  of  Transformism  known  as  the 
Darwinian,  Neo-Darwinian  and  Neo-Lamarckian  as 
insufficient  to  solve  the  problem,  not  with  the  in- 
tention of  rejecting  them  altogether,  for  "each  of 
them,  being  supported  by  a  considerable  number  of 
facts,  must  be  true  in  its  way.  Each  of  them  must 
correspond  to  a  certain  aspect  of  the  process  of 
evolution,"  whereas  "the  reahty  of  which  each  of 
these  theories  takes  a  partial  view  must  transcend 
them  all,  and  this  reality  is  the  special  object  of 
philosophy  which  is  not  constrained  to  scientific 
precision  because  it  contemplates  no  practical 
application"  {ib.,  pp.  84,  85). 

To  Professor  Bergson,  Transformism  is  not  ef- 
fected by  passive  adaptation  to  material  forces. 
He  holds  that  "the  inner  vital  movement  is  trans- 
formation" {ib.,  p.  32).  He  is  forced  to  maintain,  by 
his  Philosophy  of  Change,  that  variations,  i.e. 
changes,  in  the  forms  of  life,  i.e.  organisms,  are  so 
increasing  and  constant  that  these  forms  are  only 
accidental  to  the  one  essential  thing,  or  fundamental 


PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     185 

reality,  viz,  the  continuity  of  Duration.  And  as 
"Duration  is  an  effective  action  and  a  reality 
of  its  own"  {ib.,  p.  16),  "is  immanent  to  the  whole 
of  the  universe"  and  "means  invention,  the  crea- 
tion of  forms,  the  continual  elaboration  of  some- 
thing new"  {ib.,  p.  11),  it  follows  that  the  real  cause 
of  the  variations  in  form  must  be  sought  in  the 
life  impetus  itself,  for  "life  is  a  tendency,  and  the 
essence  of  a  tendency  is  to  develop  in  the  form  of 
a  sheaf,  creating,  by  its  very  growth,  divergent 
directions  among  which  its  impetus  is  divided" 
{ib.,  p.  99). 

In  illustration  Professor  Bergson  cites  "the  evo- 
lution of  that  special  tendency  which  we  call  our 
character."  Our  " child-personaHty,  though  indi- 
visible, united  in  itself  divers  persons,  which  could 
remain  blended  just  because  they  were  in  their 
nascent  state.  But  these  interwoven  personaKties 
became  incompatible  in  course  of  growth,  and, 
as  each  of  us  can  live  but  one  Hfe,  a  choice  must 
perforce  be  made.  We  choose  in  reahty  without 
ceasing;  without  ceasing,  also,  we  abandon  many 
things.  The  route  we  pursue  in  time  is  strewn  with 
the  remains  of  all  that  we  began  to  be,  of  all  that 
we  might  have  been.  But  nature,  which  has  at 
command  an  incalculable  number  of  lives,  is  in  no 
wise  bound  to  make  such  sacrifices.  She  preserves 
the  different  tendencies  that  have  bifurcated  with 
their  growth.  She  creates  with  them  diverging 
series  of  species  that  will  evolve  separately.     The 


1 86  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

bifurcations  on  the  way  have  been  numerous,  but 
there  have  been  many  blind  alleys,  beside  the  two  or 
three  highways;  and  of  these  highways  themselves, 
only  one,  that  which  leads  through  the  verte- 
brates up  to  man,  has  been  wide  enough  to  allow 
free  passage  to  the  full  breadth  of  life"  {ib.,  pp.  99- 
100).  Thus  "while  life,  in  its  contact  with  matter, 
is  comparable  to  an  impulsion  or  an  impetus,  re- 
garded in  itself  it  is  an  immensity  of  potentiahty,  a 
mutual  encroachment  of  thousands  and  thousands 
of  tendencies  which  nevertheless  are"  thousands 
and  thousands  "only  when  once  regarded  as  out- 
side each  other,  that  is,  when  spatialized.  Contact 
with  matter  is  what  determines  this  dissociation" 
(ib.,  p.  258).  He  says  that  "it  is  easier  to  define  the 
method  than  to  apply  it,"  that  its  appHcation 
"would  be  possible  only  if  the  history  of  the  devel- 
opment of  the  organized  world  were  entirely 
known,"  that  "such  is  far  from  being  the  case," 
for  "the  genealogies  proposed  are  generally  ques- 
tionable," "vary  with  their  authors,"  "raise  dis- 
cussions which  do  not  admit  of  a  final  settlement"; 
but  as  these  discussions  bear  "less  on  the  main  lines 
of  the  movement  than  on  matters  of  detail,"  so 
"by  following  the  main  lines  as  closely  as  possible, 
we  shall  be  sure  of  not  going  astray,"  inasmuch  as 
the  "aim  is  only  at  defining  the  principal  directions 
of  the  evolution  of  the  species,"  and  as  "not  all  of 
these  directions  have  the  same  interest  for  us" 
and  "what  concerns  us  particularly  is  the  path 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     187 

that  leads  to  man";  therefore  "our  main  business 
is  to  determine  the  relation  of  man  to  the  animal 
kingdom,  and  the  place  of  the  animal  kingdom 
itself  in  the  organized  world  as  a  whole"  {ib.,  p. 
108). 

As  matter  is  "a  relaxation  of  the  inextensive  into 
the  extensive  and  thereby  of  liberty  into  necessity" 
(p.  118),  so  "the  role  of  life  is  an  effort  to  engraft 
on  to  the  necessity  of  matter,  the  largest  possible 
amount  of  indetermination,"  i.e.  '' unforeseeable- 
ness,  variety  of  creative  forms"  (pp.  96,  114,  116), 
"freedom"  or  "movement,"  for  "the  initial  im- 
petus of  Hfe  is  essentially  directed  toward  free 
actions"  {ib.,  p.  254).  This  it  does  not  by  creating 
matter,  nor  by  creating  energy,  but  by  making 
"the  best  of  the  pre-existing  energy,"  i.e.  "by 
securing  such  an  accumulation  of  potential  energy 
from  matter,  that  it  can  get,  at  any  given  moment, 
the  amount  of  work  it  needs  for  its  action  simply 
by  pulling  a  trigger,"  i.e.  by  releasing  {ib.,  p.  115). 
Hence  "the  evolution  of  life  really  continues  an 
initial  impulsion  and  brings  life  to  more  and  more 
efficient  acts  by  the  fabrication  and  use  of  more 
and  more  powerful  explosives"  which  "represent 
a  storing  house  of  the  solar  energy,  the  degrada- 
tion of  which  is  thus  provisionally  suspended  on 
some  of  the  points  where  it  was  being  poured 
forth"  {ib.,  p.  246).  In  this  way  "life  is  an  effort  to 
remount  the  inchne  that  matter  descends"  al- 
though "life  on  our  planet  is  attached  to  matter, 


i88  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

riveted  to  an  organism  that  subjects  it  to  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  inert  matter"  {ib.,  p.  245)  and  while  "in- 
capable of  stopping  the  course  of  material  changes 
downwards,  it  succeeds  in  retarding  it"  {ib.,  p.  246). 

Professor  Bergson  tells  us  that  as  a  matter  of 
fact  "the  principal  source  of  energy  usable  on  our 
planet  is  the  sun"  {ib.,  p.  115),  but  warns  us  that 
the  origin  of  energy  is  a  problem  which  "remains 
insoluble  as  long  as  we  keep  on  the  ground  of 
physics"  and  must  be  sought  "in  an  extra-spatial 
process"  {ib.,  p.  244).  Hence  "all  life,  animal  and 
vegetable,  seems  in  its  essence  like  an  effort  to 
accumulate  energy  and  then  let  it  flow  into  flexible 
channels,  changeable  in  shape,  at  the  end  of  which 
it  will  accompHsh  infinitely  varied  kinds  of  work" 
{ib.,  pp.  253-254). 

This  is  "what  the  vital  impetus  passing  through 
the  matter,  would  fain  do  all  at  once,"  but  "the 
impetus  is  finite  and  has  been  given  once  for  all. 
It  cannot  overcome  all  obstacles"  {ib.,  p.  254),  it 
"soon  exhausts  itself  in  its  very  manifestations" 
{ib.,  p.  142),  for  the  most  living  form  becomes  frigid 
in  the  formula  that  expresses  it,  and  is  stifled  if  it 
fails  to  renew  itself  by  a  constant  effort  {ib.,  p.  127), 
so  that  "evolution  is  not  only  a  movement  forward; 
in  many  cases  it  is  a  marking  time  and  still  more 
often  a  deviation  or  turning  back"  {ib.,  p.  104),  be- 
cause it  is  "  always  opposed  "  {ib.,p.  254), "paralyzed 
by  contrary  forces"  or  "absorbed  in  the  form  it 
is  engaged  in  taking,  at  the  mercy  of  the  material- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      189 

ity  it  had  to  assume"  {ib.,  p.  127),  for  "the  act  by 
which  life  goes  forward  to  the  creation  of  a  new 
form  and  the  act  by  which  the  form  is  shaped 
are  two  different  and  often  antagonistic  tendencies" 
{ib.,  p.  29),  so  that  "the  evolution  of  the  organ- 
ized world  is  the  unrolling  of  this  conflict"  (ib.,  p, 
253.  Therefore  in  the  process  of  creative  evolution 
"two  things  only  are  necessary:  (i)  a  gradual 
accumulation  of  energy;  (2)  an  elastic  canaliza- 
tion of  this  energy  in  variable  and  indeterminable 
directions,  at  the  end  of  which  are  free  acts"  {ib., 
p.  255).  And  while  "life  chooses  the  fittest  means 
for  this  result  in  the  circumstances  with  which  it 
is  confronted"  {ib.,  p.  256),  so  that  "this  twofold 
result  has  been  obtained  in  a  particular  way  on 
our  planet,"  yet  "it  might  have  been  obtained  by 
entirely  different  means"  {ib.,  p.  255). 

In  its  primitive  contact  with  matter  "life  had 
to  enter  into  the  habits  of  inert  matter,  in  order 
to  draw  it  little  by  little,  magnetized,  as  it  were,  to 
another  track"  {ib.,  p.  99).  Thus  he  holds  that  "of 
phenomena,  in  the  simplest  forms  of  life,  it  is  hard 
to  say  whether  they  are  still  physical  and  chem- 
ical or  whether  they  are  already  vital"  {ib.),  that 
"vegetable  and  animal  are  descended  from  a  com- 
mon ancestor  which  united  the  tendencies  of  both 
in  a  rudimentary  state"  {ib.,  p.  113),  that  the  two 
tendencies,  viz.  of  gradual  storing  and  of  sudden  use 
of  energy,  were  "mutually  implied  in  this  rudimen- 
tary form"  {ib.,  p.  113),  so  that  at  first  they  "were 


IQO  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

fused  in  one"  (ib.,  p.  ii6),  that  "the  more  the 
single  original  tendency  grows,  the  harder  it  finds 
it  to  keep  united  in  the  same  living  being  these 
two  elements"  (ib.),  so  that  ''of  themselves,  and 
without  any  external  intervention,  simply  by  the 
effect  of  the  duality  of  the  tendency  involved  in 
the  original  impetus  and  of  the  resistance  opposed 
by  matter  to  the  impetus,  the  organisms  turned 
some  in  the  first  direction,"  i.e.  of  storing  energy, 
"others  in  the  second,"  i.e.  of  exploding  energy. 
"To  this  scission  succeeded  many  others.  Hence 
the  diverging  lines  of  evolution,  at  least  what  is 
essential  in  them"  {ib.,  p.  254). 

With  the  "parting  in  two"  arose  "two  divergent 
evolutions";  "the  vegetable  tending  principally" 
in  the  direction  of  storing  the  energy  and  "the 
animal  in  the  direction  of  exploding  it"  (ib.,  p.  116). 
As  the  parting  or  scission  was  gradual  "the  animal 
cell  and  the  vegetable  cell  are  derived  from  a  com- 
mon stock,  and  the  first  living  organisms  oscillated 
between  the  vegetable  and  animal  form,  partici- 
pating in  both  at  once"  {ib.,  p.  112);  therefore  "the 
animal  forms  that  first  appeared  were  of  extreme 
simplicity"  (ib.,  p.  99).  In  fact  "no  definite  charac- 
teristic distinguishes  the  plant  from  the  animal" 
(ib.,  p.  105),  so  that  "biologists  enamored  of  clean- 
cut  concepts  have  regarded  the  distinction  between 
the  two  kingdoms  as  artificial"  (ib.,  p.  106),  hence 
"the  group  must  not  be  defined  by  the  possession 
of  certain  characters,  but  by  its  tendency  to  em- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      191 

phasize  them,"  i.e.  "taking  tendencies  rather  than 
states  into  account"  (ib.),  i.e.  not  a  static  but  a 
dynamic  definition  {ib.,  p.  107). 

Now  as  Duration  or  movement  is  the  basic 
reahty,  the  guiding  principle  and  the  aim  of  Crea- 
tive Evolution,  it  follows  that  the  vegetable  and 
animal  kingdoms  are  distinguished  in  proportion  to 
the  movement  they  exercise.  The  vegetable  takes 
the  energy  necessary  for  Hfe  with  the  principal 
purpose  of  storing  it;  the  animal,  on  the  con- 
trary, takes  the  necessary  energy  with  the  main 
purpose  of  using  it  in  explosive  action.  "The 
vegetable  manufactures  the  organic  substances 
directly  with  mineral  substances"  {ib.,  p.  112),  i.e. 
"especially  carbon  and  nitrogen  which  it  derives 
directly  from  the  air  and  water  and  soil "  {ib.,  p.  106), 
and  "this  aptitude  enables  it  to  dispense  with  move- 
ment and  feeling,"  so  that  "the  vegetable  may  be 
defined  by  consciousness  asleep  and  by  insensibility" 
{ib.,  p.  112),  i.e.  by  comparative  immobility  {ib.,  p. 
130).  The  animal,  on  the  contrary,  must  obtain 
energy  in  food  from  other  animals  or  vegetables, 
and  ultimately  from  vegetables.  For  this  "the 
animal  must  be  able  to  move"  {ib.,  pp.  106-108). 
"Between  mobility  and  consciousness  there  is  an 
obvious  relationship"  {ib.,  p.  109),  and  "the  more 
the  nervous  system  develops,  the  more  numerous 
and  precise  become  the  movements,  among  which 
it  can  choose;  the  clearer  also,  is  the  consciousness 
that  accompanies  them,"  so  that  "to  choose  vol- 


192  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

untarily  between  several  different  courses  of  action, 
cerebral  centres  are  necessary,  that  is,  crossways 
from  which  paths  start,  leading  to  motor  mechan- 
isms of  diverse  form  but  equal  precision"  (ib.,ip.  no). 
Hence  "animals,  which  are  obHged  to  go  in  search 
of  their  food,  have  evolved  in  the  direction  of 
locomotor  activity,  and  consequently  of  a  con- 
sciousness more  and  more  distinct,"  and  "from 
this  standpoint  we  should  define  the  animal  by 
sensibihty  and  awakened  consciousness,"  i.e.  by 
mobility  {ib.,  pp.  112,  130).  Thus,  "in  the  animal, 
all  points  to  action,  that  is,  to  the  utilization  of 
energy  for  movements  from  place  to  place,"  so  that 
"what  constitutes  animality,  is  the  faculty  of  util- 
izing a  releasing  mechanism  for  the  conversion  of  as 
much  stored  up  energy  as  possible"  into  "explosive 
action,"  i.e.  into  movement  {ib.,  p.  120).  As  "the 
plant  has  stored  up  the  energy  chiefly  by  the 
chlorophyllian  function,  a  chemicism  sui  generis 
of  which  we  do  not  possess  the  key"  {ib.,  p.  253),  as 
"the  nervous  system  arises  by  a  division  of  labor" 
{ib.,  p.  no),  for  "in  the  beginning  the  explosion  is 
haphazard  and  does  not  choose  its  course"  {ib.,  p. 
120),  and  as  "the  nervous  system  is  a  veritable 
reservoir  of  indetermination''  {ib.,  p.  126)  as  also  "  the 
regulator  of  the  organic  life"  {ib.,  p.  123),  Professor 
Bergson  concludes:  "the  same  vital  impetus  that 
has  led  the  animal  to  give  itself  nerves  and  nerve- 
centres  must  have  ended,  in  the  plant,  in  the 
chlorophyllian  function"  (i6.,  p.  114),  and  as,  "from 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      193 

the  very  first  in  making  the  explosive,  nature  had 
for  object  the  explosion,  then  it  is  the  evolution  of 
the  animal  rather  than  that  of  the  vegetable,  that 
indicates,  on  the  whole,  the  fundamental  direction 
of  life"  {ib.,  p.  116),  for,  in  this  way,  "the  evolu- 
tion of  Hfe  continues  an  initial  impulsion  which 
brings  life  to  more  and  more  efficient  acts,"  i.e. 
movements,  "by  the  fabrication  and  use  of  more 
and  more  powerful  explosives"  {ib.,  p.  246). 

A  study  of  the  animal  kingdom.  Professor  Bergson 
holds,  shows  that  the  impulse  of  Hfe  to  movement 
has  gained  the  upper  hand  in  two  directions,  viz. 
in  the  arthropods,  whose  culminating  species  is  the 
insect,  and  in  the  vertebrates,  which  end  in  man 
{ib.,  pp.  131-133).  And  as  "instinct  is  nowhere 
so  developed  as  in  the  insect  world,"  so  "the  whole 
evolution  of  the  animal  kingdom  has  taken  place 
on  two  divergent  paths,  one  of  which  led  to  in- 
stinct and  the  other  to  intelligence"  {ib.,  p.  134), 
not  in  the  sense  that  either  "is  ever  found  in  a  pure 
state,"  for  they  "always  accompany  each  other"; 
"they  are  tendencies,  not  things,"  "complemen- 
tary" yet  "opposed"  because  they  develop  from  a 
common  origin  along  diverging  Hues,  and  so  are 
"deposited  by  life  along  its  course"  {ib.,  p.  136).  In 
reality  they  "are  two  different  methods  of  action 
on  inert  matter,  two  modes  of  psychical  activity" 
by  which  "the  life  manifested  by  an  organism 
obtains  certain  things  from  the  material  world" 
{ib.) ;  instinct  acting  directly  on  the  material  world, 


194  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

by  creating  organized  instruments  to  work  with, 
intelligence  indirectly  through  an  organism  which, 
instead  of  possessing  the  required  instrument 
naturally,  will  itself  construct  it  by  fashioning 
inorganic  matter"  (ib.,  p.  142).  Hence  the  essential 
feature  of  human  intelligence  is  "the  faculty  of 
manufacturing  tools,  i.e.  unorganized  instruments 
of  indefinite  variety "  (pp.  139-140). 

While  ''instinct  acts  with  wonderful  precision," 
so  that  "  most  instincts  are  only  the  continuance,  or 
rather,  the  consummation  of  the  work  of  organiza- 
tion itself,"  yet  "it  retains  an  almost  invariable 
structure  and  is  necessarily  specialized"  {ib.)', 
"the  instrument  constructed  intelhgently,  on  the 
contrary,  is  imperfect,  costs  an  effort,  is  not  easy 
to  handle,  but  it  can  take  any  form,  serve  any  pur- 
pose, confers  on  the  living  being  a  richer  organiza- 
tion, being  an  artificial  organ  by  which  the  natural 
organism  is  extended,"  and  so  "instead  of  closing, 
like  instinct,  the  round  of  action  within  which  the 
animal  tends  to  move  automatically,  it  lays  open 
to  activity  an  unlimited  field  into  which  it  is  driven 
further  and  further  and  made  more  and  more 
free"  {ib.,  pp.  140,  141).  Furthermore,  the  difference 
between  man  and  animal  is  one  of  kind  because 
"  the  human  brain  differs  from  other  brains  in  this 
that  the  number  of  mechanisms  it  can  set  up  and 
consequently  the  choice  that  it  gives  as  to  which 
among  them  shall  be  released,  is  unlimited.  Now 
from  the  limited  to  the  unlimited  there  is  all  the 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      195 

distance  between  the  closed  and  open"  {ib.,  p.  263). 
It  is  "this  freedom  that  the  human  form  registers. 
Man  continues  the  vital  movement  indefinitely, 
although  he  does  not  draw  along  with  him  all  that 
life  carries  in  itself."  Of  the  other  tendencies  "he 
has  kept  very  little."  So  the  evolution  of  Hfe  is 
"as  if  a  vague  and  formless  being,  whom  we  may 
call,  as  we  will,  man  or  superman,  had  sought  to 
realize  himself,  and  had  succeeded  only  by  aban- 
doning a  part  of  himself  on  the  way,"  i.e.  "the  rest 
of  the  animal  world  and  even  of  the  vegetable  world  " 
{ib.,  p.  266).  Therefore  the  process  of  Creative 
Evolution  reveals  vegetative  torpor,  instinct  and 
intelligence  as  the  elements  that  coincided  in  the 
vital  impulsion  common  to  plants  and  animals 
and  which,  in  the  course  of  a  development  in  which 
they  were  made  manifest  in  the  most  unforeseen 
forms,  have  been  dissociated  by  the  very  fact  of 
their  growth  {ib.,  p.  135). 

III.  A  Voluntarism 

An  analysis  into  the  nature  of  the  process  shows 
that  Creative  Evolution  is  the  evolution  of  a  con- 
scious will.  Hence  in  concert  with  metaphysical 
Pragmatists  Professor  Bergson  proposes  a  Voluntar- 
ism. He  uses  the  term  consciousness  in  two  senses, 
consciousness  in  general,  i.e.  supra-consciousness, 
and  consciousness  in  particular,  i.e.  organic  con- 
sciousness, i.e.  of  the  plant,  animal  or  man.     The 


196  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

former  is  "Life"  {ib.,  p.  181)  and  is  "coextensive 
with  universal  life"  {ib.,  p.  186).  The  latter  is  a 
particular  manifestation  or  division  or  distribution 
(ib.,  p.  181)  of  the  supra-consciousness  as  revealed 
in  the  particular  organism.  In  both  senses  the  word 
is  synonymous  with  mobility,  movement,  action, 
choice,  purpose,  willing.  In  fact  we  read  that  "the 
whole  present  study  strives  to  prove  that  the  vital 
is  in  the  direction  of  the  voluntary"  {ib.,  p.  224). 
Professor  Bergson  furnishes  the  proof  by  simply 
including  the  "vital"  and  the  "voluntary"  in 
"consciousness"  and  by  enlarging  the  meaning  of 
consciousness  so  as  to  embrace  both.  Thus  "con- 
sciousness is  the  name  for  the  rocket  whose  ex- 
tinguished fragments  fall  back  as  matter"  and 
is  "the  name  for  what  subsists  of  the  rocket  itself, 
passing  through  the  fragments  and  lighting  them 
up  into  organisms"  {ib.,  p.  261).  Hence  it  is  the 
principle  of  distention,  i.e.  materiality,  and  is  illus- 
trated as  "a  relaxation  of  self-consciousness"  {ib., 
p.  207),  "a  falling  and  condensation  of  steam" 
{ib.,  p.  247),  "a  relaxation  of  the  arm"  {ib.),  as 
"expressing  a  deficiency  of  will"  {ib.,  p.  209). 

Again,  consciousness  is  presented  as  "the  motor 
principle  of  evolution"  {ib.,  p.  182),  and  "the  evolu- 
tion of  life"  is  presented  "as  if  a  broad  current  of 
consciousness  had  penetrated  matter  loaded,  as 
all  consciousness  is,  with  an  enormous  multipHcity 
of  interwoven  personalities"  {ib.,  p.  181)  or  as  "a 
rising  wave"  {ib.,  p.  269)  or  as  "the  ripening  of  an 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      197 

idea"  (ib.,  p.  346)  or  as  "the  evolution  of  a  personal- 
ity" (ib.,  p.  257)  or  "of  a  consciousness"  {ib.,  p.  27) 
or  "like  conscious  activity,  is  invention,  unceasing 
creation"  {ib.,  p.  23),  "a  need  of  creation"  {ib.,  p. 
261),  and  this  "current  that  runs  through  this 
matter"  is  "a  pure  willing  thing"  (evidently  not  a 
tendency),  "which  we  hardly  feel,  which  at  most 
we  brush  lightly  as  it  passes"  {ib.,  p.  238). 

Furthermore  the  purpose  of  Creative  Evolution 
is  to  introduce  consciousness  into  inert  matter. 
For  "the  whole  history  of  life  up  to  man  has  been 
that  of  an  effort  of  consciousness  to  raise  matter 
and  of  the  more  or  less  complete  overwhelming  of 
consciousness  by  the  matter  that  has  fallen  back" 
and  this  effort  ''was  to  create  with  matter,  which 
is  necessity  itself,  an  instrument  of  freedom,"  but 
"everywhere,  except  in  man,  it  has  let  itself  be 
caught  in  the  net  of  mechanical  automatism"  {ib., 
p.  264).  In  this  sense  consciousness  is  designated 
as  "mobihty"  {ib.,  p.  163),  "indetermination"  {ib., 
p.  114),  "freedom"  {ib.,  p.  264),  i.e.  change,  "the 
continual  elaboration  of  something  new"  {ib.,  p. 
11),  "unforeseeable"  {ib.,  pp.  126,  341),  "a  centre 
of  action"  {ib.,  p.  262)  and  is  represented  as 
"unconscious"  {ib.,  p.  214),  as  having  "had  to 
fall  asleep,"  e.g.  in  plants  {ib.,  pp.  113,  181),  but 
as  "recollections  which  may  awaken"  {ib.,  p.  119), 
as  "distributed  among  divergent  lines  of  organ- 
isms" {ib.,  p.  180),  as  "infinitely  retarded  and 
divided"    {ib.),    as    the    cause  of    "organization" 


198  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

{ib.,  p.  181)  and  "the  animating  principle  of 
the  organism"  {ib.,  p.  270),  as  suffering  "fatigue" 
and  "being  fed  with  the  converted  solar  energy," 
as  "varying  with  the  power  of  locomotion  and 
deformation"  {ib.,  p.  26). 

Thus  Creative  Evolution  is  described  through- 
out as  conscious  striving  action,  the  cause  and  the 
prolongation  of  the  vital  impetus  {ib.,  p.  239).  The 
"Will  to  Believe"  of  Professor  James  here  becomes 
the  "Will  to  Act"  and  the  Will  to  Act  for  a  con- 
scious principle  implies  the  power  of  choice.  The 
reason  is  that  "the  force  immanent  in  Ufe,"  i.e. 
Duration,  Vital  Impetus,  Consciousness,  Will,  "is 
Umited,  and  that  it  soon  exhausts  itself  in  its  very 
manifestations.  It  is  hard  for  it  to  go  in  several 
directions  at  once;  it  must  choose "  (f&.,  pp.  141,  142). 
And  so  at  first  "it  succeeded  by  dint  of  humihty," 
"insinuating"  itself  into  matter  {ib.,  p.  98),  then  "by 
ages  of  effort  and  prodigies  of  subtlety  it  induced 
a  number  of  elements,  ready  to  divide,  to  remain 
united;  by  division  of  labor  knotted  between  them 
an  insoluble  bond"  and  "thus  made  them  func- 
tion" {ib.,  p.  99) ;  it  "  takes  directions  without  aiming 
at  ends,"  nay  even  "a  mere  glance  at  fossil  species 
shows  us  that  life  need  not  have  evolved  at  all,  or 
might  have  evolved  in  very  restricted  Hmits,  if  it 
had  chosen  the  alternative,  much  more  convenient 
to  itself,  of  becoming  anchylosed  in  its  primitive 
forms"  {ib.,  p.  102).  Not  satisfied  with  diplomacy, 
consciousness  manufactures  "powerful  explosives" 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      199 

and  "pulls  triggers."  After  such  and  more  remark- 
able feats  we  should  expect  to  find  matter,  which  is 
explained  by  "the  relaxation  of  will,"  thoroughly 
subdued.  But  no!  The  hard  shell  crabs  caused 
"a  sudden  arrest  of  the  entire  animal  world  in 
its  progress  toward  higher  and  higher  mobility," 
"arthropods  and  vertebrates  escaped,  however, 
and  to  this  fortunate  circumstance  is  due  the 
expansion  of  the  highest  forms  of  life"  {ib.,  p.  131). 
Strange  that  the  disciples  of  Isaac  Walton  and  the 
industrious  housewife  who  seems  bent  on  exter- 
minating insects  are  not  aware  that  they  owe 
their  very  existence  to  the  fact  that  in  the  long 
ago  "fishes  exchanged  their  ganoid  breastplate 
for  scales,"  and  with  the  insects  "supplemented 
the  insufficiency  of  their  protective  covering  by 
an  agility  that  enabled  them  to  escape  their 
enemies  and  also  to  assume  the  offensive"!   {ib., 

P-  131)- 

Again,  while  life  in  its  contact  with  matter  is 

divided  actually  into  "thousands  and  thousands 
of  tendencies"  {ib.,  p.  258),  yet  "each  of  the  species, 
through  which  life  passes,  falls  into  a  partial  sleep"; 
"of  the  four  main  directions  along  which  animal 
life  bent  its  course,  two  have  led  to  bhnd  alleys, 
and,  in  the  other  two,  the  effort  has  generally  been 
out  of  proportion  to  the  result"  {ib.,  pp.  128-129); 
and  "even  in  its  most  perfect  works  it  is  at  the 
mercy  of  the  materiality  which  it  has  had  to  as- 
sume" {ib.,  p.  127)  and  this  in  spite  of  the  fact 


200  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

that  "the  current  intensifies  as  it  progresses"  {ib., 

p.  26). 

We  might  fancy  that  the  lack  of  success  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  consciousness  "has  spHt  up," 
"divided,"  "developed"  on  "diverging  paths," 
but  Professor  Bergson's  teaching  on  individuahty 
is  adverse  to  the  assumption.  He  distinguishes 
artificial  individuahty,  i.e.  "the  outhnes  which 
we  see  in  an  object  as  the  plan  of  our  eventual  ac- 
tion" {ib.,  p.  11),  i.e.  an  intellectual  snapshot,  from 
natural  individuality  which  is  produced  by  contact 
of  the  vital  tendency  with  matter,  for  "matter 
divides  actually  what  was  but  potentially  mani- 
fold," and  so  "individuation  is  in  part  the  work  of 
matter,  in  part  the  result  of  Hfe's  own  incHnation" 
(ib.,  p.  258).  He  holds  that  "individuahty  is  a  char- 
acteristic property  of  Hfe "  {ib.,  p.  1 2) ;  that  "the  indi- 
vidual transmits  the  vital  impetus"  {ib.,  p.  259),  but 
it  is  "hard  to  decide  in  the  organic  world  what  is 
individual  and  what  is  not,"  for  "  individuahty  admits 
of  any  number  of  degrees  and  is  not  fully  realized 
anywhere  even  in  man"  {ib.,p.  12);  that  "while  the 
tendency  to  individuate  is  everywhere  present  in 
the  organized  world,  it  is  everywhere  opposed  by 
the  tendency  towards  reproduction,"  for  hfe  pro- 
gresses by  reproduction,  which  supposes  a  division 
and  so  "in  nature  there  is  no  absolutely  distinct 
individuality"  {ib.,  p.  42),  i.e.  a  thing  absolutely 
one,  i.e.  undivided.  As  "every  individual  organism, 
even  that  of  man,  is  merely  a  bud  that  has  sprouted 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      201 

on  the  combined  body  of  both  its  parents,"  it  follows 
that  "we  shall  find  him  solidary  with  his  remotest 
ancestors,  solidary  with  that  little  mass  of  proto- 
plasmic jelly  which  is  probably  at  the  root  of  the 
genealogical  tree  of  hfe,"  and  also  "sohdary  with  all 
that  descends  from  the  ancestor  in  divergent  direc- 
tions." Hence  "the  life  common  to  all  the  living, 
forms  a  single  whole"  {ib.,  p.  43),  for  "the  continuity 
ot  life  implies  a  multiplicity  of  elements  and  the 
interpenetration of  all  by  all"  {ib.,  p.  162),  and  "the 
individual  is  not  sufficiently  independent,  or  cut 
off  from  other  things,  to  have  a  vital  principle  of 
its  own"  (ib.,  p.  42).  But  this  teaching  is  the 
Hylozoism  or  Panpsychism  of  Professor  Schiller 
expressed  in  no  less  explicit  terms. 

His  conscious  purposive  voluntarism  constrains 
Professor  Bergson  to  reject  Radical  Mechanism,  as 
also  Radical  Finalism  i.e.  the  carrying  out  of  a  pre- 
conceived plan.  His  reason  is  that  both  theories 
suppose  "all  to  be  given"  and  "previously  ar- 
ranged," "closes  the  future,"  so  "time  is  useless  if 
there  is  nothing  unforeseen,  no  invention  or  crea- 
tion," i.e.  change  {ib.,  p.  39).  For  the  same  reason 
he  rejects  God  {ib.,  p.  196),  yet  he  tells  us  "that 
the  vital  impetus,  passing  through  matter,  is 
finite  and  it  has  been  given  once  for  all"  {ib., 
p.  254).  He  says  that  Radical  Mechanism 
explains  "artificial  systems,"  not  the  order  of 
Life,  and  that  while  rejecting  Radical  FinaHsm, 
he  accepts   a    Mitigated   FinaHsm,  for  the  reason 


202  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

that  the  doctrine  on  which  Finalism  rests,  i.e. 
"of  final  causes,  will  never  be  definitely  refuted," 
is  "so  flexible"  and  "so  comprehensive"  that 
"one  accepts  something  of  it  as  soon  as  one  rejects 
pure  mechanism"  (ib.,  p.  40).  So  he  proposes  "ex- 
ternal finality"  which  consists  not  only  in  "the 
co-ordination  of  the  parts  with  the  whole  of  the 
organism,"  but  also,  by  reason  of  the  soHdarity 
of  life,  in  the  co-ordination  of  "each  living  being 
with  the  collective  whole  of  all  others"  {ib.,  p.  43), 
with  this  reservation,  however,  that,  while  life  is 
a  tendency  to  act  on  inert  matter,  the  direction  of 
the  tendency  is  not  predetermined.  Life  has  no 
"end"  in  the  sense  that  it  is  "the  realization  of  a 
pre-existing  model,"  it  is  not  "an  anticipation  of 
the  future  contained  in  the  present  in  the  form  of 
a  represented  end,"  for  life  "endures  in  time," 
i.e.  changes,  and  "the  road  of  Hfe  has  been  created 
pari  passu  with  the  act  of  travelHng  over  it,  being 
nothing  but  the  direction  of  this  act  itself"  (ib.,  p. 
51).  Hence  his  FinaHsm  is  "a  particular  mode  of 
viewing  the  past  in  the  light  of  the  present,"  for 
it  teaches  that  while  "the  best  interpretation"  of 
the  evolution  process  is  "a  psychological  inter- 
pretation," yet  "this  explanation  has  neither  value 
nor  even  significance  except  retrospectively,"  for 
the  explanation  is  intellectual,  whereas  "life  goes 
beyond  intellect"  (ib.,  pp.  51-52). 

After  this  manner  Professor  Bergson  holds  that 
his  "philosophy  of  life  claims  to  transcend  both 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     203 

mechanism  and  finalism"  and  yet  ''represents  the 
organized  world  as  a  harmonious  whole"  {ib.,  p. 
50).  This  "harmony,  or  complementarity"  is 
''rather  behind  us  than  before,"  it  "is  revealed 
only  in  the  mass,"  in  tendencies  rather  than  in 
states,  and  is  explained  as  due  to  "a  vis  a  tergo," 
i.e.  a  kick  behind,  or  to  "a  tremendous  push"  {ib., 
p.  99),  or  to  the  fact  that  "life  has  taken  its  leap 
from  a  vast  spring  board"  {ib.,  p.  265).  Hence  in 
virtue  of  "the  original  common  impetus,"  of  the  fact 
that  the  developing  "tendencies  were  at  first  fused 
in  one,"  these  tendencies  "must  keep  something 
in  common  in  spite  of  the  divergence  of  their 
efforts."  Thus  "harmony  was  complete  at  the 
start,"  is  accounted  for,  not  "by  a  common  aspira- 
tion," nor  by  "reciprocal  adaptations  in  course  of 
progress,"  but  by  "an  original  identity,"  i.e.  "an 
identity  of  impulsion"  {ib.,  pp.  50,  51,  103,  116).  But 
Professor  Bergson  tells  us  that  "the  harmony  does 
not  exist  in  fact:  it  exists  rather  in  principle," 
for  while  "each  species  and  individual  retains 
only  a  certain  impetus  from  the  universal  vital 
impulsion,  it  tends  to  use  this  energy  in  its  own 
interest"  {ib.,  pp.  50-51).  Hence  "an  irremediable 
difference  of  rhythm"  {ib.,  p.  128).  Besides,  there 
are  "scissions,"  "diverging  lines  of  evolution,"  so 
"this  discord  among  the  species  will  go  on  increas- 
ing," "retrogressions,  arrests,  accidents  of  every 
kind,"  "numberless  struggles,"  and  "hence  a  dis- 
cord striking  and  terrible,  but  for  which,"  he  con- 


204  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

soles  us  by  adding,  "the  original  principle  of  life 
must  not  be  held  responsible"  {ib.,  pp.  103,  254, 
255).  Therefore  the  Theory  of  Life  shows  life  to 
be  "Creative  Evolution,"  i.e.  "true  continuity,  real 
mobility,  reciprocal  penetration"  {ib.,  p.  162),  and 
the  domain  of  Ufe  to  be  "reciprocal  interpenetra- 
tion,  endlessly  continued  creation"  {ib.,  p.  178). 


IV.  Criticism 

In  criticising  the  Theory  of  Life  proposed  by 
Professor  Bergson  we  beheve  that  its  exposition 
is  the  most  telHng  criticism.  To  designate  it  as 
a  fanciful  cosmogony  based  upon  an  "ineffectual" 
abstraction,  and  full  of  assumptions,  is  to  use 
mild  terms. 

Again  the  basic  principle  of  Creative  Evolution 
is  Transformism,  but  he  admits  that  Transformism 
is  "not  proved"  and  "may  be  wrong,"  in  which 
case  "the  doctrine  would  not  be  affected  in  so  far 
as  it  has  a  special  interest  or  importance  for  us," 
for  "the  evolutionist  theory,  so  far  as  it  has  any 
importance  for  philosophy,  requires"  only  "an 
ideal  kinship,"  i.e.  "a  logical  not  "a  material 
afhhation  between  forms,"  and  "evolution  would 
then  simply  have  been  transposed,  made  to  pass 
from  the  visible  to  the  invisible,"  i.e.  we  could 
not  see  the  evolution,  nor  know  it  really  to  be  in 
operation,  but  suppose  that  it  does  work  {ib.,  pp. 
25-26). 


PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     205 

Besides,  the  fundamental  principle  in  the  evolu- 
tion process  is  that  the  evolution  of  life  has  taken 
place  on  lines  similar  to  the  evolution  of  a  personal- 
ity. Now  this  teaching,  stripped  of  its  pecuUar 
words,  is  the  theory  of  Ontogenesis  and  Phylo- 
genesis, viz.  that  the  individual  in  the  course  of 
development  from  the  embryo  assumes  forms 
identical  to  those  which  appear  in  the  successive 
evolution  of  the  race.  Thus  Professor  Bergson 
takes  a  biological  theory  proposed  by  Haeckel, 
not  considered  trustworthy  by  leading  scientists  of 
to-day,  dresses  it  up  in  psychological  phraseology 
and  presents  it  as  something  new.  Yet  he  cannot 
get  away  from  its  original  biological  nature,  for  he 
tells  us  that  the  energy  is  acquired  by  and  in  food, 
is  stored  in  sexual  elements,  and  that  life  is  prop- 
agated along  biological  Hnes.  At  the  same  time  the 
process  is  psychological  because  he  says  it  is  so, 
or  even  logical  because  logical  affiliation  suffices. 
This  is  conceptual  manipulation  of  experience  with 
a  vengeance,  far  beyond  what  Professor  Schiller  has 
attempted. 

Furthermore  the  fundamental  principle  of  Pro- 
fessor Bergson's  whole  system  is  Duration,  Muta- 
tion, Change.  He  says  that  Creative  Evolution,  in 
its  essence,  is  the  aim,  on  the  part  of  Life,  to  intro- 
duce mobility  or  movement  or  change  into  inert 
matter,  so  that  life  in  the  external  world  would  be 
presented  as  a  process  similar  to  the  process  of  our 
inner  life,  as  he  conceives  it,  i.e.  "constant  change," 


2o6  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

"the  continual  evolution  or  creation  of  unforeseen 
forms."  Now  the  term  movement  is  used  in  two 
different  senses.  It  may  mean  mutation,  i.e.  change, 
or  it  may  mean  local  motion,  i.e.  locomotion,  as 
Professor  Bergson  spells  the  word.  So  the  strange 
fact  is  presented  that  organic  life,  as  produced 
by  Creative  Evolution,  is  not  determined  by  muta- 
tion or  change  but  by  the  necessities  of  locomotion. 
Professor  Bergson  tells  us  that  animals  are  dis- 
tinguished from  vegetables  by  mobility,  but  mo- 
bility here  means  locomotion,  for  he  expressly  states 
that  ''animals  must  go  in  search  of  food."  In  like 
manner  the  mobility  that  saved  fishes  and  insects 
was  "agility  of  movement."  In  animal  and  human 
life,  also,  the  progress  of  the  nervous  system  is 
represented  as  corresponding  to  the  variety  and 
precision  of  movement,  and  consciousness  is  said 
to  awaken  in  proportion  to  movement.  But  the 
nervous  system  is  a  sensori-motor  system  regulating 
our  animal  and  human  locomotion.  Therefore, 
locomotion  is  not  mutation,  and  the  inter- 
mittent use  of  the  same  word  in  two  different 
meanings  cannot  be  considered  a  strong  argu- 
ment; it  rather  exposes  the  falsity  of  his  position. 
As  for  movement  in  the  sense  of  change  or  crea- 
tion of  new  species.  Professor  Bergson  says  "often 
this  movement  has  turned  aside;  very  often, 
too,  it  has  stopped  short;  what  was  to  have 
been  a  thoroughfare  has  become  a  terminus. 
From  this  point  of  view,  failure  seems   the  rule, 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      207 

success  exceptional  and  always  imperfect"  {ib., 
p.  129). 

Besides,  Professor  Bergson  holds  that  *'the  law 
of  the  degradation  (i.e.  dissipation)  of  energy  is 
the  most  metaphysical  law  of  physics,  since  it 
points  out  without  interposed  symbols,  without 
artificial  devices  of  measurement,  the  direction 
in  which  the  world  is  going.  It  tells  us  that  changes 
that  are  visible  and  heterogeneous  will  be  more  and 
more  diluted  into  changes  that  are  invisible  and 
homogeneous,  and  that  the  instability  to  which 
we  owe  the  richness  and  variety  of  the  changes 
taking  place  in  our  solar  system  will  gradually  give 
way  to  the  relative  stability  of  elementary  vibra- 
tions continually  and  perpetually  repeated"  {ib.,  p. 
243).  So  Creative  Evolution  will  have  an  end,  as 
Professor  Bergson  says  it  had  a  beginning.  Life 
will  give  way  to  death,  mutation  to  local  motion, 
for  Creative  Evolution  means  the  "unceasing  crea- 
tion of  new  and  unforeseeable  forms,"  and  how  can 
these  be  possible  when  "homogeneous  changes" 
and  "elementary  vibrations  perpetually  repeated" 
only  exist. 

Again  Professor  Bergson  modifies  the  law  of  the 
conservation  of  energy.  He  holds  that  this  "law 
cannot  express  the  objective  permanence  of  a  cer- 
tain quantity  of  a  certain  thing,  but  rather  the 
necessity  for  every  change  that  is  brought  about  to 
be  counterbalanced  in  some  way  by  a  change  in 
the  opposite  direction,"  so  that  it  "is  concerned  with 


2o8  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

the  relationship  of  a  fragment  of  this  world  to 
another  fragment  rather  than  with  the  nature  of 
the  whole"  {ib.,  p.  242).  These  words  would  be  true 
if  Creative  Evolution  created  new  energy.  But 
this  Professor  Bergson  expressly  denies.  He  tells 
us  that  Creative  Evolution  creates  the  form  only, 
not  the  energy,  and  creates  the  form  by  converting 
the  potential  energy  of  matter  into  act. 

Finally  Professor  Bergson  teaches  that  man  is 
the  only  thoroughfare,  the  highest  product  of  evo- 
lution; and  this  success  he  expressly  attributes  to 
intellect,  which  keeps  the  path  of  life  open  and 
free.  In  the  anthropods,  on  the  contrary,  "nature 
has  frankly  evolved  in  the  direction  of  instinct" 
with  the  result  that  "stabiUty"  or  ''automatism" 
has  ensued,  which  keeps  the  path  of  life  "closed." 
But  he  holds  that  "intelligence  and  instinct  are 
turned  in  opposite  directions,  the  former  towards 
inert  matter,  the  latter  towards  life"  {ib.,  p.  176). 
Therefore,  the  Order  of  Life,  i.e.  Creative  Evolu- 
tion, when  left  to  itself,  closes  automatically,  and 
is  kept  open  only  by  intellect,  which,  Professor 
Bergson  teaches,  pertains  to  the  Order  of  Matter. 


CHAPTER  X 

PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION:   {continued) 

The  Theory  of  Knowledge 

Professor  Bergson  teaches  that  the  Theory 
of  Knowledge  is  inseparable  from  the  Theory  of 
Life.  By  Theory  of  Knowledge,  however,  he  does 
not  mean  what  philosophical  writers  universally 
have  understood,  viz.  a  treatise  on  the  nature  and 
operations  of  the  intellect.  His  specific  purpose 
is  to  show  the  genesis  of  intellect  in  and  by  the 
evolution  of  Hfe,  and  so  include  the  genesis  of  intel- 
lect in  the  Theory  of  Knowledge.  Hence  *'it  is 
necessary  that  these  two  inquiries,  theory  of  knowl- 
edge and  theory  of  life,  should  join  each  other, 
and,  by  a  circular  process,  push  each  other  on  un- 
ceasingly," for  ''a  theory  of  knowledge  which  does 
not  replace  the  intellect  in  the  general  evolution 
of  life  will  teach  us  neither  how  the  frames  of  knowl- 
edge have  been  constructed  nor  how  we  can  enlarge 
or  go  beyond  them"  {ih.,  Intro.,  p.  xiii;  p.  i86). 
In  proposing  to  set  forth  the  genesis  of  intellect  he 
boasts  that  he  has  gone  beyond  Plato,  Aristotle, 
Descartes,  Kant,  Spencer  and  their  followers,  all 
of  whom  took  the  intellect  without  attempting  to 
explain  the  construction  of  its  forms. 


2IO  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

The  twofold  experience  of  thought  and  of  feeling 
give,  as  we  have  seen,  "the  two  opposite  move- 
ments of  descent  and  of  ascent  in  the  universe"  (ib., 
p.  ii);  these  in  turn  present  a  twofold  evolution: 
"the  automatic  and  strictly  determined  evolution 
of  this  well-knit  whole  is  action  which  is  unmaking 
itself;  and  the  unforeseen  forms  which  life  cuts  out 
in  it,  forms  capable  of  being  themselves  prolonged 
into  unforeseen  movements,  represent  the  action 
that  is  making  itself"  {ib.,  p.  248);  and  this  twofold 
evolution  unfolds  a  twofold  order:  "that  of  the  in- 
ert and  automatic  or  mathematical"  and  "that  of 
the  vital  or  the  willed"  {ib.,  p.  224).  The  former  order 
is  the  order  of  the  inorganic,  is  the  proper  sphere 
of  the  senses  and  of  the  intellect,  and  represents 
what  is  thought;  the  latter  order  is  the  order  of 
the  organic,  is  the  sphere  of  instinct  and  of 
intuition,  and  represents  what  is  lived,  i.e.  felt 
{ib.,  p.  186).  Thus  order  takes  two  forms:  one 
is  the  "opposite"  of  the  other  {ib.,  p.  11),  the 
"inverse"  of  the  other  {ib.,  p.  247),  "contrary" 
to  the  other  {ib.,  p.  222),  "contingent"  to  the 
other  {ib.,  p.  232),  so  that  "the  absence  of  the 
one  consists  in  the  presence  of  the  other"  {ib., 
p.  233)  and  "the  negation  of  the  one  con- 
sists in  the  afi&rmation  of  the  other"  {ib.,  p. 
222).  This  doctrine  of  the  twofold  order  is 
fundamental  to  Professor  Bergson's  theory  of 
Knowledge  and  explains  the  genesis  of  intellect, 
the  illusions  of  the  intellect,  the  relation  of  intel- 


PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      211 

lect  to  instinct  and  consciousness,  and  place  and 
scope  of  intuition. 

I.  The  Genesis  of  the  Intellect 

The  whole  evolution  of  life  proceeds  from  a 
current  of  existence  and  the  opposing  current  {ih., 
p.  182).  The  current  of  existence  is  original  and 
fundamental;  it  is  the  order  of  Hfe;  by  its  relaxa- 
tion or  diminution  or  detension  the  opposing  current 
arises.  The  contrary  current,  or  movement  of 
''descent,"  is  ''materiahty"  {ib.,  p.  245),  and  con- 
tains "immanent"  in  itself  "  an  order  approximately 
mathematical  which  produces  itself  automatically" 
in  proportion  to  the  relaxation  {ib.,  pp.  218,  220). 
"The  power  of  creation  has  only  to  be  deviated 
from  itself  to  relax  its  tension,  only  to  relax  its 
tension  to  extend,  only  to  extend  for  the  mathe- 
matical order  of  the  elements  so  distinguished  and 
the  inflexible  determinism  connecting  them  to  man- 
ifest the  interruption  of  the  creative  act:  in  fact 
inflexible  determinism  and  mathematical  order  are 
one  with  this  very  interruption"  {ib.,  p.  217).  This 
order,  called  mathematical  or  "geometry,  which  is 
its  extreme  limit"  {ib.,  p.  223),  is  in  reality  only 
approximately  mathematical,  for  as  "matter  is  a 
relaxation  of  the  inextensive  into  the  extensive  and, 
thereby,  of  Hberty  into  necessity,  it  does  not  indeed 
wholly  coincide  with  pure  homogeneous  space"  {ib., 
p.  218)  which  "is  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  mind's 


212  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

movement  of  detension"  {ib.,  p.  212),  "yet  is  consti- 
tuted by  the  movement  which  leads  to  space,  and 
is  therefore  on  the  way  to  geometry.  It  is  true 
that  laws  of  mathematical  form  will  never  apply 
to  it  completely.  For  that,  it  would  have  to  be 
pure  space  and  step  out  of  duration"  {ib.,  p.  218). 

The  order  of  matter  awakens  ideas  of  inertia, 
passivity  and  automatism  {ib.,  p.  2 23) .  It  represents 
a  "deficiency  of  will"  and  presents  "a  system  of 
negations,  the  absence  rather  than  the  presence  of 
a  true  reaUty"  {ib.,  p.  208)  because  "duration is  not 
the  fact  of  matter  itself,  but  of  the  life  which  re- 
ascends  the  course  of  matter"  {ib.,  p.  340).  In  like 
manner  "the  mathematical  order  is  not  a  positive 
thing"  and  there  are  not  "in  matter  laws  compar- 
able to  those  of  our  codes";  in  fact,  there  is  "no 
definite  system  of  mathematical  laws  at  the  basis 
of  nature,"  for  "it  is  the  form  towards  which  a 
certain  interruption  tends  of  itself"  {ib.,  p.  219),  and 
so  "the  idea  that  the  mind  forms  of  pure  space  is 
only  the  schema  of  the  Hmit  at  which  this  movement 
would  end"  {ib.,  p.  202). 

Now  the  current  of  life  ascends  across  the  cur- 
rent of  matter.  Life,  or  consciousness  or  supra- 
consciousness  or  mind,  "launched  into  matter, 
fixed  its  attention  either  on  its  own  movement," 
i.e.  turned  in  the  direction  of  instinct  and  intuition, 
"or  on  the  matter  it  was  passing  through,"  i.e. 
in  the  direction  of  intellect  {ib.,  pp.  181,  182),  and 
hence  "split  up  because  of  the  need  it  had  to  apply 


PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     213 

itself  to  matter  at  the  same  time  as  it  had  to  follow 
the  stream  of  life"  (ib.,  p.  178),  so  "the  mind  goes  in 
two  opposite  ways"  (ib.,  p.  223).  Thus  we  are  told 
that  "intellectuaHty  and  materiality  are  of  the 
same  nature  and  have  been  produced  in  the  same 
way"  {ib.,p.  219),  for  "the  intellect  and  matter  have 
progressively  adapted  themselves  one  to  the  other  in 
order  to  attain  at  last  a  common  form"  (ib.,  p.  206) 
inasmuch  as  "consciousness  cannot  pass  through 
matter  without  settHng  on  it,  without  adapting 
itself  to  it:  this  adaptation  is  what  we  call  intel- 
lectuality" (ib.,  p.  270)  and  "this  adaptation  has 
been  brought  about  quite  naturally,  because  it  is  the 
same  inversion  of  the  same  movement  which  creates 
at  once  the  intellectuality  of  mind  and  the  material- 
ity of  matter"  (ib.,  p,  206). 

Moreover,  by  adaptation  is  understood  "con- 
solidation," for  we  read  that  "within  the  evolution 
of  life  and  consciousness,  the  progressive  determina- 
tion of  materiality  and  intellectuality  appears  by 
the  gradual  consolidation  of  one  with  the  other" 
(ib.,  p.  369).  In  this  sense,  intellect  is  said  to  be 
"cut  out  of  mind"  or  consciousness,  for  "mind  over- 
flows intellect,"  to  be  "a  by-product  of  evolu- 
tion" (ib.,  p.  49)  or  "a  local  effect"  (ib.,  Intro., 
p.  x),  to  be  "detached  from  a  vastly  wider  re- 
ahty"  (ib.,  p.  193),  compared  to  which  it  is 
"like  a  solid  nucleus  formed  by  means  of  local 
concentration"  (ib.,  p.  191)  or  of  "condensation" 
(ib.,  p.  193). 


214  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Therefore,  not  only  is  the  genesis  of  intellect 
and  the  genesis  of  material  bodies  correlative, 
"  for  we  cannot  make  the  genesis  of  the  one  with- 
out making  the  genesis  of  the  other"  inasmuch  as 
"both  are  derived  from  a  wider  and  higher  form  of 
existence"  {ib.,  p.  187),  but  the  very  nature  of  the 
intellect  is  set  forth,  for  "matter  is  determined  by 
intelligence  and  there  is  between  them  an  evident 
agreement"  {ib.,  p.  199).  This  agreement  is  shown 
in  the  action  of  intellect  on  matter.  For  while  the 
material  order  unfolds  automatically,  yet  intellect 
expands  it,  for  "the  more  intelligence  busies  itself 
with  dividing,  the  more  it  will  spread  out  in  space, 
in  the  form  of  extension  adjoining  extension,  a 
matter  that  undoubtedly  itself  has  a  tendency  to 
spatiality,  but  whose  parts  are  yet  in  a  state  of 
reciprocal  implication  and  interpenetration "  {ib.,  p. 
189).  Thus  intellect  is  said  "to  create  order  by 
analyzing  the  object"  and  "the  more  complexity 
intellect  puts  into  the  object  by  analyzing  it,  the 
more  complex  is  the  order  it  finds  there,"  for  "the 
order  grows  with  the  complexity,  since  it  is  only 
an  aspect  of  it"  {ib.,  pp.  208,  209). 

As  mind  is  the  principle  of  both  orders,  of  the 
vital  by  tension  and  of  the  material  by  detension, 
so  "in  general  reality  is  ordered  exactly  to  the  degree 
in  which  it  satisfies  our  thought,"  and  order  is  "mind 
finding  itself  in  things."  From  this  viewpoint 
order  is  said  to  be  "a  certain  agreement  between 
subject  and  object"  {ib.,  p.  223).     In  the  second 


PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     215 

place  the  agreement  between  matter  and  intellect 
is  shown  in  the  form  and  action  of  the  intellect. 
The  intellect  is  "originally  fashioned  on  the  form 
of  matter"  {ib.,  p.  160)  and  bears  upon  itself  "the 
general  configuration  of  that  matter"  {ib.,  Intro., 
p.  xiii);  hence  "it  treats  everything  mechanically" 
(ib.,  p.  165). 

Intellect  itself  and  its  two  main  functions,  viz. 
"deduction  and  induction  are  governed  by  the  prop- 
erties of  matter"  (ib.,  p.  212).  All  its  operations  tend 
to  geometry  as  the  goal  where  they  find  their  per- 
fect fulfilment;  but  geometry  is  necessarily  prior 
to  them,  for  these  operations  do  not  construct  space 
but  take  it  as  given;  hence  there  is  a  latent  geom- 
etry immanent  in  our  idea  of  space  which  is  the 
mainspring  of  our  intellect  and  the  cause  of  its 
working  {ib.,  p.  210).  Thus  "logic  and  geometry 
engender  each  other";  "it  is  from  the  extension  of 
a  certain  natural  geometry  that  natural  logic  has 
arisen,"  and  "geometry  and  logic  are  strictly  appli- 
cable to  matter"  {ib.,  p.  161). 

Hence  the  moulds  of  intellect  are  fashioned  on 
matter,  "its  chief  object  is  the  unorganized  solid" 
{ib.,  p.  153);  and  "it  is  never  at  home  except  when 
working  upon  inert  matter.  It  is  extended;  it 
presents  to  us  objects  external  to  other  objects,  and, 
in  these  objects,  parts  external  to  parts"  {ib.,  p. 
154).  "Its  habits  and  views  are  static"  {ib.,  pp. 
298,  300);  it  "looks  from  the  outside  and  grasps 
the  ready-made"  {ib.,  p.  200).    Constructed  as  an 


2i6  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

instrument  of  action,  i.e.  "  to  act  and  to  know  we  are 
acting,"  it  is  guided  and  ruled  by  the  special  "work 
that  is  being  accomplished"  {ib.,  p.  191),  hence 
''the  cerebral  mechanism  is  arranged  just  so  as 
to  drive  back  into  the  unconscious  almost  the 
whole  of  the  past,  and  to  admit  beyond  the  thresh- 
old only  that  which  can  cast  light  on  the  present 
situation  or  further  the  action  now  being  prepared 
—  in  short,  only  that  which  can  give  useful  work" 
(ib.,  p.  5).  And  as  action  goes  "  by  leaps,  and  to  act 
is  to  readjust  oneself"  {ib.,  p.  330),  the  intellect 
"regards  the  object  in  hand  as  provisionally  final 
and  treats  it  as  a  unit"  and  is  directed  through  the 
interests  of  action  "to  actual  or  future  positions  of 
the  object  and  not  to  the  progress''  {ib.,  p.  194). 

Hence  "of  the  discontinuous"  and  of  "immobil- 
ities  alone"  does  the  intellect  form  "a  clear  idea" 
{ib.,  pp.  154,  155).  "It  forms  the  idea  of  mobility 
by  constructing  movement  out  of  immobiHties  put 
together,  i.e.  by  substitution,  but  does  not  pretend 
to  reconstruct  the  movement  such  as  it  actually 
is;  it  merely  replaces  it  with  a  practical  equivalent." 
Thus  "the  actual  forms  which  it  uses  are  artificial 
and  provisional"  {ib.,  pp.  155,  156).  It  cannot 
grasp  reality,  i.e.  Duration,  for  "reahty  appears  as  a 
ceaseless  upspringing  of  something  new,  which  has 
no  sooner  arisen  to  make  the  present  than  it  has 
already  fallen  back  into  the  past;  at  this  exact 
moment  it  falls  under  the  glance  of  the  intellect, 
whose  eyes  are  ever  turned  to  the  rear"  {ib.,  p.  47). 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      217 

Even  this  past  it  perceives  abstractly,  i.e.  from 
Duration,  by  taking  snapshots,  considering  parts 
outside  of  parts,  although  in  touch  with  Duration. 
Hence  its  knowledge  is  abstract,  mechanical  and 
artificial  and  is  itself,  Professor  Bergson  says,  "an 
abstract  view  of  the  cause  of  its  own  being"  {ib., 
p.  53).  In  like  manner  it  "considers  the  future 
abstractly"  (ib.,  p.  53),  for  "only  that  is  foreseen 
which  is  like  the  past"  {ib.,  p.  28).  In  this  sense 
it  is  "the  faculty  of  connecting  the  same  with  the 
same,  of  perceiving  and  also  producing  repetitions" 
(ib.,  p.  52). 

Hence  "the  division  of  unorganized  matter  into 
separate  bodies  is  relative  to  our  senses  and  to  our 
intellect,"  for  "matter  looked  at  as  an  undivided 
whole  is  a  flux  rather  than  a  thing"  {ib.,  p.  186); 
yet  he  says  that  "the  knowledge  of  matter  which 
it  gives  us  appears  as  approximative,  but  not  as 
relative"  {ib.,  p.  206);  that  "the  qualities  of 
matter  are  so  many  stable  views  that  we  take  of 
its  instability";  that  "the  form  is  only  a  snap- 
shot view  of  a  transition"  and  that  "our  per- 
ception manages  to  solidify  into  discontinuous 
images  the  fluid  continuity  of  the  real"  {ib.,  p. 
302).  When  applied  to  life,  intellect  "brings  us 
and  moreover  only  claims  to  bring  us  a  transla- 
tion in  terms  of  inertia.  It  goes  all  around  life, 
taking  from  the  outside  the  greatest  possible  num- 
ber of  views  of  it,  drawing  it  into  itself,  instead  of 
entering  into  it"  {ib.,  p.  176)  with  the  result  that 


2i8  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

it  fails  to  grasp  "the  very  substance"  of  things,  i.e. 
Duration,  and  "the  manifold  causes  and  elements" 
which  it  attributes  to  vital  phenomena  are  "only 
views  of  the  mind"  {ib.,  p.  226). 

From  the  fact  that  the  intellect  in  its  operations 
is  "discontinuous,"  and  that  "it  applies  forms  that 
are  indeed  those  of  unorganized  matter,"  we  are 
enabled  to  understand  the  nature  of  "the  concept." 
"Concepts,  in  fact,  are  outside  each  other,  like 
objects  in  space;  and  they  have  the  same  stabiHty 
as  such  objects,  on  which  they  have  been  modelled. 
Taken  together,  they  constitute  an  'intelligible 
world,'  that  resembles  the  world  of  solids  in  its 
essential  characters,  but  whose  elements  are  lighter, 
more  diaphanous,  easier  for  the  intellect  to  deal 
with  than  the  image  of  concrete  things;  they  are 
not,  indeed,  the  perception  itself  of  things,  but  the 
representation  of  the  act  by  which  the  intellect  is 
fixed  on  them.  They  are,  therefore,  not  images, 
but  symbols.  Our  logic  is  the  complete  set  of 
rules  that  must  be  followed  in  using  sym- 
bols. As  these  symbols  are  derived  from  the 
consideration  of  solids,  as  the  rules  for  com- 
bining these  symbols  hardly  do  more  than  ex- 
press the  most  general  relations  among  solids, 
our  logic  triumphs  in  that  science  which  takes 
the  soHdity  of  bodies  for  its  object,  that  is,  in 
geometry"  {ib.,  pp.  160,  161).  Therefore,  the 
knowledge  of  intellect  is  external,  phenomenal 
and  symbolical. 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      219 

In  illustration  of  intellectual  action,  Professor 
Bergson  points  to  the  cinematograph.  The  me- 
chanical contrivance  of  "moving  pictures,"  he 
holds,  enables  us  to  understand  "the  mechanism 
of  our  thought"  {ih.,  p.  306).  In  the  mechanism 
of  moving  pictures  we  have  each  colored  form  or 
picture  distinct  and  separate,  i.e.  snapshot  views, 
i.e.  qualities,  forms,  positions,  intentions  {ih.,  p. 
308),  and  the  movement  is  in  the  apparatus.  This 
movement  consists  in  juxtaposing  form  to  form  or 
supraposing  form  on  form  so  rapidly  that  the  move- 
ment appears  to  be  articulated  internally  to  the 
forms  or  pictures.  But  this  is  an  illusion.  The 
movement  is  not  in  them,  for  they  are  "so  many 
stable  views"  {ih.,  p.  302),  but  in  the  machine.  It  is 
external,  mechanical,  artificial,  and  gives  not  real 
movement  itself  but  merely  an  imitation  of  move- 
ment. Thus  he  adds,  "perception,  intellection, 
language  so  proceed  in  general"  {ib.,  p.  306). 

The  criticism  which  Professor  Bergson  makes  of 
intellectual  knowledge  in  general,  he  applies  to 
science  in  particular,  for  "positive  science  is  the 
work  of  pure  intellect."  Hence  "science  can  only 
act  by  means  of  inert  matter,"  "makes  use  of  this  by 
mechanical  inventions  "  and  "gives  an  a  priori  mech- 
anistic conception  of  nature"  {ih.,  pp.  105,  196). 
Although  "inert  matter  enters  naturally  into  the 
frames  of  the  intellect"  and  so  science,  e.g.  physics, 
in  regard  "to  its  general  form  may  touch  the  abso- 
lute" {ih.,  p.  198);  yet  in  regard  to  "the  particular 


220  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

cutting  out,"  it  "is  contingent  and  relative,  relative 
to  the  variable  it  has  chosen,  relative  to  the  order 
in  which  it  has  successively  put  the  problems" 
{ib.,  p.  219). 

Furthermore  ''matter  is  a  tendency  to  constitute 
isolable  systems  which  can  be  treated  geometric- 
ally. In  fact  we  shall  define  matter  by  just  this 
tendency.  But  it  is  only  a  tendency.  Matter 
does  not  go  to  the  end,  and  the  isolation  is  never 
complete.  If  science  does  go  to  the  end  and  isolates 
completely,  it  is  for  convenience  of  study"  {ib.,  p. 
10),  and  its  systems  are,  therefore,  called  "artifi- 
cial" {ib.,  p.  31)  and  "abstract,"  for  the  systems  we 
cut  out  within  the  whole  would,  properly  speaking, 
not  then  be  parts  at  all;  "  they  would  be  partial 
views  of  the  whole"  {ib.),  for  "the  most  radical 
progress  a  science  can  achieve  is  the  working  of  the 
completed  results  into  a  new  system  of  the  whole, 
by  relation  to  which  they  become  instantaneous  and 
motionless  views  taken  at  intervals  along  the  con- 
tinuity of  a  movement,"  i.e.  it  "translates"  {ib.,  pp. 
31,  32),  and  is  mechanical  for  the  result  would  be 
"a  pure  mechanism  over  which  Duration  ghdes 
without  penetrating"  {ib.,  p.  37). 

For  like  reasons  science  deals  with  the  ''same,'' 
with  "repetitions''  {ib.,  p.  29),  and  its  knowledge 
is  "negative,"  for  it  is  based  on  the  material  order, 
which  is  negative,  and  though  it  "appears  to  deal 
with  a  positive  reality,"  yet  it  is  concerned  with 
"the  absence  rather  than  the    presence  of  a  true 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      221 

reality"  {ih.,  p.  208),  and  with  the  "abstract,"  i.e. 
with  "what  is  withdrawn,  by  hypothesis,  from  the 
action  of  real  time"  {ih.,  p.  29),  and  so  "considers 
them  in  the  abstract"  {ih.,  p.  342). 

Therefore  "physical  laws"  are  negative,  for  they 
express  "this  merely  negative  tendency";  they  are 
abstract,  for  "none  of  them,  taken  separately,  has 
objective  reality";  and  artificial,  for  "each  is  the 
work  of  an  investigator  who  has  regarded  things 
from  a  certain  bias,  isolated  certain  variables, 
applied  certain  conventional  units  of  measurement" 
{ib.,  p.  218).  As  with  the  intellect,  so  the  knowledge, 
which  science  has  of  the  living,  is  symbolical,  for 
"here  the  use  of  conceptual  frames  is  no  longer 
natural"  and  "it  is  by  accident  —  chance,  or  con- 
vention, as  you  please  —  that  science  obtains  a  hold 
of  the  living  analogous  to  the  hold  it  has  on  matter  " 
{ib.,  p.  198). 

II.   Illusions  of  Intellect 

In  the  doctrine  of  the  twofold  order,  automatic 
and  willed.  Professor  Bergson  holds  we  have  a  ready 
and  sure  solution  for  what  he  calls  the  "illusions" 
of  the  intellect. 

The  first  of  these  illusions  is  the  idea  of  Disorder 
{ib.,  p.  274).  This  idea,  he  says,  is  met  in  the  funda- 
mental problem  of  knowledge,  but  he  adds  that  the 
idea  of  Disorder  is  an  illusion,  a  pseudo-idea,  that  in 
reality  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Disorder.  For, 
as  the  two  orders  are  contrary  and  complementary, 


222  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

so  that  "the  absence  of  the  one  means  the  presence 
of  the  other,"  it  follows  that  ''only  order  is  real, 
and  disorder  is  one  of  two  orders  for  which  we 
were  not  looking."  Hence  "the  idea  of  disorder 
is  entirely  practical.  It  corresponds  to  the  dis- 
appointment of  a  certain  expectation  and  does  not 
denote  the  absence  of  all  order,  but  only  the  pres- 
ence of  that  order  which  does  not  offer  us  actual 
interest."  This  idea  is  due  to  "the  fundamen- 
tal illusion  of  our  understanding  that  we  go 
from  absence  to  presence,  from  the  void  to  the 
full,"  whereas  in  itself  it  is  "a  word"  and  no 
more  (ib.). 

The  second  illusion  is  the  idea  of  Nothing.  This 
idea  Professor  Bergson  says  is  "the  hidden  spring 
of  philosophical  thinking,"  for  it  suggests  the  in- 
quiries into  the  origin  of  existence  inasmuch  as 
"existence  appears  like  a  conquest  over  naught" 
{ib.,  p.  275).  But  he  tells  us  that  the  idea  of  nothing 
"is  a  pseudo-idea  and  the  problems  that  are  raised 
around  it  are  pseudo-problems"  (ib.,p.  277).  He  says 
that  the  idea  of  nothing  impUes  "the  annihilation 
of  everything,"  but  "while  the  mind  can  represent 
any  particular  thing  as  annihilated,  yet  the  idea  of 
the  annihilation  of  everything  presents  the  same 
character  as  that  of  a  square  circle:  it  is  not  an 
idea,  it  is  only  a  word,"  for  "there  is  no  absolute 
void  in  nature,"  and  the  annihilation  of  a  thing 
means  really  the  absence  of  that  thing  and  the 
presence  of  another  thing  in  its  place. 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      223 

Thus  the  idea  of  nothing  corresponds  to  the  idea 
of  absence,  and  there  is  absence  only  for  "  a  being 
capable  of  remembering  and  forgetting."  All  that 
is  expressed  negatively  by  such  words  as  "naught" 
or  "void,"  therefore,  is  "not  so  much  thought 
as  feeling,  or,  to  speak  more  exactly,  it  is  the 
tinge  that  feehng  gives  to  thought."  Hence 
"the  idea  implies  on  the  subjective  side  a  pref- 
erence, on  the  objective  side  a  substitution,  and 
is  nothing  else  but  a  combination  of,  or  rather 
an  interference  between  this  feehng  of  prefer- 
ence and  this  idea  of  substitution"  (ib.,  pp.  281, 
282). 

This  idea  of  nothing  is  due  to  a  fundamental  illu- 
sion of  the  intellect,  for  "every  human  action  has 
its  starting  point  in  a  dissatisfaction,  and  thereby 
in  a  feehng  of  absence.  Our  action  proceeds  thus 
from  'nothing'  to  'something,'  and  its  very  essence 
is  to  embroider  'something'  on  the  canvas  of  'noth- 
ing.' The  truth  is  that  'nothing'  concerned  here 
is  the  absence  not  so  much  of  a  thing  as  of  a  utihty" 
{ib.,  p.  297).  Therefore,  he  tells  us,  that  "the  ques- 
tion: 'why  does  something  exist?'  is  consequently 
without  meaning,  a  pseudo-problem  raised  about 
a  pseudo-idea,"  and  is  due  to  "the  fact  that  the 
forms  of  human  action  venture  outside  their  proper 
sphere"  and  "itisinorder  to  act  that  we  think"  {ib., 
pp.  296,  297),  for  "intellect  is  relative  to  the  needs 
of  action.  Postulate  action  and  the  very  form  of 
the  intellect  can  be  deduced  from  it.     This  form 


224  PRAGMATISM  AND   THE  IDEA 

is  therefore  neither  irreducible  nor  inexpHcable" 
(ib.,  p.  152). 

A  third  illusion  is  "  that  the  mind  imitates,  by  its 
instabihty,  the  very  movement  of  the  real"  {ib.,  p. 
308)  or,  in  other  words,  the  belief  that  "we  can 
reduce  things,  i.e.  becoming,  to  ideas"  (ib.,  p.  315). 
But  there  is  ^^  more  in  a  becoming  than  in  the  forms 
passed  through  in  turn,  more  in  the  evolution  of 
form  than  the  forms  assumed  one  after  another" 
{ib.,  p.  316).  Hence  we  "cannot  construct  changes 
out  of  states."  It  "implies  the  absurd  proposition, 
that  movement  is  made  of  immobilities  "  {ib.,  p.  308). 
But  "he  who  installs  himself  in  becoming  sees  in 
duration  the  very  life  of  things,  the  fundamental 
reahty."  So  "from  duration  we  can  derive  the 
forms,"  not  vice  versa.  The  illusion  is  due  to  the 
cinematographical  mechanism  of  the  intellect, 
which  attempts  to  derive  duration  from  the  forms 
{ib.,  pp.  316,  317). 

Another  illusion,  akin  to  the  former,  is  the  at- 
tempt to  impose  on  vital  phenomena  the  categories 
of  the  intellect,  viz.  "unity,  multipHcity,  mechan- 
ical causaUty,  intelligent  finaHty"  {ib.,  Intro., 
p.  x).  Now  the  vital  order,  we  are  told,  consists 
in  the  tendential  unfolding  of  countless  potential- 
ities immanent  in  the  vital  impulse  and  is  charac- 
terized by  continual  creation,  freedom,  i.e.  change, 
unforeseeability,  whereas  the  intellect  is  in  the 
material  order,  being  configured  to  matter,  regards 
the  past,  and  has  static  forms  and  habits.     Hence 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUITON      225 

the  illusion  is  due  to  a  confusion  of  the  two  orders 
and  to  an  attempt  at  explaining  the  evolution  of 
life  by  a  by-product,  or  part  of  the  evolution,  i.e. 
by  the  intellect. 

A  final  illusion  is  presented  in  "  the  idea  of  a 
general  order  of  nature,  everywhere  the  same,  hover- 
ing over  life  and  over  matter  alike"  {ib.,  p.  226).  We 
conceive  this  idea,  according  to  Professor  Bergson, 
because  phenomena  of  matter  and  of  Hving  beings 
repeat  themselves,  and  reveal  characters  of  likeness 
and  of  sameness  in  form  and  in  function,  which 
enable  the  mind  to  generalize.  Hence,  he  adds, 
"our  habit  of  designating  by  the  same  word  and 
representing  in  the  same  way  the  existence  of 
laws  in  the  domain  of  inert  matter  and  that  of 
genera  in  the  domain  of  life"  {ib.).  This  illusion 
is  due  to  ''the  confusion  of  the  geometrical  order 
and  the  vital  order,"  for  "in  both  ancient  and 
modern  philosophy  the  idea  of  'generaHty'  is  an 
equivocal  idea,  uniting  in  its  denotation  and  in 
its  connotation  incompatible  objects  and  elements. 
In  both  there  are  grouped  under  the  same  concept 
two  kinds  of  order  which  are  alike  only  in  the 
facility  they  give  to  our  action  on  things.  We 
bring  together  the  two  terms  in  virtue  of  a  quite 
external  likeness  which  justifies  no  doubt  their 
designation  by  the  same  word  for  practice,  but 
which  does  not  authorize  us  at  all,  in  the  speculative 
domain,  to  confuse  them  in  the  same  definition"  {ib., 
p.  227).     The  likeness  between  the  orders  is,  there- 


226  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

fore,  external  and  accidental,  for  "the  vital  order, 
which  is  essentially  creation,  is  manifested  to  us  no 
less  in  its  essence"  (i.e.  creation)  "than  in  some  of 
its  accidents,  those  which  imitate  the  physical  and 
geometrical  order;  like  it,  they  present  to  us  repe- 
titions that  make  generalization  possible,  and  in 
that  we  have  all  that  interests  us."  These  "acci- 
dents" are  "the  innumerable  living  beings,  almost 
alike,  that  have  to  repeat  each  other  in  space  and 
in  time  for  the  novelty  they  are  working  out  to  grow 
and  mature"  {lb.,  p.  231).  Hence  "the  repetition 
which  serves  as  the  base  of  our  generalizations  is 
essential  in  the  physical  order,  which  is  'automatic,' 
accidental  in  the  vital  order"  (ib.).  By  a  like  con- 
fusion of  the  two  orders  Professor  Bergson  explains 
the  concepts  oi  chaos , chance  Sind  anarchy  {ib.,p.  237). 


CHAPTER   XI 

PRAGMATISM  AND  CREATIVE    EVOLUTION:   (concluded) 

The  Theory  of  Knowledge 
I.   Intellect  and  Instinct 

The  doctrine  of  the  Two  Orders  is  also  the  basis 
of  Professor  Bergson's  teaching  on  the  relation  of 
intellect  to  instinct.  He  calls  intellect  and  instinct 
"two  tendencies,"  opposite  "and  complementary" 
(ib.,  pp.  135,  136).  They  "at  their  origin  interpene- 
trated each  other"  (ib.,  p.  175),  i.e.  "the  original 
psychic  activity  included  both  at  once,"  and  "if 
we  went  far  enough  back,  we  should  find  intelli- 
gence and  instinct,  in  this  elementary  condition, 
prisoners  of  a  matter  which  they  were  not  able  to 
control"  {ib.,  p.  141).  Now  the  purpose  of  Creative 
Evolution  is  to  introduce  indeterminateness  into 
matter,  yet  "the  force  immanent  in  life  is  limited 
and  must  choose  between  two  ways  of  acting  on 
inert  matter,"  for  "it  is  hard  for  it  to  go  far  in  sev- 
eral directions  at  once"  {ib.,  pp.  141,  142);  and  we 
are  also  told  that  "it  is  no  less  true  that  nature 
must  have  hesitated  between  two  modes  of  psy- 
chical activity  —  one  assured  of  immediate  success, 
the  other  hazardous"  {ib.,  p.  143).  The  reader  may 
not  understand  all  this;    however,  the  choice  was 


228  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

made.  So  the  force  chose  to  act  on  matter  directly, 
i.e.  by  instinct,  which  is  "the  faculty  of  creating 
organized  instruments,"  and  indirectly,  i.e.  by  in- 
tellect, and  this  indirect  action  is  effected  through 
the  medium  or  instrumentality  of  "an  organism 
which  fashions  unorganized,  i.e.  artificial  instru- 
ments." 

In  the  first  case  "the  same  principle,  i.e.  the 
original  psychic  activity,  remains  within  itself"  {ib., 
p.  1 68).  Therefore  instinct  "is  turned  to  certain 
determinations  of  life"  {ib.,  p.  i86),  is  regarded  as 
"completing  the  work  of  organization,"  so  that 
"there  is  no  sharp  line  between  the  instinct  of 
animals  and  the  organizing  work  of  living  matter" 
{ib.,-p.  140),  and  is  in  the  Order  of  Life.  In  the 
second  case  the  original  psychic  activity  "steps  out 
of  itself  and  becomes  absorbed  in  the  utilization 
of  inert  matter"  {ib.,  p.  168);  therefore  intellect 
"is  moulded  on  the  configuration  of  matter"  {ib., 
p.  186),  is  regarded  as  artificially  extending  the 
work  of  organization  and  is  in  the  inert  or  Material 
Order.  They  are  tendencies,  therefore  "diverge 
more  and  more  from  each  other,  as  they  overlap, 
but  are  never  entirely  separated  from  each  other" 
{ib.,  p.  142),  and  "it  is  at  the  extremity  of  prin- 
cipal lines  of  evolution  that  we  find  intelHgence 
and  instinct  in  forms  almost  pure"  {ib.,  p.   174). 

Although  of  a  common  origin,  Professor  Bergson 
says  that  instinct  and  intelligence  differ.  They 
differ  because  "they  represent  two  divergent  solu- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     229 

tions,  equally  fitting,  of  one  and  the  same  problem," 
i.e.  as  "means  of  defence  against  enemies"  {ib., 
p.  143).  But  this  is  a  strange  mixture  of  Pro- 
fessor Bergson's  cosmogony  and  the  Darwinian 
theory.  Again  we  are  told  that  they  differ  "pro- 
foundly in  internal  structure."  They  "imply  two 
radically  different  kinds  of  knowledge"  {ib.,  p. 
143):  "this  knowledge  is  rather  acted  and  uncon- 
scious in  the  case  of  instinct,  thought,  and  conscious 
in  the  case  of  intelligence.  But  it  is  rather  a  dif- 
ference of  degree  than  of  kind"  {ib.,  p.  145),  for 
"knowledge  and  action  are  here  only  two  aspects 
of  one  and  the  same  faculty"  {ib.,  p.  150).  The 
reader  of  Creative  Evolution  is  aware  that  Pro- 
fessor Bergson  is  apt  to  be  violent  and  somewhat 
unfortunate  in  the  use  of  figures  of  speech.  Here 
the  fault  is  found  in  his  use  of  adjectives,  for  it  is 
difficult  to  understand  how  a  "radical  difference" 
is  merely  one  "of  degree." 

The  "essential  difference,"  however,  "from  the 
psychological  point  of  view"  is  found  in  "the 
two  objects  upon  which  they  are  directed."  Both 
are  "inherited  functions,  therefore  innate."  In- 
stinct is  "the  innate  knowledge  of  a  thing,"  it  "im- 
plies the  knowledge  of  a  matter,"  and  "this  kind  of 
knowledge  is  formulated  in  what  philosophers  call 
categorical  propositions."  Intellect,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  "the  innate  knowledge  of  relations," 
imphes  "the  knowledge  of  a.  form,"  i.e.  something 
external   or   the  outward  aspect  of   a   thing,   and 


230  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

''this  kind  of  knowledge  is  always  expressed  hypo- 
thetically"  {ih.,  pp.  145-149). 

Finally  "this  entirely  formal  knowledge  of  in- 
telligence has  an  immense  advantage  over  the 
material  knowledge  of  instinct.  A  form,  just  be- 
cause it  is  empty,  may  be  filled  at  will  with  any 
number  of  things  in  turn,  even  with  those  that  are 
of  no  use.  So  that  a  formal  knowledge  is  not 
limited  to  what  is  practically  useful,  although  it 
is  in  view  of  practical  utility  that  it  has  made  its 
appearance  in  the  world.  An  intelligent  being 
bears  within  himself  the  means  to  transcend  his  own 
nature.  He  transcends  himself,  however,  less  than 
he  wishes,  less  also  than  he  imagines  himself  to  do. 
The  purely  formal  character  of  intelligence  deprives 
it  of  the  balance  necessary  to  enable  it  to  settle 
itself  on  the  objects  that  are  of  the  most  powerful 
interest  to  speculation.  Instinct,  on  the  contrary, 
has  the  desired  materiality,  but  it  is  incapable  of 
going  so  far  in  quest  of  its  object;  it  does  not  specu- 
late." Hence  the  ultimate  difference  is:  "There 
are  things  that  intelligence  alone  is  able  to  seek, 
but  which,  by  itself,  it  will  never  find.  These  things 
instinct  alone  could  find;  but  it  will  never  seek 
them"  {ih.,  p.  151). 

In  criticism  it  may  be  noted  that  intellect  is  said 
"to  be  configured  to  matter"  and  "in  the  auto- 
matic order,"  yet  can  speculate  and  has  formal 
knowledge.  Now  the  word  formal  may  be  taken 
in  the  concrete  and  in  this  sense  it  belongs  to  the 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     231 

Order  of  Life,  for  the  purpose  of  Creative  Evolution 
is  the  creation  of  form,  or  it  may  be  taken  in  the 
abstract.  In  the  latter  sense  we  have  intellect, 
essentially  existing  only  as  a  configuration  of 
matter,  yet  possessing  in  itself  "empty  forms" 
which  "may  be  filled  at  will  with  any  number  of 
things  in  turn."  From  this  teaching  it  is  inferred 
that  the  "forms"  are  part  and  parcel  of  intellect 
and  are  prior  to  the  particular  action  of  the  intel- 
lect. Yet  this  is  flatly  contradicted  by  Professor 
Bergson  who  says:  "Knowledge  becomes  relative, 
as  soon  as  the  intellect  is  made  a  kind  of  absolute. 
We  regard  the  human  intellect,  on  the  contrary, 
as  relative  to  the  needs  of  action.  Postulate  action, 
and  the  very  form  of  the  intellect  can  be  deduced 
from  it.  This  form  is  therefore  neither  irreducible 
nor  inexplicable"  nor  "independent"  {ih.,  p.  152), 
and  "the  needs  of  action"  are  the  needs  of  "a 
practically  useful  end"  {ib.,  p.  155). 

Moreover  instinct  is  placed  in  the  Order  of  Life, 
yet  "retains  an  almost  invariable  structure,  since 
a  modification  of  it  involves  a  modification  of  the 
species,"  is  "therefore  necessarily  specialized,  being 
nothing  but  the  utilization  of  a  specific  instrument 
for  a  specific  object"  {ib.,  p.  140);  whereas  "the  in- 
tellect is  placed  in  the  order  of  matter,  makes  its 
instrument  of  unorganized  matter"  and  this  "can 
take  any  form  whatsoever,  serve  any  purpose, 
free  the  living  being  from  every  new  difficulty  that 
arises  and  bestow  on  it  an  unlimited  number  of 


232  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

powers"  (ib.,  p.  141).  Yet  the  Order  of  Life  is,  by 
hypothesis,  the  order  of  freedom,  while  the  Material 
Order  is  the  order  of  necessity  {ib.,  p.  236).  Finally 
contact  with  matter  is  set  forth  as  the  determining 
principle  of  individuation  {ib.,  p.  258). 

As  instinct  and  intelligence  are  developed  from 
the  same  principle,  i.e.  consciousness  or  supra- 
consciousness  or  mind,  they  are  said  to  have  "the 
same  background,  i.e.  consciousness  which  **is 
coextensive  with  universal  life"  {ib.,  p.  186),  and 
instinct  is  presented  as  "not  within  the  domain  of 
intelligence  and  not  beyond  the  limit  of  mind" 
{ib.,  p.  175).  This  consciousness  is  "a  rudimentary 
and  vague  activity  diffused  throughout  the  mass  of 
the  organized  substance."  It  is  connected  with 
mobility  and  is  "the  cause  of  movement  since  it 
has  to  direct  locomotion"  and  is  the  effect  of  move- 
ment, "for  it  is  the  motor  activity  that  maintains 
it,  and,  once  this  activity  disappears,  consciousness 
dies  away  or  rather  falls  asleep."  Hence  "the 
humblest  organism  is  conscious  in  proportion  to 
its  power  to  move  freely"  {ib.,  pp.  109,  iii).  It  is 
described  as  "the  light  that  plays  around  the  zone 
of  possible  actions  or  potential  activity  which 
surrounds  the  action  really  performed  by  the  living 
being.  It  signifies  hesitation  or  choice"  {ib.,  p.  144) 
and  "is  proportionate  to  the  power  of  choice"  {ib., 
p.  179).  But  "neither  this  mobihty  nor  this 
choice  nor  consequently  this  consciousness  involves 
as  a  necessary  condition  the  presence  of  a  nervous 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      233 

system;  the  latter  has  only  canalized  in  definite 
directions  and  brought  to  a  higher  degree  of  per- 
fection the  vague  activity"  "by  giving  it  the 
double  form  of  reflex  and  voluntary  activity"  (ib., 
p.  1 10).  For,  "the  nervous  system  marks  out 
reflex  lines  on  which  action  will  run"  and  "by  their 
development  and  configuration  indicate  more  or 
less  extended  choice"  so  that  "the  awakening  of 
consciousness  is  the  more  complete  the  greater  the 
latitude  of  choice  allowed  to  it  and  the  larger 
the  amount  of  action  bestowed  on  it"  {ib.,  pp.  252- 
262). 

It  is  natural  to  suppose  therefore  that  conscious- 
ness develops  with  the  development  of  organiza- 
tion, which  is  the  work  of  Life.  On  the  contrary 
"to  find  probable  cases  of  vegetable  consciousness 
we  must  descend  as  low  as  possible  in  the  scale  of 
plants";  "to  find  the  best  specimens  of  conscious- 
ness in  the  animal  we  must  ascend  to  the  highest 
representatives  of  the  series"  although  in  some  ani- 
mals "the  progress  of  organization  must  have  lo- 
calized all  the  conscious  activity  in  nervous  centres" 
with  the  result  "that  consciousness  is  even  weaker 
in  animals  of  this  kind  than  in  organisms  much 
less  differentiated";  {ib.,  pp.  in,  112).  Yet  we 
read  that  "intelligence  points  to  consciousness,  in- 
stinct," which  is  in  the  Order  of  Life  "to  uncon- 
sciousness" {ib.,  p.  145)  and  in  fact  "instincts  are 
more  or  less  conscious  in  certain  cases,  unconscious 
in  others"  {ib.,  p.  143). 


234  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

In  the  living  being,  Professor  Bergson  tells  us 
"consciousness  does  not  spring  from  the  brain,  but 
brain  and  consciousness  correspond  because  equally 
they  measure,  the  one  by  the  complexity  of  its 
structure  and  the  other  by  the  intensity  of  its 
awareness,  the  quantity  of  choice  that  the  living 
being  has  at  its  disposal"  {ih.,  p.  262),  and  again, 
''the  consciousness  of  a  living  being  is  inseparable 
from  the  brain  in  the  sense  in  which  a  sharp  knife 
is  inseparable  from  its  edge:  the  brain  is  the  sharp 
edge  by  which  consciousness  cuts  into  the  compact 
tissue  of  events,  but  the  brain  is  no  more  coex- 
tensive with  consciousness  than  the  edge  with  the 
knife.  Thus  from  the  fact  that  two  brains,  like 
that  of  the  ape  and  that  of  the  man,  are  very  much 
alike,  we  cannot  conclude  that  the  corresponding 
consciousnesses  are  comparable  or  commensurable" 
{ih.,  p.  263). 

But  here  Professor  Bergson  changes  the  meta- 
phor and,  by  changing,  causes  confusion  of  thought. 
For  if  the  brain  or  the  nervous  system  canahzes 
a  vague  activity  diffused  throughout  the  organism, 
it  forms  or  moulds  or  consolidates  the  knife  itself., 
Professor  Bergson  holds  that  the  brain  of  man  and 
that  of  the  animal  differ  not  only  in  size  but  also  in 
function,  for  "in  the  animal,  the  motor  mechanisms 
that  the  brain  succeeds  in  setting  up,  or,  in  other 
words,  the  habits  contracted  voluntarily,  have  no 
other  object  nor  effect  than  the  accomplishment 
of   the   movements   marked   out    in    these    habits, 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      235 

stored  in  these  mechanisms.  But,  in  man,  the 
motor  habit  may  have  a  second  result,  out  of  pro- 
portion to  the  first:  it  can  hold  other  motor  habits 
in  check,  and  thereby,  in  overcoming  automatism, 
set  consciousness  free,"  and  attributes  this  to  "the 
cerebral  mechanisms  that  correspond  to  words" 
{ib.,  p.  183). 

But  inhibition  cannot  be  explained  in  a  mechan- 
ical manner  on  materialistic  grounds.  Again,  to 
explain  inhibition  by  localization  of  function  runs 
counter  to  the  process  of  Creative  Evolution,  for 
the  localization  of  speech  points  to  automatism, 
not  to  free  activity  {ib.,  p.  264). 

Finally,  the  self  is  explained  by  consciousness, 
for  it  is  "the  concentration  of  the  different  parts 
of  our  being  in  a  point,  or  rather  a  sharp  edge 
pressed  against  the  future  and  cutting  into  it  un- 
ceasingly," "if  we  let  ourselves  go,  and,  instead  of 
acting,  dream,  at  once  the  self  is  scattered"  {ib., 
p.  20),  and  this  concentration  is  "the  tension  of 
an  indivisible  active  will"  {ib.,  p.  207).  The  ten- 
sion itself  is  explained  by  the  interests  of  action, 
for  "each  of  our  acts  aims  at  a  certain  insertion  of 
our  will  into  reality"  {ib.,  p.  306). 

II.    Nature  of  Intuition 

The  doctrine  of  the  Two  Orders  enables  us  to 
grasp  the  place  and  scope  of  intuition  in  the  theory 
of   knowledge. 


236  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Intuition  is  the  characteristic  doctrine  of  Pro- 
fessor Bergson's  epistemology  and  is  considered 
by  him  as  opposed  to,  yet  complementary  of,  in- 
tellect. The  fundamental  reason  of  this  opposition 
and  complementarity  is  that  intellect  and  intuition 
''represent  two  opposite  directions  of  the  work  of 
consciousness:  intuition  goes  in  the  very  direction 
of  life,  intellect  goes  in  the  inverse  direction  and 
finds  itself  in  accordance  with  the  movement  of 
matter.  A  perfect  humanity  would  contain  both 
forms,"  but  with  us  "intuition  is  almost  completely 
sacrificed  to  intellect,"  it  is  "a  lamp  almost  extin- 
guished" {ib.,  p.  267). 

A  conception  of  the  nature  and  function  of  in- 
tuition is  obtained  in  its  twofold  relation  to  instinct 
and  to  intelligence.  Now  instinct  is  defined  as 
"sympathy,"  "a  divining  sympathy"  that  creates 
organized  instruments  and  brings  the  consciousness 
of  the  living  being  into  direct  relation  with  a 
specific  object  (ib.,  p.  175).  Hence  instinct  is  feeling 
specialized,  i.e.  canalized  in  specific  modes  of  action. 
Hence  instinct  is  in  the  order  of  life  and  intuition 
is  nothing  more  than  instinct  purified,  for  "by 
intuition  I  mean  instinct  that  has  become  disin- 
terested, self-conscious,  capable  of  reflecting  on  its 
object  and  enlarging  it  indefinitely"  {ib.,  p.  176), 
i.e.  "independent  of  the  interest  it  has  for  us" 
{ib.,  p.  274);    in  other  words,  feeling  not  specified. 

The  relation  of  intuition  to  intellect  is  grasped 
when  we  bear  in  mind  how  intellect  is  formed. 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      237 

The  intellect  is  the  adaptation  of  consciousness  to 
matter.  The  result  of  this  adaptation  is  that  con- 
sciousness is  configured  to  matter,  and  the  configu- 
ration is  presented  as  a  "luminous  nucleus"  {ib.,  p. 
177)  "formed  out  of  the  real,"  i.e.  consciousness 
or  feeling,  "by  condensation"  {ib.,  p.  46).  Feel- 
ing is  "an  indistinct  fringe  which  fades  off  into 
darkness"  and  which  "surrounds  the  bright  nu- 
cleus in  the  centre,"  i.e.  "the  intellect"  {ib.).  The 
"indistinct  fringe"  is  also  described  as  "a  fluid 
surrounding  intellect"  or  "an  ocean  of  life,"  i.e. 
feeling  {ib.,  p.  191),  so  that  intellect  does  not  radi- 
cally differ  from  the  fluid  {ib.,  p.  193).  Just  as  the 
intellect  is  "the  bright  nucleus,"  the  condensation 
of  "darkness  into  light,"  or  "of  the  ocean  of  life" 
into  a  particular  form,  so  "intuition  is  the  vague 
fringe  that  surrounds  our  distinct,  i.e.  our  intel- 
lectual representation,"  and  "this  useless  fringe  is 
that  part  of  the  evolving  principle  that  has  not 
shrunk  to  the  peculiar  form  of  organization,  but 
has  settled  around  it  unasked  for,  unwanted"  {ib., 

p.  49)- 

Now  intellect  and  intuition  furnish  us  with  the 
opposite  and  complementary  knowledge  of  the 
opposite  and  complementary  parts  of  reahty. 
Intellect  enables  us  to  grasp  the  real  in  its  inverse 
or  material  tendency,  i.e.  matter;  intuition  gives 
the  knowledge  of  the  real  in  its  creative  or  vital 
tendency,  i.e.  spirit  and  life.  The  knowledge  of 
intellect  is  called  the  knowledge  of  common  sense 


238  PR.\GMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

or  of  science.  The  knowledge  of  intuition  is  called 
the  knowledge  of  Philosophy  or  of  Metaphysics. 
In  comparison  one  to  the  other,  Professor  Bergson 
holds  that  intuition,  i.e.  the  "fringe,"  is  "of  more 
importance  for  philosophy  than  the  nucleus,"  i.e. 
intellect,  which  "it  surrounds,"  for  its  "presence 
enables  us  to  affirm  that  the  nucleus  is  a  nucleus, 
that  pure  intellect  is  a  contraction,  by  condensation, 
of  a  more  extensive  power"  {ib.,  p.  46),  whereas 
intuition  is  this  wider  power  uncondensed.  Again, 
intuition  is  in  the  Order  of  Life,  represents  positive 
creative  action  and  leads  us  "to  the  very  inward- 
ness of  Hfe."  Intellect,  on  the  contrary,  is  in  the 
Inverse  Order,  represents  a  "letting  go,"  i.e.  a  re- 
laxation of  creative  action,  and  is  occupied  with 
external  views  of  things  only. 

Hence  the  basic  teaching  in  the  Theory  of  Knowl- 
edge is  found  in  the  twofold  order  which  sets  forth 
a  twofold  experience,  viz.  that  of  intellect,  i.e.  of 
thought  which  in  its  nature  is  feeling  condensed,  and 
that  of  intuition,  i.e.  of  instinct  purified,  which 
in  its  nature  is  feeling  vague  and  uncondensed.  With 
these  two  elements  furnished  by  the  twofold  experi- 
ence the  Theory  of  Knowledge  must  be  formulated. 
As  twofold  experience  gives  two  sources  of  knowl- 
edge opposite  and  complementary,  it  is  evident  that 
the  Theory  of  Knowledge  cannot  be  based  on  in- 
tellect alone.  For  the  intellect  gives  only  half  of 
the  real,  and  the  half  it  gives  is  the  real  viewed  as 
negative,  i.e.  as  relaxing.     The  intellect  is  a  "by- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION     239 

product"  of  evolution  and  therefore,  as  a  part, 
cannot  offer  a  knowledge  of  the  whole. 

Again,  intellect  cannot  reach  the  other  half  of 
the  real,  i.e.  fundamental  reaHty,  for  "it  is  charac- 
terized by  a  natural  inability  to  comprehend  Hfe," 
i.e.  "it  proceeds  mechanically"  {ib.,  p.  165).  "Life 
has  not  employed  all  the  psychical  potentialities 
it  possesses  in  producing  pure  understanding,  i.e. 
in  making  geometricians.  The  Kne  of  evolution 
that  ends  in  man  is  not  the  only  one.  In  other 
paths  divergent  from  it,  other  forms  of  conscious- 
ness have  been  developed,  which  express  something 
that  is  immanent  and  essential  in  the  evolutionary 
movement."  "If  these  were  brought  together  and 
amalgamated  with  intellect,  the  result  would  be  a 
consciousness  as  wide  as  life"  {ib.,  Intro.,  p.  xii). 
Hence  parallel  to  physics,  i.e.  intellectual  knowl- 
edge, "a  second  kind  of  knowledge  ought  to  have 
grown  up,  which  could  have  retained  what  physics 
allowed  to  escape"  (p.  342).  To  intellect  there- 
fore should  be  added  intuition. 

The  process  by  which  this  other  kind  of  knowl- 
edge is  acquired  is  somewhat  compHcated.  It  is, 
on  the  one  hand,  "developing  intuition"  and, 
on  the  other,  "expanding"  or  "transcending" 
intellect.  Professor  Bergson  tells  what  is  neces- 
sary: "If  in  evolving  in  the  direct  Hne  of  the  verte- 
brates in  general  and  of  man  in  particular,  life  has 
had  to  abandon  by  the  way  many  elements  in- 
compatible with  this  particular  mode  of  organiza- 


240  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

tion  and  consign  them  to  other  lines  of  development, 
it  is  the  totality  of  these  elements  that  man  must 
find  again  and  rejoin  to  the  intellect  proper  in  order 
to  grasp  the  true  nature  of  the  vital  principle." 
And  "we  shall  probably  be  aided  in  this  by  the 
fringe  of  vague  intuition"  (i.e.  the  unshrunken  part 
of  the  vital  principle)  "that  surrounds  our  distinct, 
i.e.  intellectual,  representations."  It  is  "there, 
accordingly,  that  we  must  look  for  hints  to  expand 
the  intellectual  form  of  our  thought;  from  there 
we  shall  derive  the  impetus  necessary  to  Uft  us 
above  ourselves"  {ib.,  p.  49).  In  particular,  we  can 
work  on  instinct,  for  instinct  is  sympathy,  and 
intuition  is  instinct  disinterested,  hence  "if  this 
sympathy  could  extend  its  object  and  also  reflect 
upon  itself,  it  would  give  us  the  key  to  vital  opera- 
tions —  just  as  intelhgence,  developed  and  dis- 
ciplined, guides  us  into  matter"  {ib.,  p.  176). 

But  Professor  Bergson  cannot  mean  distinct, 
specialized  instinct,  for  "instinct  retains  an  almost 
invariable  structure,  since  a  modification  of  it  in- 
volves a  modification  of  the  species,  is  therefore 
necessarily  specialized,  being  nothing  but  the  utili- 
zation of  a  specific  instrument  for  a  specific  object" 
{ib.,  p.  140).  So  he  must  refer  to  vague  instinct, 
but  he  forgets  to  tell  us  the  "object"  of  this  in- 
stinct, or  how  it  can  "reflect  upon  itself."  Therefore 
both  the  general  and  the  particular  methods  present 
as  the  ultimate  groundwork  of  the  process  "a 
vague  fringe"  around  the  intellect,  i.e.  around  our 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      241 

distinct  representations,  and  "a  vague  instinct." 
Now  these  are  not  different,  for  Professor  Bergson 
identifies  the  one  with  the  other  when  he  writes 
that  "the  intellect  is  the  luminous  nucleus,  around 
which  instinct,  even  enlarged  and  purified  into  in- 
tuition, forms  only  a  vague  nebulosity"  (ib.,  p.  177). 
And  as  "nebulosity"  means  what  is  "cloudy"  or 
"hazy"  or  "foggy,"  the  process  really  consists  in 
showing  how  to  pass  from  the  luminous  brightness 
of  intellect  to  a  state  of  cloudiness  or  haziness  or 
fog  represented  by  intuition.  No  wonder  we  read 
that  it  is  "an  infinitely  difficult  enterprise  and 
which  passes  the  powers  of  the  intellect  alone"  {ib., 
p.  207).  But  as  the  enterprise  is  not  only  possible 
but  even  necessary  for  the  Theory  of  Knowledge, 
and  as  Professor  Bergson  points  out  the  means, 
we  shall  briefly  set  them  forth. 

The  first  means  suggested  is  the  cultivation  of 
the  aesthetic  sense,  so  pronounced  in  the  artist  or 
the  poet.  As  a  result  we  shall  see  not  from  without 
and  for  practical  interests  but  from  within,  so  that 
reality  will  appear  as  a  continuous  creation  of 
unforeseeable  forms  {ib.,  p.  177). 

Another  means  is  the  cultivation  of  "sympathy." 
For  while  "knowledge  properly  so  called  is  reserved 
to  pure  inteUigence,"  yet  "intuition  will  suggest 
to  us  the  vague  feeHng,  if  nothing  more,  of  what 
must  take  the  place  of  intellectual  moulds."  "Then 
by  the  sympathetic  communication  which  it  estab- 
lishes between  us  and  the  rest  of  the  living,  by  the 


242  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

expansion    of    our    consciousness    which    it    brings 
about,  it  introduces  us  into  life's  own  domain,  which 
is  reciprocal  interpenetration,  endlessly  continued 
creation."     And  "though  I  hereby  transcend  in- 
tellect, it  is  from  intellect  that  has  come  the  push 
that  has  made  it  rise  to  the  point  it  has  reached. 
Without  intelHgence  it  would  have  remained  in  the 
form  of  instinct,  riveted  to  the  special  object  of 
its   practical  interest   and   turned   outward   by  it 
into  instruments  of  locomotion"  {ib.,  pp.  177,  178). 
Hence  in   "sympathy"   we  have   "the   feeling  of 
duration,"  which  is  "the  actual  coinciding  of  our- 
self  with  itself,"  and  by  this  feeHng  "we  get  back 
into  duration  and  so  transcend  intellect"  {ib.,  p. 
200),  for  "the  veil  between  consciousness  and  our- 
selves is  removed"  {ib.,  p.  272).    Thus  "sympathy" 
assumes  its  proper   place,  i.e.  "before  perception 
and  knowledge"  {ib.,  p.  174)-     But  Professor  Berg- 
son  has  said  that  "specialized  instinct"  cannot  be 
transformed   or   freed    from    its   object,  and    that 
intellect  is   "charged   with    matter"    and   created 
only  for    matter,  that  intellect  in  reality  has  no 
"push"  in  itself,  being  only  something  negative,  i.e. 
a  relaxation  of    consciousness.     Yet  here  intellect 
is    presented  as  pushing  instinct    into   a   broader 
life.  Again  intellect  and  instinct  represent  diverging 
and  opposite  tendencies,  and  how  can  one  push  the 
other? 

The  cultivating  of  sympathy  is  described  as  a 
"squeezing,"  for  we  read  that  "intellect  is  charged 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      243 

with  matter,  instinct  (i.e.  sympathy)  with  Kfe. 
We  must  squeeze  them  both  together  in  order  to 
get  the  double  essence  from  them"  (ib.,  p.  178), 
and  this  because  as  "the  nucleus  has  been  formed 
out  of  the  rest  by  condensation,  the  whole  must  be 
used,  the  fluid  as  well  as,  and  more  than,  the  con- 
densed in  order  to  grasp  the  inner  movement  of 
life"  {ib.,  p.  49)-       ^ 

But  to  squeeze  divergent  tendencies,  they  must 
be  brought  together,  and  for  this  Professor  Bergson 
advocates  more  violent  measures.  So  we  are 
told  that  we  must  awaken  "the  consciousness  that 
slumbers  in  instinct"  (ib.,  p.  165).  Strange  that  in- 
stinct, which  is  in  the  Order  of  Life,  should  fall  into 
such  a  profound  sleep!  We  might  have  supposed 
that  intellect  would  do  this  according  to  Professor 
Bergson's  principles,  but,  on  the  contrary,  intellect 
seems  to  be  very  wide  awake.  However,  we  are 
not  told  how  to  awaken  instinct.  Possibly  the 
**push"  of  the  intellect  does  this.  Secondly  we 
must  place  ourselves  within  the  vital  impetus; 
this  impetus  or  current  of  will  is  at  the  basis  of  our 
being,  but  we  seem  to  be  outside  of  it,  for  "we 
hardly  feel  it"  and  when  we  do  "we  only  grasp 
an  individual  and  fragmentary  will."  "To  get  it, 
we  must  put  back  our  being  into  our  will  and  our 
will  into  the  impulsion  it  prolongs,"  i.e.  the  "vis  a 
tergo.^^  Thus  "when  we  contract  our  whole  being 
in  order  to  thrust  it  forward,"  we  get  "the  con- 
sciousness of  becoming"  {ib.,  pp.  237,  239). 


244  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

The  great  obstacle  in  a  performance  of  this  kind 
is  the  intellect.  Life  in  general,  or  consciousness 
in  general,  is  will,  i.e.  the  vital  impetus,  but  intellec- 
tual consciousness  is  not  will,  but  thought.  And 
thought  is  consciousness  in  general  adapted  to 
matter.  Professor  Bergson  says  that  "conscious- 
ness in  man  is  pre-eminently  intellect,"  i.e. 
thought;  "it  might  have  been,  it  ought  to  have 
been,  also  intuition"  {ib.,  p.  267),  i.e.  will  or  feel- 
ing, but  it  is  not.  Now  how  can  thought  become 
will,  i.e.  how  can  human  consciousness,  which  is 
a  product  of  consciousness  in  general,  be  made 
to  coincide  with  its  principle?  This  can  be  done 
by  getting  it  away  from  matter,  i.e.  "by  making 
it  transcend  itself,"  and  this  is  possible  because 
"intellect  and  feehng  are  of  the  same  nature."  So 
we  read,  "in  order  that  our  consciousness  should 
coincide  with  something  of  its  principle,  it  must 
detach  itself  from  the  ready-made  and  attach  itself 
to  the  being-made.  It  needs  that,  turning  back  on 
itself  and  twisting  on  itself,  the  faculty  of  seeing 
should  be  made  to  be  one  with  the  act  of  willing  — 
a  painful  effort  which  we  can  make  suddenly,  doing 
violence  to  our  nature,  but  cannot  sustain  more 
than  a  few  moments"  {ib.,  p.  237). 

Thus  in  transcending  intellect,  i.e.  getting  it  out 
of  matter,  we  also  expand  intellect,  i.e.  make  it 
coincide  with  something  of  its  principle.  The  ideal 
state  implies  a  complete  expansion  which  would 
give  "a  consciousness  as  wide  as  life."     This  is 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      245 

obtained  by  amalgamation,  for  "if  the  other  forms 
of  consciousness,"  developed  on  other  paths  diverg- 
ing from  the  Kne  of  evolution  ending  in  man,  "were 
brought  together  and  amalgamated  with  the  intel- 
lect, the  result  would  be  a  consciousness  as  wide 
as  life.  Such  a  consciousness,  turning  around 
suddenly  against  the  push  of  life  it  feels  behind, 
would  have  a  fleeting  vision  of  life  complete" 
{ib.,  Intro.,  p.  xii). 

The  difficulty  for  the  reader  in  this  explanation 
is  to  locate  the  "push."  On  the  original  hypothesis 
the  "push"  is  the  vital  impetus,  and  is  not  so 
"tremendous"  after  all,  for  it  becomes  atrophied 
and  goes  to  sleep,  e.g.  in  instinct.  Also  this  push 
comes  from  behind,  for  it  is  a  "m  a  tergo.''  Also 
the  intellect  is  described  as  having  "its  eyes  ever 
turned  to  the  rear,"  therefore  it  ought  to  see  some- 
thing of  the  "push,"  for  while  in  its  own  nature 
it  is  a  relaxation  or  "letting  go"  {ib.,  p.  161),  yet  as 
a  matter  of  fact  we  are  told  that  "the  relaxation 
is  never  complete."  Strange  to  say,  the  intellect 
does  not  see  the  push.  The  result  of  the  amal- 
gamation of  other  forms  of  consciousness  with  in- 
tellect turns  the  intellect  around  in  the  direction 
of  life.  In  this  position  of  looking  forward,  intel- 
lect cannot  see  the  "push,"  which  on  hypothesis 
comes  from  behind.  So  it  must  turn  around  again 
and  is  rewarded  with  "a  fleeting  vision." 

Professor  Bergson  calls  the  "amalgamation"  a 
"mixture,"  for,  when  explaining  the  nature  of  re- 


246  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

flex  and  voluntary  actions,  he  says  we  must  mix 
both  so  as  to  get  ''the  fluid  reality  which  has  been 
precipitated  in  this  twofold  form  and  which  prob- 
ably shares  in  both  without  being  either"  and  this 
fluid  is  found  in  the  "undifferentiated  protoplasmic 
mass"  and  is  "the  original  simple  activity,"  but 
"became  diversified  through  the  very  construction 
of  mechanisms  like  those  of  the  spinal  cord  and 
the  brain"  {ib.,  p.  366). 

While  the  hints  for  expanding  intellect  come  from 
"the  vague  fringe,"  yet  Professor  Bergson  says  that 
"the  intellect  possesses  a  means  by  which  it  can 
transcend  itself,"  viz.  its  formal  knowledge,  for 
"a  form,  because  empty,  may  be  filled  with  'any 
number  of  things  in  turn."  But  the  intellect  gives 
us  only  abstract  knowledge,  i.e.  snapshot  views  of 
duration,  whereas  intuition  gives  us  concrete  knowl- 
edge, i.e.  of  the  real  or  duration  itself.  The  intel- 
lect by  its  nature  is  incapable  of  grasping  the  real, 
i.e.  duration,  and  the  filling  of  the  forms  will  only 
give  "snapshot  views."  No  manipulation  of  ab- 
stract forms  filled  with  abstract  knowledge,  i.e. 
"events  detached  from  the  living  whole"  {ib., 
p.  342),  will  enable  us  to  pass  from  the  ab- 
stract to  the  concrete,  as  is  Professor  Bergson's 
aim,  when  no  element  of  the  concrete,  i.e.  dura- 
tion, by  hypothesis  enters  into  this  abstract 
knowledge. 

The  result  of  the  process  is,  from  Professor 
Bergson's  point  of  view,  twofold.     First  we  have 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      247 

the  true  reconciliation  of  Science  and  Philosophy, 
inasmuch  as  Philosophy  or  Metaphysics  is  pre- 
sented as  "the  true  continuation  of  science"  {ib.,  p. 
371).  Science,  the  work  of  intellect,  deahng  with 
the  surface  of  things  and  engrossed  with  practical 
results,  directs  our  action  on  things,  i.e.  gives  a 
workable  knowledge  useful  for  the  actual  needs  of 
practical  Ufe.  Philosophy,  calhng  upon  intellect 
"to  renounce  its  most  cherished  habits"  and 
"certain  natural  aspirations,"  seizes  "the  vague 
fleeting  intuitions,  in  order  to  sustain,  expand  and 
unite  them  together."  The  knowledge  it  gives 
"is  practically  useless,"  it  "will  not  extend  our 
empire  over  nature,"  but  it  possesses  "reahty 
itself"  {ib.,  pp.  342,  343).  The  second  result  is  that 
Philosophy,  in  grasping  what  is  below  the  surface 
of  things,  enables  us  to  judge  the  value  of  intel- 
lectual knowledge,  and  in  expanding  intellect  into 
a  consciousness  as  wide  as  life,  becomes  "an  effort 
to  dissolve  again  into  the  whole"  {ib., -p.  igi),  which 
is  Duration,  "the  unceasing  creation  of  new  and 
unforeseeable  forms"  {ib.,  p.  239). 

III.   Criticism 

In  criticising  the  theory  of  Knowledge  set  forth  in 
Creative  Evolution  we  premise  by  observing  that, 
although  Professor  Bergson  writes  philosophy  in 
the  French  language,  yet  he  is  not  a  French  phi- 
losopher.    The  characteristic  trait  of   the  French 


248  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

mind  is  clearness  of  thought  and  lucidity  of  expres- 
sion. 

Creative  Evolution  includes  "a,  certain  concep- 
tion of  knowledge,  also  a  certain  metaphysics, 
both  of  which  imply  each  other"  {ib.,  p.  185).  Now 
the  metaphysics,  i.e.  the  theory  of  Life,  is  radically 
erroneous,  and  as  this  is  the  basis  of  the  theory  of 
Knowledge,  the  latter  falls  with  the  former. 

In  the  theory  of  Knowledge  ''science  and  meta- 
physics are  two  opposed  but  complementary  ways 
of  Knowing"  {ib.,  p.  344)  in  the  sense  that  ''each  of 
these  two  lines  of  thought  leads  to  the  other;  they 
form  a  circle  and  there  can  be  no  centre  to  the 
circle  but  the  empirical  study  of  evolution"  {ib.,  p. 
179).  But  the  evolution  described  is  fundamentally 
erroneous.  Therefore  there  is  no  centre  to  the 
circle  and  consequently  no  circle.  Besides,  the 
knowledge  which  intellect  and  science  possess  is 
an  abstract  artificial  mechanical  construction  of 
reahty.  On  hypothesis  they  do  not  grasp  reality 
itself,  i.e.  Duration.  Intuition  alone  is  supposed 
to  reach  reality  and  the  knowledge  of  intuition 
consists  in  "vague  fleeting  visions"  of  a  vague 
feeling.  But  this  is  Sceptical  Idealism  with  a 
vague  feeling  as  the  only  avenue  of  escape. 

This  conclusion  is  strengthened  when  we  bear 
in  mind  that  the  working-hypothesis,  so  dear  to 
Pragmatists,  is  extended  by  Professor  Bergson  to 
include  not  only  the  operations  of  the  intellect  but 
the  very  nature  and  construction  of  the  intellect. 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      249 

So  intellectual  knowledge  by  its  very  nature  is 
abstract,  artificial  and  hypothetical.  In  fact  Pro- 
fessor Bergson  admits  that  "our  habitual  manner  of 
speaking,  which  is  fashioned  after  our  habitual 
manner  of  thinking,  leads  us  to  actual  logical 
deadlocks.  But,"  he  adds,  "we  are  not  anxious 
because  we  feel  confusedly  that  we  can  always  get 
out  of  them:  all  we  have  to  do  is  to  give  up  the 
cinematographical  habits  of  our  intellect"  or  "re- 
vise the  bent  of  our  intellectual  habits"  or  "make 
complete  abstraction  of  the  mechanism,"  i.e. 
change  the  nature  of  the  intellect  by  "abstraction" 
or  by  "installing  yourself  within  change"  {ih.,  pp. 
308,  314).  But  this  is  easier  said  than  done  as 
the  reader  understands  upon  recalling  the  means 
proposed  to  transcend  the  intellect. 

Furthermore  in  defining  the  intellect  as  a  mech- 
anism and  in  describing  its  working  by  the  mechan- 
ism of  moving  pictures  Professor  Bergson  reveals 
the  basic  error  in  his  theory  of  Knowledge,  i.e.  he 
confounds  intellect  with  imagination.  A  classic 
illustration  in  Scholastic  Philosophy  is  to  compare 
the  imagination  to  a  canvas  on  which  the  impres- 
sions of  the  senses  and  the  ideas  of  the  intellect 
are  pictured.  But  the  picturing  canvas  is  not  all 
there  is  to  the  mental  operation.  Together  with 
the  pictures  is  the  eye  of  the  intellect  which  sees, 
criticises,  analyzes,  compares  and  reasons  on  them. 
So  Professor  Bergson  omits  the  most  important 
element,  viz.  the  intellect,  without  which,  in  fact, 


250  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

he  could  not  see  the  pictures.  Thus,  whereas  the 
imagination  is  compared  to  the  pictures,  the  intel- 
lect is  compared  to  the  audience.  Therefore, 
according  to  Professor  Bergson,  we  have  on  suppo- 
sition a  moving  picture  show,  but  no  one  present 
to  say  whether  the  movies  are  there  or  not,  and  no 
one  to  tell  what  the  pictures  were,  not  even  an 
operator,  for  he  expressly  teaches  "there  are  no 
things,  only  tendencies"  and  things  are  artificial 
"cut-outs"  from  Duration,  so  the  operator  would 
be,  in  his  hypothesis,  a  part  of  the  moving  pictures, 
not  distinct  from  them. 

Finally,  Professor  Bergson  confounds  intellect 
with  imagination,  because  he  confounds  the  image 
with  the  idea.  Thus  he  says  that  "the  idea  is 
the  stable  view  taken  of  the  instability  of  things" 
and  is  the  "quality"  or  "form,"  "which  is  a  moment 
of  becoming,"  or  "the  intention,  which  is  nothing 
else  than  the  material  design,  traced  out  and  con- 
templated beforehand,  of  the  action  accomplished," 
or  "the  essence,  which  is  the  mean  form  (i.e. 
image)  above  and  below  which  the  other  forms 
are  arranged  as  alterations  of  the  mean."  These 
ideas  or  images  are  "cut  out  of  duration,  pure 
abstractions  of  the  moving  reality,  snapshots 
taken  at  intervals  of  the  flowing,  relative  to  the 
mind  that  takes  them,  and  have  no  independent 
existence."  "These  forms  the  mind  isolates  and 
stores  up  in  concepts;  their  intellectual  equivalent 
is  artificial   and   symbolical"    {ib.,    pp.   315,   317). 


PRAGMATISM  AND   CREATIVE  EVOLUTION      251 

Hence  in  representing  the  idea  as  a  detached  image 
of  a  moving  reality,  i.e.  Duration,  Professor  Berg- 
son  naturally  appealed  to  the  cinematograph  as  the 
best  illustration  of  the  nature  and  operation  of  the 
intellect.  Therefore,  in  the  last  analysis  Creative 
Evoluton  is  based  on  an  erroneous  conception  of 
the  idea,  the  most  fundamental  and  apparently  the 
simplest  element  in  mental  life. 


CHAPTER   XII 

PRAGMATISM   AND    SCHOLASTIC   PHILOSOPHY 

The  preceding  studies  of  Pragmatism  as  set 
forth  and  developed  along  various  lines  by  its 
principal  exponents,  show  clearly  that  the  constit- 
uent elements  of  the  system  are  Idealism,  Evolution 
and  a  Theory  of  Mental  Life.  Idealism  is  the  basic 
element;  Evolution  is  the  integrating  element  and 
the  Mental  Theory  may  be  called  the  formative 
element  inasmuch  as  it  gives  to  Pragmatism  a 
peculiar  form  and  character.  These  three  prob- 
lems, therefore,  present  a  well-defined  issue  to 
point  out  the  attitude  of  Scholasticism  toward  the 
latest  modern  school  of  philosophic  thought. 

I.   Perception  of  External  Things 

Some  forms  of  Pragmatism,  e.g.  the  systems  elab- 
orated by  Professor  Royce  and  Professor  Bergson, 
teach  a  Pantheistic  Idealism  of  Manifestation. 
But  this  Idealism  is  a  part  of  their  peculiar  meta- 
physics and  cannot  be  regarded  as  characteristic 
of  Pragmatism  properly  so  called. 

The  Idealism  which  is  distinctive  of  the  system 
itself  and  which  forms  the  basic  element  common 
to  all  of  its  exponents,  including  Professor  Royce 


PRAGMATISM  AND   SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  253 

and  Professor  Bergson,  is  the  Idealism  which  is  con- 
nected with  the  perception  of  external  things.  This 
Idealism  is  called  the  Phenomenal  Idealism  of 
Sensism  or  Mediate  Perception.  Thus  Pragmatism 
teaches  that  the  perception  of  external  things  is 
not  the  perception  of  the  things  themselves,  but  the 
perception  of  our  ideas  of  the  things  or  the  percep- 
tion of  our  feelings  about  things,  so  that,  to  reach 
the  things,  reasoning  or  induction  is  required. 
Hence  thought  is  concerned  directly  and  primarily 
with  modifications  or  sensations  purely  subjective. 
The  result  is  a  Sense-Idealism.  And  as  these 
sensations  are  viewed  as  means  by  which  through 
reasoning  we  attain  the  knowledge  of  things,  we 
have  Mediate  or  Indirect  Perception.  In  the  last 
analysis  this  doctrine  is  a  form  or  rather  the  fun- 
damental principle  of  Agnosticism,  for  external 
things  are  really  the  unknown  cause  of  our  sensa- 
tions and  the  ego  is  the  unknown  recipient,  for 
Pragmatism  does  not  admit  a  soul  and  regards  the 
ego  as  the  resultant  of  our  activities  or  as  present 
knowledge  personified. 

On  this  point  the  issue  between  Scholastic  Phi- 
losophy and  Pragmatism  is  clear  and  marked. 
Scholastic  Philosophy  rejects  Mediate  Perception 
as  a  fundamental  psychological  error,  and  main- 
tains the  doctrine  of  Immediate  Perception,  i.e. 
we  directly  and  immediately  know  existing  things 
themselves.  This  doctrine  of  the  Immediate  Percep- 
tion of  bodies  by  the  external  senses  is  a  primitive 


254  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

fact  clearly  attested  by  consciousness,  confirmed  by 
common  teaching  embodying  the  experience  of  the 
whole  human  race,  viz.  that  we  see  with  the  eyes, 
hear  with  the  ears,  touch  with  the  hands,  taste 
with  the  tongue  and  palate,  smell  with  the  nose, 
and  that  what  we  see,  hear,  etc.  are  things  inde- 
pendent of  us  in  their  existence  and  activities. 
This  primitive  fact  and  the  Scholastic  theory  based 
upon  it  are  simple  and  natural,  not  forced  or 
artificial. 

Scholastic  Philosophy  holds  that,  for  the  per- 
ception of  external  objects,  three  conditions  are 
necessary:  a  subject  perceiving,  which  it  teaches  is 
not  the  soul  only,  nor  the  sense-organ  only,  but  the 
animated  organ  or  organism,  i.e.  the  conscious 
living  human  being,  an  object  perceived  and  a  con- 
tact or  union  of  the  subject  and  object.  This 
contact  or  union  consists  in  the  action  of  the  object 
on   the   sense-organ. 

The  most  elementary  psychological  observation 
tells  us  that  we  are  in  incessant  contact  with 
external  agents  of  nature  which  in  their  impres- 
sions upon  us  make  us  aware  of  their  actions  and 
of  themselves.  Sometimes  these  agents  which 
come  into  contact  with  us  are  the  external  bodies 
themselves,  as  e.g.  in  the  sense  of  touch.  In  the 
other  senses  we  grasp  the  vibrations  of  the  air  or 
ether  resulting  from  the  actions  of  the  bodies.  In 
both  cases  we  directly  and  immediately  perceive 
objects  and  their  activities  external  to  us.     There 


PRAGMATISM  AND   SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  255 

is  no  intermediary  between  the  external  object  and 
the  sense-organ  other  than  the  action  of  the  exter- 
nal object  upon  the  organ  of  sense.  In  this  action 
the  contact  consists  and  is  described  as  a  union  of 
the  object  perceived  with  the  subject  perceiving. 

St.  Thomas  Aquinas  explains  this  contact  or 
union  by  the  famiHar  illustration  of  a  seal  ring 
impressed  in  wax.  The  act  of  impressing  the  ring 
in  the  wax  leaves  upon  the  wax  the  impressed 
likeness  of  the  ring.  In  like  manner  the  contact 
of  the  object  with  the  organ  leaves  an  impressed 
likeness  of  the  object  upon  the  organ  according  to 
the  specific  nature  of  the  organ,  whether  it  be  sight, 
hearing,  smell,  taste  or  touch.  This  impressed 
likeness  is  called  the  species  impressa.  The  result 
of  the  impression  is  the  conscious  reaction  of  the 
sense-organ  to  the  object  or  agent  making  the 
impression.  This  conscious  reaction  is  the  percep- 
tion of  the  object,  just  as  the  wax,  if  conscious, 
would  react  to  the  impression  of  the  ring  and  so 
would  perceive  the  ring  making  the  impression 
upon  itself.  The  sentient  subject  perceives  the 
object  therefore,  and  in  so  doing,  expresses  in  the 
imagination  a  likeness  of  the  object  perceived. 
The  conscious  expressed  likeness  of  the  object 
perceived  made  by  and  in  the  reaction  of  the  sen- 
tient subject  to  the  impression  is  called  the  species 
expressa,  i.e.  the  expressed  likeness  of  the  object 
perceived,  or  the  image  of  the  object.  Hence  the 
species  impressa,  i.e.  the  impressed  likeness  of  the 


256  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

object  on  the  organ  of  sense,  is  not  what  is  per- 
ceived in  the  act  of  sense  cognition,  but  is  the 
disposing  or  determining  cause  by  which  the  organ 
is  placed  in  sentient  contact  or  union  with  the 
object  perceived.  For  example,  in  the  case  of 
sight  the  sentient  contact  of  the  organ  with  the 
object  is  effected  by  and  in  the  impressed  likeness 
of  the  object  upon  the  retina,  so  that  an  eye  without 
the  retina  could  not  see  the  object  because  it  could 
not  be  placed  in  the  sentient  contact  with  the  object 
which  is  necessary  for  the  sense  of  sight.  But  the 
particular  impressed  likeness  is  not  what  we  see; 
it  is  in  itself  a  quaHtative  modification  of  the  retina 
and  as  such  is  the  cause  which  disposes  or  deter- 
mines the  eye  to  the  act  of  seeing,  and  what  we  see 
is  the  object  or  agent  making  the  impression.  As 
a  necessary  modification  determining  the  organ  to 
the  act,  e.g.  of  seeing,  the  species  impressa  co- 
operates with  the  organ  antecedently  to  the  act 
itself  and  so  cannot  be  considered  as  an  inter- 
mediary between  the  act  and  the  object.  Like- 
wise the  species  expressa  or  the  expressed  image 
of  the  object  is  not  what  is  perceived  nor  is  it  an 
intermediary  between  the  organ  and  the  object, 
for  it  is  the  result  of  the  whole  process,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  the  expressed  likeness  of  the  perception  itself 
and  thus  follows  on  the  perception. 

From  the  illustrations  of  the  impression  on  the 
retina  and  of  the  action  of  the  ring  on  the  wax  it  is 
clear  that  the  impression  of  the  ring  on  the  wax  or 


PRAGMATISM  AND   SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  257 

of  the  object  on  the  retina,  i.e.  the  species  impressa, 
is  the  one  same  individual  act  with  the  reception 
of  the  impression.  It  is  the  same  indivisible  act 
which  the  one  gives  and  the  other  receives.  The 
act  therefore  is  common  to  both;  the  giving  and 
receiving  is  the  same  act  having  different  relations, 
i.e.  to  the  agent  and  to  the  recipient.  As  the  act 
of  sensation  is  a  conscious  act,  consciousness  grasps 
the  twofold  element  of  the  not-me  and  the  me  in 
the  one  indivisible  act:  of  the  not-me  as  something 
from  without  producing  the  impression  and  of  the 
me  as  receiving  the  impression.  It  thus  perceives 
the  not-me  and  the  me  as  distinct  and  exclusive  one 
of  the  other.  Thus  e.g.  I  touch  an  object  which 
resists;  in  this  one  indivisible  act  I  am  in  contact 
with  or  united  to  the  object;  in  the  tactile  percep- 
tion, I  am  immediately  conscious  of  the  not-me 
and  the  me  known  together  and  known  in  mutual 
opposition;  I  am  conscious  of  two  existences  by 
the  same  indivisible  intuition.  Thus  consciousness 
gives,  as  an  ultimate  fact,  a  primitive  duality,  an 
original  antithesis.  Hence  in  every  act  of  sensation 
we  have  a  twofold  knowledge,  external,  i.e.  of  the 
not-m^,  and  internal  and  subjective,  i.e.  of  the  me. 
Now  the  sentient  organ  is  in  its  nature  indetermi- 
nate, i.e.  it  cannot  determine  itself  by  itself  to  per- 
ceive this  or  that  object.  The  determination  which 
disposes  it  to  the  act  of  perception  comes  from  the 
action  upon  it  of  the  external  object.  Hence  the 
sentient  subject  is  conscious  primarily  of  the  ob- 


258  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

ject  impressing  it,  i.e.  of  the  external  knowledge. 
Herbert  Spencer  admits  this  fact,  for  he  teaches  that 
the  external  knowledge  precedes  the  internal  knowl- 
edge of  our  sensations  {Psychology,^  II,  p.  369). 
Hence  the  world  is  not  the  unknown  cause  of  our 
sensations,  nor  are  our  sensations  confined  to  internal 
subjective  ideas,  feelings  or  states.  Sense-perception 
consists  in  the  operations  of  external  bodies  on  the 
sense-organs.  These  bodies  acting  upon  us  we 
directly  and  immediately  perceive. 

The  error  of  Pragmatism  is  that  it  neglects  the 
distinction  between  the  external  knowledge,  i.e. 
of  the  object  impressing  us,  and  the  internal  knowl- 
edge, i.e.  of  the  subject  modified;  or  rather  it  denies 
the  former,  and  holds  the  latter  to  be  the  only 
knowledge.  Yet  the  distinction  is  experimental. 
The  external  knowledge  is  representative ;  the  in- 
ternal is  affective.  The  former  is  prior  to  the  latter. 
Again  their  objects  are  different :  the  internal  knowl- 
edge consists  in  noting  the  subjective  modifications 
of  the  me,  i.e.  the  effect  of  the  action  on  me;  the 
external  knowledge  embraces  the  extended,  lumi- 
nous actions  which  have  modified  the  me,  i.e.  the 
cause  or  agent  of  the  subjective  feehngs.  Besides, 
they  accompany  or  succeed  each  other  in  inverse 
ratio;  one  gains  in  strength  and  precision  what 
the  other  loses,  i.e.  the  stronger  the  organic  im- 
pression, the  more  obscure  is  the  external  perception 
and  vice  versa,  as,  e.g.  a  fight  too  brilKant  prevents 
1  Ed.,  N.Y.,  1877. 


PRAGMATISM  AND   SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  259 

me  from  seeing  the  object  and  causes  pain  to  the 
eyes. 

Furthermore,  in  the  normal  act  of  sense-percep- 
tion it  is  the  determining  cause  or  external  agent 
which  we  primarily  and  directly  grasp.  Pragma- 
tism holds  that  we  primarily  and  directly  perceive 
the  subjective  element,  that  we  ought  to  project 
these  subjective  feelings  without  us  and  then  cor- 
rect them  by  reasoning.  But,  in  fact,  this  never 
takes  place  and  besides  is  clearly  impossible. 
Finally,  the  same  external  cause  can  produce  dif- 
ferent effects,  e.g.  pain  or  pleasure,  and  in  very 
variable  degrees  according  to  temperament,  habits 
and  dispositions. 

Thus  the  objective  element  is  clearly  grasped 
and  distinguished  from  the  subjective  element, 
as  elementary  consciousness  testifies.  Therefore, 
Scholastic  Philosophy  holds  that  the  world  is  not 
the  unknown  cause  of  our  sensation,  that  what  we 
perceive  in  the  act  of  sense-perception  is  not  the 
subjective  feeling  only,  but  primarily  the  external 
bodies  acting  upon  our  sense-organs;  and  in  this 
teaching  confirms  the  knowledge  of  common-sense 
as  well  as  furnishes  a  sure  basis  for  the  edifice  of 
the  experimental  sciences. 

II.  Evolution 

The  integrating  element  of  Pragmatism  is  Evolu- 
tion.   This  element  is  essential  to  all  its  forms,  but 


26o  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

takes  on  local  color  from  the  subject-matter  and 
special  aim  of  the  writers.  As  regards  Evolution, 
Scholastic  Philosophy  is  at  direct  issue  with  Prag- 
matism. 

First  of  all,  Scholastic  Philosophy  teaches  that 
Evolution  is  based  upon  a  simple  fact  of  ordinary 
daily  experience,  viz.  the  fact  of  growth.  It  teaches 
that  growth  is  a  law  of  Hfe;  that  every  living  being, 
inasmuch  as  it  lives,  grows.  Jesus  refers  to  this  law 
in  the  Gospels,  e.g.  the  parable  of  the  sower;  a 
classic  phrase  in  Christian  asceticism  is  "growth  in 
holiness";  and  Cardinal  Newman  in  the  Essay  on 
Development  of  Doctrine  applies  the  law  to  the 
teachings  of  the  Christian  reHgion.  But  living 
beings  do  not  grow  in  the  same  way;  their  specific 
nature  influences  their  development,  as  ordinary 
experience  shows.  The  study  of  the  nature  and  de- 
velopment of  Hving  beings  in  the  world  around  us 
is  the  special  object  of  the  Natural  Sciences.  Thus 
Botany  deals  with  the  laws  which  govern  the  de- 
velopment of  plant-life.  These  laws  differ  from  the 
laws  which  guide  the  growth  of  the  human  body, 
as  set  forth  in  Physiology,  and  these  in  turn  differ 
from  the  laws  of  mental  development,  whose  special 
object  is  Psychology.  Now  Evolution  is  not  con- 
cerned with  the  laws  of  growth  as  observed  in  the 
individual  or  in  individuals  of  the  same  species. 
It  goes  much  farther  and  strives  to  show  the  origin 
of  species  by  maintaining  that  species  grow  out  of 
or  develop  from  other  species,  which  in  turn  de- 


PRAGMATISM  AND   SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  261 

velop  from  others  until  we  reach  the  beginnings 
of  life.  As  such,  Evolution  appears  in  a  twofold 
form:  a  scientific  hypothesis  and  a  philosophical 
speculation. 

As  a  scientific  hypothesis,  Evolution  investigates 
the  genetic  relations  of  systematic  species,  genera 
and  families  and  endeavors  to  arrange  them  accord- 
ing to  natural  series  of  descent.  It  strives  to  prove 
the  descent  of  present  from  extinct  species  and  thus 
is  opposed  to  the  constancy  or  immutability  of 
species.  It  is  not  concerned  with  the  origin  of  life, 
nor  with  the  act  of  creation.  The  attitude  which 
Scholastic  philosophers  hold  to  scientific  Evolu- 
tion is  twofold:  as  to  principle  and  as  to  fact. 

As  to  the  principle,  Scholastic  Philosophy  teaches 
that  ultimately  all  organisms  owe  their  existence 
to  the  Creator,  as  is  set  forth  in  the  Biblical  account 
of  creation,  that  the  concrete  how  does  not  enter 
into  the  proposition  of  faith  regarding  creation, 
with  the  exception  of  the  human  soul  which,  being 
spiritual  in  its  nature,  cannot  be  transmitted 
through  matter,  but  requires  the  creative  act. 
Since,  therefore,  there  is  no  objection,  as  far  as 
Catholic  faith  is  concerned,  to  assuming  the  descent 
of  all  plant  and  animal  species  from  a  few  original 
forms,  the  question  resolves  itself  into  one  of  fact. 

As  to  fact,  Scholastic  writers  hold  that  the  scien- 
tific hypothesis  of  Evolution  is  still  only  a  hypothe- 
sis. By  the  scientific  hypothesis  is  here  understood 
the  general  theory  regarding  the  fact  of  Evolution 


262  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

as  distinguished  from  the  special  theories  advanced 
to  explain  the  general  fact  of  Evolution  by  an  appeal 
to  special  causes,  e.g.  natural  selection,  environ- 
ment. The  Darwinian  explanation  is  rejected  by- 
scientists,  for  its  principle  of  natural  selection  is 
considered  scientifically  inadequate,  and  its  teach- 
ing of  indefinite  variability  or  plasticity  of  forms  is 
contrary  to  observed  facts,  which  in  general  show 
that  both  in  Hving  nature  and  in  geological  strata 
there  exist  types  sharply  determined  from  one 
another.  There  is  no  evidence  whatever  for  the 
common  genetic  descent  of  all  animals  and  plants 
from  a  single  primitive  organism.  The  greater  num- 
ber of  botanists  and  zoologists  regard  a  polygenetic 
evolution  as  much  more  acceptable  than  a  mono- 
genetic.  It  is  the  task  of  the  future  to  determine 
the  distinct  and  independent  genetic  series.  Paleon- 
tology knows  nothing  of  common  primeval  forms 
but  points  to  parallel  series  whose  origin  is  un- 
known; has  no  evidence  in  favor  of  spontaneous 
awakening  of  life  and  of  the  ascending  development 
out  of  primitive  protoplasmic  masses  up  to  the  Cam- 
brian era;  is  silent  about  successive  developments 
anteceding  the  rich  specific  fauna  of  the  Cambrian, 
and  the  flora  of  the  Post-Silurian  eras;  gives  no  proof 
in  a  concrete  case  for  the  gradual  transformation 
of  one  species  into  another;  regards  the  genesis  of 
angiosperms  and  of  vertebrates  as  an  insoluble 
problem;  gives  no  information  about  the  early  his- 
tory of  mammals;  presents  the  genealogy  of  the 


PRAGMATISM  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  263 

horse,  considered  the  most  striking  example  of  an 
evolutionary  series  within  a  mammalian  family 
as  scarcely  more  than  a  very  moderately  supported 
hypothesis;  and  knows  of  no  records  that  point  to 
the  relationship  between  the  body  of  man  and  that 
of  the  anthropoid. 

In  like  manner  the  study  of  existing  organisms 
has,  up  to  the  present,  given  no  confirmation  of  the 
central  idea  in  modern  Evolution  theories,  viz.  pro- 
gressive specific  development.  E.  Wasmann  holds 
that  the  formation  of  new  species  is  directly  ob- 
served in  but  a  few  cases  and  onjy  with  reference 
to  such  forms  as  are  closely  related  to  each  other, 
e.g.  in  the  plant-genus  (Enothera  and  in  the  beetle- 
genus  Dinarda,  but  Muckermann  denies  that  these 
variations  are  examples  of  the  formation  of  new 
specific  characters.  It  is  true  that  there  are  num- 
berless analogies  between  plants  and  animals,  e.g. 
the  cell-division,  the  method  of  fertilization  and 
other  analogies  of  structure  and  function,  but  no 
serious  scientist  would  ever  dream  of  explaining 
these  by  a  common  origin.  On  the  failure  to  con- 
firm progressive  specific  development  is  based  the 
saltatory  theory  proposed  by  De  Vries  in  accord 
with  the  investigations  of  Abbot  Mendel.  In  fact, 
Mendel's  Law  is  the  only  fact  of  scientific  value 
in  modern  Biology.  On  this  law  the  scientific 
hypothesis  of  Evolution  now  rests  and  looks  to 
the  future  for  more  complete  and  systematic  de- 
velopment. 


264  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

As  a  philosophical  speculation,  Evolution  is  not 
confined  to  the  genetic  history  of  plants  and  ani- 
mals upon  our  earth  but  is  extended  to  embrace 
the  history  of  the  solar  system  and  of  the  universe. 
Thus  it  considers  the  entire  history  of  the  cosmos 
as  a  harmonious  development  brought  about  by 
natural  laws.  Philosophical  Evolution  appears 
in  two  principal  forms:  Anti-Theistic  and  Theistic. 
Scholastic  Philosophy  rejects  Anti-Theistic  Evolu- 
tion, because  the  theory  in  this  form  cannot  account 
for  the  first  beginning  nor  for  the  law  of  its  evolu- 
tion, since  it  denies  a  Personal  Creator  andLawgiver; 
again  it  supposes  spontaneous  generation,  which 
contradicts  the  facts  of  scientific  experimentation, 
and  is  built  upon  baseless  assumptions.  The  fore- 
most defender  of  Anti-Theistic  Evolution  is  Ernst 
Haeckel.  But  his  system  rests  on  unfounded  gen- 
eraUties,  is  constructed  on  unscientific  methods, 
e.g.  frauds,  want  of  distinction  between  fact  and 
hypothesis,  neglect  to  correct  wrong  statements, 
disregard  of  facts  not  agreeing  with  his  a  priori 
conceptions,  ignorance  of  history,  physics  and 
modern  Biology,  the  use  of  ridicule  when  sound 
arguments  fail,  and  consequently  it  abounds  in 
numerous  errors  of  every  kind. 

The  attitude  of  Scholastic  philosophers  towards 
Theistic  Evolution  is  twofold:  as  to  fact  and  as  to 
principle.  As  to  fact,  Scholastic  Philosophy  seeks 
in  the  Natural  Sciences  for  the  laws  which  govern 
the  development  of  the  universe.    As  to  principle  it 


PRAGMATISM  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  265 

is  not  opposed  to  the  Theistic  conception.  For  the 
principle  which  guides  Scholastic  Philosophy  in  the 
interpretation  of  nature  is  threefold:  (a)  All  things 
in  their  existence  and  nature  are  referred  to  God 
as  to  their  principle  and  ultimate  cause.  "In  the 
beginning  God  created  heaven  and  earth"  (Gen.  i). 
(b)  Created  things  in  relation  to  God  are  termed 
secondary  causes,  yet  they  possess  true  causal 
efficiency  in  virtue  of  their  own  proper  nature,  and 
in  proportion  to  the  exercise  of  their  true  causal 
activities  the  order  and  harmony  immanent  in 
nature  unfolds  before  our  eyes.  Thus  St.  Augus- 
tine writes,  "God  governs  all  things  which  He  has 
created  in  such  a  way  that  He  permits  them  to 
exercise  and  develop  their  own  proper  activities" 
{The  City  of  God,  VII,  c.  30).  And  St.  Thomas 
says,  "The  more  potent  the  cause  is,  the  more  po- 
tent is  its  efhciency  in  the  sense  that  its  potency 
is  extended  to  produce  more  effects"  {Of  God  and 
His  Creatures,  tr.  by  Father  Rickaby,  S.J.,  II,  c. 
16),  and  "since  therefore  the  efficiency  of  divine 
providence  is  the  very  greatest,  it  ought  to  extend  its 
activity  through  certain  means  so  as  to  reach  the 
most  remote  things"  {ib.,  Ill,  c.  77).  (c)  As  a  cor- 
ollary Suarez  expresses  the  principle,  "God  does 
not  interfere  directly  with  the  natural  order,  where 
secondary  causes  suffice  to  produce  the  intended 
effect"  {De  opere  sex  dierum,  II,  c.  x,  n.  13).  Thus 
the  power  and  wisdom  of  God  is  not  lessened,  but 
is  rather  enhanced  in  the  production  of  the  universe 


266  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

by  a  single  creative  act  of  His  will  and  in  its  natural 
development  according  to  laws  implanted  in  it  by 
this  creative  act. 

But  when  we  pass  from  the  philosophical  theory 
of  Evolution  considered  in  itself  or  in  the  abstract, 
i.e.  apart  from  any  actual  formulation  of  the  theory 
as  found  in  any  existing  philosophical  system,  and 
take  up  the  consideration  of  the  evolution  theory  as 
presented  by  Pragmatic  writers,  it  is  evident  from  the 
foregoing  pages  that  Pragmatic  evolution  is  directly 
opposed  to  the  teaching  of  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

In  the  first  place  Pragmatism  does  not  accept  God 
in  the  Christian  meaning  of  the  term.  Empiric 
Pragmatism  in  fact  does  not  deal  with  the  existence 
of  God,  but  postulates  belief  in  God  if,  and  in  so  far 
as,  that  belief  may  be  useful  to  the  individual.  Ab- 
solute Pragmatism  views  God  as  the  extension  or 
integration  of  human  consciousness.  God  therefore 
is  the  product  of  the  human  and  the  human  blends 
into  the  divine.  Creative  Evolution  likewise  is  Pan- 
theistic. Instead  of  the  Personal  Creator  and  Ruler 
of  Scholastic  Philosophy  we  are  presented  with  a 
caricature  of  the  Almighty.  The  Absolute  appears 
as  a  tendency  dividing  into  opposite  tendencies,  one  of 
which  endeavors  to  overcome  the  other,  and  in  the 
endeavor  is  described  as  being  fed  with  solar  energy 
as  Hmited  and  dependent.  Life  and  Spirit  differ  from 
matter  and  intellect  not  in  nature  but  only  as  counter 
tendencies.     Intellect  is  configured  to  matter. 

In    describing    the    evolution    process,    Empiric 


PRAGMATISM  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  267 
Pragmatism   uses  biological  terms  and  with  Meta- 


.i;jv L  -i 

ERRATUM 


Page  267,  line  3,  for  science  read  sense. 
III.  Theory  of  Mental  Life 

Pragmatism  does  not  admit  the  existence  of  the 
soul.  Hence  its  Psychology  is  a  Phenomenal  Psy- 
chology, i.e.  a  Psychology  without  a  soul.  It  ex- 
plains the  unity  of  mental  life  by  ''the  judging 
thought,"  by  "present  knowledge,"  by  "conscious- 
ness" or  by  "the  unity  of  the  organism."  Thus  its 
explanation  is  either  purely  physiological  or  con- 
sists in  personifying  "the  unity  of  apperception," 
which  it  takes  for  granted  without  the  slightest 
attempt  to  account  for  this  unity. 

In  direct  opposition  to  this  teaching  Scholastic 
Philosophy  proposes  as  the  basic  doctrine  of  its 
psychology  the  existence  of  a  simple  spiritual 
principle  in  man  which  it  calls  the  soul.  In  proof 
it  appeals  to  the  most  elemental  facts  of  conscious 
experience.  The  most  superficial  analysis  of  con- 
scious Hfe  reveals  two  primary  facts:  (a)  Changes 
and  modifications  of  thought  and  feeling,  ever  vary- 
ing and  ever  succeeding  one  another  like  a  "flow- 
ing stream";  {b)  An  active,  permanent,  substantial 
basis  of  these  changes  and  modifications.  This 
second  element  explains  the  unity  of  consciousness, 
the  fact  of  personal  identity  and  the  possibiUty 
of  memory.     Without  this  permanent  element  and 


268  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

its  ever-varying  modifications,  I  would  not  be  able 
to  recognize  states  of  consciousness  as  "states,"  i.e. 
in  the  plural;  there  would  be  no  past  or  future, 
consciousness  would  be  merely  a  "state,"  i.e.  in 
the  singular,  and  not  a  "stream";  nor  could  I 
remember  the  incidents  of  my  life  so  as  to  write, 
e.g.  an  autobiography,  or  make  an  examination  of 
conscience  on  the  actions  of  the  day,  or  remember 
what  I  did  a  moment  ago,  or  recall  the  last  sen- 
tence I  wrote;  nor  would  I  be  aware  that  I  who  now 
am  writing,  am  the  same  person  who  yesterday 
paid  a  visit  to  a  friend,  who  during  the  past  years 
lived  in  such  and  such  places,  went  to  such  a  school 
or  college  or  university.  The  past  would  be  a  com- 
plete blank  and,  far  from  entering  into  the  present, 
would  instantly  disappear  into  the  unknown.  To 
personify  the  "present  knowledge"  or  the  "present 
state  of  consciousness"  or  "the  unity  of  appercep- 
tion" is  to  recognize  the  active  permanent  element 
in  conscious  life,  but  not  to  explain  it  (cf.  Christian 
Philosophy  J  The  Soul,  ch.  i). 

In  explaining  the  contents  of  mental  life,  i.e. 
knowledge,  the  attitude  of  Scholastic  Philosophy 
to  Pragmatism  is  also  clear  and  well  defined.  By 
knowledge  or  thought  Pragmatism  understands 
sense-experience  as  such  and  this  experience  re- 
fined or  modified  under  the  influence  of  "mind." 
This  refined  sense-experience  is  called  "thought" 
or  with  Professor  Bergson  "feeling."  Hence  thought 
is  of  the  same  nature  as  sense-experience.     Now 


PRAGMATISM  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  269 

Scholastic  Philosophy  teaches  that  we  have  two  dis- 
tinct elements  in  knowledge,  viz.  sense-experience, 
and  a  higher  element,  viz.  thought,  and  that  the 
knowledge  of  sense  is  essentially  different  from  the 
knowledge  of  thought.  For  proof  it  appeals  to  ele- 
mentary facts  of  consciousness. 

It  is  evident  to  any  one  who  carefully  analyzes 
the  facts  of  the  conscious  life  that  the  act  of  sense 
is  totally  different  from  the  act  of  intellect.  The 
object  of  sense  is  concrete,  singular,  individual,  i.e. 
a  particular,  determined  concrete  individual  thing. 
We  perceive  it  as  this  something,  here  and  now, 
limited  by  the  material  determinations  of  color, 
size  and  form.  Hence  a  sensation  is  quantitative, 
has  extension,  can  be  measured,  e.g.  in  intensity, 
and  localized,  e.g.  in  a  sense-organ  or  in  a  definite 
part  of  the  brain. 

The  object  of  intellect,  on  the  contrary,  is  ab- 
stract, unextended  and  immaterial.  We  have  ideas 
which  cannot  be  referred  to  a  bodily  organ.  They 
move  on  a  plane  above  sense  and  belong  to  an 
order  of  entities  which  have  nothing  in  common 
with  sense.  We  have  the  conception  of  God;  we 
speak  of  His  infinity,  power,  mercy,  holiness.  Yet 
these  notions  cannot  be  confined  within  the  limits 
of  sense.  Ideals  of  the  true,  beautiful  and  good, 
notions  of  right  and  wrong,  first  principles,  in  fact 
the  constructive  elements  and  framework  of  the 
sciences,  of  the  arts,  industry  and  commerce,  have 
nothing  in  common  with  the  operation  of  sense. 


270  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

Not  only  does  intellect  possess  objects  which 
cannot  be  confined  within  the  representations  of 
the  senses,  but  intellect  and  sense  act  in  a  man- 
ner totally  different  when  brought  in  contact  with 
material  things.  Thus  e.g.  the  sense  shows  the 
"round  object,"  the  intellect  directly  and  prima- 
rily grasps  the  ''roundness";  the  sense  presents  the 
"moving  object,"  the  intellect  seizes  the  "move- 
ment." Thus  while  the  particular  data  of  our 
knowledge  come  from  the  senses,  the  intellect 
grasps  these  data  in  an  immaterial  manner.  Hence 
besides  sense-knowledge  we  have  a  higher  knowl- 
edge essentially  distinct.  The  higher  knowledge 
has  three  indissoluble  elements:  idea,  judgment, 
reasoning;  the  idea  is  the  basic  element. 

Scholastic  Philosophy  teaches  that  the  intellect 
is  indeterminate,  i.e.  has  no  separate  forms  or  ideas, 
as  Plato  held,  by  which  it  determines  itself  by  itself 
to  the  knowledge  of  definite  objects.  Hence  like 
the  senses  it  is  ultimately  indeterminate  and  re- 
quires determination  from  without  with  this  differ- 
ence that  external  bodies  in  contact  with  the  organ 
of  sense  determine  the  act  of  sensation,  whereas 
the  act  of  sensation  awakens,  so  to  speak,  the  in- 
tellect which  throws  its  light  on  the  object  and  by 
this  illumined  object  is  determined  to  elicit  its 
acts  of  thought.  Hence  the  act  of  sensation  is 
analogous  to  the  act  of  thought.  The  intellectual 
determinant  is  the  intellectual  species  impressa  and 
is  not  the  object  perceived  but  only  the  determining 


PRAGMATISM  AND  SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  271 

cause.  Hence  the  act  of  knowing  is  not  the  act  of 
the  object  alone  nor  the  act  of  the  subject  alone,  but 
the  act  of  subject  in  so  far  as  it  is  impressed,  ac- 
tualized, differentiated  by  the  object.  The  intellect 
consciously  reacts  to  the  determination,  and  the 
intellectual  expression  of  the  conscious  intellectual 
reaction  is  the  idea  or  concept,  i.e.  verbum  mentis, 
the  mental  word,  which  takes  outward  expression 
in  language. 

Hence  sense-knowledge  is  had  by  contact  of  the 
external  object  with  the  organ  of  sense,  which  con- 
tact consists  in  the  impression  made  by  the  object 
upon  the  sense-organ,  and  intellectual  knowledge  is 
had  by  contact  of  the  external  object  with  the  intel- 
lect, effected  by  and  in  the  act  of  sensation.  In 
both  cases  we  directly  and  immediately  perceive 
the  object  or  agent  making  the  impression,  i.e.  com- 
ing in  contact  with  the  sense  and  the  intellect,  not 
the  how  of  the  impression  or  contact.  In  reflective 
thought  the  mind  may  study  and  analyze  and  men- 
tally separate  the  how  and  prepare  an  explanation 
for  the  simple  indivisible  act  of  contact,  as  e.g.  in 
the  sciences  of  Logic  and  of  Psychology.  In  ordi- 
nary daily  life,  however,  we  are  conscious  that  our 
senses  and  intellect  are  in  direct  contact  with 
things;  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  how;  in  fact 
never  think  about  it.  For  example,  I  strike  my 
foot  against  a  solid  object  or  I  burn  the  tip  of  my 
finger;  directly  and  immediately  I  am  conscious  of 
the  resistance  to  the  foot  and  of  a  hot  object  burn- 


272  PRAGMATISM  AND  THE  IDEA 

ing  the  finger.  The  anatomist  and  physiologist  by 
his  knowledge  of  the  nervous  system  may  be  able 
to  designate  the  particular  nerves  which  carried  the 
impressions  from  the  foot  and  the  hand  to  the 
common  sensory  in  the  brain  and  thus  explain 
the  process.  But  this  scientific  knowledge  does 
not  change  the  direct  perception  of  the  objects. 
Again  I  talk  to  a  friend  through  the  telephone  or 
I  send  him  a  message  on  the  telegraph  wire.  What 
we  are  directly  conscious  of  is  the  fact  that  we  are 
in  direct  contact  with  another:  I  giving,  he  receiv- 
ing the  message.  We  do  not  advert  to  the  wires, 
poles  and  keyboards  as  instruments  of  the  contact, 
although  afterwards  upon  reflection  we  may  and  do 
recognize  them  as  such. 

While  the  senses  and  the  intellect  are  in  direct 
contact  with  external  things,  yet  the  contact  of 
sense  is  different  in  nature  from  the  contact  of  in- 
tellect. The  contact  of  sense  exhibits  the  external 
object  to  the  sense  as  a  sense-object,  i.e.  as  extended, 
figured,  sonorous,  luminous,  etc.  The  contact  of 
intellect,  however,  exhibits  the  external  object  as 
an  intelligible,  and  so  the  intellect  seeks  its  nature, 
meaning,  relation  to  the  objects  known,  its  causes 
and  effects. 

In  illustration  we  appeal  to  language  for  language 
in  the  expression  of  thought,  and  Comparative 
Philology  reveals  the  structure  of  language  itself. 
Place  a  strange  object  before  the  eyes  of  a  child 
and  the   question   spontaneously  comes:    What  is 


PRAGMATISM  AND   SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY  273 

that?  Thus  directly  and  immediately  the  mind 
seeks  the  whatness  of  that  particular  thing.  The 
answer  to  the  question  is:  That  is  such  or  such 
a  thing.  The  terms  are  reversed:  The  subject  of 
the  interrogative  sentence  becomes  the  predicate 
of  the  declarative  sentence  and  the  predicate  of 
the  interrogative  becomes  the  subject  of  the  de- 
clarative sentence.  The  predicate  of  the  declarative 
sentence  explains  the  meaning  and  nature  of  the 
subject.  This  predicate  is  a  universal  idea,  because 
in  giving  the  nature  or  meaning  of  this  particular 
subject,  it  can  also  be  used  as  a  predicate  in  many 
more  sentences  having  different  individual  sub- 
jects which  nevertheless  have  the  same  nature  or 
meaning.  Thus  language  shows  how  the  intellect 
acts,  how  in  asking  and  defining  the  whatness  it 
directly  and  immediately  grasps  the  universal, 
and  how  in  seeking  the  whatness  of  a  particular 
thing  or  in  applying  the  whatness  to  a  particular 
thing  it  grasps  the  particular  thing  also,  in  a  kind 
of  indirect  manner. 

By  virtue  of  the  union  of  soul  and  body  in  our 
human  composite  existent  being,  intellect  and  sense 
always  accompany  each  other;  the  intellect  takes 
its  own  immediate  object  ultimately  from  sense- 
experience,  but  the  object  is  superior  to  the  object 
of  sense-experience.  Hence  there  is  no  idea  without 
an  image  of  some  kind.  The  idea  evokes  the  image 
and  vice  versa.  But  they  are  not  thereby  to  be 
confused  or  confounded  one  with  the  other.      The 


274  PRAGMATISM    AND    THE    IDEA 

image  is  the  representation  on  the  imagination  of 
a  concrete  object  in  a  concrete  material  manner, 
i.e.  it  is  a  picture  exact  or  approximate  of  the  ob- 
ject. Hence  it  is  concrete  and  particular.  The  idea, 
however,  expresses  the  meaning  or  definition  of  the 
image  and  as  such  is  universal  and  can  be  applied 
to  a  number  of  particular  images  of  the  same  nature. 
In  direct  thought  the  object  of  the  intellect  is  ex- 
ternal things;  in  reflective  thought,  however,  what 
we  see  before  the  mind's  eye  are  express  or  ap- 
proximate or  analogous  images  of  the  things  we 
are  thinking  about.  When  we  think  of  concrete 
things  we  can  image  things  expressly.  But  when 
we  think  of  immaterial  or  of  spiritual  things  we 
must  use  analogies,  signs  or  symbols.  Hence  signs 
or  symbols  do  not  refer  to  the  idea  but  to  the  imaged 
picture  of  the  idea.  Their  very  use  shows  how  vast 
is  the  difference  between  the  idea  and  the  image 
and  how  the  intellect  reaches  out  far  above  and 
beyond  the  concrete  representations  of  sense. 


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